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The thesis explores the relationships between legal provision and ideas on forests in
colonial India from 1792 to 1882. The colonial officials generally maintained that in
India there was disorder, despotism and injustice till they brought modern law, which
was certain, ordered, principled and just. But in the case of forests, the forest law
introduced by the colonial government was far from settled, certain and ordered. The
law on the ownership of forests, whether the government or the landholders, was
changed almost every ten years. This is not to say that 'traditional' law was itself settled
and clear, but modem law, in its origins, was partisan, arbitrary and manipulative and
far from its pretensions. Beneath the grandeur of legal theories and principles, there was
strategic play of power and domination.
In exploring the processes and discourses through which these reversals of law were
secured, I draw from and engage with the works of Foucault and other theorists of post-
colonialism, post-structuralism, deconstruction and Critical Theory. I particularly
critique work which accords primacy to textual productions, ignoring the specific social
and historical conjunctures in which these are produced. Locating the specific
provisions of law and legal ideas in the every-day practices in the micro sites, my study
suggests that the specific legal provisions were neither authored by the top layers of the
administration nor based on nor derived from legal theories and principles. The
strategies and counter-strategies produced in the micro sites of societies were
abstracted, refined and accommodated within the given legal ideas. In this sense, forest
law was a dossier of already prevalent practices. Similarly, legal ideas were produced in
specific contexts to legitimate certain strategic devices. These ideas then were refined,
revised and assimilated in the body of legal knowledge. The legal theory had the
function of legitimating and projecting certain practices while the Act took care of
specific details of administering the forests. The law thus is formed through the
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PREFACE
I argue in this dissertation that ideas need to be located in their social and material
context. It would be ironic to say that the theme and its treatment had nothing to do
with my context. I can identify three formative influences. Based in India, I see that
law is everywhere in its presence and yet, an understanding of the working of law has
received indifferent attention. It has been my endeavour to make a contribution in
this field. The question of environment and forest use has much dominated the public
attention. The tussles over it presented several facets of law, including its historical
dimension, almost enticing one to work on it. But above all, social theory has
presented an array of approaches. At times, these options are bewildering and other
times, inviting and engaging. One can take different means, method or modality of
engaging with it. But one cannot ignore it.
I first thank my supervisors Peter Young and Roger Jeffery for their continuous
encouragement and support in developing and completing the study. Ajay Skaria,
Steve Kemp and Richard Jones read drafts of the thesis and provided valuable
suggestions for developing the ideas and improving the presentation. Crispin Bates
always had references for any question on Indian history. I thank the staff of the India
Office Library, London and State and National archives in Delhi, Bombay and
Madras for their support. A Studentship from the University of Edinburgh was the
material support for undertaking the doctoral work. The Ford Foundation, India,
provided a grant to travel within India to visit archives.
The Sociology Department, University of Edinburgh, provided not only office and
related assistance but also made me a part of a warm and collegial community of staff
and doctoral students. I thank Sara for extending support and affection, despite
enhanced responsibility of the care of our child, often at the cost of her academic




SCOPE AND THEORETICAL APPROACH
This work is on the making of the forest law in colonial India between 1792 and
1882. I understand law to involve two elements, firstly, specific functional details
called legal provisions, and secondly, theories, concepts, ideas and ideologies
associated with law. The study begins with the first contact between the British rule
and India over the question of forests, which was in Malabar in 1792, and ends with
an examination of the making of the Indian Forest Act, 1878 and the Madras Forest
Act, 1882. I explore how specific legal provisions were strategically grafted to meet
certain functional ends; how legal principles were revised to accommodate the
specific legal provisions; and how social and administrative practices shaped legal
ideas and provisions.
This dissertation is centrally on law: on the relationships between state, law and
society. My engagement with the Indian colonial forest law is a part of a wider
interest in the broad field of the sociology of law. I am concurrently interested in
three fields, namely, forest law in colonial India; the making of law by the colonial
state; and the nature of law in general. I hope to say something specific about forest
law, to comment on the nature of law making by the colonial state, and to suggest
possible ways of looking at law in general. I see conceptual threads running through
these different layers. Further, in conducting a work in the sociology and history of
law, one has to venture into, engage with, and even recreate, other fields. The study in
its empirical location relates to the overall question of control, management and use
of forests during British rule. It thus shares the terrain with the field of the history of
the environment in India.
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Introduction
1. Objectives and Theoretical Position
My general interest is in how specific legal provisions and legal ideas are produced,
modified and disseminated. I begin by stating my general theoretical position on
making of law and how I came to work on forest law. Law passes under the
authorship of the state. My contention, however, is that the state does not imagine
and invent the law out of nothing. It extracts the law from social practices. The social
is about co-operation and conflicts. The field of law, however, is concerned with
conflict. Away from the institutions of the state, in different locations in the society,
strategies and counter-strategies are produced to outflank, control and dominate one
another.1 The state abstracts, refines and organises these strategies and techniques as
legal provisions. Law is a dossier of the strategies fashioned in the field. Further,
strategies are always in relation to counter-strategies. These are produced to outflank
counter-strategies. The strategies thus, are already imprinted with their opposites. As
a result, law in encoding the strategies becomes a register of social struggle.2 The law
thus produced arises from specific contexts and contingencies. Once abstracted and
freed of its specificity, it is extended to newer contexts. The text of the law is then
received in the ideological and strategic context of the new locations. In this sense,
law is always in formation and thus, emergent.
I similarly argue that legal ideas and theories are not idle contemplation by thinkers
and philosophers. Nor are these centrally planned, detailed out and imprinted on the
dispersed sites. People conceive ideas in specific contexts, in relation to strategies,
and with the aim of production of specific practical effects. Strategies are forged in a
certain context of beliefs, values and ideologies (including ideas associated with
law). Ideology limits, facilitates and conditions the strategies. At the same time, legal
ideas are framed and revised to accommodate strategic devices and produce certain
desired results. The legal ideas produced in the field are then abstracted, refined,
1 The study draws from Foucault in being attentive to details in sites away from the state, what
Foucault calls, 'dispersed sites', and specific details in micro locations. I have several disagreements





theorised and accommodated within the body of existing legal theories. In this
process, specific legal provisions are not simply derived from legal ideas. The two,
in fact, seem to have different functions. The legal provisions deal with specific
details of regulation, governance and control, while the ideas associated with the
legal provisions serve the general function of representing the practices associated
with the legal provisions as normal, appropriate, just, lawful and desirable.3
Such an understanding of law could be verified, elaborated and seen in action only in
a study covering a relatively long period of time. The processes of abstraction of
legal provisions from practices, revision of legal ideology and social acceptance of
the new ideas, could be expected to take place only over many years. Further, in my
theory, law is linked to strategies. To explore these linkages, I need to go into the
details of a particular historical field. The contemporary conflicts over the use of
forests, and the prominent role of law made in the past century, made forest law an
appropriate field for study.
One quarter of India's territorial area is forests. The Indian state owns almost all of
it. The forests are spread over different regions of India. The village communities
living in the vicinity, by far the poorest rung of the India society, have long depended
on these forests for their livelihoods. In the 1970s and 1980s, numerous conflicts
between the state and the local population living in the vicinity of forests became
prominent. The emergent international awareness about environmental issues gave a
further impetus in recognising these concerns. The question of control, use and
management of forests became a matter of national debate in India. The question of
the livelihood of the forest dwellers was an immediate concern. But this also became
a critique of the Indian state. The environmental groups, non-government
organisations, activists and academics argued that the Indian state was promoting
and protecting the urban and industrial interests at the expense of the poorer
segments of the society.4
3 See for example essays in Hunt (1993).
4 CentreTor Science and Environment (1982); and Centre for Science and Environment (1985).
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There have been attempts through policy, governmental plans and initiatives of
people to reduce the tension and conflict over the control, use and management of
forests. This has generated a voluminous literature on the subject.5 One of the crucial
interests in this field has been in the laws which secured the Indian state's ownership
and control over its forests. The emergent policies of forest conservation and
people's involvement since the 1980s stand in an uneasy truce with the forest laws
formed in the colonial period. The newer thrust requires a restructuring of law, while
so far there have only been selective insertions into an old body of law. The existing
law is talked of as an insurmountable barrier in the path of creating a participatory
property regime between the local people and the state. It is therefore important to
explore how the state came to own the forests in the first place. There is also a hope
that a study of how the law was made could give clues as to how it could possibly be
remade.
Settling for a case study of a colonial law may provide additional insights. British
rule considered the introduction of 'modern' 'Western' law as a major innovation
and development in Indian society.6 The Indian polity is now based on a system of
written laws and adjudication through courts. What India prides itself for, its modern
Constitution and rule of law, comes from this colonial contact. The celebration here
is that colonialism was undesirable but not modernity. For the past two decades,
however, from the perspective of contemporary social theory, modernity has been in
a crisis. The claim of the proponents ofmodernity, that modernity brought universal
knowledge, progress and emancipation has been thrown into serious doubt. It is
alleged that the self-secured, autonomous and conscious subject was in fact the
invention ofmodernity. In the modern myth, the subject could some how stand apart
from society, history and time, to be the source of infallible truths. For the critics of
modernity, the subject instead is found to be deeply implicated in his own times,
5 For a summary, see Centre for Science and Environment (1982) Centre for Science and
Environment (1985); and Sundar and Jeffery (in Press).
6 This was asserted almost from the beginning of the Colonial rule. See The Fifth Report From the
Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, in Parliamentary Papers, 1812 (VII);
and Stephen (1876). Also see speeches of Henry Maine in Duff (1892).
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prejudices and incertitude.7 Modernity invented foundations for securing its
prejudices as truth. It is only through convention, and force, that it secured its status
as knowledge and truth. The crisis of modernity has thrown open the possibility of
understanding the colonial project in a new light. In the past two decades, such
research has been pursued.8 In this context, examining colonial law gives us a
different vantage point for understanding modernity, since in the colonies the
achievements of the modem law were claimed most emphatically.
Modem law was celebrated as an achievement over 'tradition' even in Europe.9 In
the colonial context of India, Western-modem law was given an even more exalted
place. As Stephen Benjamin, a prominent colonial official, the Law Member in the
Governor-General's Council put it; 'Our law is in fact the sum and substance of what
we have to teach them. It is so to speak the gospel of the English'.10 The Colonial
administration pronounced that since time immemorial, in India there was chaos,
disorder, despotism and injustice. It claimed that British rule brought the modem
institutions of law and a glorious era began. In its judgement, the people were not
worthy and deserving of these institutions. But such was the power of modem law
that even among them, it created justice, order and civility.
In fact, as I shall argue, contrary to its representation, modem law in its working was
far from being certain, measured, reasoned and objectively discovered. Instead, it was
malleable, arbitrary, ad hoc and whimsical, just like the predecessor it wanted to
condemn. In this dissertation, I shall show that the law on the ownership of forests
was changed almost every ten years in the 19th Century in colonial India. The East
India Company (hereafter, the Company) was incorporated in Britain with an
exclusive charter from the Queen to trade with India. From the 1760s onwards, the
Company acquired territory in India from the local rulers through wars and grants. In
7 See Bauman (1992).
8 See Chakrabarty (1991).
9 From Marx to Weber there was an agreement that modern law was an advance over prior legal
forms. ForWeber's work see Weber (1954). For Marx's work on law see Cain and Hunt (1979). In a
more elaborate work in developing Marxist position, Pashukanis emphasised that only within





1792, it acquired the territorial control and administration of Malabar, the southern
western coast of India, from the local ruler Tipu Sultan. Malabar was rich in timber
and this was the first contact between the local society and Company administration
over the question of rights over forests. Company officials in Malabar were emphatic
that the landholders owned the forests, but the Court of Directors in London, the
highest administrative body, in 1800 confidently declared that according to local law
the forests belonged to the Company. With equal ease, the Court of Directors in 1840
stated that the Company never had any pretence of ownership over forests in
Malabar. In Kanara, a district neighbouring Malabar, the Company administration
had maintained since 1800 the law that the landholders owned forests. In 1860, this
law was declared a 'mistake'. The correct law was that the state owned the forests.
Even before the ink could dry, so to speak, the Madras officials were alleging that
this 'correct' view was erroneous and the real owners were indeed the landholders.
The 'mistake' after all was not a mistake. The mistakenly mistaken view was re¬
installed as the law in 1874. In this circus of law, there was another somersault. In
1882, the Madras Forest Act again declared the state to be the owner of forests.
Colonial state represented law to be reasoned, balanced, just and principled. I show in
this dissertation by taking up the case of forest law, that law in its origins was
partisan, arbitrary and manipulative. Beneath the grandeur of legal theories and
principles, there was a strategic and contingent play of power and domination. I also
explore how these contradictions between the practices on law and their
representation were secured, how in the law, arbitrary and structured, malleable and
firm, and justice and contingency were all possible. In the following sections, I
review the literature on law, state and society in India; and social theory. From this
review, I forge ideas for conducting a study on forest law. In the light of these ideas, I




2. Law, State and Society in India
I begin the review of literature on law from the material on the specific question of
forest law in India. According to Guha and Gadgil, by the end of the 19th century, the
colonial state acquired a vast area, almost one-fourth of the geographical extent of
India, as forests under its exclusive ownership.11 The Forest Departments were
created in various provinces from 1860s to manage this property. The history of
forests since has been one of conflicts between the Forest Departments and local
communities. Forest Departments policed forests for imperial and commercial
purposes while local communities, mainly peasants, depended on these resources for
their survival. The control of the resources by the state and 'scientific management'
of forests significantly restructured the relations between state, forests and local
communities.12 Law, particularly the Forest Act of 1878, is accorded a central place
as the means for the state in usurping the resources of the local communities.13
Despite the centrality of the law, there has been no account of the social,
administrative and legal processes through which the provisions of the law arose and
became effective in creating government reserves. In most accounts, law is treated as
a mere 'instrument' of the state power in appropriating the forests.14 This
construction accords a unity to the state and to law. To the contrary, the state, even if
a colonial one, has different institutions, organically tied to the society and other
institutions of the state. In these institutions, different, and sometimes even contrary
interests crystallise.15
Further, even if law is to be treated as an expression of state power, state power does
not mechanically materialise in the text of law. The exercise of state power is bound
and mediated by existing relations and legal provisions and ideologies. Since state
II See Guha (1989); and Gadgil and Guha (1992)
12 See Rangarajan (1996); Bandopadhyay and Shiva (1987a); Bandopadhyay and Shiva
(1987b); Gadgil and Guha (1992); and Guha (1989).
13 Guha (1989); Gadgil and Guha (1992); and Rangarajan (1996).
14 Guha (1989); and Gadgil and Guha (1992).
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power has to be translated into the language of law, and law has its own network of
meanings and procedures, the translation of state power may not be linear and
mechanical.16
The instrumentalist nature of the explanation of forest law is a part of a general
neglect of a sociological account of law in India. Social science has increasingly seen
law as a site ofmultiple and complex linkages with society. This has been evident in
the proliferation of academic work under the banner of the Sociology of Law, Law
and Society, Critical Legal Studies, Law and Deconstruction and Law and
Postmodemity. However, in writings on state and society in India, with some stray
exceptions, law continues to be seen as an unproblematic instrument of state power
either as 'will of the sovereign' or on behalf of the ruling classes. The only exception
were the legal pluralists. Beyond this, researchers have merely urged others to
develop a sociological understanding of law in India.17
2.1. Legal Pluralism
The legal pluralists posited a binary duality of 'traditional' and 'modem' law. This
was a continuation and refinement of the colonial writings. The Colonial state
considered that it was 'modernising' the law in India through codification of the
existing law and introduction of new legislation.18 The liberation of the colonised
nations after 1945 created renewed initiatives for understanding the transformation of
these societies. Influential modernisation theory argued that the forces of
modernisation would eventually displace the traditional polity, economy and legal
system.
15 There is a wide body of literature on state and state theory. See Jessop (1990); Therborn
(1989); and King (1990).
16 This has been the findings of the Sociology of Law. For a comprehensive review see
Cotterrell (1984).
17 Baxi made the call in 1986 to develop a sociological understanding of law. See Baxi
(1986). He had to repeat it a after seven years. Baxi (1993).
18 Duff (1892); and Stephen (1876).
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The empirical record and experience in India belied the assumptions of a gradual
disappearance of 'tradition'. The past and tradition refused to disappear. The
challenges were met in various ways by positing 'modernity of tradition',19
'traditionalisation as a process of modernisation' and the absorption of tradition into
modernity.20 The revisions conceded that India's past was a formative influence on
its modernisation. In relation to law, the Rudolphs responded to the persistence of the
traditional legal system by a presumed co-existence of the two legal systems, that is,
modem and traditional. They posited that both exist, but each gets modified in the
interactive process.21 In a more imaginative summary of this academic tradition,
Gallanter detailed the complexities involved in such duality and demonstrated the
persistence of traditional in contemporary social processes under the hegemony of
modem law.22
The work of legal anthropologists was a major advance in exploring the relationship
of state, law and society. The characterisation, however, of 'traditional' and 'modem'
is not empirically tenable. Several studies have now shown that pre-British Indian
society was dynamic with a developed trade, commerce, banking and
commercialisation of agriculture.23 Contrary to the view that shastric (scriptural
texts) law was static and inflexible, Lingat invites our attention towards the
essentially evolutionary processes through which customary law was incorporated in
the shastric law by the shastric scholars from time to time.24
If 'traditional' was a fiction, the modem was equally illusory. Washbrook
demonstrates that British rule was not insistent on modernising India. Instead, it
merely responded to national and international contexts to secure its colonial hold. In
the course of it, the capitalist processes of changes were deliberately held back rather
than ushered in. This was clearly reflected in the nature of the laws made under
19
Rudolph and Rudolph (1969).
20 Galanter (1972).
21
Rudolph and Rudolph (1969).
22 Dhavan (19S9).





colonial rule. If there was never any 'traditional' and 'modern', 'modernisation of
tradition' could only be a misleading conceptualisation.
Further, developments in social theory in the past two decades have made this duality
entirely vacuous. Social theorists doubted the very claims of modernity, and eroded
the claims of universal knowledge, progress and emancipation.25 The duality had
implied a value in advancing from 'traditional' to 'modem'. The critique of
modernity ruptured these normative positions, and left its proponents bewildered.
Thus, rather than assume pre-given categories of 'modem' and 'traditional', we need
to explain the concrete economic, social and cultural practices of the contact of
colonial and pre-colonial. Further, modernisation theorists constructed and imagined
a 'tradition' over which, in a self-congratulatory mode, it could announce the triumph
and victory of modernity. For example, modem law and its ideology of 'rule of law'
created a myth of pre-modem societies as arbitrary, lawless and unjust.26 We thus
need be conscious that every description of 'traditional' is already coloured by these
prejudices.
2.2. Sociology of Law
There are exceptionally insightful case studies on the working and implementation of
specific legislation,27 but there is nothing comparable on how laws come to be made.
The sociology of law has had to jostle with an instrumentalist view of law that it was
the 'will of the sovereign' or dictates of the ruling classes. Being emphatic that
98
society constitutes the law was itself an achievement. A more refined version was
that the relationship between law and society was a two way process: law and society
are tied in a constituting-constitutive relationship.29 I take this position for granted. I
am interested in working out how exactly law and society constitute one another. The
studies which empirically engaged with the question of making of law, also worked
25 See, for example, Bauman (1992).
26
Fitzpatrick (1992). Also see Chapter 1 in Douzinas, Warrington and McVeigh (1991).





at the macro level of generalisations. For example, the fascinating study, Law and the
Rise ofCapitalism, covers many centuries to show how modern law is imprinted with
the historical struggle of the bourgeoisie.30
Foucault's work has given a respectability to specific local studies, but the adoption
of Foucault in the field of law has been slow. In Foucault's account, it is not the law,
but disciplinary techniques which are at the centre of the modern society and state.
Thus, there is no straightforward approach to bringing his work to a study on law.
One suggestion is to see law as a means of bringing in 'normalisation' in society.31 I
find this position a deterministic and instrumental account of law. In this account, law
is nothing but a means of disciplining and normalising society. A study of law has
only in the past two decades come out of instrumental accounts of law.
'Governmentality'32 is another theme from Foucault which is potentially useful to a
study of law. The argument here is that the modern state does not repress people. It
fosters life, makes individuals productive, and constitutes them. Law could be seen as
a part of these techniques of 'governmentality'.33 I find this position also
unsatisfactory. Foucault himself denies that the modern state is only about
governmentality. He sees the persistence of all the three modes in the modem state
and society, juridical mode (associated with coercion and repression), disciplining
and normalisation, and 'governmentality'.34 Put this way, there is nothing distinctive
about it to be a guide to a study on law. We already know that law has multiple
functions in society. I do not think there is a direct way of using Foucault in studying
law. But Foucault is immensely insightful, even for legal studies. Foucault never
intended to be a comprehensive theorist of society. Thus, he can be of use only if we
do not see him as giving us a theory of law. Freed of this constraint, we can borrow
from his insights to graft on our own understanding of law.
Political science is another field where we can look for some guidance in
understanding the processes which influence how law is made. This includes
30 Tigar and Levy (1977).
31 Ewald (1990).
32 Burchell and Gordon (1991).
33 Hunt and Wickham (1994).
34 See Feucault's essay on governmentality in Burchell and Gordon (1991).
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Political science is another field where we can look for some guidance in
understanding the processes which influence how law is made. This includes
lobbying, publicity, campaign and consultation. These processes undoubtedly
influence law making. But my concerns are distinct from this in two ways. Firstly, I
am interested in finding the linkages between day-to-day practices, law and
ideologies. I would thus ask: where do the idea which are lobbied for come from?
Secondly, what is made to bear at the level of legislature, still has to be translated
into the language of law. It has to be expressed in specific provisions of law and
justified by appropriate legal ideas. In the course of this, existing legal ideas are
modified, abridged and displaced. Thus, in my project what is at stake is different
from studying the influences that are brought to bear on the legislatures.
In the past two decades, Critical Legal Studies have questioned the neutrality of law
and brought to the fore that law was implicated with power and inequality.35 Authors
in this group challenged the conventional ways of looking at the law. As a result, the
insurgent positions were divergent. There was no coherent theoretical position of the
Critical Legal Studies. Over the past decade, there have been further advances
following developments in social theory. Derrida has been deployed to deconstruct
or
texts on law and jurisprudence. Post-modemity has invited us to the possibility, and
even necessity, of demolishing the 'legal system'37 and looking at law differently.38
These studies rely upon and draw heavily from social theory, and I engage with the
founding literature on which these studies are premised in the following sections
three and four.
There is another imperative, perhaps more important, for engaging with social theory.
An influential body of literature takes the view that the colonial power invented and
fabricated truths about India.39 It argues that there was no given knowledge about
India. These were constituted through colonial discourses and India was made to
35 See Fitzpatrick and Hunt (1987).
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made in the official discourses. Was law making purely a matter of how the colonial
rule constructed the law on India? Was colonial rule autonomous in constructing
these knowledges? I will explore these questions in relation to forest law. But also,
the position itself is an offshoot of debates in Social Theory. We can seek a resolution
of these questions in social theory. The broad question is on the nature of truth. Social
theory has engaged with the question as to what extent truth is purely a matter of
convention, that is, human discourses.
3. Knowledge and Discourse
What ideas and concepts could be used for studying the making of law? I start from
the general field of social theory. I ask the specific question: Was forest law just a
matter of what colonial rule constituted it to be? The question derives from the post-
structuralists. They have espoused the linguistically inspired theory that truth is
constituted through discourses alone. In other words, there is no other foundation to
knowledge than human communication. Discourses constitute their own truth.
For example, Lacan asserts that everything, 'being', subject, and what the subject
knows, is constituted through language and discourse.40 Lacan bases this on his
emphasis that the sub-conscious is constituted in and by language.41 For Lacan, it is
through discourses that the sub-conscious comes to be constituted.42
For Derrida, there is nothing outside of a 'text'. Everything is already a part of
discourses. Derrida is emphatic in denouncing the theory of knowledge that Western
Philosophy has held dear. According to it, 'truth', already there, is acquired through





deployed as merely a means to communicate this truth to others. He 'deconstructs'
philosophical texts to show that there is no 'presence' and 'truth' which Western
Philosophy has privileged. It has only elevated its opinion and prejudices to the status
of truth by force and injustice. Derrida and Lacan from here take a turn to subvert the
very possibility of truth or knowledge. According to them, discourse (language), by
its very organisation, is incapable of conveying a definite meaning. There is no
single, ultimate meaning but only 'difference' and 'trace'.43
Foucault gives a more socially and historically located exploration of how discourses
constitute knowledge. Foucault also maintains that a discourse constitutes its own
truth. He displaces conventional epistemology by contending that the social is not
about 'will to knowledge' but 'will to power'. Epistemes and 'regimes of truth'
change, but in each instance, knowledge is constructed within discourses and on the
basis of power relations. Foucault maintains that power creates the objects of
knowledge not only within discourse but as real objects.44 In other words, there are
no 'real' objects outside of discourses, but discourses constitute these objects and we
come to see them as real.
I agree that there is no truth beyond discourse in general. There could be no human
knowledge without human beings and society. In this sense, knowledge is constituted
through discourses. However, this is different from contending that there is nothing
that lies beyond a particular discourse, or that every discourse constitutes its own
truth. This impression arises in Foucault's work because he privileged the dominant
discourse and ignored the opposing ones from a multiplicity of counter discourses.
He mentioned plurality of power, resistance and counter-knowledge but never took
these seriously in his work.45 If we engage with these, we would ask a different set of
questions. We could ask, what did the opposing powers do? What happens to the
truth claims of counter-knowledges? How does the dominant knowledge revise itself
42 Lacan (1989).
43 Derrida (1976); and Derrida (1978).




to counter the threat and spread of the counter-knowledge? How do the competing
claims manage to legitimate themselves?
A discourse operates in relation to counter-discourses. A discourse, constituted by
power/knowledge, as Foucault would have it, has to take account of resistance to
power and counter-knowledges.46 Discourses and counter-discourses, power and
resistance, knowledge and counter-knowledge cannot keep working on their own.
These are organically united. All knowledge is interested and motivated. However,
disputes on what is going to count as the truth have to be resolved. Newer disputes
arise, but at each stages, the contending parties have to take stock of the opposing
positions and resolve the dispute.
How do people resolve conflicting claims and counter-claims? A discourse stakes a
claim to truth. Counter-discourses attempt to question and present alternatives to
these validity claims.47 The competing discourses get into a dialogue, expand their
boundaries and terms of reference to settle the dispute. The discourses refer beyond
themselves to find a foundation for their claims.
The reference to things beyond a discourse is not to a transcendence beyond all
discourses. It only brings to notice the historical location of the discourses. A
discourse may be about power but this power cannot construct what it pleases. It has
to work on prior knowledges which already exist. Undoubtedly, the prior knowledges
themselves have been constituted by discourses and counter-discourses. A discourse
does not mirror the world constituted through prior discourses. It works upon it,
displaces it and constitutes it. At the same time, a discourse has to relate to what it
represents from the vantage point of counter-discourses and prior discourses. The
very intelligibility of a discourse is premised on knowledges constituted by prior
discourses. Thus, a discourse is always constituted historically in relation to counter
and parallel discourses.
46 Dews (1987). See essays in Kelly (1994).
47 This has been one way of understanding how human knowledge is constituted. See Barnes (1977).
Also see, Callinicos (1982).
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4. Text, Discourse and Social Practice
Said has been a theoretical force in deploying Foucault's ideas on the production of
knowledge in relation to colonial domination. In Orientalism he emphasises the
prominence of certain kinds of discourses.49 He takes literary and scholarly texts as
the sites for production of hegemonic ideologies, claiming that through a discourse,
European culture imagined, produced and managed the 'Orient' sociologically,
ideologically and politically. He contends that the point is not to investigate the 'real'
orient against the one constructed by Orientalism. Instead, the issue is how
'Orientalism' authorised and controlled the orient and appropriated the power to
produce and disseminate by stripping the 'Other' as a 'free subject of thought or
action' in the conditions of colonialism and imperialism.50 Said thus maintains that
knowledge and truth about the Orient were constituted in and through colonial
discourses alone.
Works privileging discourses invariably use the literary and philosophical texts of a
period as the main source for their analysis. The contested question is: what can we
infer from these texts about social practice? Some works implicitly assume or merely
claim that the literary and philosophical texts represent social practices or somehow
manage to dictate these practices. The claim for privileging the texts in relation to
Colonial rule is more emphatic, arguing that colonial rule appropriated the power to
'write' for the dominated and subjugated colonial subjects.51 The dominated were
rendered voiceless and speechless. Thus, colonial rule had the power to represent
India and its past. I broadly agree that the literature of a period would bear some
relationship to its material and social context. However, I am in disagreement with
Said's blurring of the distinction between different categories of texts and collapsing
literature and social practices. The point becomes sharper when we see how Derrida
48 Said (1979).
49 In the last 20 years, Said has moved away from his founding work in Orientalism. To the extent it





takes this strategy of collapsing to an extreme, and by considering the critique by
Habermas of Derrida's work.
Derrida justifies the strategy of collapsing different oeuvres of texts (for example,
literary, philosophical, everyday practices) on the grounds that these use a common
language. He highlights the metaphorical nature of all communication and thus
disrobes any claim to the 'presence' of a truth. These post-structuralist and
deconstructionist accounts of texts are based on a particular account of language.
They claim that language, by its very organisation, is incapable of conveying a
definite meaning. According to them, there are always 'freefloating signifiers' and
'signifiers sliding under the signified'.52
The 'reading' of texts and the communication of ideas are important for both the
domains of my study— law and history. Law is textual, perennially caught in reading
and re-readings. I will give an account of history by relying on colonial archival
sources. These documents themselves were interpretations and re-interpretations of
the previous ones. Thus, history in one sense itself is a web of texts. I am, however,
unable to take the strong position on the inherent 'irreducibility' of meaning,
emphatically asserted by Derrida. The inherent incapacity of a signifier to signify is
founded on a particular reading of Saussure's linguistics. Towards this, Lacan claims
that he showed the way to Derrida, and presumably, Derrida showed the way to the
others.
Post-structuralists have come under scathing attack for advancing a distorted reading
of Saussure. Tallis accuses Derrida of deliberately misreading Saussure to advance
his fanciful theories of the 'irreducibility' of all meaning.53 Ellis alleges that
Derrida's reading of Saussure, that the relationship between signifiers and signified is
arbitrary, is partisan and exaggerated. According to Ellis, Saussure consistently
maintained that the signifier and signified were united like the two sides of a sheet of




this sense, the relationship between signifier and signified is 'arbitrary'. But this
should not let one to conclude, as Derrida does, that a signifier cannot
unambiguously signify anything.54 The association between signifier and signified is
set up by practices and convention. More often than not, a signifier signifies
something definite and intelligible. Without this, no language and society would be
possible. Even a Derridean, Norris, recognises that the claims of the post-
structuralism on the incapacity of signifiers to signify is exaggerated.55
Habermas finds Derrida's collapsing of oeuvres rhetorical and misleading. He asserts
that in everyday life, communicative practices of participants are dependent upon
decision, action and consensus. Habermas emphasises that:
Linguistically mediated processes such as the acquisition of
knowledge, the transmission of culture, the formation of social
identity, and socialisation and social integration involve mastering
problems posed by the world.56
I would put the point more specifically. People receive and form their ideas in
specific material and social contexts. Their horizons and experiences are limited by
their contexts. Texts are received and interpreted in these specific contexts. Further,
in specific contexts, people are engaged in day-to-day problems. Their interest in
knowledge production are not speculative and idle but are instead oriented towards
cn
solving their concrete problems. A text is thus received in a certain context and
interpreted to solve problems. Ideas are never communicated exactly in the shape in
which they arose. Their dissemination is mediated by the concrete interests and
problems of different locations and sites. But this does not mean that signifiers
cannot signify or as Derrida claims, that meaning is 'irreducible'. We should engage




56 See the essay 'On Levelling the Genre Distinction Between Philosophy and Literature' in Habermas
(1987).
57 The point has been made by Barnes (1977).
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rather than accord an autonomy to the texts.58 Through this engagement, we can
explore the production, dissemination and reproduction of ideas and ideologies.
To summarise, my disagreements with work on truth and discourse are twofold.
Firstly, a discourse is often analysed in isolation from other discourses and counter-
discourses. Secondly, invariably, only the philosophical and literary texts of a period
are given primacy as 'discourse', ignoring the social contexts in which these are
produced and disseminated. The boundary of a discourse is closed at the sites of
production of grand ideas, policy and ideology. We can make two different
arguments to emphasise the same results. If by discourse we are to mean
philosophical and literary texts only, we need to examine the social practices in
which these texts are produced and disseminated. Alternately, we can argue that all
social activities are communicative and thus discourses. There is no reason for us to
privilege philosophical and literary discourses over other discourses.
In this light, we can evaluate Said's Orientalism and other works, for example that of
Inden, who asserts that Europeans and Americans created the knowledge of 'others'
during the period of their world ascendancy,59 or Chakrabarty, who argues that
analysts may have dissolved the dichotomy of the 'modern' and the 'tradition' but the
phenomenon does not disappear simply because some have attained critical
awareness of it.60 According to him, 'Europe' and 'India' (Modern and Traditional)
remain very much as figures of imagination and geographical referent, abstracted and
celebrated in everyday relationships of power.
Porter questions Said's construction of the unified character of western discourse on
the Orient.61 He finds that Said portrays as unified ideas of Europe and Orient that are
riddled with ambivalence, contradictions and ruptures. Lele questions Said for









creating this 'monolith of power' of Europe.63 Majid, dealing with colonial writings
on India, alleges that imperial power, in India at least, was of a much more fragile
nature than the sort depicted by Said.64 The power relations were an enmeshing of
diverse interest of the colonial rule and local society, rather than an imperial
hegemonic fabrication. Majid examines Mill's History of India and shows that it was
intended to challenge a powerful dominant ideology in England by using India as a
matrix for doing it. He also shows the complexity of the author's work,
contradictions within the text and the multiple power relations within which these are
produced.65
Said, and others following him, privilege literary and scholarly texts as sites for
discourses and production of ideas. William urges us to pay attention to not only 'the
articulate upper level of ideology' but also 'a whole body of practices'.66 The web of
ideas and practices are dynamic and enmeshed. I agree with Porter's critique of Said
that the works which accord a primacy to textual production67 ignore that ideas are
produced in concrete historical conjunctures through a sphere of conflicts in which
power relations are continually reasserted, challenged and modified.
This review of social theory has contributed direction for my work on law. I am
interested in finding out how knowledge on forest law, ideas about forest law and
detailed specific provisions of law were made. The review suggests that the
pronouncements of colonial officials, thinkers and legislators should not be accepted
at their face value. I should examine how these ideas arose from social practices, and
how these ideas were received, disseminated and impacted on social practice. In the
light of the above discussion, I move from the general to the specific and assess how
the knowledge on law was produced within the context of colonial domination.









5. Colonial Rule and Legal Knowledge
Irrespective of the social theory just discussed, some might simply argue that law was
what the British authorities said it was. They were the rulers, and they were rulers
because they had coercive and police powers over the subjects. But we will see that
law's role could never be so straightforward.
5.1. Law and Coercion
British rule fought wars for imperial ends at the expense of the local people.68 The
wars, however, were not directed against the local people but against the armed
forces of other rulers. In the course of consolidating its rule, Colonial rule
systematically disarmed all other competitors, like zamindars (land owners) and
conquered rulers,69 and thus, monopolised the control of coercive forces.70 As Arnold
puts it,
Britain acquired India as a colony largely through the use of its army, and it
was to the army that the British turned both in moments of extreme crisis and
to provide a background source of deterrent strength.7'
The army, however, was only the last resort. In other times, it maintained control
through the police. British rule created a centralised police force for its colonial ends
and yet the state was never omnipotent or omnipresent. It was constrained by the
strength of diverse forces within the Indian society, its own financial stringency and
by distrust of its subordinates. Due to a combination of these factors, resort to the
exercise of coercive forces, with a few exceptions, was very limited.72
Law was the main means for ruling India. The mle of law was not only a code for
binding the ruler and ruled but also for accountability of the different hierarchies
68 Marshall (1987); and Bayly (1989).
69 Marshall (1987).
70 Arnold (1986).
71 Arnold (1986): p4.
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within the state.73 The rule of law implied rule by 'law' and not the whims and
fancies of the alien administrators. Often, coercion and consent, the two Gramscian
modalities of ruling, are posed as poles of a duality. Law features as a part of
'consent'. I find the duality untenable. No society can be based on coercion alone. As
Foucault demonstrates in relation to torture in ancient regime74, coercion has to be
social. Its purpose is to communicate a message and mould the subject. For this,
coercion, as Foucault shows, has to be measured, graded and calculated. In other
words, coercion is not mindless violence. There is a consent on the efficacy and
legitimacy of violence. Even in coercion there is law, and law is about coercion.
'Colonial' rule gives an impression that any law could be imposed on the subjects.
This was not the case. In appreciating the nature of law and state in colonial India, it
is important to bear in mind that a few thousand Europeans on their own could not
have ruled so vast a territory and population.75 The colonial state was a crystallisation
of multiple interests in England, India and within the state itself. To give some
illustrations, in the beginning the rulers themselves were so incapacitated by their
greed and lawlessness that Comwallis, the Governor-General of India in 1790s, had
to adopt the Permanent Land Settlement and to separate the executive and the
judiciary. The Permanent Land Settlement fixed the land revenue in perpetuity and
thus, among other things, took away the discretion of the company officials.76 Yang
in his appropriately titled book The Limited Raj, demonstrates that the power of the
state tapered off beyond the district towns, where the zamindars took over. Further,
the relationship of the zamindar to the cultivators in Saran, the district of his study,
was mediated through a layer of intermediaries and social classes.77
Guha records 100 major rebellions from 1800 to 1900.78 Although the rebellions












settled with cultivators and talukdars (an intermediary rentier class) were dubbed as
parasites. After the mutiny of 1857, many settlements were reversed and talukdars
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were declared the natural leaders of the masses. Within contract law, as it had
emerged in England and was brought to India, the antecedents of the contracting
parties was never a consideration. After the Decan revolt in 1880s, the contract
between money-lender and peasant was to be subjected by the court to the previous
81
transactions.
I observe in this section that the Colonial state was not free to put up anything as law.
If India was to be governed by law, in other words, if law had to acquire a
significance as a mediator of social relations— between social classes and groups,
between state and society— it could do so only by assimilating the claims and
resistance of various social groups. My next question is how does law register these
interests? Law passes under the authorship of the state. Thus, these interests have to
register at the level of the institutions of the state. The specific question then is how
did the Colonial state form knowledge about law on India?
5.2. Legal Theory and Social Practice
In the early years of the British rule, it was a general principle to follow the local law.
Innovations had the danger of creating political turmoil and destabilising British rule.
The administration thus was engaged in 'discovering' knowledge about the 'native'
law. One would have expected the state, in this context, to have been bound by
numerous social layers in its law making. In fact, on the contrary, the official
discourses often appear autonomous in constituting what suited them as the 'truth' of
the local law in India.
For example, in Bengal, despite opposition and evidence to the contrary from within







been the owners of land.82 Under the Permanent land settlement, land was settled with
them. Up to the 1820s, the Company maintained that sati was a practice sanctified by
religion. After 1820, the earlier construction was reversed and it was asserted that sati
was not a religious practice. This was to justify imposing restrictions on the
practice.83 Thomas Munro, the founder of ryotwari settlement, deemed the vargadars
as the real and ancient landowners, founding their ownership on ancient well
preserved records. The records turned out to be non-existent.84 Nightingale goes even
further in alleging the arbitrary nature of law making. She suggests that the Bombay
Presidency officials in Malabar in the 1790s were reporting the local law to be the
one which suited their private business interests.85 The official discourses appear
arbitrary and whimsical. The official pronouncements seem entirely unrelated with
the way things actually were. However, we get a more complete picture when we
look at the way these pronouncements were put into practice.
Local law was not a thing which could be discovered. There was no knowledge
already there to be learnt. The local society had its own contradictions,
inconsistencies and dynamism. Colonial rule had its own concepts, ideas and
exigencies of administration. The very act of identifying the local law (for example,
on who owned the land) was already pre-disposed and implicated in certain strategic
devices. The law was to be a representation of the existing practices. The colonial
officials had a degree of freedom in constructing the local law. They were not forced
to adopt a particular understanding of the social practices. At the same time, the
social practices and the way it was represented by them could not be completely
divergent. The ultimate constraint was that the social practices could not be arbitrarily
altered by these legal constructions. Social practices and official discourses had to
find a common ground.
The relationship between law in official discourses and law in social practice took a
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legal knowledge. It forged theories and ideas (within the constraints of disputes
within the state itself), most suited to its needs, but while deploying such theories,
existing social arrangements were not disturbed. The existing practices were
continued and accommodated in the theory as concession, ex-gratis and
discretionary. Thus, the social practices, irrespective of their representation, could
continue without major restructuring. What then was the use of developing a theory if
it could not change practices? Development of a theory was no guarantee of its
success in practice. But it created the potential for circulation of the theory and
eventual transformation of the social practices.
To summarise, there were gaps, and even contradictions, between law in official
discourses and social practice. I now want to move to further details as to how these
gaps got created and were managed. How does law meet the contradictory demands
of being fixed and malleable; and certain and ambiguous? My general argument is
that law is both, functional and strategic; and theoretical and ideological. We can find
directions by unifying these two facets of law, and relating them to social practices.
Towards this, as I move from general to the specific details of law, I realise the
paucity of work on law. However, there is literature on land settlement, policy and
tenure relations. Many insights on state, law and society in colonial India can be
extracted from this literature. I attempt this in the following section.
6. Law, Ideology and Social Practice
6.1. Law and Ideology
Law is associated with ideas, theory and ideology. It claims to derive from certain
given principles. I want to explore this claim for colonial law and policy. Stokes and




ideas developed in Europe. They suggested that ideologies dominant in Europe
became the yardstick for the colonial administrators to judge, evaluate, measure and
transform Indian society. Thus, one needs to understand the dominant ideologies in
Europe and locate India within it. Stokes emphasised that the 'British policies moved
within the orbit of ideas primarily determined in Europe'.87 He analysed the way in
which utilitarianism, liberalism and the doctrine of rent developed by Malthus, James
Mill and Ricardo dictated British legislation on India in the 19th century. Guha's
essay 'Rule of Property', despite its depth and richness, nevertheless located the
origin of the Permanent Land Settlement88 in the 'confluence of ideas where the two
mainstreams of English and French thought merged in the second half of the
eighteenth century'.89
As noted earlier, the linkages between everyday practices and philosophical and
literary realms are complex. Guha and Stokes assume that the ideas developed in
Europe were imbibed in their entirety by colonial officials, brought to India, and
unfolded in their original sense without regard to the specific context of the actors
and India. This position supposes that ideologies are fixed, coherent and settled, they
can be communicated, and applied coherently and consistently. It also suggests that
actors produce knowledge, free of all power relations, on the basis of this ideology.
In opposition to Guha and Stokes, some have suggested that the policies and laws
framed by Colonial administrators had little to do with European experience, but
were locally fashioned by the administrators in response to social and administrative
imperatives.90 Colonial rulers forged together ideas from local experience to secure
the financial and political stability of their rule.91 In concrete terms, several 'local
influences' and compulsions of the social structures were the determinants of British
86 Guha (1963); and Stokes (1959).
87 Stokes (1959).
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policy.92 This position emphasises the strategic nature of the construction of the local
society by the colonial administration.
Similarly, some assume that the British by sheer habit and familiarity, since the very
beginning of colonial rule, introduced the system of courts based on the British
system.93 But this is not correct. They first tried to continue with the indigenous
system of justice. Only when it did not produce desired results was the system of
British courts introduced.94
6.2. Law and Strategy
The argument that colonial law was forged together to produce specific results is
attractive. Often, in the fascination of legal theory and principles, it is forgotten that
one facet of law is specific, functional, instrumental and strategic, calculated to
produce certain specific effects. Researchers have not given adequate notice to this
feature of law in constructing legal theory. Foucault, who centrally engages with the
micro-details of social life, launches an attack on political theory with the injunction
'to cut off the king's head'.95 According to him, classical political theory was
obsessed with the 'sovereign' as the maker of law. The call is instead to examine the
micro-sites of the working of power in society. Foucault's position on the importance
of law in modern society is at best ambivalent, but an engagement with micro-details
can be illuminating.
The social is about conflict and co-operation but law is more concerned with conflict.
The dispersed sites are locations for the formation of strategies. Strategies are in
relation to opposing strategies, in that these are already impregnated with their
opposite. I suggest that the strategies are abstracted from the field, refined and
organised as law. I see law as a dossier of the strategies fashioned in the field.
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Further, since strategies are in opposition to counter-strategies, law in encoding the
strategies becomes a register of social struggle.96
In emphasising the role of strategy, one should note that actors conceive strategies in
certain ideological contexts. In my view, studies emphasising the functional role of
law have implicitly assumed the abstract interests of the Company or 'colonial rule'
as the guiding value, ideology and direction for all the officials. I find this to be a
questionable assumption. The ideologies within which actors operate are more
specific.
I propose an enmeshed account of strategy and ideology. Strategies are forged in a
certain context of beliefs, values and ideologies (including ideas associated with law).
Ideology limits, facilitates and conditions the strategies. For example, the
instrumentality for administration during the colonial period was developed in the
ideology of the rule of law, of faith in private property and of tolerance for local
custom.97 If strategies are conceived in an ideological context, ideologies themselves
are modified in the course of accommodating the strategic devices. For example, by
the 1860s, despite the proclamation of Queen Victoria to uphold native law, the idea
was played down within the administration. Instead, the idea to intervene and
restructure Indian society came to be accepted. As we have noted before, talukdars
(an intermediary class), in Oudh were earlier believed to be parasitic elements. After
the Mutiny of 1857 they were turned into natural local leaders.98 The separation of
executive and judiciary, a core feature of the rule of law, was abandoned within the
iyotwari Settlement to centralise executive and judicial power in the Collector in
Madras Presidency.99 Ideology and strategy are caught in this interplay.
If strategies are formed in dispersed sites, ideologies are not grand designs centrally
planned, detailed out and imprinted on the dispersed sites. Ideologies themselves are
produced in dispersed sites in the society. A genealogy of an idea would take us to
96 Edelman (1979).
97 Guha (1963); and Metcalf (1994).
98 Metcalf (1994).
99 Stein fl 989).
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concrete practices from which it arose and show its partisan and base origins.100 The
rule of law was produced among the Burghers in Europe in their struggle against the
feudal lords.101 British Imperialists' respect for Indian law came from their concrete
experiences of early colonial contact where they realised that the local community
might be sensitive to religious prejudices.
An ideology then may acquire a hegemonic position transcending its local roots to
have a general validity. In the process of attaining hegemony over alternate
articulations, ideas project their version as the truth cutting across diverse sites.
Similarly, strategies have a dual affect on legal ideology. The existing legal
ideologies condition the legitimate possibility of strategic devices, and the reverse,
that legal ideology to accommodate strategic devices has to modify and re-state itself.
In this interplay, laws acquire the ideological force of universality and inevitability.
6.3. Unifying Law, Strategy and Ideology
I thus focus on the abstraction of ideologies and strategies from dispersed sites. All
sites are not privileged locations for the generation of all ideas. The dispersed sites
are tied in a hierarchy of relations. The nature of power relations shapes the filtration
of strategies and ideologies. For a strategy or ideology to become hegemonic, it has
to pass through these channels. In this process, it undergoes modifications and
refinement.
I formulate the relationship between law, strategy and ideology as follows. Law
systematises the socially legitimate power by abstracting the strategies. If law
systematises prevalent socially legitimate power, it also creates the foundation for the
future directions of the relationship. It arises from a specific context, is abstract,
stripped of its context, cast into universal terms and then extended to all sites. Law
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the prevailing position as settled, beyond dispute and thus, manageable. But in
practice, law is an encoded text of the present relationship with the seeds in it for its
future directions. The text of law once extended is negotiated in newer contexts. In
this sense, law itself is always in formation and thus, emergent. In its abstraction and
dispersal, law becomes the language of communication across sites. This leads to
homogenisation through dispersal and extension of law to all the sites and opens the
possibility for its articulation. Therefore, law acquires its own life and by its
existence, it affects the social relations. Thus, the application of law is contradictory
and inconsistent, largely governed by the politics of ruling. However, law, once
formed, affects social relations. Thus, in the process of modulating the social
relations, law itself undergoes a change.
I have thus far developed ideas about law and Colonial rule, for example, how
official discourses could have an autonomy in producing legal knowledge. I have also
formulated a relationship between law, strategy and ideology. I take this perspective
to reappraise the literature on forest law. I had a preliminary engagement with the
literature to notice that it took law as an instrument of state power. In the reappraisal,
I would identify specific issues which could possibly open up possibilities for
investigation in the subsequent chapters.
7. Law and Forests
The interest in the environment in the past two decades has created the impetus for
writing on environmental history. This body of literature deals with the questions of
control, management and use of resources. It will be useful to engage with this
literature.
7.1. State and Forest Conservation
Much of the literature on the environmental history of India creates a binary duality
between western, modem, rational and commercial and 'traditional' and pre-colonial.
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In this conceptualisation, the 'traditional' society stood for resource conservation,
symbiosis with resources and ecological prudence while the colonial state stood for
resource exploitation and commercialisation. A modem property regime on forests
subjugated and displaced the traditional arrangement. The literature on the history of
forests, implicitly or explicitly, is set in this duality. A growing and influential body
of literature has argued that in Western culture the dominant view of nature was to
conquer, tame, control, subjugate and order it. The rise of empiricism and 'rational'
science created the arrogance that comes with the capability of achieving this
vision.102 Colonial rule was based on this culture to rule over people and nature.
Following this, it is argued that in the cognition of the colonial officials, agriculture
was productive, ordered and soothing. Forests, on the other hand, represented
untamed nature and thus, were described as ugly, desolate and barren.103 Thus, the
approach of the colonial officers to forests was always hostile.104
The adoption of the binary duality of modem and traditional is ironic. I have already
noted that the tradition of scholarship relying on a binary duality of 'modem' and
'tradition' ran into problems. Attempts at resolution created unworkable formulations
like 'modernity of tradition'. Surprisingly, environment studies picked up this
category discarded by the rest of social sciences. I will question this duality again,
this time with reference to literature from the field of environment studies.
One plank of the engagement is to question the fossilisation of the 'traditional'
society.105 The other approach presents a counter to the construction that the colonial
rule necessarily 'appropriated' forests. Grove106 draws attention to the rise of the
science of environment and its impact on the management of forests in India during
1840 to 1860. Grove documents that by the 1840s the nexus between deforestation
and siltation of rivers and ecological changes was developed and well understood in
Europe from the experiences of France and Germany. The experiences of the tropical
102 See essays in Arnold and Guha (1995).
103 Arnold and Guha (1995).
104 Arnold and Guha (1995).




forests of Mauritius and other colonies further strengthened the nascent science. The
Company doctors who were respected and university educated 'experts' with
knowledge of Botany applied their learning and also learnt from experience and
observation of the environmental role of forests in India. The doctors highlighted the
adverse effects of the destruction of the forests and precipitated a conservationist
policy towards them. Grove concludes that this brought about a rupture from a
production and exploitation centred agenda to one towards resources conservation.
The Company thus abandoned short-term anarchic interests of capitalism for long
term stability. As a result, the state vigorously created forest departments and
entrusted them with the task of creating and managing government reserves.
By highlighting the interest of the colonial state in forest conservation, Grove
demonstrates that the duality of pre-colonial and resource symbiosis counter-posed to
colonial and resource exploitation in forest use lacks factual support. Despite this
correction, in my opinion, both the positions suffer from a common problem. The
writings are motivated by the contemporary interest in environment. Because
preservation of forests has been a pressing contemporary concern, these studies have
tended to be evaluative. Instead of engaging with the social and administrative
relations within which forests figured, and ideologies on their use were generated, the
studies ask the question: Was the conservation of forests a value, ideology and
practice? The two positions are interested in a particular answer to the question.
Thus, these positions miss the social and administrative relations through which
forests and their management was constituted.
For example, Grove is interested in pan-global perspectives on the rise of
environmental thought. In this, his reference becomes the emergence of
environmental thought in Europe. The subsequent developments are explained with
reference to this emergent science. Our reference should not only be Europe where
environmentalist ideas were produced. In fact, we should be more interested in the




how a global environmental thought managed to take roots, if at all, in the context of
India.
The rise of ideologies must be understood in the context of specific problems. Grove
captures the formation of the ideology in the context of a science and its
inquisitiveness. However, Grove makes the domains of knowledge and ideology
autonomous. But ideas are produced in specific sites, are articulated in a language in
search of legitimation, and acquire hegemonic positions through negotiation within
and across sites. Thus, the fact of a production of 'knowledge of the environment'
and an 'ideology of ecology' is no guarantee of its deployment. Their adoption,
extension, articulation, accommodation and accession to a hegemonic position to
acquire the status of 'knowledge' is contingent on the power relations in and across
the dispersed sites. That doctors were respected people was no guarantee of the
'expert knowledge' acquiring a hegemonic position. In fact, on the contrary, without
being deterministic, the 'expert' knowledge would be subservient to the power
relations within which it was produced.
Similarly, I have emphasised in this chapter that the dissemination and adoption of
any ideas, and here the idea of conservation, would be addressed to and received by
different layers of administration differently. I will show that this is indeed what was
happening. The 'experts' endorsed the use of the forests for imperial purposes and
for coffee planters, which were declared by them to be legitimate activities.
Conversely, the livelihoods of the indigenous population practising slash and burn
agriculture was described as 'rude', 'uncivilised' and 'improvident'.107 The Court of
Directors talked of conservation in the interests of 'humankind' while the forest
officers understood their job as only the organising of axemen to fell timber.
Thus, in my opinion, representing colonial policy and practice as 'appropriation' or
'conservation', as these two positions do, are only fragments of a complex process.




tendencies, appropriation and conservation; coercion and legitimation; and coherence
and arbitrariness. The task before us is not to muster up material to highlight a pre¬
determined facet as characteristic of colonial rule. The challenge instead is to explore
how the social is possible only through a continuous assertion, negotiation and
resolution of these contradictions.
We should not take a policy, a pronouncement or a statement of an 'expert' as a
representation of the dominant ideology and practice. The policy and reality, and
'expert' and practice are caught in multiple power negotiations. The 'science' of
forests was learnt, developed and deployed in the context of the prevalent power
relations. The 'science' expressed itself in the language and terms of the power
relations to gain legitimacy. The 'respect' for the 'expert' knowledge was contingent
on its usefulness, and the 'expert' knowledge was to be valued and adopted within
these bounds. The question of forest law needs to be located within these processes
of the rise and dissemination of ideas.
7.2. Law and Forests
Guha provides thus far an almost unchallenged account of the making of the forest
Act of 1878 and Madras Act of 1882. He rightly notices that Baden-Powell, a
prominent colonial official, constructed a theory that according to the ancient law of
India, forests were the property of the state vested in the king. Using this precedent,
Baden-Powell argued that the colonial state, as the conqueror, acquired the sovereign
rights of all forests. According to Guha, Baden-Powell argued that the widespread
use of forests in no way created a legal right for the local people, but only 'privileges'
which could be denied at will by the state.
Guha calls this the 'annexationists' view which he portrays as dominating the
thinking within the state. Guha informs us that following Baden-Powell's theory, 'a




based on Baden-Powell's distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges', the Forest Act
of 1878,
...was a comprehensive piece of legislation which, by one stroke of
the executive pen, attempted to obliterate centuries of customary use
by rural population all over India.109
I noted earlier that the state often constructed a theory which suited its interests.
However, Guha alleges that the state went ahead and attempted to implement one of
its far fetched theories. Guha is pre-disposed towards this conclusion because of the
way he understands the state. Guha's favourite concept of the 'executive pen'
assumes a simplistic view of the state, in that since the state was 'colonial', it must be
coercive, repressive and arbitrary.
Guha further assumes that legal provisions are based on and derived from certain
ideas. Guha's assumption is that the entire law was derived from the principle that
the state had a right over forests and what people had was only 'privilege' and
'concession'. Detailed analysis of the legal provisions shows they were not 'derived'
from the ideas which were being discussed. The Forest Act had very detailed
provisions on management of forests, including use of forests by the local people,
punishment for unauthorised use and transit restrictions. Guha provides no
explanation of where did these come from?
Guha takes account of the different opinions within the state on the nature of legal
rights on forests. He prefers the position of Brandis, the Inspector General of Forests
over Baden-Powell. Brandis likened the use of forests in India to customary rights in
England. Guha contends that Baden-Powell was firm that the common law was to be
applied only in England. Guha laments that Baden-Powell was opposed to the liberal
and enlightened European laws being made available to Indians. Thus, according to
Guha, Baden-Powell was hostile to the idea of Brandis of treating local use of forests
in India as 'customary rights' based on European law. Guha coins three terms
109 Guha (1990): p78.
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'annexationist', 'pragmatists' and 'populists' and labels Baden-Powell's ideas as
'tortuous' and Brandis as a man of 'noble sentiments'.
I will not question here the way Guha has read the sources and drawn conclusions. I
will take this up in substantive chapters that follow. Here, I will only engage with
Guha's understanding of law and legal ideas. Guha makes the individuals and their
ideas free of history and social context, and produces an inadequate account of how
legal ideas are contested, negotiated and shaped. Colonial officers, even when
engaging with 'theory', were acting in the realm of administration and practical
effects. They were not interested in the sanctity and the logical coherence of ideas.
Their interest was in producing certain desired effects. Thus, instead of judging the
moral positions of the officials in the light of current concerns, I will ask first what
was being secured by advancing a particular idea. When I explore this, an entirely
different picture emerges.
8. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have moved from the general, the nature of ideas, their production
and dissemination, to the specific, the details on forest law in India. In this
conclusion, I shall reiterate the points which guide us through the subsequent
chapters. One facet of law has to do with ideas, theories and concepts. In this
dissertation, I shall be dealing with ideas associated with forest law. Ideas are
articulated by individuals like thinkers, colonial officers or as a document in the
name of the state. We should not be content to rely on these ideas. These ideas
should be located in their social and material context. Production, revision and
deployment of ideas are invariably involved in achieving certain results. Similarly,
ideas are disseminated and received in specific contexts, partially deployed,
selectively unfolded, abridged and modified to produce desired results.
A point related to this is that discourses are not only literary or by philosophers,
thinkers and upper layers of the administration. They are related to the social,
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material and everyday practices. We need to see these discourses in their relatedness.
However, this does not mean that the social practices would map one to one in the
discourses. As we have noted, the colonial state had a monopoly on the production of
legal knowledge. In this sphere it produced what suited it the best. But the state could
never immediately deploy these ideas into practices. This would have ruptured the
social life and created 'lawlessness' and 'disorder'. Thus, in the gaps between official
discourses and social practices, we should expect ambiguity, confusion,
contradictions and co-existence of competing ideas. This is not to be regretted. We
should not compress it to make it more coherent. In fact, these contradictions are
productive, and without these the law would not be in motion.
In the conditions of coloniality, the state was powerful and hegemonic. The
conflicting discourses (within or without the state), obviously seem feeble, futile and
pointless. Despite this, we must bring to the surface and take account of the counter
discourses. This is not to do with any normative celebration of dissent. Only when we
take the opposing forces into account that we can see how the dominant discourses
were organised. Discourses are integrated with their opposition, the counter-
discourses. One would not exist without the other. In this sense, the colonial subject,
even in his/her silence, was forever always present through the practices.
9. Organisation of Chapters
In what follows, I try to substantiate these general assertions by examining the
development of legal ideas and provisions on ownership, use, control and
management of forests in Colonial India between 1792 to 1882. I have divided the
dissertation into two parts. Parts one covers the question of ownership of forests in
Malabar and Kanara from 1792 to 1860. Part two covers the legal develops during
1860 to 1882. Part one comprises of chapter one, two and three. The remainder
chapters are in part two. There is a short note at the beginning of the two parts. In
these notes, I provide a general background and supporting information to facilitate
assimilation of the material covered in the chapters.
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I begin the investigation with Chapter 1 with the very first contact between the
colonial rule and Indian society over the question of forests. This was in Malabar in
1792. The East India Company had won over Malabar from Tipu Sultan, the ruler of
the neighbouring Mysore state. At different times, three groups were advanced as the
owners of forests, jenmkars (local landholders), local rajas (rulers) and Tipu Sultan.
The three positions emerged and receded depending on the dominant interests of the
Company officials in Malabar. Finally, the Court of Directors imposed the least
likely option. They alleged that Tipu Sultan, and through him the Company as the
new ruler, was the owner of forests.
The law was only a pronouncement, and was yet to become a practice in Malabar.
The law was taken to Malabar through a Conservator's establishment, created for
extracting timber. Things worked out all right for a few years. The Court of Directors
had made a provision for a 'pension' to the landholders to solicit their co-operation in
timber extraction. The 'pension' was to be paid to those who 'alleged' that the forests
were theirs. The Conservator paid a 'pension' to a landholder before felling timber.
For the local people, oblivious of official pronouncements, the practice was only
reasserting their property right. When the Conservator exceeded this limitation, by
extending a complete state monopoly on forests and timber trade in Malabar and
Kanara, there was widespread resentment. The Governor of Madras, Thomas Munro,
persuaded the Government of India to abolish the Conservator's establishment. Thus,
in 1820s the state lost all rights over forests it had developed over more than two
decades. This forms the subject matter for Chapter 2
In Chapter 3 I take up the case of development of law of forests in Kanara. In 1800,
the first Collector of Kanara, Thomas Munro, had declared that all lands including
wastes and forests were private property of the vargadars (landholders). By 1840,
there was much extension of agriculture and appreciation of the value of forests in
Kanara. The Company, having conceded all land as private property, could neither
charge additional revenue nor benefit from the timber trade. Thus, it developed an
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interest in turning the law around. The Company officials struggled for twenty years,
between 1840 to 1860, with the prevailing legal order and finally reversed it in 1860.
The earlier position was described as a 'mistake'. The new law was that the
government owned the forests. I explore the modalities and techniques which were
used to reverse the law.
By 1860, the interest in forests was not confined to Malabar and Kanara. The
Government of India had initiated measures to promote forest conservancy all over
India. In 1840, a group of Company officials had emphasised the environmental
functions of forests. They claimed that deforestation could lead to reduction in
rainfall, desertification and dryness. This could affect the agricultural productivity
even in areas far away from the forests. The nascent forest establishment took this
environmental argument further to carve space for itself within the Company
administration. In Chapter 4, I note that the ideas of forest conservation were there
since the very beginning. In certain contexts, the idea became dominant and
subsequently receded. I explore how the environmental arguments since 1840s were
expressed differently to different layers of the administration in search of
legitimation. In turn, the idea was received differently by the different layers of the
administration. It is in this context of accommodation of ideas, interests and conflict
within the state that we would be able to locate the formation of the Forest Act of
1878 and legal ideas.
In Chapter 5, I cover the period from 1865 to 1872, the early developments towards
making of forest legislation. The forest departments pressed ahead with the creation
of forest reserves, free of local use. On the initiative of the forest department, the
Government of India made the Forest Act of 1865. But the Act was did not satisfy the
aspirations of the forest department. It had hoped to have powers to curtail and
extinguish local use. But within the dominant legal ideology, the Act had recognised
the 'prescriptive' rights of the local people over the forests. Within this constraining
context of the law, the nascent forest department had two detractors, the local people,
and civil officers in the districts and local administration. The forest departments
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forged strategies and practices to deal with the two opponents. It assimilated these
practices in a draft of a new Act.
Alongside this, the forest department worked to displace the legal theory of
'prescriptive' rights over forests. Its concern was to advance a theory which would
justify powers to the forest department to extinguish and curtail local rights. Several
legal ideas were tried until the most appropriate theory could be found. Chapter 6
narrates this exploration.
The Forest Act was finally passed in 1878. In Chapter 7, I demonstrate that the
provisions of the Forest Act came from the practices. The strategies fashioned in the
field were refined and assimilated in the law. Each of the practices had emerged from
protracted negotiations between the contending interests in the field. In this sense, the
provisions were a dossier of practices and a register of social power.
Chapter 8 is on the making of the Madras Forest Act, 1882. The Madras Presidency
vehemently opposed all the efforts of the Government of India to make a forest law.
It advanced a theory of ownership of forests entirely opposed to the one favoured by
the Government of India. It argued that in the Madras Presidency the government had
no rights over forests. All forests were communal property. I suggest that in addition
to a hostility towards the forest department, it was trying to assert its independence
from the Government of India. It was taking a different position from the
Government of India to make an issue out of it. Having denied its acceptance of the
Act of 1878, it could exercise its legislative competence and make its own law. And
it did. Despite all the controversy over the theory of ownership, it was the same law
the Government of India had made. But the Government of India was not going to
take to this evasion kindly. In Conclusion, I take up the themes I had raised in the
introductory chapters. I show that the colonial discourses on the production of legal
knowledge had a degree of freedom. But also, I show that these need to be seen in
relation to the social and material practices. I also show that legal ideas and
provisions are drawn from social practices. Finally, I take up the question of the 'rule
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of law' during the colonial period. Drawing from my study and leading literature
the subject, I suggest possible directions for locating and exploring the 'rule of law
Part I
PARTI
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: OWNERSHIP
OF FORESTS IN MALABAR AND KANARA
This part of the dissertation includes the first three chapters, in which I explore the
formation of ideas on ownership of forests in Malabar and Kanara from 1792 to
1860. Malabar and Kanara districts were the main suppliers of timber to Bombay.
Bombay was a major consumer of timber, particularly due to the requirements of the
dockyards located there. During this period, the major interest was on the ownership
of forests. By 1860, the Government of India became interested in managing the
forests all over India. An engagement with the management of forests gave rise to
numerous legal questions on control, conservation and use of forests. Thus, the form
of law till 1860 was often only a statement as to who owned the forests. In the post-
1860 period, law became more elaborate. I will take up this period in the second part
of the dissertation.
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Company had three well-established
trading centres in different parts of India. These were located at Calcutta, Bombay,
and Madras. The Dutch and French also had their bases in India, and military attacks
on one another were not uncommon. The trading establishments, as a result, were
actually forts. In addition to personnel who procured, stored and shipped
commodities, the forts also had military and soldiers. A council headed by a
President administered these centres. Due to the office of the President, these centres
came to be known as Presidencies: Bengal Presidency in Calcutta, Bombay
Presidency and Madras Presidency. The overall supervision and control of these
centres was done by the Court of Directors in London, the executive body of the
Company.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the company changed its character from
being a merely trading establishment to administering territories. With the decline of
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the centralised Mughal State in India in the early eighteenth century, numerous
contenders for local power emerged. The Company was finding a stronghold in this
fragmented Indian society. Through the war of Plassey in 1757, agreement with local
rulers, and a charter from the Mughal emperor in Delhi in 1765, the Bengal
Presidency acquired the right to collect revenue and administer the three provinces of
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.
In the beginning, the Company interested itself only in the revenue collection and left
the general administration in the hands of the local rulers. This was followed by the
Company officers taking over the administration from the local rulers. The Company
followed the pre-existing, taking over the functions which the Indian rulers had
performed. This included the function of revenue collection and administration of
justice. Even this was found inadequate. Cornwallis, the Governor-General during
1786-93, realised that the administration was paralysed by the greed of its own
employees. Excessive power in the hands of the officials was leading to lawlessness
and extortion. Thus, he separated the executive and judicial functions.
Administration of justice was taken from the Collectors and vested in Magistrates.
The Collectors had administered the local law. The Magistrates, modelled as English
courts, were to continue this. Cornwallis introduced a land policy called the
Permanent Land Settlement. Zamindars, who collected land revenue from the
cultivators over extensive estates and paid a part to the rulers, were recognised as the
landowners. The revenue to be paid by the zamindars to the Company was fixed in
perpetuity. This took away the discretionary powers of the Collectors and thus, the
possibility of misuse of the office. Also, in the opinion of Cornwallis, it created
certainty from the vagaries of exaction by the state, and thus, created a favourable
environment for development of agriculture.
While the Bengal Presidency was governing extensive tracts, of the other two
Presidencies, only Madras had some territory. In 1759, it acquired about 17,000
square miles from the Nizam, a local ruler with his seat in Hyderabad. The area came
to be known as Northern Circars. Chingelpet district, called Jaghire was acquired
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from the local rulers. After 1792, the territorial control of the Madras Presidency
expanded. Tipu Sultan was the ruler of Mysore in the southern part of India.
Following his defeat in a war in 1792, Tipu Sultan had to cede Malabar to the
Company. In the next war with the Company in 1799, Tipu Sultan was
comprehensively defeated. Following this, Kanara came in the territorial control of
the Company. The Nizam's government ceded territory to the Company towards
defraying costs of an 'augmented subsidiary force'. The territory came to be called
Ceded districts. By 1800, the Madras Presidency controlled significant territory in
southern India. Bombay Presidency was to have its territorial expansion in the
subsequent decades.
To administer the new territory, there was already the model developed by the
Bengal Presidency. This included creating courts and administering justice. This was
an important means to bring the newly acquired areas under political control. For
administering the 'local law', the prevailing law in the area had to be first found out.
In the course of settling the newly acquired area in the Madras Presidency, a new
system, ryotwari, in opposition to the Permanent Land Settlement, was put forward.
Ryotwari became influential in the next two decades and was followed not only in
the South but also in the other parts of India. Under the Permanent Land Settlement,
the zamindars were deemed to be the landowners. The zamindars owned very
extensive estates. Within ryotwari, it was the persons actually engaged in agriculture
who were considered to be the landowners. Ryot meant one who cultivated the land.
The changing role of the Company led to changes in its administration. The three
Presidencies had functioned independently, each reporting directly to the Court of
Directors. In 1773, through the Regulation Act, a kind of central government was
created. A Governor-General with four councillors, based in Calcutta, was to be
primarily responsible for the administration of the Bengal Presidency. In addition, it
was to exercise control over the Madras and Bombay Presidencies on matters
relating to waging wars on and forming diplomatic and political relations with the




In the Madras Presidency a Governor and his Council headed the administration. The
Governor always worked with his Council. This executive body was called the
Governor in Council. The territory was divided in districts and sub-districts. A
Collector or Principal Collector headed districts. The Collectors reported all matters
relating to land and revenue administration to a Board of Revenue. The Board of
Revenue was an intermediary body between the Collectors and the Governor in
Council. The Board of Revenue took its decisions and forwarded matters for the
orders of the Governor in Council. The administration was organised into different
department, like Public, Revenue, Justice and Military. Matters were brought from
all these departments for the orders of the Governor in Council.
The Company had frequent financial difficulties on account of its military
campaigns. The British government bailed out the Company from liquidation in
1784. In return, it subjected it to its control through the India Act of 1784. A body
controlled by the British Parliamentary, called 'Commissioners for the Affairs of
India' was created. This body came to be known as the Board of Control, an
instrument of control, direction and supervision over the affairs of the Company.
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Chapter 1
CHAPTER 1
TRADERS AND LEGISLATORS: COMPANY RULE
IN MALABAR, 1792-1807
Introduction
The first contact between the India society and the Company administration over the
question of rights over forests was in Malabar in 1792. The Company acquired Malabar
from Tipu Sultan in 1792. The acquisition of Malabar was in order to profit from the
lucrative trade associated with it. In addition to other items, teak was a major item of
trade from the Malabar Coast. For the new entrant to benefit from the timber trade, it
became important to understand the existing practice. The Company had to 'discover'
the existing law on ownership of forest.
The production of legal knowledge in official discourses can be autonomous from social
practices. I will substantiate this claim in relation to the production of legal knowledge
on the ownership of forests in Malabar. The Company officials in Malabar first reported
that jenmkars (the local landholders) had ownership over all the teak trees. The position
was changed in a year's time to assert that Tipu Sultan had a royalty right over all teak.
Finally, following a detailed enquiry, the Company officers in Malabar and the
government in Bombay concluded that the jenmkars were the owners of the teak
growing in the forests. But the Court of Directors set the findings aside. It declared that
Tipu Sultan had a royalty on forests and through him, the Company had acquired a right
over the teak in Malabar.
There have been two main positions on the nature of law and policy introduced by the
British rule in India. One position argues that these were derived from the dominant
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ideas in Europe. The second suggests that the laws and policies arose from the
imperative of managing the local imperatives. I have argued that ideologies and
strategies are fully enmeshed. In this chapter, I will illustrate this point. The Company
officials, far from earning profits for the Company, were interested in individual profits
through private trade. The law, which they reported as prevalent in the Malabar society,
was calculated to secure their private trade. When the Malabar administration fell in
more honest hands in 1800, the jenmkars were advanced as the owners of forests. This
was to secure their support in the politically turbulent Malabar. For Walker, this was a
strategy to neutralise the influence of the rajas (the local rulers ruling small
principalities). But the Court of Directors wanted to draw benefits from the timber trade
and secure supplies to the dockyards at Bombay. The Company itself was the biggest
buyer of timber supplied from Malabar at Bombay. The Company had the dockyards at
Bombay where ships were under construction. It was thus emphatic about Tipu Sultan's
right through which it could make a claim for the Company.
I will also show that ideas are produced, disseminated, understood and deployed in
specific context towards attending to problems. The production, generation and
deployment of ideas is not speculative but concrete, material and functional. The concern
of the Company officials was not which theory was used but whether certain results were
achieved or not. Thus, the Company officials in Malabar first followed the local
categories and arrangement, the idea of 'royalty', for understanding property rights.
When this could not be sustained, the notion of 'sovereign' rights on forests, and the
dualistic conception of public and private for separating the domains of ownership was
deployed. Walker relied on the local conception of jenmkar as having the right by birth
to own land. The Court of Directors, aware of their power and authority, did not even
find it necessary to back their claim with a coherent theory. It vaguely asserted
'sovereign' rights but emphatically asserted that it had no doubts at all about its rights
over the forests. In this context, I note that some have argued that the notion of public-
private was distinctly a colonial introduction in India. Colonial officials, having
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internalised the concept of public-private from their social context of Europe, inevitably
imposed it on India.1 I show that the Company officials did not deploy ideas
ideologically but strategically and functionally.
I first give a brief account of the society and administration in Malabar. This serves as a
background to place the discourses on the question of ownership of forests. The second
section is a narrative of changing positions on the question of ownership of forests
within the Company administration. In the concluding section, I discuss the ideas that
emerge from the narrative.
1.1. Bombay Presidency and Malabar
1.1.1 Geography and Economy of Malabar
The strip along the Western coast of India, upwards of the southern tip, constituted the
Malabar Coast. Beyond the narrow coastal strip of plain land, away from the sea, land
rose in a series of hills, abruptly acquired great heights (the ghats), and tapered in a
plateau. Malabar could be accessed from above the ghats, now comprising the States of
Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, only through a few treacherous passes. The isolation of
Malabar from its neighbours, however, was more than compensated by vigorous
communication through the sea route.2
Malabar had been a major commercial and trade centre since 600 AD. It had trade links
with important centres in Asia and Africa.3 This had constituted the social and ethnic
composition of Malabar. The agents of other trading centres settled in Malabar to
1
Chakrabarty (1991).





facilitate trade. Gradually, they made Malabar their home. The population of the settlers
grew, creating a mix of ethnic groups in Malabar. The inhabitants included Arabs and
Christians, in addition to the local Hindus.4 The coastal plains supplied rice, coconut and
other food grains. The foothills and lower reaches of the ghats produced the major items
of exports, spice, sandalwood and teak.5 The spice trade had lured all the European
powers to Malabar. In the eighteenth century, the French, Dutch and the East India
Company competed to control and profit from the lucrative trade.6
1.1.2 The Company and Local Nairs against Tipu Sultan
The East India Company acquired the territorial control of Malabar in 1792. The
officials of the Bombay Presidency finally realised their long cherished dream of a
territory under their control. Till then, only the Bengal presidency had command over
territory. The Bengal officials had amassed wealth through trading on their personal
accounts and extortion7 and returned home as 'nabobs of Bengal'. The Company
officials in the other two Presidencies, Madras and Bombay, could only envy and
attempt to emulate Bengal by waging wars to acquire territory. The ever rising military
expenditure, due to such misadventures, had made the Company indebted. The
Company's debt rose to 8 million pounds in 1784. To remain solvent, it had to submit
itself to the Government control through the Pitt's India Act of 1784, which explicitly
prohibited the Company from waging wars on or making treaties with the local rulers
without the British government's permission.8
Malabar had been in the control of Tipu Sultan, the ruler of neighbouring Mysore. The
forces of the Mysore state, located above the ghats, had successfully descended through
the passes and invaded Malabar in 1776. Malabar till then was ruled, if the social
4 Dale (1980): pi 1-33.
5
Gupta (1967).





structure could at all be so described, by numerous local Hindu rajas (kings) who
controlled small principalities. With Tipu Sultan's invasion, under the threat of
conversion to Islam, much of the Hindu population fled to the neighbouring state of
Travancore. moppilas, the Muslim population (descendent of Arab settlers), became the
allies of Tipu Sultan. For Tipu Sultan, the East India Company was a formidable enemy
in realising his ambition of territorial expansion and control. He had collaborated with
the French and attempted to oust the Company by imposing a trade embargo. Cornwallis,
the Governor-General of India, was concerned about the financial position of the
Company. War would have meant heavy expenditure. He tried alliances with the local
rulers, including attempts to make pacts with Tipu. But Tipu forced the Company into
9
war.
Comwallis found natural allies in Nair princes (local Hindu rajas and chieftains), in
exile in Travancore, to share the war efforts and expenditure. Treaties were signed for
support and participation in a war against Tipu. The Nair rulers were to be reinstated and
in return, they were to give the Company trading privileges. After losing the war in 1792,
Tipu Sultan retained his Mysore State but had to cede Malabar to the Company.
1.1.3 Profiteering by Company Employees
To administer the newly acquired territory, Comwallis appointed a four member
Commission. Two members were drawn from the Bombay Presidency, and the other two
were to be representatives of the Governor-General, drawn from the Bengal Presidency.
This was understandable. The Governor of Bengal Presidency also had over-all charge of
the administration in India and acted as the Governor-General. The Commission was to
report on resources and on the best means of governing the hitherto unknown and
turbulent Malabar. William Farmer and Alexander Dow were nominated from the
8
Nightingale (1970): p5-6.
9 See Chapter 2, Nightingale (1970).
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Bombay Presidency. Dow had been the military commander at Tellicherry (a town in
Malabar) without distinguishing himself and Farmer had no experience of the
province.10 Farmer had lost the lucrative chiefship of Surat, the only valued posting for a
Bombay official, to his junior John Griffith. He and his brother in England bitterly
complained against the 'reward' being denied.11 Malabar, which was soon to have the
reputation of making civil servants rich, came as a consolation to Farmer.
By the time Malabar was ceded, Cornwallis had decided not to reinstate the Nair princes
as independent rulers. They were instead to be subjects on the same footing as the
Bengal zamindars (landholders).12 The Commission was instructed to conclude
temporary agreement with the rajas to deliver one year's revenue to the Company; to
transfer all judicial powers into the hands of the Company; and to enforce a Company
monopoly on the pepper trade. The Commission also had to understand the local
arrangement to suggest a system for administering the territory.13
The two Bombay Commissioners, who had exclusive control of the Commission till
members from Bengal arrived months later, feared administrative reforms. Cornwallis
was reforming the administration so that the civil servants would be denied the
opportunity of private trade, and corruption and profiteering was being purged away.
This was unacceptable to the Bombay officers. After decades of impoverishment, debt
and failure, they had acquired the chance in Malabar to amass wealth.14
From their first meeting, instead of attempting to implement Cornwallis' instructions,
Dow and Farmer vehemently opposed it. They argued that the Company should leave the
10
Nightingale (1970): p73.
11 Farmer to Henry Dundas, Chairman of the Board of Control, 28/2/1787 and Samuel Farmer to CD,
28/2/1787, Melville Papers, MSS 1072, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh. (National Library of
Scotland, Edinburgh, hereafter NLS).





administration in the hands of the local rajas. Further, they proposed that the Company
should give up any plans for a monopoly of pepper. This suggestion was revolutionary in
the management of the affairs of the Company. Farmer was in alliance with Murdock
Brown, a man who had been Tipu's ally in the embargo on English trade. Brown was
based in Mahe\ a territory in French occupation, and was trading in competition with the
Company. Farmer was discussing the Company's policy with Brown and was
reproducing Brown's views as his own to be endorsed by the Company.15 But the local
rajas controlled the pepper trade, which partially vitiated the ambitions of Brown and his
associates. Company intervention then became desirable to loosen the control of the
rajas. In just nine months, between April 1792 to December 1792 the Commissioners
reversed their position. They now alleged that the rajas were oppressive and
irresponsible and thus, the Company intervention was desirable.16
Despite the arrival of Commissioners from Bengal, Duncan and Boddam, Brown's
influence continued. Duncan and Boddam, unlike Farmer, did not have any business
dealings with Brown.17 But Brown managed to impress and influence them.
Subsequently, Duncan became the Governor of Bombay and Brown enjoyed a privileged
position. Mahe\ where Brown was based, fell from French control and came in the
hands of the Company. Despite opposition from Bombay officials, in 1793, Brown was
appointed to a senior position in Malabar administration. Bombay government ordered
his dismissal but the Malabar authorities ignored the order and Brown kept his office.18
Murdock Brown's influence was felt everywhere in the province, and he and his partners
profited while the Company struggled to get even a small share of the trade.
14 On low emoluments, Cornwallis confided in Henry Dundas that the Company servants were to either
starve or take what was not theirs. And if such people were made governors no results and reforms











The Company, far from being a unified body with a single interest- the profit of the
Company- was permeated by the individual interests of the employees. The policy and
law, which was being set for Malabar, was guided by the private interest of the
employees. In the next section, I explore how these interests worked to construct the
law on property right over forests.
1.2. Discourses on Property Right on Timber
1.2.1 Introduction
The Commission was to explore and settle the 'ancient customs' in Malabar. This was
to be the foundation for Company rule in Malabar. My specific concern here is the
production of knowledge about property rights in forests in pre-British Malabar. For the
Malabar administration, there was no given and fixed 'pre-Colonial Malabar' to be
discovered. The production of knowledge amounted to the creation of an 'archive' on
the basis of which a position could be advanced. Different groups within the Company
took different positions on the ownership of forests. Almost arbitrarily, in a span of 15
years, all the positions, one after another, enjoyed the status of the authentic
construction of Malabar's past. And finally, the Court of Directors installed, what
seemed to be the most improbable position at that time within the official discourses, as
the correct understanding of social relations in Malabar.
In this section, I attempt to examine the modality and techniques by which different
positions, all 'truths', were created, destroyed and re-created. In the course of this, the




1. The Company as the conqueror was the inheritor of Tipu's rights.
2. In opposition to 1, the Company should rule by the local social arrangement
prevalent in Malabar before Tipu's period.
3. The conceptual distinction of public-private was a universal standard to express
social, political and property relations.
We will see how these different ideologies were employed to create different effects.
1.2.2 Revival Of Timber Trade
Immediately after Malabar came in British control, the Court of Directors instructed the
government in Malabar to identify commodities for trade. Particular attention was to be
paid to trade which had flourished prior to Tipu's embargo.19 Trade in teak timber was
one of them. In June 1793, Farmer pointed out that the Company had inherited from
Tipu Sultan the right to enjoy a monopoly of all timber growing in the province.20 A
reliance on Tipu's claim over forests was surprising.
Cornwallis had reversed the policy of reinstating the local rajas. However, most of the
princes believed that treaty with the Company was for their political independence. The
local rulers still commanded political and social leadership. And even more, the rajas
had come back as warriors in exile who fought Tipu to win their rule and restore the
social order. The Company could not blatantly strip them of their powers. The
imperative of acquiring political control compelled the Company to restore the property
and social arrangement prior to the Tipu Sultan's rule. The supposed thrust of the
administration was to understand the 'ancient' system which had prevailed prior to




Tipu's rule. And indeed, the Commission in relation to agricultural land followed the
arrangement prior to Tipu's rule.
I
The Commission reported that by the ancient customs of Malabar, the owners held their
lands free. That is, they were not required to pay revenue or tax to the rajas. They were
only obliged to attend their rajas when called on to war.21 The landowners were called
janmis, the holders of land as a birth-right.22 An assertion of Company's claims over
forests was incongruent. In the case of agricultural land, they were celebrating the
janman right as a 'right to the soil', the 'plenum deminium' of Latin Jurists and directing
the administration to act upon the validity of 'European Idea' they had found in
Malabar.23
1.2.3 Ownership of Forests Constructed as 'Royal Privilege'
On the question of ownership of forests, Farmer instead took an opposite view. He
recognised the private ownership of forests prior to Tipu's rule. However, jamabandi (a
statement of revenue of an area), which Tipu Sultan had submitted while ceding Malabar
to Cornwallis, had an entry of 30,000 pagodas (local currency) as revenue drawn from
timber in the province.24 Farmer insisted that the Company inherited this rights of Tipu
Sultan. And thus, it could utilise the forests as a royalty. Shortly after this, Farmer
recommended that the Bombay Government should accept a proposal of Alexander
Macknochie of setting up a sawmill at Beypore river to supply the Company with planks.
The demand for timber at Bombay for shipbuilding was considerable and timber trade
could be lucrative. The Commissioners highlighted that the sawmill would improve
timber trade in the province of Malabar and be convenient for timber supplies to the
20 Malabar Commission Report.
21 Malabar Commission Report.
22 Malabar Commission Report.
23
Logan (1951): p491.
24 GinC to CD, 21/1/1801, f/4/89/1843 , IOL.
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docks.25 The Company itself was the biggest buyer of timber for constructing ships at the
Bombay dockyard.26 Also teak was being exported, in small quantities, to England for
repair of ships.27 Farmer's recommendation was seconded by the Bombay government
and sent to the Court of Directors. Farmer was supposed to be Macknochie's partner in
the enterprise, and Farmer's associate, Murdock Brown, was also involved!28 The
legislators were traders, and the traders were legislators.
The Court of Directors approved Macknochie's proposal and advanced him a loan of
10,000 pounds for setting up a sawmill 'for improving timber trade in the province of
9Q
Malabar'. The Company was to buy planks from him for a period of ten years. The
Court of Directors was interested in reviving and promoting trade for the benefit of the
Company but not at the expense of political stability. Thus, the Court of Directors noted,
The encouragement we have agreed to extend to Macknochie in
execution of a sawmill in Malabar province is not to be construed as
allowing him to confer any monopoly of the timber trade whatever, nor it
is meant to exclude any persons from disposing of their timber in any
way they please.30
Farmer had taken the position that Tipu Sultan had a monopoly on teak timber, despite
other evidence to the contrary. Dow, another Commissioner reported that the forests
were the private property of the inhabitants.31 According to Dow's report, annexed to the
First Malabar Commission Report, even when Tipu Sultan ruled Malabar, he was
obliged to pay to the landholders for cutting the timber.32 Further, in the review of the
25 CD to GinC (Public), 28/4/1795, e/4/1010, IOL.
26 CD to GinC (Marine), 1/8/1798, e/4/1013, IOL.
27 CD to GinC (Public), 25/6/1793 (Public), e/4/1008, IOL.
28
Nightingale (1970): plOO.
29 CD to GinC (Public), 1796, e/4/1011, IOL.
30 CD to GinC (Public), 28/4/1795, e/4/1010, IOL.
31 Malabar Commission Report: p54-60.
32 Malabar Commission Report: p54-60.
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Malabar Commission Report, John Shore, the Governor-General, approvingly noted that
forests in Malabar were private property.33
In the meanwhile, the Government in Malabar, had entered into an agreement with local
traders, to encourage timber trade. They were to be given a one-year lease for cutting
timber and catching elephants within the 'wilds' and 'jungles'. It was assumed that these
wild 'timber forests' were the property of the 'sovereign'. On finalisation of the contract,
the Commissioners were to publish a proclamation prohibiting others from felling timber
or catching elephants.34 The contract was sent to the Governor for ratification.
Macknochie and Legal Position of'Royalty'
In this while, Macknochie came back to Malabar in 1796 from Europe, after shipping the
sawmill machinery, to learn that an exclusive contract was to be given to local
contractors. The Commissioners had already been informed that the Court of Directors
was giving him support for setting up a sawmill in Malabar. The proposed monopoly
contract to the local merchants was obviously detrimental to his interest in timber trade.
Macknochie raised several objections to the system of yearly lease. The Commissioners
had got into the agreement to revive the timber trade and to raise revenue for the
Company. They were also definite that Macknochie was proposing too large an
expenditure for the resources that existed in Malabar.35
The question became one of the legal rights of Macknochie. The Bombay government
sought the opinion of the Company solicitor. The Solicitor noted that the proposed lease
to the local merchants would be incompatible with the permission and encouragement
given to Macknochie by the Court of Directors. In its opinion, Macknochie had spent
labour and resources and would suffer great damage. The Bombay government exercised
33 Shore (1879).
34 Logan (1891).
35 MC to GinC, Bombay Revenue Consultations, 25/1/1797, f/4/39/965 , IOL.
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its power to refuse to ratify the contract drawn with the local traders, and through a letter
dated 28 February, 1797, it ordered the Commissioners to desist from reaching any
agreement with local traders.36
Macknochie started setting up the sawmill but a control on the timber in forests was
important for the success of his enterprise. The problem had to be resolved. Macknochie
used a two-fold strategy. One, he claimed that forests were the property of the Company.
Following from this, two, he made a case for an exclusive privilege for the use of forests.
In a letter dated September 15, 1797 to the Commissioners, he asserted the Company's
prerogative to the exercise of royalty on forests.37 His argument was that when Tipu
ceded the province of Malabar, he also transferred all the rights whether of conquest or
of treaty by which he had previously possessed the country. He contended that Tipu and
Hyder considered their sovereignty over teak as a part of the revenue of the province,
which they transferred to Cornwallis and which was valued at 30,000 pagodas in the
jamabandi,38
Macknochie was not importing any ideology from Europe. He was only stating the
property arrangement in Malabar in the local category of 'royal privilege'. For
Macknochie, it was a legitimate ideology to see the Company as an inheritor of Tipu's
rights. He was aware, by then, that he was going against prevalent views, noting that 'the
Company's right to this royalty seems to be denied by the Governor and Commander in
Chief.39 He countered this by quoting from Farmer's report that during Tipu's period
nothing was paid to the proprietor.40
36 Government in Malabar to CD (Revenue), 1/1/1798 and Bombay Revenue Consultations, 25/1/1797,
f/4/39/965 , IOL.
37 Macknochie to John Spencer, the President of MC, 15/9/1797, No. 1710, Malabar Diaries, Tamil Nadu






Having, thus, argued for Company's property right over forests, Macknochie set out to
establish his claims to derive a privilege from the Company.41 He alleged that the system
of forest farming had led to the destruction of forests by adventurers who had neither the
money to purchase timber, nor elephants to carry it away, and thus he should be awarded
the exclusive right to use the forests.42 Macknochie applied for an exclusive privilege of
farming forests for a sum of Rupees 10,000 a year. In the succeeding years, the amount
was to be raised.43
'Royalty': Counter-arguments
The administration in Malabar was not convinced. They argued that if an entry in
j amabandi was decisive proof of royalty, by this logic, pepper should also be a royalty.
Tipu had entered the profits in the trade of pepper in the jamabandi. The government in
Malabar made the point that monopoly in trade and royalty rights were different things
and should not to be confused.44 The government in Malabar adduced facts to counter
Macknochie's assertions. The Commissioners noted that the Supravisors45 in the early
years maintained that forests were private property, and that even Tipu had to pay the
owners for the trees he felled.46 The government in Malabar, thus, wondered why owners
would wantonly destroy their own property. It further alleged that on enquiry with
Macknochie, he could not furnish any details of names of persons destroying the forests.
He only alleged a general devastation of forests by 'every person interested in opposing
Company's right to the royalty of the forests, who had been in the practice of cutting
timber therein, and appropriating it to their own purposes'.47
41 ibid.
42 Government in Malabar to CD (Revenue), 1/1/ 1798, f/4/39/965 , IOL.
43 GinC to CD (Revenue), 21/1/1801, (Revenue), f/4/89/1843, IOL.
44 Government in Malabar to CD (Revenue), 1/1/1798, f/4/39/965 , IOL.
45 The Company administrators in Malabar were called 'Supravisors'.




The government in Malabar reviewed the proposal of Macknochie to farm forests. They
found the terms poor compared to what was offered by the local traders in Malabar. The
crowning argument of the Commissioners however, was that the Court of Directors had
imposed a general prohibition on Europeans being given a farming right. The Bombay
Government, however, with a view to give encouragement to timber trade, and
employment to his sawmill, entered in a contract with Macknochie in June 1797 for
supply of seven thousand candies of timber and planks.48 Macknochie was specifically
instructed to take care of his relations with landholders, Nairs and rajas49
In these four years since Farmer had recommended Macknochie's application, several
changes had taken place in Malabar. On October 11, 1793, the Commission was
dissolved and Farmer acquired the administration of Malabar as Supravisor.50 Farmer
finally got the chiefship of Surat in the beginning of 1794 and was succeeded in Malabar
by James Stevens as Supravisor.51 Stevens had private interests of his own, in
competition with Murdock Brown. Stevens had to resign in the middle of December,
1795 on corruption charges and was succeeded by Handley. A special Commission, the
Second Malabar Commission, was appointed in May, 1796 to investigate into the
charges of corruption against Stevens. Stevens finally was found guilty by a court in
England and given two years of imprisonment.53 Stevens claimed that Brown was his
bitterest foe and the entire case was fabricated by him.54 Wilkinson and Alexander Dow
were the members of the Commission. The Supravisor was also merged in the
Commission and thus, Handley became the third member. Wilkinson was a partner in
the Bombay Agency house of Rivett, Wilkinson and Torin.55 Subsequently, all of them,
Rivett, Wilkinson and Torin, became members of the Malabar Commission. The
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membership changed frequently but all of them were close to Murdock Brown and had
business dealings with him.56
In the context of proximity of member to Brown, it is surprising that Macknochie did not
get ready support. In the absence of information, we can only speculate. One, Farmer, his
promoter, was no more in Malabar. Two, Brown was trading actively in timber
himself.57 He had perhaps disassociated himself from Macknochie. Three, Macknochie's
claims would have created a monopoly for him and jeopardised Brown's interest.
However, what is more relevant for us is that the Commission eventually got around to
the argued position on the royalty rights of Tipu Sultan.
1.2.4 Ownership Constructed as Public-Private Property
Macknochie, to reassert himself, shifted the terrain of his contention from the legality on
the basis of jamabandi to social facts in Malabar. He submitted the findings of his
'enquiries' to the Commissioners on 24 May, 1798. Earlier, he had claimed that Tipu
Sultan had a royalty over all forests. But he had to contend with the assertion of the
Commissioners that forests were private property. The evidence of private property
could not be countered by relying on the legality ofjamabandi. It could be done by either
controverting the facts produced by the Commissioners or revising the nature of the
legality itself. Macknochie found the distinction of public and private property
convenient. He distinguished between 'the forests and jungles properly so called', over
which the Company have, he asserted 'a right of royalty' and the plantation of 'trees on




Nightingale (1970): pi 13.
57
Nightingale (1970): plOl.
58 CD to GinC (Revenue), 28/8/1800, e/4/1015, IOL.
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Thus, Macknochie jettisoned the local category of 'royal privilege' and imported the
European distinction between public and private to construct the ownership of forests in
Malabar. Through this deployment, he could still privilege the 'public', the rights of the
Company. The categories of public-private were appropriate. The claims of the
Commissioners could be conceded on 'private' forests without foregoing the rights of
the Company on the rest of the forests. Till Macknochie was compelled to introduce the
notion of public-private, he was comfortable working with the local category of
'royalty' rights.
Macknochie claimed that his views were based on a 'survey' conducted in the area.
What was to count as 'knowledge' for the Company administration was not opinion and
judgements. The knowledge had to be derived through certain procedures. For a claim
to be tenable, it had to be scientific and rational, and based on a claim of having made a
t 5 59
survey .
1.2.5 Reversion to Royal Privileges
In the light of this assertion of Macknochie, the Commissioners considered it necessary
to investigate the question of ownership of forests. According to the Commissioners,
the statement which Dow had given to the first Commission claiming private property,
seemed unsubstantiated. Further, Smee, the Superintendent of the Southern part of
Malabar, had told Macknochie that there were forests which were not mentioned in
Dow's list at all.60
The Commissioners further investigated the question. They presented the views of
Shamnath, the Minister of Zamorin6', who was employed by the Commissioners as an
informant. Shamnath testified that previous to the Mysorean conquest, all rajas and
59 GinC to CD (Revenue), 21/1/1801, f/4/89/1843, IOL.
60 MC to GinC (Revenue), 12/10/1798, No. 1715, Malabar Diaries, TNA.
61 Zamorin was the ruling family of the state of Calicut in Malabar.
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chiefs held the adjoining timber in royalty. They either cut the produce themselves, or
granted annual lease to the Mopillas, the Muslim contractors and traders. Some of the
rajas and chiefs had even mortgaged the forests. However, during Hyder and Tipu's
government, these rajas and chiefs were never allowed any rights in these forests,
which were considered and held as royalties. Following this right, Tipu had leased
forests in the southern part of Malabar for a lakh of rupees per annum, and prohibited
rajas from felling timber or catching elephants.62
Shamnath clarified that even the timber growing within the enclosures of private estate
was a royalty during the Tipu's rule. The only exceptions were the forests standing on
the enclosures of temples.63 As a proof, Shamnath pointed out that the hills or groves of
timber, even within the private enclosures, were not assessed to general revenue any
more than the other forests.64 Shamnath sounded an alarm that during the Company's
rule, the rajas had resumed their 'interference' in the forests. Shamnath's claim was
that the Company had inherited the right to forests from Tipu and it should assert its
royalty over it.65
Shamnath had given the names of two contractors who had felled during Tipu's rule.
The Commission interviewed one of the contractors, who gave contradictory and
misleading testimony. He deposed before the Commissioners that the growth of teak
only in the forests, was 'generally' deemed royalty during Tipu's administration. The
owners could not dispose of them without the government's permission. He had a
contract with Tipu, which he supplied from his own land. Even for the Commissioners,







this left the question open if he could have supplied from others without bargain with the
proprietors.66
A principal landholder, Mancherry, was also called as a witness. He deposed that the
forests were the property of the landholders. He thereby implied that these were not the
property of the rulers and rajas. For example, within the territory of Nilambur raja, he
identified many landholders who were owners of forests, including himself. He told the
Commissioners that Tipu would contract for supply of timber to mopillas and mopillas
would fell what they wanted with the consent of, and only after setting terms with the
proprietors.67
The Commissioners, however, left the counter-evidence aside and solely relying on
Shamnath's testimony concluded in their address to the Government of Bombay on 12
October, 1798,
...the teak forests may be considered royalty; at least, it is pretty evident,
they were considered in this light under the Mohammedan government.
The Commissioners seem to have concluded on ambivalent evidence, a part of the larger
politics of administration in Malabar. Commissioners in Malabar were setting a policy
for the interest of private trade in Bombay. Nightingale describes them as a 'forward
school of imperialists'.69 The Commissioners were determined to extinguish the
administrative and judicial authority of the local princes, by force if necessary. This was
to be replaced by English officials and institutions. The private traders had two
opponents. One, the rajas who sought to protect their own privileged commercial
position. Two, directors and servants of the Company who wanted to benefit the
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dangers, therefore, also combined an attack on the local institutions. Despite the protest
of Duncan, the Governor of Bombay presidency, the Commissioners insisted on forcing
the authority of the Company. In their zeal, they captured the raja of Pyche creating a
military crisis. Thus, the conclusion of Company's right over forests on ambivalent
testimony was not an isolated instance. It was a part of the general thrust of the
administration to improve the power and authority of the Company.70
The Commissioners received evidence from another landed chieftain, Tachera Taroopad.
He asserted that previous to Tipu's government, the timber forests were considered as
much private property as the rice fields. Tipu and his agents felled where they liked
without paying the proprietors but they did not stop proprietors from felling as much as
they wanted for their own use.71 He refuted that timber was a royalty. He claimed that
landholders were free to fell from their own land; even felling of teak timber was not
prohibited.72
The Government in Bombay was suspicious of the designs of the Malabar officers. The
Governor in January 1799 described the evidence as inadequate 'volumes of parole
testimony'. The Governor still considered Dow's report, which had asserted private
rights over forests, as the most informed answer. The Governor disregarded the
testimony of Shamnath, noting that Shamnath had 'insensibly and unavoidably'
supported the rights of ownership of landholders. In the judgement of the Governor,
Shamnath confused 'claims of sovereignty' and 'rights of proprietorship'. Further, the
Governor contrasted Shamnath's position with Dow's statement and came to a different
conclusion about the status of the rights in forests during Tipu's period. The Governor
also adduced other support to claim that, perhaps with the exception of a few years, Tipu
paid for felling to the forest holders. He found the evidence of other witnesses
70
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inadequate to conclude that Tipu had royalty rights. The Malabar officers were, thus, told
to re-investigate. The best sources were to be persons who had taken mortgage from the
forest holders.73 The officers were further instructed,
... nothing was to be asserted in general terms or merely as opinion
without quoting or adverting at the same time to the evidence or
probability on which each position as to matter of fact may be
founded...74
Smee, one of the Commissioners was required to report. Smee was insistent. He noted in
January 1799,
... but without incurring the imputation of interfering on private rights
and dispossessing individuals whatever Royalties existed under the
Mohammedan Government surely have by conquest ... unequivocally
vested to the Company.75
Smee claimed that under Zamorin, even the landholder entered into a contract with
moppilas and other merchants to sell timber growing on their estate. At the same time,
Zamorins as the permanent lord, could order teak for their own purposes from any of the
forests and groves of his said vassal, in the like manner as he could command their
personal assistance for military service. Smee observed that Tipu, from motives of
convenience, could extend his engagement with timber only in one principal forest of
Nilambur of district Emad. It was no surprise for him that both Manchery and Tachery
Terupad came from that area. Smee controverted Dow by alleging that 'the Sultan was
not so accommodating to his Nair subjects' as Dow had credited him. In conclusion, he
recommended to the government in Bombay that the Company's general right of royalty
should be introduced. However, the exercise of the right should be introduced only
gradually. A beginning could be made with the forest of Bollangur, in the territory of




Zamorin, the revenue charge of which had been resumed by the Company.76 Thus,
Macknochie had started in 1797 with the assertion of 'royalty' but shifted in 1798 to the
conceptual construct of public-private; by contrast, the Commission had by 1801 shifted
back to the concept of 'royalty'.
1.2.6 Forests as the Property of Landholders
In the subsequent years, the conclusion and tenor of the investigation changed.
Alexander Walker joined the Commission in early 1800. Even before this, he was a
significant presence in Malabar as the Secretary to Stuart, the military Commander. The
Governor and Stuart were based in Malabar to resolve the military crisis created by the
capture of the raja of Pyche. The military crisis and the removal of some of the
Commissioners had already brought home the point to the remaining Commissioners of
the dangers of indiscriminate interference in the local affairs. Walker shifted the enquiry
on forests from the arrangements during Tipu's tenure to the prior period. Smee had
promised never to differ with him.77 Walker was considered by the Governor- and even
the Governor-General- to be one of the ablest and most honest officers. Walker was
contemptuous of the dishonesty and inefficiency of his predecessors and was satisfied
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that Malabar had 'now fallen into more honest hands'.
Walker was clear in his reading of Malabar. He advised Duncan, the Governor of
Bombay, that despite surface appearance, it should not be assumed that the Company
had authority in Malabar. Walker cautioned,
We must not yet attempt a too indiscriminate play of sovereign power
which will either be assisted or vainly exerted.79
76 ibid.
77 Walker to Duncan, 23/4/1800, Walker Papers, MSS 13602, NLS.
78 Walker to Phip Moodford, January, 1800, Walker Papers, MSS 13606, NLS.
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Walker was of the opinion that without the support of the principal inhabitants the
authority of the government was nominal.80 In the absence of support from the
landholders, Malabar could be ruled only with the assistance of military. Walker's
solution was to change the terms of 'justice' from the rajas to the people of Malabar.81
In other words, his strategy was to build the landholders as the allies of the Company.
The perspective brought about a new position on the question of the ownership of
forests.
Walker first demolished the testimony of Shamnath, the principal evidence on which the
Commissioners had rested their claims. Shamnath testified to Walker that prior to the
Mysorean rule, the rajas of Zamorin and Cochin were in full possession of the timber
produce of their kingdoms. Walker noted that the area was far too extensive for the rajas
to have ever exercised this claim. From Shamnath's testimony, Walker showed that the
merchants would not go to a place where there were no convenient rivers,82 and thus
demonstrated that Shamnath's claims were dubious.
Similarly, Shamnath had stated that the rajas of Palghat and Vellatre had property claims
over forests. Walker contradicted that these rajas were never known to trade in timber.
Walker then questioned the entire testimony of Shamnath by alleging that he had not
adduced any argument or record to substantiate his point. According to Walker, from all
that Shamnath had reported, the only inference which could be drawn was that every area
generally acknowledged raja's authority. By Shamnath's testimony itself, in every area,
there were villages and pagodas (temples), over which some principal person presided.
In such cases, the Zamorin, the headman and the pagodas, participated in the profits of
the trade.83 Walker then brought in other evidences and said,
79 Walker to Duncan, May, 1800, Walker Papers, MSS 13602, NLS.
80 ibid.
81 Review of Administration in Malabar, by Walker, Walker Papers, MSS 13616, NLS.
82 Walker to the Board of Revenue, Bombay, 6/6/1800 Walker Papers, MSS 13609, NLS.
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I have received various particulars of information on the foregoing
subject from different persons which if not better acquainted with them
are probably less interested than Shamnath.84
Walker reported that these people had informed him that the Zamorin raja never made
any sort of trade in timber. But it was usual for merchants to purchase from individuals
without any reference to the rajas. To give credence, Walker elaborated the detailed
modality of this arrangement.85
Walker gave a new interpretation to the previously alleged royalty of Tipu Sultan.
According to Walker, Tipu had imposed prohibition only on private trade in timber. The
merchants were forced to sell their timber to the Tipu's government. Walker by
implication suggested that this was only a trade arrangement and the modality by which
o/r
the merchant obtained the timber from the proprietor was left to them.
Even prior to this, evidence of jenmkar's (landholder of Malabar) right over forests was
accumulating. Following the instructions of the Governor in Council, the President of
the Commission, John Spencer, had sent instructions in May, 1799 to George Waddell,
Acting Southern Superintendent, to ascertain the ownership of forests in his part of
Malabar. Spencer directed Waddell to ascertain whether there were private claims to the
forests within the Company's territory. Documents and proof of such ownership were to
be collected. Spencer also said that landholders in Palghat were claiming forests while
some rajas were opposing this. Waddell was to ascertain whether this was 'Muslim
innovation or ancient constitution'.87
Waddell replied on August 29, 1799 and enclosed several testimonies. Pathara





The merchants came and took permission from the jenmkar for felling trees. The
jenmkar was not obliged to ask the raja for giving a lease of his forests. Pathara was
categorical, 'The property was exclusively in him'. Similarly, the teak trees around the
house were not the property of the tenants but exclusively vested in the jenmkar.88
On the same note, Pathary Nair informed that timber was sold by the jenmkar and
deemed their property. If the raja wanted timber for his own use or for pagodas, he sent
one of his people to whom permission was given and no money charged. All trees on
compounds and pagodas belonged to jenmkars. Raja of Velatre also attested that all
timber belonged to the jenmkar and not the raja. According to him, a raja could fell
trees for the repairs of his palace or pagoda but only after taking permission from the
jenmkar. He also added that on the land of which he was the jenm (jenm was another
word for jenmkar), the forests vested in him exclusively. Waddell also produced several
documents which were copies of permission given by jenms to merchants to fell trees for
the period during and prior to the Mysorean rule.89
Waddell concluded on the above evidence and several other sources. He said,
... previous to the invasion of Malabar by Hyder Ali Nabob, there was no
such thing as any royalty or property in the timber forests or hill vested in
the different rajahs, but on the contrary the whole belonged to some or
other jenmkar, where any raja possessed one or more forests or hills
containing timber, the property was not vested in him as being the rajah
of the country but as being jenmkar of such hills or forests.90
87
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So much so that there was a term kutty kanam for giving lease by the jenmkar to the
merchants. The term kutty kanam 'is really neither more or less than the price of the tree
paid to the jenmkar'.91
Walker already had support for his claims. He, thus, concluded,
I have been informed by several intelligent men that Jenmkar are
considered the legal proprietors of hills and jungles within their
respective estates, which right they have by inheritance. So much so that
jenmkar furnish the merchant with a certificate defining the area from
which the merchant could fell the trees...Jenmkar enjoy the produce of
timber in Malabar which is universally considered their property.92
Walker then theorised on the origin of such property relations. According to him,
Zamorin raja had formerly a right to all the regions in the country producing wood. This
right he derived from earlier period. But afterwards, he divided the country among lesser
chieftains. In the uninhabited part, it is the jenm who were allowed to cut and fell as they
pleased. When Zamorin raja made this arrangement, he reserved the right to himself to
cut timber anywhere without paying for it, but every other person must pay to the jenm.
In this way, Zamorin took timber when he pleased, by sending his people into the
jungles, for his palace and pagodas.93
The Company administration admitted different and even contrary ideologies as equally
legitimate. One, the Company, as the conqueror, was the inheritor of Tipu's rights. Two,
the property arrangement could be resolved in the familiar category of public-private.
Three, Malabar was to be ruled by its 'ancient' constitution. If Macknochie and earlier
Commissioners had followed the first two positions, Walker followed the third to
constitute the jenmkars as owners of forests.
91 ibid.




Walker deployed the 'ancient' constitution to declare janmis (another name for jenmkar)
as the owners of forests. He ignored the conception of public-private, even when
Macknochie had already employed it. Instead, he constructed the property right in the
local category of janmis, owners of territory by birthright. Rights of rajas to take timber
free from owners were not constructed as a 'public' right. Instead, it was accommodated
within the political arrangement of Malabar itself. The argument was much the way
janmis had to give military service so they had to give free timber to the raja for his use.
Constructing the rights on forests in the language of public-private would have meant the
Company acquiring the 'public' right, the right of rajas to make free use of janmi's
property for their own use. Walker was clear that the Company's 'sovereignty' was not
to be introduced in Malabar in the current circumstances.
While the ownership of forests was constructed in the local categories, Walker, like the
earlier Commissioners continued to posit for janmis (as owners of agricultural lands), a
'private' property even more perfect than the British one!94 Walker did not employ
ideologies for their theoretical and conceptual rigour, nor did he work them to their
ultimate logical conclusion, by eliminating all contradictions. Instead, he deployed ideas
strategically; certain facets were selectively unfolded; and their import carefully crafted.
But Walker, despite his reputation for being able and honest, had not won. The Court of
Directors dismissed everything he had done and the installed Company as the successor
to Tipu's rights.
1.2.7 Court of Directors Reverts to Public-Private
The only mode of communication between India and London was through sea. Ships
would leave only in certain seasons, when winds were favourable. Thus, a despatch from
India could take as long as 9 months to reach London. While Walker was conducting
investigations in Malabar, the Bombay Government informed the Court of Directors that
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Smee was stubborn in maintaining the royalty claims and that the Bombay Government
had instructed the Malabar Government to do fresh enquiry to 'induce him to depart
from the opinion.95 The Court of Directors had made up their minds on the question of
property rights on forests. In fact, oblivious ofWalker's zeal, they had already declared it
unnecessary and redundant. The Court of Directors noted,
We are inclined to think that further investigation will terminate in the
same uncertainty whether forests were considered as royalty previous to
the province coming under the dominion of late Hyder Ally...If in the
neighbouring states of Travancore and Cochin, timber and elephants, as
has been asserted, are considered as royalties, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that they were so considered in the province of Malabar previous
to Mohammedan conquest.96
Even this, however, could possibly leave space for further debate. The Court of Directors
intended to crush any such possibility. They continued,
But the determination of this point does not, we conceive rest upon, this
point being ascertained. It is sufficient to know that the late Tippoo
Sultan exercised the right of felling timber as a branch of his Royal
.97
Prerogative.
Concurring entirely with Macknochie's claim, they reproduced his point that whatever
royalties existed under the Mysore province under the Tipu's government had by
'conquest and consequent cessation unequivocally become vested in the Company'.98
Having created the legal-ideological basis for Company's claim, they were reminded that
laws and legal ideas do not only have to be tenable in official conversation, but they also
had to be legitimated in the turbulent social context of Malabar. The jenmkars, oblivious
94
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of the official discourses, would have a basis for a counter-claim to the Company's
proclaimed ownership. The Court of Directors moved to address this thorny issue. They
cautioned the administration,
... utmost moderation should be observed in the exercise of this right, we
most willing adopt the distinction proposed by Mr. Macknochie, in his
very able letter upon the subject, between forests and jungles, properly so
called, and those groves and plantations described in the proceedings as
laying contiguous to or forming a part of the estates of the Rajas and
landholders of the province..." (underlining original)
The Court of Directors, endorsing the suggestion of Macknochie, directed the
government to conduct a survey to ascertain and fix the boundaries between forests and
groves. Macknochie was to lead the survey. After the survey, the private property would
be at the sole disposal of the proprietors and by the principle of exclusion, the rest would
be 'public' property fully under the control of the government. Interestingly, the Court of
Directors specifically directed Murdock Brown, because of his 'great knowledge and
experience', to be associated with Macknochie in the survey of the forests.100
The Court of Directors changed their tone of address,
... we authorise you to declare, by public proclamation, that the Company
consider the right of cutting timber in the forests as vested in them, both
by cessation and conquest, and that they will enact laws and regulations
for the preservation of that right, the breach of which will be punished in
the most exemplary manner.101
99 ibid.




1.2.8 Walker's Report and the Stubborn Court of Directors
The Court of Directors was oblivious of the findings and predilections of the
Commissioners in Malabar. In the light of the new evidence, the Court of Directors
could have revised their position. There was no question of loss of honour or prestige.
After all, in the very same question of forests, in relation to Macknochie, they had
revised their opinion several times. Macknochie had claimed that the survey, on the basis
of which he had asserted Company's right on forests in Malabar, had escalated his
estimated expenses from 1 lakh to 2,75,000 rupees of principal alone. He had pleaded to
the Court of Directors for a loan on mortgage of the sawmill.
The Court of Directors asked the Bombay government to discuss it among them and
decide. However, the Court of Directors volunteered that Macknochie has countered the
practice of felling small tree prematurely in Malabar.102 Further, they suggested that if
the Bombay government could forward the application to the Court of Directors, it could
as well grant it. In short, it was a recommendation to consider the application favourably.
In the meantime, many apprehensions were caused by the failure of Tate, a principal
merchant in Bombay. The government in Bombay then learnt that Tate was a partner of
Macknochie in the sawmill. On hearing of this, the Governor wrote to Malabar
administration on 24 June, 1799 to countermand the bond for loan. But the
Commissioners had already executed the bond. Further, it was not in circulating paper
but cash! The Bombay government pleaded to the Court of Directors that 'motive of
preference' (of Commissioners in Malabar for paying in cash) which they were unable to
specify as their letter got lost but must be 'reasonable and expedient' in the Malabar
102 CD to GinC (Revenue), 28/8/1800 (Revenue), e/4/1015, IOL.
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administration's view.103 The government in Bombay was then mortified to learn that
machinery had gone out of order and Macknochie asked for further assistance.104
With the assistance of the Sheriff and the Bombay government, Macknochie bought
Tate's share and liquidated the sawmill by handing it over to the government in Malabar.
In the course of this, Macknochie proved difficult by contending over the terms and
conditions of the loan and liquidation of the sawmill.105
In 1800, Malabar was transferred to Madras Presidency. The Madras government,
impatient with a stubborn and litigious Macknochie, asked him to quit Malabar.106 The
Court of Directors changed their position on Macknochie. They directed the Bombay
government,
...his turbulent and litigious temper should be marked by your
displeasure. We are decidedly of the opinion that he has forfeited all
pretensions of our further protection.107
Further, the Court of Directors ordered the Bombay government to cancel his
appointment as a member of the survey team.108
The Court of Directors accused Macknochie of representing himself as the sole owner
when he was only a partner. From the writer of 'able' reports and knowledgeable on
property rights on forests he became a villain. The Court of Directors noted,
... that should Macknochie ever turn from projects in mechanics to
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speculation in law, there is no Court to which he can resort...
103 GinC to CD (Revenue), 21/1/1801, f/4/89/1843, IOL.
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In the new version of the Court of Directors, the Commissioners had 'earnestly'
endorsed Macknochie's proposal to improve timber trade. The Bombay government was
not 'badly motivated in advancing the loan' and the advance was for 'the cause of the
nation'. And the Court of Directors was encouraging the 'highest public utility' of timber
supply. Thus, except Macknochie, everyone was absolved.110
If the Court of Directors wanted to, they could have found many honourable ways of
revising their opinion. But they reasserted their earlier view and summarily dismissed the
matter, 'Your proceedings have caused no alteration in the royalty position we expressed
earlier'.111
But why was the Court of Directors being stubborn? The Court of Directors, in the
beginning, when they gave support to Macknochie, were interested in developing trade
and merchandise in Malabar. However, by the end of 1800, they had realised that the
Company had drawn no benefit from the timber trade. The neighbouring Cochin and
Travancore, despite inferior quality of timber, were doing a vigorous trade in timber.
There was considerable demand for timber for shipbuilding in Bombay and the Company
itself was the sole buyer. A clear property claim over the forests could have taken away
some of the uncertainty and improved the abysmal performance of its own officials. The
King's navy was short of timber for building ships and it was becoming a distinct
possibility that frigates could be built in Bombay. These factors hardened the position of
the Court of Directors.112
noibid.
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1.2.9 Transfer of Malabar from Bombay to Madras Presidency
The corruption and inefficiency of the Bombay government became intolerable for the
Governor-General. To purge the administration of this, Malabar was transferred to the
Madras Presidency in 1800. The official reason was the geographical proximity of
Malabar to the Madras Presidency but the real reasons were inefficiency and corruption
in Malabar. The Court of Directors, however, was keen for the Bombay Presidency to
retain control over forests and forest trade. But they did not have the powers to effect the
transfer themselves. The Court of Directors and Henry Dundas, then chairman of the
Board of Control, perceived Bombay as an important commercial and strategic point.
The Court of Directors, thus, pleaded to Fort William (the office of the Governor-
General in Calcutta) that due to the port and sea route, the management of all
commercial concerns on the western coasts should be vested exclusively with
Bombay.113 The Court of Directors colluded with the Bombay Presidency and
pressurised the Madras Presidency to get forest and forest trade transferred back to the
Bombay Presidency. The Bombay government was asked by the Court of Directors to
make a case to the Governor-General that timber was of great national importance for
the King's Navy and that all the dockyards and shipbuilding were under the Bombay
Presidency. The transfer finally materialised in 1806.
Bombay Presidency was agitated by the loss of control and territory. Duncan had bitterly
complained of this loss to the President of the Board of Control. The government in
Bombay was indebted to the Court of Directors for redeeming some of it by the transfer
of forests to its control. The Bombay government had already pledged to the Court of
Directors in 1805 that in the event forests were transferred to the Bombay Presidency, it
would follow its position.114
113 CD to GOI, 2/12/1800, Banerjee (ed.) (1974).
114 GinC to CD (Public), 26/2/1805, e/4/482, IOL.
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The privileged position for the Bombay government now was not the report of Walker.
It was a memoir prepared by Wrede, a person long resident in Malabar. The Bombay
government claimed to the Court of Directors that he had prepared the report on his own
but it was actually prepared on the initiative and suggestion of Jonahan Duncan, the
Governor of the Bombay Presidency. The Bombay government perhaps felt embarrassed
abruptly changing its position. Thus, it got Wrede to say what it desired. Wrede had
relied on the claims of Tipu Sultan to establish the Company's right. However,
pragmatically, he had suggested that those who had set up their claims could be
compensated and their claims bought."5
To abide by the Court of Directors, the archives had to be reorganised. Wrede's report
made Walker's findings ambiguous and inconclusive. In contrast, the received position
was powerfully rehearsed and elaborated. A clear and categorical finding ofWalker, just
a few years back, was turned into,
Whatever might, or ought, it first have been observed in respect to the
claims of these chieftains...116
Ignoring Walker's findings, Wrede noted,
... that any part of it is private property, lies with the claimants and
hitherto, none of them has been able to make out his claim in a
satisfactory manner nor probably ever will...they have no dominial rights
over jungles, nor had their ancestors in the Zamorin's time, for after the
conquest of Hyder, it is out of all question they did not venture, nor
would they have been allowed to start such claims against his Circar..."7
The claims of the chieftains were reluctantly conceded. Wrede was writing as if he were
the Government of Bombay,
115 ibid.
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... however as we have condescended to suspend the exercise of our
royalty in its full extent, and these claimants are supposed to possess still
more influence in the contiguous districts, it may be advisable to assign
them small pensions by way of indemnity...118
The pension was subject to the assistance and co-operation from the grantees. The report
was endorsed by the Bombay government and forwarded to the Court of Directors.
The Court of Directors was only too happy in the endorsement of their 'sentiments' by
Wrede's report."9 In addition to the claim of deriving rights over forests from Tipu
Sultan, and that in the neighbouring Travancore and Cochin the Kings had rights over
forests, they reiterated Wrede,
At any rate the presumption of their being a royalty militates for the
Company as sovereign of the country.
120
This legality needed to be reconciled with the fact that landholders and chiefs were in
actual possession of forests. The Court of Directors noted,
As however the claims have unaccountably been allowed to exist to the
present period, it would not perhaps be advisable to deprive the claimants
altogether of the privileges to which they may consider themselves to be
entitled. It may therefore be proper to assign them agreeably to the
suggestions of Mr. Wrede's small pension, by way of indemnity under
the proviso that they give every assistance in their power to such persons
as may hereafter be appointed by us to the management of the forests.121
The Court of Directors, as suggested by Wrede, recommended a survey of forests for









... with a full confidence that its importance will attract your most serious
consideration, and should the result of the investigation be in our favour
(which we can by no means doubt)...122
When the surveyors took up the question of property rights, the Court of Directors
prohibited them from investigating it. They reproduced Wrede's sentence,
... their being a royalty certainly militates in favour of the Company as
sovereign of the country; the subject is however of ulterior consideration
as connected with the survey of the forests, although of very great
importance in itself which in due time we wish to be minutely
investigated.123
The 'due' time never came. The Court of Directors was determined to establish
Company's ownership over forests. They only had to peg it on a convenient idea. The
most convenient and appropriate one was Macknochie's idea of public-private. The
contesting claims of ownership of jenmkars in Malabar could be cast aside by referring
to the practices in the neighbouring states of Travancore and Cochin. The idea given by
Wrede 'their being a royalty militates for the sovereignty of the Company' was
reproduced. But how was the ownership of forests by the landholders going to militate
against Company's sovereignty? What does the sentence mean? The Company was still
the 'sovereign' in Malabar even if the question of ownership of forest was disputed. It
could not have denied its sovereignty of Bengal, even if zamindars were considered as
owners of forests.124
The Court of Directors probably did not know what the sentence meant. They may have
employed Wrede's statement without caring for what it meant. Why should we privilege
every action and utterance with a settled meaning, conceptual neatness and coherence?





the conceptual rigour of their utterances. A reference to notion of 'sovereignty' was
adequate for their purpose. However, if this was not adequate, for the Court of Directors,
the right of 'conquest' was always there.125
The Bombay government was reproducing and elaborating what the Court of Directors
had said. And the Court of Directors had just rephrased and reproduced ideas and facts,
which were reported to them. In the Company hierarchy, the supervisory and controlling
layer was dependent on other sites for the production of knowledge. Even if the Court of
Directors had information from non-official sources, these had to enter the official
discourses to be a fact for the official hierarchy to work on. But they were completely
ignorant of the realities in Malabar. Their ignorance and helplessness is apparent in their
continuous reproduction of the reports and writings originating in Malabar. Clearly, a
macro-level study, privileging the wisdom of the Court of Directors would be necessarily
flawed.
The endless reproduction, however, had profound power effects. The re-circulation from
the Court of Directors made a particular idea an authorised one in competition with other
ideas. The endorsed position was further rehearsed, strengthened, modified, adapted and
circulated. The unrestricted circulation of an idea invested it with power, authority and
respectability. With its reproduction, the idea became clear and cogent. Through these
power effects, certain opinions were elevated as knowledge and truth while others, the
opposing ones, were denigrated as errors, misconceptions and opinion. In so rehearsing
these ideas, putting them down on paper, circulating them, utterances transcended from
knowledge to the status of law.
Wrede's report had strongly recommended the Company to exploit timber itself rather
than lease it to merchants. Towards this, Wrede recommended an establishment of the
124 GGinC to CD, 6/3/1793, see Ross (1859, Vol. 2): p554-55.
125 CD to GinC (Revenue), 28/8/1800, e/4/1015, IOL.
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government to fell, draw and trade timber from the unoccupied forests. He even
nominated Macknochie as the head of the proposed establishment. Macknochie must
have been very well connected with the Bombay government. Unfortunately,
Macknochie died before he could take charge, and the establishment was created in
Malabar with Captain Watson as its head, as the Conservator. With the creation of the
Conservatorship, the question of ownership of forests in Malabar seemed settled, at least
in the official discourses.
Conclusion
To summarise the main events, after acquiring Malabar from Tipu Sultan in 1792, the
administration of the territory was entrusted to the Bombay Presidency. One of the first
Commissioners, Dow, had reported that teak growing in the province was the property of
the local landholders. But the later Commissioners took a different view on the subject.
On the recommendation of Farmer, a Commissioner in Malabar, the Court of Directors
gave a large loan to Macknochie to set up a saw mill in Malabar. Macknochie tried to
establish a right for the Company over forests and derive benefits through it. In 1800,
Walker demolished all claims of Macknochie and the prior Commissioners by
establishing that jenmkar owned the teak trees in Malabar. But the Court of Directors in
1800 and 1801 set aside the findings of Walker and claimed that through Tipu Sultan the
Company had acquired a right over teak trees. In 1806 a Conservatorship was established
in Malabar to exercise this right.
I have illustrated in this chapter that the pronouncements in official discourses were not
constrained by what the practice in Malabar was. The official discourses were
autonomous in producing knowledge on the ownership of forests in Malabar. The Court
of Directors refused to consider the detailed investigation of Walker by summarily
dismissing it and claiming Company's rights over forests. I have also shown that
Company officials produced, disseminated, understood, deployed and extended ideas on
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the ownership of forests in Malabar in a specific context with the intention of producing
desired results or engaging with concrete problems in hand. Macknochie first understood
and explained the arrangement in terms of 'royalty' rights. This was the best means of
securing Company's claims from whom he could derive benefits. When this position did
not produce results, he jettisoned the local category of 'royal privilege' and imported the
European distinction between public and private. Walker deployed the 'ancient'
constitution on Malabar society to claim that the jenmkars were the owners of forests.
He deployed the theory only to the extent it was necessary to sustain his claim. If he
followed this theory beyond a point, since in local conception the rajas had a claim of
free timber for their use, he would have ended up conceding rights for the Company. The
Court of Directors merely reproduced ideas propagated by Macknochie. Later, they
reproduced a line from Wrede's report that did not make much sense. It went 'At any
rate the presumption of their being a royalty militates for the Company as sovereign of
the country'.
In this context, we can see the problem with Chakrabarty's argument that the notion of
public-private was distinctly a colonial introduction in India. Colonial officials, having
internalised the concept of public-private from their social context of Europe, in the
context of colonial domination, its introduction was inevitable.126 In thus arguing,
Chakrabarty endows a fixity to the conceptions of public and private. I do not deny that
the conception of public and private right was learnt from Europe. What I have shown is
that several ideas were generally available. Company officials did not adopt an idea on
the basis of its origin. An idea was selected for its suitability for substantiating a
particular position. Similarly, the idea was understood, explained and unfolded to
strengthen the claim of a particular position.
In the social practices in Malabar, however, the landholders and chiefs had maintained a





it was imperative for it to recognise the claims. Yet, the claims of landholders and chiefs
did not determine the legal theory. The Company maintained a monopoly on production
of legal knowledge and made this sphere independent of immediate constraints. Thus, it
could be arbitrary in inventing the 'truth' of the pre-British law in Malabar. Having made
the theory, the constraints were recognised not as a legal right but a 'pension' grated 'ex-
gratia'.121 The local constrains could be described as exception and concession, and thus
consigned to the periphery of the theory. The law was taken to Malabar within this
political economy. On the request of the Bombay government, the Madras Presidency
handed it over the forests of Kanara also in 1806. A Conservatorship was established in
1806 to exercise Company's rights over forests in Malabar and Kanara. In the next
chapter, I explore how the theory of ownership propounded in the official discourses
fared in the social and administrative context of Malabar and Kanara.
127 BPP, 26/2/1805, p/343/20, IOL.
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CHAPTER 2
DISCOURSE TO SOCIAL PRACTICES: IMPOSITION AND
ABOLITION OF COMPANY'S RIGHTS, 1807-1823
Introduction
The Conservatorship in Malabar was based on the legal theory of 'sovereign' right over
'public' forests. But this was only a declaration in the official discourses. The categories
of public and private were imposed on the insistence of the Court of Directors. Leaving it
at this would be privileging or relying alone on the ideas produced by the upper layer of
the administration or the official discourses. The official discourses need to be related to
the social and administrative practices. In practice, the Company could not deploy these
ideas into practices. This would have ruptured the social life in Malabar. Thus, there
were contradictions between pronouncements and practices. In these gaps between
official discourses and social practices, we should expect ambiguity, confusion,
contradictions and co-existence of competing ideas.
The Court of Directors while pronouncing their theory, as we noted in the last chapter,
had advised caution. Appropriate bridges were built between official discourse and social
practice by making a provision for pension for the persons who claimed ownership over
forests. The Conservator paid the landholders 'pension' before felling timber they
'alleged' were theirs. As a result, the existing arrangement was understood differently by
different groups. The landholders understood the pension as the kutty kanam, their claim
to a fee on each tree felled by the contractors, a well-recognised law in the Malabar
society. Thus, seen from their point of view, the local law of Malabar was being
respected and followed by the Company. The Madras Government understood the social
arrangement within the jenm's notion of property. The Bombay government and the
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Court of Directors understood that they had established their 'public' and 'sovereign'
rights over forests.
These contradictions and ambivalence were productive of law. It created a possibility for
the new legal ideas, pronounced in official discourses, to circulate and over a period of
time engulf the practice. But this was only a possibility. As it happened in Malabar, a
new and zealous Conservator disrupted the arrangement. He extended the monopoly of
the Company without paying any pension. This created resentment among the local
inhabitants. By 1815, the Madras government, charged with the administration of the
area, became intolerant of the Conservatorship. It campaigned with the government in
Calcutta and got the Conservatorship abolished in 1823. With this, all the construction of
law that had taken place since 1792 was razed to the ground. But the categories of public
and private were imposed in Mala' r on the insistence of the Court of Directors. This
became the authorised language for communication within the administration. The more
the Madras government disputed the property rights over forests with the Bombay
Presidency, the more it transformed the jenm's right into the language of public and
private. Eventually, the 'sovereign' lost the forests but the categories of public and
private circulated to become the conceptual categories for the state to understand the
property arrangement in Malabar.
2.1. Conservatorship and Malabar Administration
Almost immediately after resuming the charge of the Conservatorship in 1806, Captain
Watson proposed a regulation to arm him with authority. Madras government found this
unacceptable. It had agreed to the supervision and use of government forests by the
Conservator. However, it had not anticipated that the Conservator would impinge on
general administration and affect the rights of the people. In Madras's opinion, such
powers were to be exercised only by the Collectors and Magistrates. The Madras
government expressed its reservation that the creation of the Conservatorship was not
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intended to give him 'powers which might infringe on the positive right of the
inhabitants'.1 It refused to enact a regulation vesting powers in the Conservator.2 On the
persistence of the Bombay government, the Madras government issued a proclamation in
April 1807, declaring the Company's rights over forests. The proclamation declared,
The Honourable Court of Directors having resolved to assume the
sovereignty of the forests in the province of Malabar and Canara and to
place them under the superintendence and control of the Government of
Bombay, the government has deemed it expedient to appoint an officer to
the special charge of the forests, with the title of Conservator, whose
particular duty it will be to see that no injury is done to the forests, and
that no timber is cut in them without special authority of government.
All persons are accordingly hereby prohibited from cutting and
destroying teak forests in the province of Malabar and Canara or from
taking away the young plants on pain of being proceeded against as
plunderers of public property.3
Problems with the authority of the Conservator started almost immediately. Doughlas, a
Company servant, complained to the Judge and Magistrate of Tellichery in September
1807, that the Conservator's establishment had detained and seized his timber.4 Watson
argued that he could not execute his duties to prohibit illicit felling of trees from public
forests 'without infringing the rights and interests of individuals'.5 The Judge was in
'considerable doubt' with the contentions of the Conservator.6 However, on the grounds
that it was a temporary measure for gathering information, the Judge permitted the
practice.7 The Conservator's establishment moved from one dispute to another. This
time it was a complaint of the merchants of Malabar. The Court of Directors had
1 Minute recorded by William Thackeray, see 'Timber Monopoly and Malabar Forests', in 1822,
f/4/777/21016, IOL. Hereafter Thackeray's Minute (1822).
2 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
3 MRC, 25/4/1807, p/276/13, IOL.






summarily dismissed jenm's notion of property in favour of 'sovereignty' on 'public'
forests. But the local people were insistent on the jenm's notion of property.
The complaint of the merchants was in February 1808 to the Judge of Tellichery about
the timber monopoly. The merchants were aggrieved that the Conservator was
appropriating the 'private' rights in timber of the landholders.8 The Judge tried to
persuade them that 'the forests and all uninhabited waste were the prerogative of the
ruling power'.9 But the merchants persisted and claimed, as reported by the Judge, that
the landholders had
... obtained their right to the forests of Malabar precisely in the same way
and hold them by the same tenure as they do every other description of
landed property, and that therefore if the government annihilated the one,
their property in the other becomes extremely precarious.10
It is curious that the merchants were anxious about the ownership rights of the
landholders. The reason was that in Malabar timber could be extracted only if one had
the means of carriage. Without this, timber had no value. Only the merchants had the
capital and resources to extract and transport timber. Thus, they had interests in the
ownership of the landholders. The continued ownership of landholders was essential for
them to find access to the forests.
The Judge observed 'there is no doubt but that large tracts of these forests have
escheated to the government'.11 For the Judge, a conclusive proof was that timber
supplies had been obtained at one-tenth the price without a murmur or objection from
the inhabitants.12 For the merchants, however, there was no question of any right vesting







in the Company. The Judge reported that they were clear that the property in forests had
always vested in the jenmkars.
The Madras officials were also defending and working within the jenm's notion of
property. In September 1807, Thackeray, a member of the Board of Revenue, despite the
finality given by the Court of Directors to property right of the Company over forests,
was emphasising the jenmkars as the owners. He was not only claiming the 'truth' of a
past practice but also asserting it as a legitimate practice which had continued in
Malabar. He stated,
Nairs who preferred to the proprietary rights in the trees and soil, have
actually exercised this right by selling and mortgaging the trees to
Moppilah merchants. In order to establish the monopoly on sure grounds
and just principles, the Company ought to buy up the rights of individuals
if there are private owners whose claims it is likely that the courts of
judicature will acknowledge. Having purchased these rights, and either
bought up or relinquished the trees which have been actually sold or
mortgaged to the merchants, the Company will possess the sole property
in the soil and in the trees.13
The previous year, the merchants had petitioned to Thackeray against the Conservator's
monopoly. He had recommended to the government that if the rights of proprietors were
bought, the merchants would have no basis for complaint.
The Madras government was concerned about the claims of the timber merchants. It sent
a copy of the petition to Bombay and demanded that the Conservator's operations should
be confined to 'such only of the forests as were undoubtedly public property'.14 It
dragged in the authority of the Court of Directors to assert that they could not have
intended to sanction the Bombay government to infringe on private rights. The Madras
13 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
14 MJC, 29/3/1808, p/322/31, IOL.
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government threatened, 'in the event any obstacle arises to the occupation of the duties
confided to Watson, they would form the proper object of regulation'.15
While the Madras government was trying to prevent encroachments on the private rights
of the inhabitants ofMalabar, the Court of Directors was urging the Bombay government
to get revenue and supplies out of forests. They directed,
...after the blood and treasure expended by us in obtaining them, fairly
look for some benefits from them.16
The Bombay government pledged its obedience to the Court of Directors by claiming
that they had established the sovereignty of the Company on the forests of Kanara and
Malabar.17
The occasion for the Madras government to insist on a regulation soon arose. A person
complained to Judge Ibberton on June 27, 1814, that a log of teak purchased from
Cochin, having paid duty before, was detained for second duty. The party contended that
the seizure was illegal. The Conservator's contention was that the produce of Cochin and
Travancore was not exempt from taxation. The Judge demanded from Fell, the next
Conservator, the document which authorised him to levy an impost upon timber,
imported by sea from countries not within the Company's jurisdiction and totally
unconnected with government forests in Malabar. Fell had none. He merely alleged that
any wood which was floated on river whether from interior or foreign country had to pay
duty.18
The Government of Madras wrote to Bombay government that the rights and duties of
the Conservator were not recognised or supported by any of the regulations of the
15 ibid.
16 CD to GinC, 13/11/1811, f/4/429/10507, IOL.
17 GinC CD (Public), 21/12/1811, f/4/348/8156, IOL.
18 MJC, 26/7/1814, p/323/9, IOL.
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Madras government. As a result, many of his routine activities were illegal. Further,
since the Conservator's establishment was not recognised by law, he could not appear
before a court in his official capacity. Madras noted to the Bombay government that the
incidence of interference with private rights had become frequent and intolerable.
Madras government felt that the time had come to regulate the functions of the
Conservator, and it suggested that the Bombay government should prepare a draft
regulation and submit it for review. The Madras government considered it important to
remind the Bombay government,
It may be unnecessary to add that the regulation will require to be framed
with due regard to the interests and rights of individuals and of the
community at large...19
While the Bombay government was still preparing a draft, the want of a regulation
surfaced again. A merchant had filed a suit against the Conservator claiming money. But
the Courts did not have an authority to summon the Conservator.
The first Conservator, Watson, had maintained a balance among the competing interests.
The nature of right over forests was constituted differently in different discourses. The
Court of Directors had ordered in the notion of public and private. Bombay government
thought it had established its 'sovereignty' over forests. Madras and the local people
continued to look at the forest rights in terms of the jenm 's notion of property.
The burden of the entire theory, however, was on the Conservators. They had to show
results. To them it did not matter which theory was used as long as timber was extracted.
'Pension' served the bridge between theory and social context. The Court of Directors
had suggested a small 'pension' for the chieftains. Captain Watson in 1807, instead of
giving a pension to the claimants to forest property, proposed payment on the basis of




economical and also, acceptable to the local people. Effectively, Watson was proposing
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the continuation of kutty kanam. While for the Madras government it was the purchase
of a right. Local people could see the pension as price for their ljenm' right. Thus, the
official pronouncement of the law of 'public' ownership of forests by the Court of
Directors had to confront other discourses and practices in Malabar. In this negotiation,
the social practices in Malabar could not be transformed abruptly. Watson had
successfully managed a balance by buying up the rights of the proprietors.21 However,
things had changed after Fell took charge in 1809.22 He had extended the monopoly even
to teak growing on private estates. Further, as the Judge noted,
... it is evident to me that irregularity and frauds of various kinds are very
likely to occur in the forest Department and that the merchants employed
in the trade must be subjected to occasional vexation and possible
extortion, which they would be diffident of complaining of.23
2.2. Madras Officials and Bombay's Draft Regulation
On May 12, 1815, the Madras government received a draft regulation from Bombay. It
forwarded the draft to local officers in Malabar and Kanara for their comments. Apart
from levying a duty on all timber, the draft asserted Company's sovereignty over forests.
The provision of the draft over the question of ownership came in for severe criticism.
Pearson, the Judge and Magistrate of South Malabar, commented on the total silence on
the extent of public and private forests in Bombay's draft regulation. Citing a letter from
Bombay in 1806, He claimed that the timber in the inhabited part of the country was the
property of the landholders, and jungles forming the eastern boundaries of the province
were undoubtedly the right of the Company. According to him, Watson had respected
20 Bombay Public Consultations, 21/8/1807, p/343/48, IOL.





this distinction but Fell took an extended view of the Company's rights. Under Fell's
Conservatorship, all teak, whether on forests, mid-land district or gardens near the coast
were all considered the property of the government and no tree could be felled without
his permission.
Pearson suggested that the distinction between public forests and private property should
be based on jamabundy (statement of revenue chargeable on an estate) and piyamashee
(revenue on the basis of measurement of land) accounts.24 The assessed lands were to be
private property and unassessed lands were to be public.25
Thackeray disagreed most vehemently with Pearson's suggestion. He contended,
The distinction does not depend upon what is assessed or not assessed,
but upon what really is, or is not, private property and any other
r\r
distinction is unjust...
In these claims, the Madras officials at times were presenting the jenm's notion of
property and other times converting the jenm 's claim in the language of public-private.
Thus, commenting on the draft regulation in 1815, Warden, the Collector of Malabar,
was at once undermining the notion of public-private and upholding jenm's notion of
property. He pointed out that the proprietary right of the Company was assumed under
orders from England. He implied that the theory imposed by the Court of Directors had
no basis in the social and historical context of Malabar. As if to substantiate the point, he
expressed satisfaction that in practice, the local notion of property in forests had
prevailed,
... the manner of the assumption, as carried into effect by the first
Conservator Watson, gave general satisfaction to the Rajas, chieftains
and others who as proprietors had therefore received the profits arising
24 MJC, 4/8/1815, p/323/18, IOL.
25 ibid.
26 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
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from the products of the forests. Their rights as proprietors were so far
recognised and attended to, as to subject the government or the
contractors employed in felling timber to pay them the customary fee
called 'kuty kanum' on every teak that was cut down.27
'Public-private' had started its career as an imagination of the Court of Directors. In fact,
it was an imagination of others borrowed by the Court of Directors. But a
communication between Bombay and Madras over the powers of the Conservator and
forest rights was possible only in the language of 'sovereign' and 'public-private'. The
Court of Directors had legitimated these terms. As Warden put it, 'the proprietary to the
forests having already been assumed by the government, that is a question which can
admit of no discussion'. However, he was translating the substantive jenm rights in the
language of public-private. He thus objected that in the proposed regulation the section
'declaratory of the sovereignty of the Company over property of the forest and royalty'
denied the kutty kanam rights prevalent in Malabar.28
Warden was of the opinion that the public forests were those on the base of the ghats,
uninhabited where trees grew spontaneously or without human aid. He emphasised that
the Court of Directors could not have intended to exceed this limitation. For Warden, the
Collector's revenue records could not be the basis for deciding uninhabited and inhabited
parts. He recommended a joint commission of judicial, forest and revenue officers to
ascertain the private and public rights.29
If the government of Bombay had concluded the property right of the Company because
the local people could not prove their rights, Harris, the Collector of Kanara, inverted the
onus of proof. Since no document declaring the royalties could be found, he concluded
that the inhabitants had the right to the forests. According to him, immemorial usage had





guaranteed to the farmers the rights in forests.30 Commenting on the draft regulation, he
asserted for a prescriptive right of the inhabitants of the hills contiguous to estates.
According to him, these rights were in vogue since the Bednore government in 1660 AD.
The forests of Sonda and Soopah had been considered government's property but village
communities had their common right of cutting, grazing, gathering leaves and manure
within certain distance around each village. Further, if a rigid view of property in forests
was to be taken 'the more beneficial extension of agriculture will never take place'. And
arguing on the grounds of equity, 'But it would in a great measure interfere with the
actual welfare of the most abject race of our subject, equally as deserving our
protection'.31
2.3. Abolition of Monopoly
The Madras government sent their comments to the Bombay government in 1815. The
Bombay government did nothing for six years. In 1821, they returned a revised draft.
The new preamble declared that following the 'conquest of Tipu Sultan's right', the
Company had acquired 'sovereign rights' on forests and the government had 'to assert
and maintain the said just and unquestionable rights'. The Court of Directors had
approved of Warden's recommendation to ascertain the claims of public and private
through a survey and directed its incorporation in the draft regulation. But the Bombay
government had omitted this. Instead, it adopted Pearson's distinction of assessed and
unassessed lands.32
Madras government did not take kindly to the unwarranted delay and tactics of the
Bombay government. Thackeray, the earlier Collector of Malabar and then a Member of
the Madras Board of Revenue, wrote a minute making a case for abolition of the
30 Harris to Board of Revenue, 13/9/1820, MBOR, 25/9/1820, p/293/64, IOL.
31 ibid.
32 Copy of the Draft Regulation, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
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Conservatorship itself. Thackeray, as we have seen before, had dismissed Pearson's
views as erroneous. He accused Bombay government of deliberately following Pearson's
suggestions. He commented that this was to,
... continue to the Conservator these indefinite powers of interference
with private property, of which it is so desirable to deprive him.33
Complaints against the Conservatorship had accumulated over the years. Thackeray
consolidated these and made a scathing attack. He described the Conservatorship as 'an
arbitrary and unjust system' which overlooked the rights and interests of men the Madras
government was bound to protect.34 Thackeray alleged that in the ambiguity of the extent
of public and private forests, the Conservator was continuously encroaching on the rights
of rajas and ryots to strengthen his monopoly. He argued that the Court of Directors
never intended to give the Conservator,
...arbitrary powers to confiscate private property and levy duty on timber
as he pleased without regard to custom, justice, or even law, for all his
acts beyond these have been illegal.35
Describing the monopoly as a major grievance, Thackeray alleged,
... the only beneficiary are the shipping interests in Bombay and
individuals whom it gives appointments... Bombay should not be raised
at the expense of Malabar, of justice and general policy... Why should the
Conservator impoverish and disgust their subjects in Malabar, to supply
the merchants of those provinces... The Collectors of Canara and Malabar
have much more means of information and influence than the insulated
Conservator. They will have much more encouragement to preserve and
or
plant trees than double foreign management.
33 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
34 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
35 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
36 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
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The Madras government's antagonism to the Conservatorship could be explained as
rivalry within the administration. Timber trade was exempted from payment of duty,
reducing the revenue of the Madras presidency.37 The Conservator had sold timber from
Sonda, above the ghats in Kanara, to the neighbouring Maratha peasants. The Madras
Presidency had vigorously asserted that this was not timber export but inland trade. The
earnings should have been considered as land revenue and accrued to the Madras
Presidency.38 Shipbuilding had moved out of Malabar affecting the prosperity of
Malabar.39 The Conservatorship had created other impediments. Madras was keen to
maintain good relations with the neighbouring states of Cochin and Travancore. But the
Conservator had created ill feeling by insisting on the payment of duty on timber passing
through Company territory in Malabar.40
The Madras Presidency need not have opposed the legality of ownership of forests in
order to retrieve forest management from the Bombay Presidency. After all, if it got back
the control of territory, it would have already surrendered its right on forests to the local
people. There was a lot more than simple administrative rivalry. Since 1800, there was
intense tussle within the Company administration in India and England to reverse the
Permanent Land Settlement by the ryotwari Settlement. Thomas Munro was the
champion of the ryotwari system and had supporters in the administration in Madras and
also in the Court of Directors and Board of Control in England.41 His appointment as
Governor in Madras was a sign of a changing mood in the administration in England.
Within the ryotwari system, the cultivator was constructed as the bearer of legal rights
on land. The land and land revenue was to be settled with him. Defending the ryotwari
Settlement was defending the rights of the ryots. How were the contradictory notions of
37 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
38 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
39 Thackeray's Minute (1822).
40 A minute by Thomas Munro Timber Monopoly in Madras and Canara', 26/11/1822, printed in ed.




property in forests in Malabar and privileging of ryots managed in the official
discourses?
Thomas Munro, on becoming the Governor of Madras Presidency, took up the
Conservatorship issue aggressively to bring the monopoly to an end. As we noted in
Chapter 1, the Court of Directors had merely uttered 'sovereign' rights over forests,
borrowing it from Wrede's memoirs, without bothering about its meaning and import.
The Bombay government had parroted this claim. Munro asked,
...when the Conservator assumed sovereignty of the forests, that term
should have been clearly defined, if it meant proprietary right, the
assumption should have extended only to forests belonging to the
government, and their limits should have been accurately ascertained, if it
meant the right of presumption, the sovereignty should have been
exercised only with respect to the trees required for national purposes,
and provisions should have been made for affording ample
indemnification to those over whom it is exercised.42
On the question of indemnification for rights on forests, Munro resumed the position of
Warden and Thackeray about the local arrangements which had prevailed in Malabar
before and after Tipu's rule. Munro noted,
Under the Native Princes and under our own government, before the
appointment of the Conservator, the trade and timber was perfectly free,
subject to a duty of exportation. Every ryot planted or cut down at
pleasure on his own property. Part of his property consisted of hills, some
near, others remote, from his habitation. On these hills he occasionally
cleared away spots in succession for cultivation, by selling or burning the
trees without any interference whatever, because they were his property
as much as his rice fields, and were included in the deeds of the sale of
, . 43
his estate.
42 Munro to GinC, Bombay, 2/12/1822, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
43 Munro's minute (1822): pl84.
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Munro cautioned that the use of timber for domestic and agricultural purposes should not
have been obstructed.44 According to him, 'immemorial usage' constituted a private
property and, he asserted, 'it could not be taken from him without a violation of private
property and administration both of his income and of the revenue'. 45
Thus, the established legality of public-private was again being questioned by bringing
in the local system and practices. Public-private was instituted by the Court of Directors
and could not be wished away. But Munro was being subversive in restoring local
proprietors. He said,
In order to protect the property of the public and of individuals in the
forests, their limit must first be ascertained, and this can only be done by
46
a survey.
According to Munro, however, a fair survey could be done as long as the
Conservatorship existed. Munro hoped,
By abolishing the monopoly, private rights will at once be secured by
each man looking, as formerly, after his own... and the inhabitants will
easily adjust their respective rights when they are freed from the
intervening authority of the Conservator.
In negotiating the property rights on forests, there was another play. Thackeray and
Munro, in constructing the local practices, replaced ryot for proprietor and jenm. Ryot
emerged triumphant as a bearer of private rights on forests. Ryotwari system privileged
the rights of ryots and paternalistic governance of the Collector. Munro noted,
Let the public be guarded by its ancient protector; not a stranger, but the
Collector and Magistrate of the country, and we shall get all the wood the
country can yield, more certainly than all the restrictive measures.47
44 Munro to GinC, 2/12/1822, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
45 Munro's minute (1822): pl84.
46 Munro's minute (1822): pl83-4.
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The Madras government finally won. The Conservatorship was abolished in 1823. After
the abolition of the monopoly, in Malabar the forests were constituted as private property
of the landholders. In the final section of this chapter, I explore how the property law on
forests further unfolded in Malabar.
2.4. Malabar: Construction of Private Ownership
The government in Bombay had anticipated the outcome of the outrage of the Madras
officials. At this late stage, there was no point in opposing the abolition of
Conservatorship. The best was to accept it graciously. The Bombay government itself
argued that the abolition of the Conservatorship would not have adverse effects. It
brought to notice that shipbuilding for the Navy at Bombay was in any case being
terminated. It further reasoned that the abolition of monopoly would make available
timber at cheaper prices.48 The amicable pronouncements, however, were only at the
level of the governments in Bombay and Madras. Just the opposite was happening in
Malabar. The Conservator's establishment ran away to Bombay with all the records.
They did not even communicate with the Principal collectors in Malabar and Kanara
about the existing arrangements.49 Madras Presidency had to plead to be returned back at
least the files on property rights on forests.50
After the abolition of the monopoly, even after a lapse of 20 years, the persons, 'who had
held possession of them on the first occupation of the province by the Company's
government' resumed the right over forests.51 From a ruler, one never takes, it is always
given away. The Madras government abandoned forests 'to the neighbouring rajas and
47 Munro's minute (1822): p 186.
48 GOB to GOM, 24/4/1823, MRC, 16/5/1823, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
49 MRC, 17/10/1823, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
50 ibid.
51 Falconer (1852): pi79.
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landholders'.52 The timber merchants got what they had struggled for. The exploitation
of the forests started on the initiative of the timber agencies which had ceased to exist
after the establishment of the Conservatorship.
Soon, the Marine Department at Bombay complained of shortage of quality timber at
reasonable price. In 1830, the Bombay government requested the Indian Navy Board, the
concerned body of timber users, to submit a report on the Malabar forests with the view
to continued timber supplies. In 1831, the Navy Board complained that with the
abolition of the Conservatorship, the accessible forests near the river banks had
completely disappeared and inferior timber was being felled. The supply of quality
timber meant higher extraction costs in drawing timber farther from the rivers. The
Marine Board reasoned that this required elephants and labour which most contractors
could not afford. The Marine Board, thus, looked back to the happy days of the
Conservatorship by strongly advising its reconstitution.53
The request was communicated for a decision to the Madras Board of Revenue. Having
successfully wrested control of forest and forest trade from Bombay, Madras had passed
the onus to Bombay for any reform. The Board remained silent for seven years. On
prodding, it promised to make enquiries. It also forwarded a report by Clemenston, the
Collector of Malabar, on the proposal to re-introduce the Conservatorship. The report
had been submitted to the Board on April 3, 1834. On the abolition of the
Conservatorship, Clemenston said that this,
... was obviously to afford protection to the inhabitants of Malabar
against any encroachment on their private property. That the monopoly
which prevailed until 1823 was an encroachment upon private rights and
property, has been established beyond doubt... I confess I am at a loss
how any infringement can be laid without infringing upon private rights,
for with the exception of certain forests in the talooks of Palghaut,
52 Falconer (1852): pl79.
53 MBOR, 28/4/1831, p/298/9, IOL.
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Temalpooram and Wynaad which belongs to the Government, all rest are
private property.54
To ward off the encroachment of Bombay, Clemenston asserted that there were strong
private rights on forests in Malabar. The proposed Conservatorship could then be pitted
against this firmly established private right. In this contest, the Conservatorship would
inevitably infringe private rights. Clemenston further anticipated that the proposed
Conservator's establishment would have imposed restrictions on the felling of young
teak trees. He wanted to crush this option even before it could be suggested. Shefield, a
Collector before Clemenston, in a letter to Board, dated December 25, 1828 had
proposed prohibition of young teak trees under a heavy penalty. Clemenston rebuked that
the imposition would infringe private ownership and that this point had escaped the
attention of the earlier Collectors. Clemenston asserted,
I cannot concur as it will be an illegal interference with private rights,
which would be not only inconsistent with the liberal views of
Government, but one which would, I fear excite the greatest discontent;
all that can be done to discourage in some degree a practice which is
likely to be injurious to our maritime interests, is impose duty.55
The prevailing view of private property on which Clemenston relied was that it was
absolute and unfettered and could not be regulated and modified. According to
Clemenston, even in a 'public' cause, restrictions on felling would have been a direct
interference with private property and rights. A duty, however, was acceptable. This
would have only indirectly discouraged felling of under-sized timber. There were further
reasons for insisting on a duty. A duty was a revenue to the account of the Malabar
administration headed by the Collector, and a restriction, an arduous obligation.
The Marine Board and the Bombay Presidency continued to mount pressure. They were
sending independent commissions and agents to Malabar to assess the availability of
54 MBOR, 17/4/1834, p/299/35, IOL.
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timber during the late 1830s. Underwood, the Collector of Malabar in 1839, realised the
urgency of addressing the availability of quality timber. He lamented that the unoccupied
land on which the Conservatorship had effectively created government ownership had
again fallen into private hands.
Clemenston had produced the 'law' to suit his requirements. Underwood had to
surmount this precedent. He recollected that the proclamation of 1807 had constituted
the Company's right over public forests. The argument ran that those rights had not been
relinquished by any subsequent proclamation or by the measures of the Conservator.56
Underwood argued that the decision to abolish the Conservatorship was only an
administrative arrangement, and was not intended to give away the Company's rights
over forests. In support, Underwood relied on a letter from the Secretary to the
Government of Madras to the Madras Board of Revenue, issued after the abolition of the
Conservatorship. The government had ordered, next to permitting people to use the
resources,
... to secure the valuable property in the public forests from fraudulent
and wanton injury... The principal collectors should actually inquire and
examine the extent of public forests, the precise nature of the right of
property in them...57
Underwood lamented that the Board did not take prompt action by making definite
arrangements. They had merely awaited reports from the local officers regarding 'tenures
of forests in Malabar and Canara, the extent of the tracts they occupy and the nature of
their produce'.58 Following the legal position, Underwood argued that the government
never intended to abandon its rights to the forests. He asserted that the government
possessed a 'much stronger claim upon the forests than they assume'.59
55 ibid.
56 MBOR, 10/10/1839, p/302/10, IOL. Hereafter Underwood's Report.





Underwood drew a parallel with the neighbouring states of Cochin and Travancore. He
pointed out that the rajas of these states, taking a hint from Tipu, 'seized the forests
which they appear never to have relinquished, and if their right be one of assumption,
and yet be recognised as a legal tenure'.60 Underwood was of the opinion that the
government could 'with equity and propriety' assert their claims to the royalty in the
limited sense of imposing restrictions.61 Through this reasoning, Underwood was
attempting to loosen the unfettered rights of the individuals and make claims for the
Company to impose restrictions. Underwood recommended that the Company could
f\j
revive its right by issuing a proclamation.
The Board of Revenue questioned Underwood's recommendations. It doubted if the
royalty after having been abandoned for a considerable period could be legally revived
through a proclamation. The Board advised a reference to the legal authorities. It further
circumscribed, even if a proclamation were issued. The Board was of the conviction that
the term 'royalty' should be carefully defined to mean merely the right to prevent the
indiscriminate felling of timber and not to include any right for the government. The
Board, thus, conceded the possibility of prohibiting the felling of small and undersized
timber. However, they were categorical that administration should be left in the hands of
(\\
the revenue officers and no independent authority should be set up.
The Court of Directors were convinced that the Government had 'no pretension' to the
proprietorship of the forests.64 They rephrased Underwood to conclude,
...that in the time of the ancient rajahs the forests were held as private




63 MBOR, 7/11/1839, p/302/13, IOL.
64 CD to GOI, 30/11/1842, e/4/772, IOL.
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the country, and after its cession to the Company they were taken
possession of on behalf of the latter...65
The Court of Directors, however, conceded that having abandoned the forests to the
original proprietors for many years,
it would be no less unjust than impolitic to revive a claim to them which
seems never to have had any other foundation than Tippoo's
usurpation.66
Compare this formulation with that in 1800 where, despite counter-evidences, the Court
had insisted on 'Tipu's right'. It now became 'Tipu's usurpation'. The Court of Directors
was gratified to find that there was no intention of acting on the suggestion of
Underwood to re-assert the right of the government.
Thus, the official discourses on forests were not independent of social practices in
Malabar. Indeed, the official discourses picked up the strategies from the micro-site,
elevated it to the status of legality and legitimated it as a practice. The Court of Directors
followed the earlier recommendation of only imposing a duty.
Conclusion
The Conservator's establishment since its beginning in 1806 in Malabar and Kanara got
into problems with the Madras administration. The Conservator felt justified in
intervening and imposing on the local people to guard forests and levy duty. This was
unacceptable to the Madras government. The Madras government considered dealing
with the local people its exclusive concern. The relationship deteriorated further with a
new Conservator who disrupted the delicate balance by extending the Company's





the Madras Presidency became insistent on the abolition of the Conservatorship and
regaining control of the Malabar and Kanara forests. The Bombay Presidency tried to
retain the control but was unsuccessful. The Conservatorship was abolished in 1823. The
Madras government left the forests for the original proprietors to take control.
In this chapter I have shown that the pronouncements of the upper layers of the
administration (the texts) on forest law, should not be privileged as representative of the
entire field of social life. These need to be seen in conjunction with what they represent—
the social practices. The Court of Directors could pronounce the 'sovereign' right over
'public' forests in Malabar. But it could not arbitrarily dispossess the local proprietors of
their forests. 'Pension' for the 'alleged' proprietors was the link between the official
discourse and social practice. The local people constructed the pension as a continuation
of their kutty kanam rights while the Bombay government and the Court of Directors
claimed that the Conservatorship had established the 'sovereign right over 'public'
forests.
These gaps, confusion, ambivalence between discourse and practice and the co-existence
of contradictory constructions are not a matter for regret. These were productive of law.
Law got into motion because of these contradictions and ambiguities. Further, the
linkages between official discourses and practices were not static. The conflicting
interpretations tended to extend their domains. We see two illustrations of this process.
Firstly, social practices subverted the extension of official discourses. The Company
could not establish its rights over forests. Secondly, official discourses extended over
practices to establish the categories of public and private for understanding the property
rights. I will summarise below how these processes worked.
The Madras government contested with the Bombay Presidency over the continuation of
the Conservatorship. The communication could take place only in the language of
sovereign and 'public-private'. It was the only authorised category for understanding and
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discussing property rights in Malabar. By 1840, the negotiations had changed the way
property rights on forests were understood within the state. The conception of jenm
property had slowly faded away. From being a conceptual-functional category for
understanding property relations, it became a vague diffused statement of past practices.
In the earlier accounts, the concept ofjenm was located in history and social and political
relations in Malabar. Property owning classes, rajas and chieftains and jenms, were well
defined and discernible. In the discourses of 1807-40, time became subsumed under the
indistinguishable category of 'past', and social location became loose like 'native',
'inhabitants' and proprietors.
Alongside, the notion of sovereign and public-private gained ascendancy. In discerning
the 'sovereign' domain of the company, the extent of forests in Malabar was discussed,
debated, contested, asserted and revised in the categories of public and private. The more
the governments communicated with and negotiated each other, the more the notion of
public-private became a reality and the notion of jenm receded. Ownership rights could
then be thought of, imagined, talked about, explained and judged in the category of
public and private. Through these processes, the concept became a habit, a reflex, and an
inner voice. Thus, the notion of 'public-private' won but the 'sovereign' lost the forests.
Thus, in Malabar, where the Company had constructed its claim over forests and even
effected it, the Company completely reversed its position and constituted forests as
private property. In Kanara district, just the opposite happened. Since the inception of
the Company rule in 1800, it was maintained that that forests were private property of
the landholders. By 1860, the Company reversed the law and claimed rights for itself





TURNING OWNERS INTO ENCROACHERS: OFFICIAL
DISCOURSES ON KANARA FORESTS, 1800-1860
Introduction
I have so far explored how official discourses and social and administrative practices
worked in conjunction. The declarations in official discourses on the ownership of
forests were received and evaluated in social practices in Malabar and Kanara. This
process was dynamic. Official discourses do not conclusively declare the law. The
official discourses are continually at work, assessing, evaluating, supervising and
reformulating the law and legal ideas. Officials revise and reformulate the ideas which
others had pronounced earlier. I have argued that the production of ideas in the official
discourses was to produce certain effects. The revisions and reformulation are to bring
about new results. In this chapter, I move to the next level of complexity of working of
official discourses, and explore how official discourses revised and reformulated their
pronouncements in the light of the practices. These ideas were selectively deployed,
unfolded and produced to secure certain desired results.
With the fall of Tipu Sultan at Seringapatnam, in May 1799, Kanara was ceded to the
East India Company. Captain Thomas Munro, who later became the Governor of the
Madras Presidency, was appointed Collector to administer the province. Munro
'discovered' that in Kanara all lands, including wastes and forests, belonged to the
landholders. The recognition of the private ownership of all lands became the foundation
for the Company administration. The arrangement served well in the early years. But by
1840, its disadvantages for the Company administration became apparent and pressing.
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Between 1800 and 1840, the landholders had extended cultivation significantly. Also,
the earlier inaccessible forests, due to increased communication and demands for timber
from Bombay, became valuable merchandise. But within the existing legal arrangement,
the Company could neither demand additional revenue nor benefit from timber trade.
The Company administration struggled during 1840 to 1860 to invent a more favourable
theory of property arrangement. Blane, the Collector of Kanara in the late 1840s,
formulated a new theory of the ownership of wastes and forests. This entirely reversed
the theory laid down by Munro. In the new theory, forests and wastes were constructed
as the property of the state. In the following ten years, the position was taken further.
Finally in 1860, the Madras government adopted Blane's theory and claimed rights of
the Company over the forests. The earlier position was described as a 'mistake'.
3.1. Munro's Construction
On resuming the Collectorship of Kanara in 1800, Munro found the petty chieftains, the
poligars, creating a state of anarchy in Kanara. Agricultural lands were abandoned and
one-third of the population had fled the area. Munro's task as Collector was to identify
the persons who were to pay revenue and fix the assessment. Munro investigated the
relations that had subsisted between the landholders and successive governments from
the earlier times. Relying on this 'ancient' system, Munro established a basis for the
ownership of agricultural lands, wastes and forests. This was crucial for determining the
quantum of assessment and the person who was to pay it. Munro reported his findings to
the Madras Board of Revenue in two Minutes dated May 31, 1800 and 19 November,
1800. The two Minutes became the foundation of the land revenue administration in the
district for years to come.1
1 The minutes were titled 'The Condition and Assessment of Canara', printed in Arbuthnot ed. (1886).
Hereafter, Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800) and Munro's Minute (November 16, 1800).
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3.1.1 'Ancient' Land Revenue System
According to Munro, the Nairs were the original landlords or mulvargadars. Varg was
an estate or a holding. The holders of estates were known as vargadars. Mulvarg meant
original proprietary right in land and mulvargadar the proprietor of an ancestral
hereditary estate. Under the proprietors, there were two classes of tenants, the mul-gainis
(permanent tenants) and chali-gainis (temporary tenants). Lands originally waste or
which had devolved upon the state by escheat or abandonment, when let to a tenant by
the state, was called gaini-varg.
Munro claimed that kurnums and shanboghs (accountants) had preserved the accounts in
black books to furnish a complete abstract of the land rent during a preceding period of
more than 400 years. Munro reported that Kanara had an ancient land revenue system, in
which, one-sixth of the crop was the share exacted by the government. The system
continued till 1336, when the area came under the Vijaynagar dynasty. The account
books gave the proportion in which the resources were to be shared between the
sovereign, landlord and cultivator. The ratio of seed and crop was assumed to be 1:12.
Half the produce was to be retained by the cultivator towards the cost of agricultural
operations and as the share of the cultivator. One-fourth was to accrue to the proprietor.
The balance one-fourth accrued to the sovereign, brahmins and others. This was known
as the settlement of Harihar Rai. The settlement was not based on an actual assessment
of the crop, but from a rough estimate of the quantity of seed reported to have been
usually sown in each field. This was called the bijavari mode of computation.
This system continued in operation till 1618 when an additional assessment of 50% was
imposed by one of the Bednaur princes. In 1660, a tax was imposed on coconuts and
other fruit trees. The Vijanagar assessment (with the 50% addition just mentioned) was
considered the standard rent or rekah of all lands cultivated or waste. Until the end of
Bednaur rule, till 1763, cess was frequently imposed, being fixed at a percentage of
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standard assessment. According to the above calculation, government's share amounted
to one-third of gross produce but it was taken on a rough estimate of seed sown.
According to Munro, the state's demand was considered light, people were happy,
prosperous and there were no overdue on land revenue.
Against the name of each ryot, a standard rekah was written; this was the Vijaynagar
assessment. Deductions were made for waste and over assessed land. The details of these
remissions are important as these pertain to forests and waste. The wastes in the varg of
the proprietors included the following. Kulnasht meant agricultural lands abandoned or
deserted by the proprietary cultivator. Rekahnasht meant land fit for cultivation but it
was primeval or immemorial waste. In respect of kulnasht and rekahnasht, a remission
was made by the Vijanagar government from rekah in ascertaining the shist. Shist was
the revenue charge of the state on the ryot. The term nasht was applied to lands flooded
by rivers, or land never cultivated since the time of Vijaynagar government. These lands,
from their location amongst hills and jungles, were deemed unlikely to ever be cultivated
again, and were withdrawn from the sum of the general assessment of the country. From
this, the temporary remission was deducted to give shist of the holder of the varg. By
totalling vargs, the shist of a village was calculated.
According to Munro, the shist was considered the only legitimate demand of the state.
The extra assessment was listed separately and known by oppressive names like chauth,
impost and fines. These were always opposed by the inhabitants. These were not fixed
on land but on the capacity of the cultivator to pay, and were highly fluctuating.
In 1763, Haider's government took possession of Kanara and ordered an investigation of
sources of revenue in order to augment it. Haider's government made numerous
increases but could not collect them. Haider tried to extract as much as possible without
diminishing cultivation, and Tipu Sultan marked an even heavier assessment. When
revenue fell into arrears, according to Munro,
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He knew no way of making up the failures, but by compelling one part of
the ryots to pay for the deficiencies of the others; he made them pay not
only for those which arose from upon the cultivation of the current year,
but also for those which arose from the waste lands of dead and deserted
ryots, which were annually increasing.2
Generally, the people could not pay either the rent of their own or of the defaulters'
lands. Not more than half of the nominal demand could be collected. The exaction led to
the flight of the population and abandonment of land. The result of this system,
according to Munro, was that the population diminished by one-third. The ancient
proprietors were extinguished and land abandoned.
3.1.2 Construction of Ownership of Land
According to Munro, land was clearly private property in ancient Kanara. He highlighted
the extent, as well as the firm and secured basis of the private ownership of
mulvargadars. He noted,
The alienation of land, by sale or otherwise, was unrestrained. Nothing
but gift, or sale, or non-payment of rent could take it from the owner. If
he absconded with balances standing against him, it was transferred to
another person; but if he or his heir returned at ever so distant a period, it
was restored, on either of them paying a reasonable compensation for
balance, and such extra expenses as might have been incurred on account
of improvements.3
Munro found the 'ancient' revenue system so ingrained that even the disruption by the
Mysorean rule could not alter it. Munro emphasised,
The lands of Canara are still to be considered as held under the same
conditions, and governed by the same rules of transfer, as they were




under the ancient government. The increase of assessment by Hyder and
Tippoo Sultan has, in some places, annihilated the old proprietors; and it
has everywhere diminished the quantity, but not altered the nature of the
property.4
Munro's reference to property in 'land', included not only agricultural lands but all
lands, cultivated and uncultivated, within the varg of a mulvargadar. The ownership of
vargadars excluded the ownership of the state over land. Munro was categorical,
The only land in Canara that can in any way come under the description
of sircar lands is unclaimed waste, to a great deal of which it is very
likely claimants would appear, were it once brought under cultivation.
There are also some uncultivated lands, particularly in the Northern
districts, which may be reckoned public. There are lands which were
originally unproductive, and which, from the death or absence of the
owners, would have been allowed to run waste... But exclusive of this
land, cultivated by compulsion, and unclaimed waste, all other is private
property.5
Munro was constructing the mulvargadar as the owner of all lands, that is, cultivated
lands and the kulnasht and rekahnasht included within his varg. Furthermore, the vargs
was extensive. The government land was to be constituted by the principle of exclusion
and residual rights. Only the lands that no vargadar claimed were to be government
land. Even in this, Munro's view was that at some time in the past, everything belonged
to vargadars. From this state, the government acquired the estates when abandoned by
the vargadars. Munro further declared the absence of government lands by asserting that
'all public documents convincingly testify that sirkar land was altogether unknown'6 and
substantiated the private ownership of wastes,
As all land was private property, no man would occupy or cultivate
waste, until he had obtained a patta, either to secure him in the






he was liable, if he neglected this precaution, to be turned out at any time
by the owner, without compensation.7
The private ownership of land was reiterated subsequently in official accounts. In the
Fifth Report, tabled to the British Parliament in 1812, was a review of land
administration in India. The Report noted on Malabar and Kanara,
The lands in general appear to have constituted a clear private property,
more ancient, and probably more perfect, than that of England. The
tenure, as well as the transfer, of this property, by descend, sale, gift and
mortgage, is fortified by a series of regular deeds, equally various and
curious, and which bear a very strong resemblance, in both parts of the
country...In Cannara ... Even when they do not pay tax or land is
mortgaged, the land will always return back to them on satisfaction of
dues.8
The above view was approved and sanctioned by the authorities in London. The Court of
Directors, in relation to Kanara, directed the government of Madras in 1813, 'We have
no property in land to confer, with the exception of some forfeited estates'.9 We need to
bear in mind that Kanara was constructed to have a tenurial system different from other
parts of the country. But even in those other parts, the Court of Directors had taken a
similar position on ownership of land. There were conflicting positions. One position
was that the state was the owner of all lands. The opposing point was that the ruling
power had no proprietary right but only a right to a share of the produce. The Court of
Directors had settled for the second position.10
The construction of private ownership, through its circulation in the official discourses,
had come to be firmly established. We have already noted in chapter 2 that The
Collectors of Kanara in 1810s and 20s, Read and Harris, had emphasised the private
7 ibid: p67.
8
Parliamentary Papers, 1812 (VII)-II, (Hereafter Fifth Report): pi30.
9 Letter dated December 17/12/1813 see in East India Company (1820).
10 CD to Bengal Government, 6/1/1815, East India Company (1820): p283.
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ownership of forests.11 Also, in 1822, as the Governor of Madras Presidency, Munro
again alluded to private ownership over shifting cultivation land in Malabar and
Kanara.12
3.2. Private Right on Forests: In Theory and Practice
The Company, by its own construction, could assert property right over only the
unclaimed wastes and escheated estates. In practice, the Company administration gave
away the rights even on these lands. The concern of the administration was not to assert
right on forests and wastelands, rather, it was to see that cultivated lands did not turn into
waste.
In 1799, in relation to wastelands in the Northern Sirkars, The Madras Board of Revenue
issued instructions to the Collectors dated October 15, 1799 that these to be given up in
perpetuity to the zamindars free of any additional assessment.13 The order of Lord
Wellesley in 1800, on which the legislation and administration of the Madras Presidency
were based, ordered the conversion of government lands into private estates.14 In 1808,
to a suggestion to reserve wastelands towards augmenting revenue, the Board of
Revenue replied,
the government does not look to any advantage of that nature beyond the
benefit of increasing the amount of the public taxes in proportion to the
increased resources of the country.15
Read, Collector of the Northern divisions of Kanara, remarked in 1801 on the great
extent of wasteland. This was not with the view to assert state's right but with regret that
11 See Section 2 in Chapter 2.
12 See section 3 in Chapter 2.
13
Appendix 18 in Fifth Report: p725.
14 ibid: p725, 729.
15
Appendix 30 in Fifth Report: p902.
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the land 'would require more than ordinary labour and expense to bring under
cultivation'.16 The Collector of South Kanara wrote in 1802 to the same effect of the hill
i ~j
tracts within his division. Collector of Southern Division of Kanara reported,
Nearly all the wastelands of Canara, are lying close under the range of
ghauts... I fear it must naturally, therefore, take a considerable time... to
... extend cultivation ... induced to go and take land in that quarter.... The
rents are cheaper near the ghats to induce them to remain in such jungly
and unhealthy situations.18
Munro, as the Collector of Kanara in 1800, described the forested parts of Kanara with
the same disdain. He commented,
... Sunda Payanghat, is nearly in the same state, with respect to
cultivation, as the most desolate districts of Canara; but Sunda Balaghat
is much worse than either. It is nearly a complete desert. It has not
throughout its whole extent a cultivated spot of a mile square, except a
few small openings thinly scattered; all the rest of the country is
overgrown with so thick a forest, that it can only be penetrated in the few
places where roads have been made.19
Read, in 1802, regretted that in Sonda the 'largeness of the trees' had prevented the
extension of agriculture.20 Referring to Ankola, Read commented,
Ankola is in the worst condition; contains less inhabitants, is more
overrun with jungles, and possesses fewer private estates than any district
in Kanara.21
In 1814, as the Collector of Kanara, he spoke of the advantage of inducing the people to
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cultivate the wastes and occupy the inland parts of the province. Towards this end, he
16
Appendix 24 in Fifth Report: p814.
17 Collector of Southern Division of Canara, 30/4/1802, Appendix 24, Fifth Report: p818.
18 ibid: p818.
19 Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800): 70-1.




dwelt on the imprudence of a tax on the felling of timber. He recommended the removal
of the tax on financial considerations: the advantages from extension of cultivation
9^
would soon set off the loss of revenue from the tax.
In 1817, Harris, the Collector of Kanara proposed that the deserted estates in Ankola
should be let out on a low rent.24 In 1821, he recommended that in remote areas
cultivation should be encouraged by the allowance of clearing.25 Further, leasehold ryots
were to have the right on timber on their holding. He considered shifting cultivation as a
recognised mode of preparing the ground for continuous cultivation, and as we have seen
in an earlier chapter, in 1823, he succeeded in getting the approval of the government for
9f\
abolition of the tax on felling of timber in the forests of Soopa and Sonda.
Earlier, ryots were invited to apply for and cultivate wastelands to any extent at half
assessment for the first year. They were guaranteed against claims of mulvargadars after
the first year. Harris, in 1820, earnestly invited the ryot to come forward and apply for
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muli tenancies of lands abandoned for 12 years by the former mulvargadars.
As late as 1836, it was lamented that in the inland part of Kanara, land was still being
abandoned. Sub-Collector Anderson noted,
The effect of this want of population in the country under the Ghauts is,
that much land lays waste, not from over assessment, but from want of
oo
people to cultivate it.
22
Baskarapa V/s The Collector of North Kanara, judgement of the Bombay High Court, reported in Indian




26 See Chapter 4.
27 Kanara Forest Case: p552.
28 Anderson (1890): p21.
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The intention of the Government was apparent in the mulpattas (documents conferring
ownership on land) granted by the Collectors. The boundaries of the granted estates
9Q
included a considerable extent of forests and wastelands. Clearly, the concern was not
to assert the state's right over unclaimed waste, which Munro considered the only
Government property in Kanara. Just the opposite, the agricultural lands were turning
into wastes and this trend had to be reversed.
3.3. Owner to Encroacher: Administrative Concerns On Land
Revenue in Kanara
After giving a complete account of land revenue practices in Kanara, Munro urged the
Board of Revenue in 1800 to reduce the revenue.30 He suggested that the assessment
should be fixed at not more than 30% of the amount charged by Haider. The subsequent
Collectors maintained this assertion. Read, the Collector from 1801 to 1816, claimed
that more revenue was drawn from the area than it could bear. He informed the Madras
Board of Revenue that most of the lands were rated at more than 75% of Haider's
additions. As a result of the exaction, agriculture was on the decline. He suggested that
the government's share should not be more than 33% of gross produce. This was in
contrast to the prevailing charge of 30-50% of the gross produce. He also complained
that the original and extra assessment of different vargs were grossly unequal and there
31
was no guide to how to equalise government demand.
In consideration of Read's suggestions, the Board of Revenue made a reference to the
Collector of Kanara to fix the maximum rate of assessment. Harris, the next
29 Fisher to the Board of Revenue, dated August 30, 1858 in Board Proceedings, 13/10/1858, TNA.
Hereafter Fisher's Report (1858).
30 This section is based on Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XV-Part II, Kanara, Bombay,
Government Central Press, 1883, hereafter Gazetteer of North Kanara. Vyakunta Bapuji v/s The
Government of Bombay, judgement of the Bombay High Court, reported in Bombay High Court
Reports, in Appendix to Volume 12, May 1875, hereafter Kanara Land Assessment Case. This
judgement is a valuable repository of correspondence on land revenue administration in Kanara.
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collector( 1817-22), noted that the low rated lands were no more being taken up for
cultivation. Also, several lands were charged at full Haider's assessment. Munro, who
was then in Kanara again, clarified that he had expected escheated estates to be taken up.
However, this would have happened only if the assessment on neighbouring estates were
kept lower than Haider's assessment to induce cultivators to take up such lands. He
adhered to the opinion of reduction of assessment.32
Harris reiterated that shist was varying and unequal in neighbouring estates creating a
state of oppression. He claimed that this was due to corruption of the officials in the
governments preceding the Company. The Board of Revenue replied that their concern
was not to equalise shist but to limit government demand. In the Board's opinion, the
inequality in the neighbouring estates would always be a result of good management
practice and industry of the landholder. To equalise the assessment would be to
annihilate the entire basis for industry and labour. The Board recommended that the best
means would be to collect the average assessment paid on an estate since the start of
British Rule.33
Harris stipulated that the guiding factor in fixing the assessment should be the productive
power of land, rather than a fixed percentage of Haider's assessment. He said that he was
already following this. He further claimed that Munro himself had fixed assessment in
hundreds of cases higher than 75% of Haider's assessment. Harris had also started a
survey of some villages, which could give the productive capacity of land. After
determining the productive power of land, Harris fixed the assessment at 30% of the
gross produce.34






Babington (1822-27), the next Collector, objected to the survey and to fixing assessment
at 30% of the gross produce. He was concerned that it left different profits for different
persons. As a result, inferior lands were being given up. Further, a revised assessment
could force the vargadars to abandon their land, indirectly annihilating their private
property. Babington also feared that frequent re-assessments would create discontent.35
The Board of Revenue, however, was convinced of the necessity of a survey and re¬
assessment. It argued that there was no other way of putting the revenue on a sound
footing. Further, tax on industry was everywhere even if it changed the ownership. To
the fear of discontent, the Board replied that once the assessment was equalised, it would
take a great time for it to become different. The Government of Madras approved the
proposal of the Board but noted that to equalise revenue at a standard of 30% was
■j/r
erroneous. For the government, the main idea was to regulate to induce cultivation.
In 1830, riotous meetings broke out in Kanara. Some attributed it to a specific episode
which spread37 and others to failure of crops.38 A member of the Board, Stokes, was
deputed to report on the condition of Kanara. Stoke indicated that the successive
Collectors had exaggerated the excessiveness of the revenue demand. To the contrary, he
found the revenue light. There was rising prosperity. Land had acquired a sale value and
was changing hands. This could have happened only if the assessment, at least on some
lands, was light enough to leave surpluses with the proprietors. However, he highlighted
unequal assessment across the vargs. Several measures were suggested including
adjusting assessment with reference to neighbouring estates.39
It had been evident since Munro's time that only a survey and settlement could be an




38 Gazetteer of North Kanara: pi65.
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expensive and thus could not be contemplated. From 1800 to 1830, the extent of
cultivation had greatly increased. However, there were no additions to the revenue. This
was making the administration exasperated. The administrators were convinced that the
rekah fixed by the previous governments were not accurate, as these were manipulated
by the local accountants. According to the officials, this had lowered the revenue of the
state. Further, during Company rule, many landholders had made 'fraudulent' and
'clandestine' encroachments to extend cultivation.40 Such lands paid no revenue at all.41
The only strategy was to settle for a survey. The Board in 1843 argued that the expense
incurred in a survey would be more than compensated by the exposure of concealed and
misappropriated land. The Board also had to contend with the objection, earlier raised by
Babington, that a survey would affect the property right of vargadars. The Board
dismissed the objection by arguing that the government was not bound by property
obtained by fraud and encroachment. The Governor in Council agreed with the
imperative of a survey. However, they feared a survey could create discontent. Blane, the
Collector of Kanara, was asked to report on the proposed survey and its possible
implications 42
3.3.1 Blane's Report
Blane questioned the very legal basis on which the ownership of the vargadars rested.
According to him, the entire basis of administration of revenue by the Company was
flawed. The rights of vargadars, on a 'logical' interpretation, vested only on agricultural
lands. But even before Blane presented an alternate conception of ownership of land, a
certain consensus among the officials in undermining the earlier basis of ownership had
already become established. When Munro took charge in 1800, the Malabar coast was in
39 Stokes (1833).





a state of rebellion. There were many contenders for independent authority and political
power.43 In the succeeding years, the Company managed to consolidate its position. In
the next section I shall show how the construction of vargadars as 'ancient' owners by
Munro was itself a means of conciliating the local population. Having gained political
stability, however, the Company found itself bound by the legality created in the earlier
years. To wrestle with this, the officials vilified mulvargadars as 'fraudulent
encroachers'.44 The unequal assessment was attributed to collusion of vargadars and
shanbhogs during the Mysorean rule.
If forests were earlier 'barren' and 'desolate' tracts, in the context of timber demands,
and increasing extension of agriculture, these had acquired value. Forests were being
felled since the abolition of the Conservatorship, to supply fuelwood to Bombay and
other markets.45 The Company was making desperate attempts to extract timber from
Kanara.46 The government regretted that the fee was being appropriated by 'alleged'
proprietors.47 Arguments to undermine the property in forests were finding expression.
In 1839, Maltby, an officer in Kanara, reported to the Board of Revenue,
The extent of the Government right in the jungles and waste has never
been very clearly defined, and some extensive tracts have been gradually
included by persons whose right is extremely doubtful. In many cases the
just claim to the right of pasturage or of gathering leaves for manure
preferred by the holders of the neighbouring estates, to the exclusion of
other villagers, has been changed to a claim of proprietary right in soil;
and many secret encroachments have been made upon waste to which the
parties have no title whatever.
43 Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800).
44 Gazetteer of North Kanara: pi65-8. Stokes (1833).
45 Blane to the Board, 31/8/1847, MBOR, 8/11/1847, TNA. Hereafter Blane's First Report (August 31,
1847).
46 Blair to the Board of Revenue, 18/8/1838, MBOR, 6/9/1838, TNA.




Blair, the Collector of Kanara, in 1838 referring to forests added to Kanara from Coorg
noted,
... in most instances claimed private property but this claim is founded
more on prescriptive right established by previous enjoyment than in the
possession of sunnads or other documents conferring proprietary title.49
In 1843, Blair recognised the value of forests in Kanara, and issued a proclamation
prohibiting the felling of five species in government forests.50
If the Company administration was staking its claims on forests, the mulvargadars
considered themselves owners of the agricultural and wastelands in their varg.
Vargadars claimed they were felling what belonged to them. In fact, they had earned
their right over forests. The Conservator, between 1807 and 1822, had prohibited felling
of valuable timber from their private lands. After the abolition of the Conservatorship, a
proclamation was issued permitting vargadars to fell what they liked standing on their
estates. By the same argument, they considered themselves free to put any land in their
varg under cultivation or shifting cultivation without paying any additional revenue.
They claimed that rekah assessment had already constituted estates and fixed the revenue
on the entire estate, cultivated and waste.51
Blane was forming his judgement in this context of contestation over the ownership. He
lamented that despite the population of Kanara having doubled and that there was much
prosperity, the state was the loser as there was no enhancement in revenue. The interest
of getting additional revenue was connected with the question of ownership and use of
forests. Blane was aware that if the vargadars could successfully claim ownership over
wastes, no additional revenue could accrue to the Company. To enhance land revenue in
49 Blair to the Board of Revenue, 18/8/1838, MBOR, 6/9/1838, TNA.
50 Blane's First Report (August 31, 1847).
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Kanara, the existing basis of ownership needed to be engaged with.52 Blane had an
additional concern. This was to do with kumri (shifting) cultivation.
Kumri cultivation had two juridical forms, sarkar kumri and varg kumri. The shifting
cultivators farming government forests paid taxes directly to the government. Each year,
the cultivation was assessed and a tax imposed on the cultivators. The shifting
cultivation done on government land was called sarkar kumri. While varg kumri was
cultivated on the waste within the varg of the mulvargadars. The charges for kumri,
entered as a separate head, kumri shist, were included in the total assessment of the
estate. Blane was concerned that cultivators from the plains and Mahratta country were
adopting it as a form of livelihood.53 Furthermore, in Mysore, on the initiative of
Cleghorn, who was later to be an influential figure on the forest question, shifting
cultivation was banned. Blane was sure there would be an exodus of such cultivators
from Mysore into Kanara.54 Since vargadars were claiming the forests within their varg,
they and not the Company would have been the major beneficiaries of the enhancement.
Blane, in addition to the concerns of revenue, was apprehensive that the extension of
shifting cultivation might destroy valuable timber altogether. Blane identified the
increasing incidence of shifting cultivation as a major cause of a growing scarcity of
timber. He reported to the Board of Revenue in a letter dated August 31, 1847,
The practice of kumari cultivation is one of so wasteful and improvident
a nature, that it appears to me it ought not to be tolerated except in a very
wild and unpopulated country, and the time seems to have arrived, when
it would be most advisable to place it under considerable check and
regulation.55
51 Blane's First Report (August 31, 1847). Blane to the Board of Revenue, 20/9/1848, MBOR, August,
1850, TNA. Hereafter Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848). And Blane to the Board of
Revenue, 31/8/1849, MBOR, 4/4/1850, TNA. Hereafter Blane's Third Report (August 31, 1849).
52 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).




He then elaborated the economic rationale for his conviction:
The revenue paid upon this destructive kind of cultivation is very trifling;
and if the wood were preserved in accessible spots, the duty upon the
export of timber and firewood would, under proper regulation, exceed
tenfold.56
Blane did not have any significant objection to the existing population continuing with
shifting cultivation. His concern was the additional population which would bring virgin
forests under cultivation. The economic and revenue considerations, in conjunction with
threat of its rampant expansion, had led to a general condemnation of shifting
cultivation. Blane noted,
It was formerly confined entirely to the race of wild and uncivilised
people who dwelt habitually in the jungles; others have since taken it
up... it is not a pursuit which it is at all desirable to encourage the people
newly to engage in. It has no doubt some attraction for those who are
impatient of control, and are fond of roving life; but it leads to unsettled
habits, and takes many away from the regular cultivation of a fixed spot.
57
Blane knew that it was beyond the surveillance of the state to prevent 'wild' forest
dwellers, 'impatient of control' from cutting kumri. And for others, as long as vargadars
could claim the right of use of the forests in their varg, shifting cultivation could not be
prohibited. Blane thus opted for a more strategic intervention, primarily guarding the
forests close to the coast which could be turned into a merchandise. He suggested:
I am not disposed at present to recommend its entire prohibition; but I
think it would be well to do so in all places accessible to the seaports
whence timber and firewood could be brought down, and to place it
CO





On Blane's suggestion, the Government authorised the Collector of Kanara to restrict
kumri cultivation to 'such places as to such an extent as might, in his opinion, be
expedient for the preservation of the forests and general well being of the province'.59
Blane had bitterly complained, 'There is nothing scarcely which the people of Kanara
will not claim as a right if they think there is any chance of it being conceded'.60 The
Madras Board of Revenue directed him to assert the right of government to all forest
lands, to which title could not be clearly established by private individuals.61 Thus, Blane
had successfully inverted the entire conception of public and private property. In contrast
to earlier years, where only unclaimed lands were public property, now, what could not
be proved to be private property was to be public property.
Blane had to face considerable embarrassment in implementing his policy. A vargadar,
Narna Cumpti, raised an objection that he was owner of extensive forest subject to kumri
cultivation, and for which he was assessed to land revenue. The sub-collector solved the
difficulty by directly settling with kumri cutters, 693 in number, regardless of the
vargadar's rights.62 Blane requested the Board to approve the direct settlement with the
/TO
kumri cultivators.
3.4. Reorganisation of Legal Theory by Blane
The task before Blane, then, was to re-organise the very legality of ownership of wastes
and forests to solve the problems of enhancement of assessment, revenue from forests
and regulation of shifting cultivation. The legality was established by Munro and it was
very much observed in practice in Kanara. If Blane was subject to prior official
59 MBOR, 8/11/1847, TNA.
60 Blane's First Report (August 31, 1847).
61
MBOR, 8/11/1847, TNA.




discourses, he was also a bearer of a consciousness to bring about newer administrative
practices. The law was completely meshed in these administrative practices and
processes. Certain effects could be brought about only if the law was re-organised.
However, the law could be re-organised only if those effects were imperative, logical
and imminent.
One way of bringing this about was to erode the very foundation on which the existing
law was based. Munro had based the law on 'ancient' system, and Blane's strategy was
to show that this system was non-existent or that it had not been properly derived into
law. I will only in passing summarise his argument dealing with agricultural land and
then deal with that part dealing forests and wastelands.
Blane doubted the entire basis for the revenue administration by the Company
administration. He argued that during Tipu's reign, everything was suspended and
records were falsified with the collusion of accountants and vargadars. He wondered
how the original assessment and extra impositions had been accepted as if the documents
were of ascertained authenticity. He objected to the reliance on the 'ancient' system of
revenue which was constructed by Munro. He asserted that even before the Company
took over administration, the 'ancient' assessment had become notional. In the system of
average assessment, followed since Harris' Collectorship, Company rule in the
preceding 22 years had become the base. The average of those 22 years was taken as the
Company's revenue demand. Blane questioned the soundness of the average assessment.
He argued that those were the most depressed years, lowering the demands of the
Company. Blane alleged that there were no estimates of the extent of estates. Thus, the
mulvargadars had the facility to encroach on land. The system of seed measurement was
indefinite and did not help. For Blane the question thus, resolved into this: The
Government had to decide whether it considered itself limited to a total demand. If not,
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and Blane was sure the answer could not have been otherwise, it should go ahead
addressing these questions.64
For Blane, the property rights of the vargadars extended only to the lands under
cultivation. Blane argued that there used to be revenue from the culturable wastes
(kulnasht) before the average settlement. The method of averaging since the beginning of
company rule removed any reference to lands which were actually cultivated in any year.
Thus, the average also implied that any land which was ever cultivated or could be
cultivated was paid for and included in the average.65 Similarly, as we will see later,
Blane argued that the vargadars had no property rights on rekahnasht (immemorial
waste). This was the opposite to the theory advanced by the vargadars. The vargadars
argued that their estates included fallow waste and immemorial waste. Further, that they
had a right to bring both under cultivation without paying any extra assessment.66
As we have seen before, in Harris's time, when the average settlement was introduced, it
was very well understood that the estate of a vargadar included kulnasht and rekahnasht.
In any case, the rekah assessment included both kinds of waste. Besides, the question
was not what the vargadar paid for, but what was actually his. In the minds of the
Company officers, the varg undoubtedly included rekahnasht and kulnasht. Blane made
what was clear doubtful,
The practice does not here exist, as in other districts, of a raiyat only
occupying the land he pays for, and throwing the waste land given up or
left uncultivated in to the general aycat bunzar, or waste land of the
village; but whatever be the amount of waste it still continues attached to
the estate... There has never been any application, in Kanara, of the
simple rule, that a man has only a right to as much land as he pays for...
64 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
65 ibid.
66 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848); and Blane's Third Report (August 31, 1849).
67 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
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Munro had categorically stated that a varg included agricultural land, agricultural wastes
(,kulnasht) and immemorial waste (rekahnasht) and the assessment included for all the
lands of the vargadar, cultivated and waste. According to Munro, the temporary holders
were granted remissions on account of bad crops. This was, however, never allowed in
the cases where land was private property. Munro reported,
When a man agrees to become the proprietor of Sarkar land, he shows at
the same time a confidence both in the forbearance of Government and in
his own means of improvement, because by the custom of the country,
whatever may happen, he has from this moment no claim to remission.69
For the mulvargadars with a proprietary right in their lands, Munro said,
The accounts contained a register of the number of landholders and the
fixed assessment of their respective estates, the total of which formed the
jama, but they took no notice of waste lands when there was a proprietary
in existence. As long as he was present he was responsible for the full
rent, whether he cultivated or not.... It was never inquired what portion of
his estate a landlord cultivated or left waste. It was expected that, in
whatever state they were, he was to pay the whole rent.70
Munro reiterated the point and insisted that the same considerations would apply still
more strongly to the case of a person holding under a kowl, a mulpatta or other
description of lease, stipulating for a fixed annual rent.
Blane completely ignored the foundation on which Munro had rested the mulvargadar's
ownership. This can be one of the techniques of displacing an existing law. In its place,
an alternate construction of law could be created. Blane picked up different elements to
create a new foundation for ownership of immemorial waste. After recognising that these
were attached to the estates of vargadars, he detracted,




They are often termed 'kumeki' lands, or land allowed to assist in the
cultivation, and they were intended to afford to the raiyats the means of
procuring leaves from the brushwood or jungles growing on them as
manure for their fields, and to furnish grass as fodder for their cattle...71
Having enumerated the use of the wastes, Blane moves towards a legal displacement by
contrasting it with other areas,
... but they do not appear originally to have differed materially from the
wastelands used for similar purposes in other parts of the country, except
that, in place of being common to the whole village, they were divided
and enjoyed in separate portions by the individual landholders.72
Munro had forewarned against this construction by asserting that Malabar and Kanara
were entirely different from the rest of the country. It was only in Malabar and Kanara
that private property was secured on a sound foundation. Munro stated that the
landowners in Malabar and Kanara were,
...possessing their lands as private property,- circumstances which
distinguish Canara in a remarkable manner from all the countries beyond
the ghauts, and which must be attended to in whatever system may
hereafter be framed for its management.73
Even within Kanara, Munro said that the ownership of land above the ghats followed a
different system of property. He confided in Cockburn, a senior Company official,
It cannot be supposed that I yet know much of the state of landed
property. I have seen enough, however, to convince me that it is very
different in different parts of the country.74
Munro elaborated the different property arrangement in a part of Kanara, called Sonda:
70 Kanara Forest Case: p527.
71 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
72 ibid.
73 Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800): P 58-9.
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Gardens or plantations of cocoa-nut, betel-nut and pepper are considered
private property, and follow the same rule as in Canara; but all other land
is supposed to belong to the sirkar.75
Thus, in Sonda the agricultural lands had belonged to the state, and ryots cultivated it as
the tenants of the state. Ordinarily, they were not removed as long as they paid rent.
However, if another person offered nuzzarana (a sum of money) to the state, he could
become an owner of the land.76 The intention of Munro was clearly to emphasise that the
property regime of Malabar and Kanara could not be compared with a general universal
notion of wastelands in India.
Blane evaded engaging with Munro by merely alleging that Munro was wrongly
constructed by the later officers. For example, Munro had said that only 'unclaimed'
land was state property. Despite the eagerness of the administration to give away forests
(which we noticed earlier), Blane argued that the 'claims' had to be valid and not
fictitious. Blane then interposed that Munro may have intended to use the word
'reclaimed waste'. In this case, the claims of vargadars would be confined to waste
which was earlier cultivated. He further suggested that Munro may not have intended to
make 'allusion at all to immemorial or unreclaimed waste, but referred exclusively to
that which had been formerly under cultivation'. 77
My insistence on counter-posing Munro to Blane is not to suggest that Munro had
constructed an 'authentic' and 'true' account of ownership in Kanara. He himself
constructed and invented an ownership in the context of the exigencies of administering
74 Letter to Cockburn, 20/12/1799, printed in Gleigh (1830): p240.
75 Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800): p70.
76 ibid: p70.
77 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
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politically unsettled Kanara, of his ambition of advancing his promising career, and of
tussles within the Company administration.78
I will not dwell at length on this here. We have already seen in Chapter 1 how the
Company administration 'discovered' the local law. I will only highlight some features
of Munro's construction. Munro was clearly instructed to 'reconcile the inhabitants to
our authority by the utmost degree of indulgence to their prejudice and customs, and by
refraining from any other changes of system'.79 Munro found that the poligars were in
rebellion and had 'pretensions of independent authority'.80 He apprehended that he might
suddenly be called upon to make a Permanent Settlement.81 This was before he wrote the
two important letters of 31st May and 9 Nov., 1800. He had already worked out a
critique of the Permanent Settlement in his work with Read in Baramahal. This critique
took shape as the ryotwari system and presented a formidable challenge to the
Permanent Settlement.
Thus, politically, if the poligars could not be reconciled, the best recourse was to
strengthen the vargadars, the 'principal inhabitants'. To settle the lands directly with the
ryots was also consistent with the emergent theory of ryotwari. The political and
administrative exigencies, to be acceptable and legitimate within the administration,
needed to be in conformity with 'local custom'. Thus, Munro 'discovered' the 'ancient'
system of Kanara, privileging the rights of the vargadars. The later Collectors regretted
that they could not find a single copy of the famous account books on which Munro had
based his entire theory!82
My interest, thus, is not to take Munro's account as 'truth' and demonstrate how Blane
evades this truth. I am interested in exploring the tools and modalities that Blane deploys
78 See Stein (1989).
79 Wellesley Quoted in Kanara Land Assessment Case: pi02.
80 Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800): p57.
81 See Kanara Land Assessment Case.
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to displace an existing legal theory of ownership. Munro had forbidden a comparison of
Kanara with other parts of the Country. Blane conveniently ignores it. He created
parallels between Kanara and other areas from which he could thus hypothesise,
The original terms upon which they were held, then, I conceive to have
been essentially as an adjunct to, and in connection with, the cultivated
lands; and the right to them to have been a modified right, and only to be
enjoyed for the purposes for which they were held as above stated. The
usufruct of them for such purposes was a necessary concession; but I do
not conceive them to have been on that account the less Government
lands, but only lands which they were permitted to occupy for particular
83
purposes.
Blane quickly turned a hypothesis and conjecture into a conclusion,
If such were, in general terms, the nature of the tenure under which they
were held, it has become entirely altered under our administration. The
raiyats now claim the absolute proprietary right in them the same as to
their cultivated lands, and, as a necessary consequences of such a right,
the liberty to bring them under cultivation without the payment of
additional assessment, and even of selling or letting them, thus separating
them, if they choose, from the cultivation, and alienating them from the
original purposes for which they were intended.84
Munro, as late as 1822, in opposition to the initiatives of the Conservator to appropriate
timber from such lands, had reaffirmed his position on the question of ownership. He
recognised that the immemorial wastes were primarily used for fuel and manure.
However, the use was not to decide the ownership. He had emphasised that private
property existed in these wastes,
They constituted a material part of the property by which he was enabled
to pay his revenue... The ryot had complete control over his wood of
every kind, whether on the hills or in villages, because it could not be
82 Sturrock (1894): p95.




taken from him without a violation of private property and administration
both of his income and of the revenue.85
Blane further objected that through this pretension of ownership, the vargadars
prevented others from taking them up on a patta (lease) from the government.86 The
person occupying them paid the rent to the landlord not to the Government, and was in
every respect his tenant. Blane upheld his newly created theory,
... the claim to these lands ... has been incautiously admitted, or, at least,
not opposed...It is necessary to observe, however, that the right to
cultivate such lands is not admitted in theory, but it is, as a general rule,
actually enjoyed in practice...87
Blane thus created a duality between law and social practice, and privileged law over
practice to bring a new interpretation of law.
3.5. Rent Theory of Shifting Cultivation
Blane, as mentioned in an earlier section, had submitted for the Board's approval a
proposal for direct settlement with kumri cultivators. Blane also expressed his opinion
on the question of the rights of mulvargadars over shifting cultivation land in their varg.
Shifting cultivation was done on the rekahnasht (immemorial waste). Blane argued that
the entry of a kumri shist in the patta of a vargadar gave no proprietary right over the
forests.
Blane argued that shifting cultivation was of 'uncertain' and 'transient' nature formerly
carried exclusively by 'wild' and 'little civilised' people.88 Blane suggested that these
people had no fixed habitation. They built temporary huts on the spot, which they
85 Munro's minute (1822): pl84.
86 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
87 ibid.
88 Blane's Third Report (August 31, 1849).
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occupied for the year, and shifted their place of residence with their cultivation. As a
result, it was difficult for the government to fix the spot liable for assessment and collect
revenue from the cultivators directly. The easiest mode was to rent out the collection to
one or more of the principal inhabitants of the village, who could make their own terms
with the cultivators.89
Blane recounted that during the Company rule, the estate holders were issued yearly
patta specifying the demand against them on the fixed land revenue for their permanent
cultivation. He argued that for convenience, the payments made on account of kumri
were entered in their patta. In course of time, such forests came to be claimed by
vargadars as a part of their varg. Blane argued that the sum was not land revenue but
only rent,
The same system was adopted with regard to many other items of
demand which were not strictly land revenue, such as the moturpha,
honey farm, fishery, and other petty farms, which were all entered as
portion of the varg of the raiyat; but they have been subsequently struck
out of the patta and collected separately as extra revenue.90
To conclude Blane's position,
... the kumri cultivation was, and still continues to be, of the nature of a
rent similar to other rents, such as the puleri or grazing rents in other
parts of the country, or privileges of collecting honey or felling timber in
the forests themselves.91







As to the mode of entering miscellaneous charges in the pattas of the
vargdars, Mr. Blane's description is not supported by any evidence
produced in the present case. A large number of pattas have been
recorded, but the vargadar is not in that character charged for any thing
but the rate at which his land has been assessed.92
Blane knew that law does not declare itself legal. The Board had to take a position. A
pre-condition for the validity of law is its effects. The new theory of law could be
propagated by highlighting its effects. Blane systematically created the conditions for
upholding his construction of the law. He declared that if the proprietary right of
vargadars were affirmed, the shifting cultivators would be tenants of the vargadars.
Thus, the Collectors would have no power to prevent the destruction of the forest and no
authority to protect the kumri cutters from the exaction and oppressions of the
vargadarsP
To illustrate the loss of revenue to the Company on account of payment of kumri shist,
Blane instanced the case of Martab Rao, a vargadar. According to Blane, Martab Rao
claimed jurisdiction over more than 50 square miles of forest. The number of ryots
cutting kumri under him had so much increased that he collected from them 1,000 per
cent of what he paid as kumri shist to the Company. It was important for Blane to trace
the ancestry of the family who formerly held the office of naib shanbhog in the Ankola
Taluka, to show the scheming and manipulating nature of the claims of the vargadars.
Blane further warned that with increasing influx, large number of people would settle in
these thinly-peopled tracts and become the tenants-at-will of such men as Martab Rao
and Narma Cumpti. As a consequence, they might have ten or twenty thousand
dependants on their estate.94
In addition, Blane attempted to annihilate the very category of varg. Blane cited a
Kanarese Scholar, Mr. H Stokes, who had mentioned that in a tradesman's books in
92 Kanara Forest Case: p572.
93 Blane's Third Report (August 31, 1849).
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Kanara his account with a customer was headed the 'varg of that customer'. Following
this, Blane argued that the term 'varg' has come to mean 'estate', but originally it meant
'account' of the ryot with government. Hence Blane concluded that by a ryot's varg was
formerly understood his 'account with the Government', and comprised, therefore, not
only his landed property, but 'anything for which he had to make a payment to
Government; but that the entry did not necessarily imply that he had an absolute
indefeasible proprietary right in the thing for which he paid'.95 In this manner, Blane
argued that the rent of the collections from the kumri cutters came to be entered in the
varg patta. While the term 'varg' came to mean 'estate', the forests in which the kumri
was cut came to be claimed and considered a portion of the estate.96 If Munro had traced
the origins of the 'ancient' system to uphold the ownership of vargadars, the origin of
origins could be traced to a point to find a contrary meaning.
3.5.1 Gaps In Theory and Practice
Blane, despite his theoretical arguments, had to confront the social practices and
reconcile the two. He identified the principal reason for the gap between theory and
practice by pointing out that there was no estimate of the extent of the original estates.
Therefore, it was difficult to tell what was a new cultivation and what was old. Further,
according to Blane, there was no rate or rule for the Collectors to determine the
assessment. Blane complained,
It is of no avail for him to say, you have three or four times as much land
as is equivalent to the assessment you pay; the simple answer is, that it is




91 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
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Blane, similarly for shifting cultivation, as we have seen before, had identified the
vagueness of the extent of the estate of a vargadars. However, Bombay High Court, in
the Forest Case, endorsing an earlier Sheristedar (revenue office, sub-ordinate to the
Collector) noted,
The vargdar was charged and deductions were allowed on the aggregate
holding; and vagueness as to the precise areas held, if it prevented the
growth of a right, through recognition, in the case of kumri lands, would
very often have equally prevented its arising in the case of rice fields,
especially those which paid only for occasional cultivation.98
If Blane had to confront the prior legality of ownership and its well ingrained basis in
social practices, he also had to contend with the official sanction given to private
ownership by the very interpreters and upholders of the law—the courts. Blane lamented
that the vargadars fortified their 'alleged' rights, on 'evidence of friendly neighbours' or
'some document'.99 Further, any opposition or attempt to restrain 'encroachment' to
protect 'government' property, involved a protracted contest in a law suit 'if there be the
most slender grounds for disputing the award'.100
In 1800, Munro had described the attachment of the ryots to their estate,
... the destruction of part of the property by the heavy demands of the
sirkar seems rather to have increased than impaired the attachment of the
proprietor to the remainder. He never quits the estates of his ancestors
while he can live upon it as a farmer or a labour; but if, after paying the
Sarkar rent, and what is due to him for his labour, there remains the most
trifling surplus, he will almost as soon part with his life as with his estate.
Disputes concerning land, where the property frequently does not amount
to ten pagodas, are often carried before every successive amildar for
twenty years.101
98 Kanara Forest Case: p573.
99 Blane's Second Report (September 20, 1848).
100 ibid.
101 Munro's Minute (May 31, 1800): p68.
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Vargadars, so zealous of their property, were unlikely to have conceded their property
by being 'friendly neighbours' even if the property was in forests.
Blane comments on the awards made by the courts,
In suits between individuals the rights of Government do not come under
discussion; and the production of an admitted sale, or mortgage deed, or
other evidence of a like nature has always led to the land being decreed to
one party.102
Blane delegitimated the court decrees. Finally, he tarnished the vargadars as litigious,
scheming and colluding persons, vitiating the very sanctity of the court by their native
ways.
The second plank of Blane's argument was to demonstrate the inadequate grounds for
the decree by the courts themselves. Blane argued that the courts had not taken the legal
rights of the state and thus, the decrees should have limited validity.103 In this, Blane was
making a double attack. The target was not only the decree but also the court and the
judges. Under the ryotwari system, Munro had proposed that all the functions of a
district, that is, revenue collection, judiciary and law and order, were to be with one
person, the Collector. This system was adopted but later discontinued. Blane was using
the opportunity to demonstrate the inefficacy of separating the judicature from the office
of the Collector. The third ground for displacement was that a theory of law always
prevailed over practice, even if it was the practice of the courts which were supposed to
give a firm and settled meaning to law. The courts were to be bound by the theory rather
than the theory to be bound by the courts.




3.5.2 Comments on Blane's Theory
Blane was not deriving his theory from the vantage point of another theory or idea. He
did not deploy any work developed in the West either on land or property or colonial
difference between the ruler and the ruled. He was struggling with the administrative
exigencies and the obstacles posed by the prevalent conception of the property of the
vargadars in Kanara. He did not employ hegemonic theories or ideas, irrespective of
their end effects. Rather, he tried to forge certain ideas together, in order to dispossess
the vargadars of their claims. Ideas were elaborated only to the extent necessary to
produce the effect of creating property in forests for the state. But where did these ideas,
no doubt selectively employed, come from?
Blane explicitly refers to the arrangement of use of wastes by village communities in
other parts of India. He contrasts Kanara with these areas to derive that the vargadar had
no rights over it. Blane had learnt this in other parts of the Madras Presidency.104 Blane
made the distinction between 'rent/tax' and revenue to dispossess vargadars of their
claim to ownership of shifting cultivation land. The distinction between the categories
'revenue' and 'rent' was well established. Blane deployed this categorisation to produce
certain results. He was not overwhelmed by hegemonic ideas and their logical coherence.
Instead, in the context of social and administrative processes and contestation, he
produced some ideas locally and selectively borrowed others. The ideas were
strategically grafted to produce certain effects.
3.5.3 The Madras Board of Revenue's Response to Blane
The Board was in agreement with Blane that the vargadars had eroded the powers of the
Collector to preserve forests. Blane's proposal also involved the welfare of the jungle
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tribes, who were completely subjugated by the vargadars. However, Blane's views were
different from the settlement reports of former Collectors. After all, as late as 1841,
Sullivan stated that 'in Malabar and Canara, all land is private property, and the owners
have an absolute property in the waste'.105 And, in 1847 Blane himself had
acknowledged that the revenue officers and courts had recognised the right of vargadars
to cut timber from forests.106 The Board asked him to examine the old accounts of the
district.107 The Collector was required to ask the vargadars to produce the old records
upon which they claimed the privilege of cutting and clearing forests. The Board thought
that the entries in old records on kumri shist would allow them to distinguish the
1 OR
assessment on kumri from the demand on the regular estate in each individual case. In
other words, the Board was completely at variance with what Blane was proposing. The
Board was clear that the vargadars had an undisputed right to cut kumri on forests
included within their estate. The Board thought that the vargadars asserted rights over an
indefinite extent of forests which were the property of the government! After all, as late
as 1844, the Board of Revenue was saying, 'there is no foot of unappropriated ground' in
1 AQ
Kanara. In the Board's opinion, the accounts would have given them ground to
present a charge against the vargadars on accounts of kumri distinct from that on
account of 'regular estate' that is, the estate recognised as a defined aggregate, and
subjected to assessment according to ordinary rules.110
In 1849, Blane had called for the information suggested by the Board but soon he moved
out of Kanara. Maltby became the Collector and was succeeded by Fisher. A final report
was submitted by Fisher ten years later in 1858.
104 MBOR, 21/3/1871, TNA.
105 Sullivan (1916): p9
106 Blane's First Report (August 31, 1847).
107 MBOR, 10/6/1850, p/309/10.
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3.6. Circulation of Rent Theory
Fisher declared that in these years, 'the whole process was brought under the control of
the Government'.111 As we have seen, the Board, despite agreeing with Blane, was not
yet ready to settle with the kumri cultivators directly. In this while, the vargadars were
allowed to let out to kumri cutters on the lands they 'averred' were their property
included within their vargs. However, they could let out only as much to earn twice the
kumri shist paid by them. This was described as the 'customary' rate. For any
transgression, they were fined a double assessment on the excess.112 Other controls were
introduced. Maltby, the Collector following Blane, introduced a standard rate for kumri
cultivation. Further, he introduced more accurate measurements for the extent of shifting
cultivation.113
Fisher took forward the construction that he had inherited from Blane. An alternate
conception of property on waste and forest emerged and gestated as a question mark.
Blane grafted on it from as many approaches as could undermine the ownership of
vargadar. Fisher now was fully working within the construction of Blane. Fisher
rephrased the misunderstanding between the Board and Blane,
The question at issue ... was not... the right to hold kumri cultivation not
within the limits of the varg or proprietary estate of the landholders, but
whether the payment of Kumri shist created a proprietary right in the soil
of any forest tract brought under kumri cultivation;- in fact, whether the
entry of kumri shist confers any proprietary right at all, such as a similar
entry would be held to do in regard to regular cultivation, or whether it is
a mere rent paid for certain forest privileges, which can be resumed at
pleasure by a remission of the Government demand.114
111 Fisher's Report (1858).
mibid.
113
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Fisher picked up one element of Blane's construction and developed, refined and
elaborated it. Thus, the question of right over forests now was to be constructed on the
alternate basis of ownership advanced by Blane. Fisher had made the question sharper by
removing reference to forests in and out of varg. The question was more general-
whether payment of shist creates any property right.
Fisher, having recast the problem, reviewed the arrangement in the pre-British period.
He argued that the pre-British governments, wherever the opportunities for exaction
arose, taxed all forms of agriculture. Thus, a mere taxation could not have been the basis
for ownership. He alleged,
As under native governments all cultivation was taxed according to the
description and value of its produce, the Government having a recognised
right to a certain share in that produce, whatever it might be, there is
good reason to suppose that the kumri shist was but a rent for certain
forest privileges, and did not confer any proprietary right in the soil on
the kumri cultivator.115
The only 'good' reason Fisher could think of was,
Had it been otherwise, most of the garden in the country, and much of the
rice land also, would necessarily have been entered as kumri.116
He continued,
Probably almost all the estates in the country have, at one time or other,
been under kumri cultivation and in the most wooded portions of the







A supposition was then turned into a conclusion. With equal ease and comfort he
declared,
There can be no doubt as to forest tracts generally being in this district
the property of Government, as, with the exception of one taluka, kumri
holdings are altogether undefined, though this is not the case with the
regular cultivated portion of estates, and there has always been Sarkar
kumri as well as that attached to estates. The collections made by former
Governments on this account were entered as poll-tax, and there is little
reason to doubt that the only difference between Sarkar kumri karlaya
and the karlaya paid by vargdars consisted in the one being levied direct
from the kumri cutters themselves, whereas vargdars were allowed to
collect this from those people either cultivating portions of their land or
otherwise under their influence, on paying a specified sum as part of the
demand on their estates. This shist, moreover, was increased when a new
tenant or other individual took kumri cultivation under a vargdar, but the
shist on the regular estate was fixed.118
Fisher's argument, therefore, was that since the amount of kumri shist was proportional
to the number of cultivators doing kumri cultivation, it was a tax. In the Forest
Assessment case, 1878, however, the Bombay High Court could not find a basis for this
conclusion by Fisher,
I may observe that no instance, though it was asked for, has been brought
to our notice in the present case in which the vargdar's kumri shist has
been immediately increased in consequence of a new tenant cultivating
kumri under him. Where there was an azmaish or estimate of what an
estate could bear, its productiveness in kumri as well as in rice cultivation
seems to have been taken account of, and its productiveness in kumri was
estimated by the number of hatchets employed. The occasional increases
and decreases of the jamabandi for a particular year seem to be justified
by a reckoning of kumri gains, as well as other gains, as greater or less
than before; but no distinction of treatment is perceptible until Mr. Blane
felt authorized not to increase the assessment on account of increased
kumri cultivation; but to cut down the cultivation to a production of
double the assessment.119
mibid.
119 Kanara Forest Case: p572.
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The alternate theory of Blane was tentatively employed on the grounds of administrative
exigencies of restricting kumri cultivation, pending the resolution of larger question of
ownership. Fisher was citing this practice to uphold the theory itself.
Inheriting from Blane, Fisher continued putting into practice the opinion that kumri shist
was basically a tax. As an administrator, his primary job was not the generation of
theories. Blane had already done it. Fisher had to elaborate, substantiate and refine the
theory of 'tax' in the context of social practices in Kanara. He needed to generate facts
and evidences to strengthen the theory.
From the experiences of regulating shifting cultivation, Fisher noted that different areas
had different claims to shifting cultivation. In Supa, the vargdar cut kumri in the forest
just where he pleased, without reference to village or any other boundaries, and could
190
not, therefore, claim any particular spot as his kumri ground. The vargadar in
Payengat boldly claimed all the unoccupied forest lands in their respective villages, and
sometimes even in whole magnis, because they alone of all the vargars in these villages
191
or magnis happened to pay kumri shist. Vargadars argued that as forest was necessary
to kumri cultivation, and they were the only parties who paid kumri shist, the whole of
122
the forest belonged to them.
He contrasted this with the situation prevailing in Bekan taluka (an administrative sub
unit of a district). The quantity of kumri cut by a vargdar depended on the opportunities
open to a vargadar rather than to the kumri shist entered in government records. In
consequence of land suitable to garden and rice cultivation being insufficient for the
support of the population, kumri in Bekal had long assumed the character of regular
cultivation. Due to pressure of land and population, they treated them in every way as the





bonafide property of the ryots. These lands were sold and mortgaged like settled
agriculture.
Blane had employed the strategy of creating a duality of law and social practice to
appropriate the law. Fisher tactically moved from law to practice. Since social practices
differed within the district, Fisher claimed that the law could not have been definite,
settled and uniform. Interestingly, relying on the account books Munro had endorsed the
argument that a varg was often composed of unconnected parts situated in different
villages without having a specific rent fixed to different parts. Instead, there was one
general rent for the entire holding.123 Fisher relied on the diversity of practices to argue,
...(rights) claimed on account of kumri shist vary in different parts of the
district... the difference observable raises doubts as to any proprietary
rights being claimable on account of this shist, and rather goes to show
that those who have claimed most and been loudest in defence of rights,
real or assumed, have, at any rate, had more conceded to them than their
neighbours.124
Fisher, thus, had firmly established the 'rent' theory in official discourses.
3.6.1 The Government of Madras and Rent Theory
The construction that kumri shist was a rent and conferred no property right on
vargadars had been in circulation in official discourses since 1848. The discourses
making this construction legal, consistent and logical had already been sustained. The
Board had appreciated that if vargadars were the owners of forests, the Collectors would
have had no powers to protect forests and kumri cultivators from the exaction of
vargadars. The succeeding ten years were a long time for the new theory to appear
consistent and logical. The Board in a Proceeding on 16 April, 1859 ruled,
123 Kanara Forest Case: p572.
124 Fisher's Report (1858).
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... the entry of the kumri shist in the accounts of any varg does not confer
a proprietary right in the forests, but only the rent of the privilege of
cutting kumri therein, which rent may be discontinued on surrender of the
yearly sum paid for it...125
The Government of Madras endorsed the legality laid down by Blane. The proceedings
of the Government of Madras 23 May, 1860 ordered,
It appears that certain proprietors of land in parts of Kanara and some
persons not holding land at all, claim to have exclusive and proprietary
rights of Kumri over extensive tracts of forest land, so that no other
persons can cut Kumri within these tracts without their permission; while
they allege that their own rights to make or allow kumri there at pleasure
can no more be interfered with by Government than their rights over their
ordinary estates. These claims appear to have been acquiesced in for
many years by the revenue authorities of the district; but when, subjected
to investigation by a later collector (Mr. Blane), they were found to stand
on no good foundation.126
The Madras Government adopted the views of the Board on the question of legal rights.
But the Board had proposed lenient measures for the ultimate discontinuance of the
practice. The Government described it as a political indulgence and ordered that 'the
proper course will be to remit the shist' which was a euphemism for extinguishing the
right, or abolishing the practice for which it was paid. Finally, the rights of the vargadars
over forests as well as varg kumri was brought to an end in the official discourses.
Conclusion
In 1799, Munro took charge of Kanara district. He constructed the vargadars as the
owners of all lands, including wastes and forests. By 1830s, the Madras government
realised that there was much extension of cultivation and a flourishing timber trade. But
125
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within the law that the vargadars were owners of wastes and forests, the government
could not benefit from the extension of cultivation and timber trade. The government
resented this loss. It expressed its bitterness by alleging that the vargadars had acquired
title to the land through collusion with sanboghs and other fraudulent means. Gradually,
there were responses within the administration to undermine the existing law. Blane, the
Collector of Kanara in 1840s made the most effort. He reorganised the existing and
prevalent theory. Through this, he denied Munro's theory and replaced it one more
favourable to the Company. The Collectors following Blane, Maltby and Fisher,
gradually extended this theory into practice. In 1860, the Madras Presidency upheld the
new legal theory and declared forests as its property and thus, prohibited shifting
cultivation in most of the district.
In this chapter, I have established how the prevalent ideas on forest ownership in Kanara
were eroded and replaced by newer ones. It is commonplace that law changes with the
changing social and material conditions. But we have to locate the changes and these
processes in discourses. The changes in social and material conditions in Kanara had to
register in official discourses for the change in law to become possible. In the official
discourses, the incongruity between the law and imperative of the situation was
highlighted. Through this, the desirability of changing the law was established. This
process was not sudden and abrupt. It seeped in gradually and accumulates over a period
of time. Following this, Blane and others worked to demonstrate the law as incoherent,
ruptured and illogical.
Blane used several techniques to do this. He outright denied and disclaimed the right of
the vargadars. This was initially borne out of anxiety and a desire. But the circulation of
this denial served a useful function. It facilitated other simultaneous processes of
changes in legal ideas. Subsequently, the denial was incessantly circulated and asserted
emphatically to get it accepted as the 'truth'. There were several strategies to undermine
the existing law. This included a demonstration that the law was based on wrong facts, it
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was wrongly derived or the issues were not adequately understood (a defect which time
and experience and progress can rectify). Another modality was to search deeper into the
'foundations' and 'origin' to find a basis to demolish the existing law.
Alongside this, Blane constructed an alternate legal theory. He pieced together elements
from diverse practices and ideas. The important thing was not to derive it from a cogent
coherent idea. Instead, having settled on the outcome, the challenge was to find ideas to
justify it. To take this further, Fisher created a duality between legal theory and social
practice. If social practices were convenient to the Company interest, practice was
privileged over theory. It was argued that a right, which was never exercised, was not a
right at all. In other situations, 'law' as theory and idea was privileged over social





In the preceding chapters, I have explored the discourses on ownership of forests from
1792 to 1860 in Malabar and Kanara. By 1860, several changes had taken place in the
field of forest administration in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies. The
environmental functions of forests were emphasised by the Surgeons, who also acted as
scientists and experts. They argued that destruction of forests deteriorated the climate
and reduced the rainfall. These adverse results, the scientists threatened, could disrupt
the entire agrarian economy. The Railway expansion, started in India in 1850s,
exacerbated the demands for timber. Thus, Madras and Bombay Presidencies during this
period developed an interest in managing their forests. The two Presidencies created
separate establishments of the Conservator of Forests to organise timber supplies and
manage the forests. By the 1860s, the concern for management of forests and timber
supplies had transcended the local limits to draw the attention of the Government of
India. The Government of India created a forest establishment in 1862 to promote forest
management all over India.
The nascent Forest Departments pressed for the creation of exclusive government
reserves to meet the supplies and conserve the forests for future needs. Towards this, it
demanded enactment of legislation declaring and vesting forests in the state. In achieving
its ends, the forest officers encountered intense opposition from the civil officers who
had managed the revenue and administration of India. The established revenue
administration considered the new department an intrusion into its function and power.
The contests between the adversaries were over the ideology of environment, the politics
of ruling the population, the cost effectiveness of different ways of meeting timber
demands, and the nature of the rights of the local people. At different layers of the
administration, the issue took different forms.
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On the insistence of the forest establishment, a Forest Act was passed in 1865. But the
Forest Departments found it grossly inadequate. The drafting of another Act started
almost immediately after the enactment of the Act of 1865. The civil officers and local
governments turned down three successive drafts. Finally, after 13 years, an all-India Act
was enacted in 1878. The forest law arose from intense tussles within the state. A crucial
issue here was how the idea of environment and conservation was forged, deployed,
understood and accommodated within the administration. In the following chapter, I
explore the relations within the state over the management of forests. This then becomes
the base for us to detail the formation of ideological basis of the Acts and formulation of
the detailed provisions. This will be the subject for the subsequent chapters.
Changes in the administration of the government from 1833 onwards are significant
factors. In 1833, the East India Company became a purely administrative body. The
legislative and financial powers were centralised in the Government of India, headed by
the Council of the Governor-General. The additional territories which were acquired
after 1830s were not placed under the Presidencies. For example, Punjab, the North
West Provinces, the Central Provinces, were placed under the Control of the
Government of India. These were headed by Lieutenant Governors. These were called
'local governments'. Thus, there were the three Presidencies and the local governments.
Following the war of Independence by the local people in 1857, the administration was
transferred to the Crown. A Secretary of State was appointed in London to supervise and
control the administration in India. The Secretary of State took over the powers of the





STATE, 'MANAGEMENT' OF FORESTS AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF CONSERVATION
Introduction
Most of the literature on environmental history of India posits a binary duality between
western, modern, rational and commercial; and 'traditional' and pre-colonial. It is also
argued that in the imagination of the colonial officials, agriculture was productive,
ordered and soothing. To the colonial officials, forests represented untamed nature, and
thus, these were described as ugly, desolate and barren. Following this line of reasoning,
the approach of the colonial officers to forests was hostile. Grove questions this binary
duality. As I reviewed at length in the Introductory chapter, he brings to notice that the
Colonial state had initiated forest conservation following the expert opinion of the
Company Surgeons.
In my opinion, Grove by showing that there were conservationist ideas and practise
during the colonial rule, questions the factual basis of the dualism of modern and
tradition. I, however, disagree with both the positions. I show in this chapter that both the
positions are evaluative. Further, Grove privileges the expert knowledge and thus,
assumes that the state simply accepted it. I will show that the doctors produced the idea of
conservation within the prevailing power relations within the state. In its dissemination,
the idea of environment was received differently by different layers of the administration.
To displace both the positions discussed above, I start from the early years of Company
rule in Malabar and Kanara, the supposed beginning of the contact between 'modern' and
'traditional'. Section 1 is an account of the period 1800 to 1810 of the ideas the Company
official held on forests. Company officials were far from hostile to the forests. The
assumed duality between agriculture and forests in the literature is generalised and
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overarching. Company officials, charged with governing the area, were actually more
specific in their understanding of the territory. The Company administration was already
describing its understanding of ways of husbanding forests as a 'science' of forest
management. For me, this is neither a cause for celebration nor disbelief. I am more
interested in how this idea was produced, understood, disseminated and deployed. The
idea was put forward and negotiated in the context of tussles within the Company
administration. The early propagation of ideas of conservation was from the Bombay
Presidency, eager to get the Malabar forests from the Madras Presidency.
Section 2 is an account of how after Bombay government got the forests from Madras, the
idea of conservation crystallised and was bureaucratised in the office of the Conservator
of Forests. In section 3, I will show that after the abolition of the Conservatorship, the
Bombay government again started propagating the idea that the forests in Malabar were
getting degraded. It pressed for the institution of the Conservatorship while Madras was
trying to ward off the encroachment. Madras government, nevertheless, had to engage
with the question of timber supplies. Thus, conservation of forests became a matter of
administrative discourse again. In section 4, I take up the question of the rise of the
science of environment in the 1840s. I show that the idea of conservation arose in the
context of and was imprinted by the power relations within the state. Cleghom, the Father
of 'scientific forestry' in India, pledged to the Madras government his commitment to
forest extraction and organising timber supplies. He expressed the idea of conservation
differently to different layers of the administration, and different layers understood and
adopted the idea of conservation differently.
In this early period the Company was not wantonly destroying forests in Malabar and
Canara. It was instead discussing conservation of resources. To the contrary, it was the
local people who were blamed for destroying forests and felling under-sized timber. I will
argue that forests entered the colonial imagination in a complex and fractured way. The
forest at one level, was the 'other' of agriculture. But it entered the imagination in many
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other forms. It was a land that could be brought under agriculture, the abode of wild
animals and an 'internal frontier' where the ruler's power ended.
4.1. Company Administration and Forests, 1800-1810
How were the resources, particularly agriculture, land and forests categorised, understood
and assigned meaning within the Company administration, and how did these perceptions
and categories change? I start the narrative at the very juncture where the colonial rule
first came in contact with the pre-colonial in relation to forests, that is, 1800 in Malabar
and Kanara.
The text of Buchanan's journey through Malabar and Kanara in 1800 is representative of
the opinion of the Company officials. The basis for my reliance of Buchanan's text is that
the Governor-General had commissioned Hamilton Buchanan in 1800 to conduct a
special survey of Malabar, Kanara and the Ceded districts to understand the resources and
people with the view to acquiring knowledge for better administration. Not only was the
report much appreciated by the Company, leading to its publication, but also,
methodologically, the report was representative of the opinion of the colonial officials in
Malabar, Kanara and Ceded districts. Buchanan had solicited written reports from the
local officials. Since his stay in each location was short, just a few days, he acquired
information primarily by talking to the local administrators. In assimilating opinions and
judgements of the local officials, he reproduced their categories.
4.1.1 Forests, the 'Other' of Agriculture: A Collage of Images
Buchanan described an area in Malabar,
The whole of this district may be divided into two portions; the one which
is well inhabited, and much cultivated; the other is covered with thick
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uninterrupted forests, among which are scattered a few villages of the rude
tribes, who subsist by collecting the productions of these wilds.1
The colonial officials cognitively mapped the geographical spaces into a duality of
cultivated lands and the 'other'. The agricultural lands were productive, occupied by
humans, yielded revenue and thus, brought feelings of satisfaction, happiness and oneness
with it. Agriculture represented civilisation. The rest, an undistinguished mass 'forests',
was wild and unproductive. The rude tribes did not live in forests. Rather, the tribes who
lived in forests were 'rude'. This duality, constructed by colonial officials, has been
commented on and theorised.2 The point, however, is that these constructions are not
static and monolithic. If the construction of the duality is a representation of the
geography, it is as much to bring about change and reorganisation of the spaces. If the
categories are constituted by the space, the categories constitute the space.
The boundary between cultivated lands and forests had changed in the past and could
always possibly be changed by the Company administration. Buchanan regretted that on
once agricultural fields,
Teak and other forest trees are now fast springing up ... and this part of the
country will soon be no longer distinguishable from the surrounding
forests.3
The opposing categories of cultivated lands and forests were not a simple watertight
duality. These entered the imagination of Company officials in a more complex way.
What was forest could become agriculture and the reverse, the agricultural land could
turn into a forest. The space was not a given one but crystallisation and representation of
administration and polity. Referring to rice fields which had become forests, Buchanan
noted,
1 Buchanan (Vol. II, 1870): p60.
2
Bhattacharya (1995); and Pouchepadass (1995).
3 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): p49.
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Owing to the persecution of the Hindus by the late Sultan, and to incessant
warfare between them and the Moplays ... one-fourth of the rice fields in
Curumbara Nada is estimated to be waste.4
The space was a testimony of the virtues of the Company administration in contrast to the
prior rule of the 'despotic' local rulers and warring groups. Reclaiming the agricultural
lands was to restore 'peace' and 'justice' in the province. Geographical space was
political. A well cultivated area was a sign of good and just governance and civilisation.
In one sense, the categories of cultivated lands and forests were a representation of the
space. But also, there was a memory to what the space in a prior period was. The thrust
was to restore the landscape to the prior period. The reclaiming of agriculture was not an
arbitrary act of destroying and clearing forests. It was self-evident that agriculture could
be done only on certain kinds of soil and slopes. Referring to an area in Malabar,
Buchanan regretted, 'Although the soil of these hills appears to be good, yet scarcely any
part of them is cultivated'.5 Referring to another area, Coiote in Malabar, Buchanan
observed, 'not more than one-thirtieth part of the two districts is too steep, rocky or
barren for cultivation' ,6
Buchanan thus concluded that in Coiote 'by far the greater part of what is fit for
cultivation is covered with forests'.7 One of the contradistinctions of agriculture with
forests was about productive and unproductive use of resources. Commercial plantation
of spices was more than a welcome change. Thus, Buchanan was estimating the extent of
land on which plantation could be done in Coiote.
Interestingly, while Buchanan had started his journey, Thomas Munro was already in
Kanara. Munro's accounts are full of forests and hills as wild, wretched, desolate and
barren.8 He resented his journey through the ghats where he could not see any cultivation
4 Buchanan (Vol. II, 1870): pl53.
5 Buchanan (Vol. II, 1870): p81.
6 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): pi84.
7 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): pi84.
8 Munro to his sister in a Journal which came to hand on October 4, 1800, see in Gleigh (1830): p273-288.
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but only the uninterrupted stretch of forest. The forests and ghats thus, alluded, defied and
were present as a disturbing, distancing field.
Munro had his reasons for feeling miserable in Kanara. Family misfortunes had forced
him to come to India as a soldier at a young age of 17. Despite his hard work, brilliance
and shrewdness, Munro could not find any support in the patronage oriented Company
administration. After years of struggle and insecurity, he was noted for his capabilities
and rewarded with the Collectorship of Kanara. But for Munro, to be in one of the most
difficult and unsettled areas, was not a reward but punishment, particularly, when he had
come after a similar stint elsewhere.9 Munro later in his life, secured and successful,
could be more philosophical about the serenity of the forests and hills.10
Interestingly, shifting cultivation was not condemned in the early years. Buchanan
described it in a matter of fact way.11 Similarly, Munro plainly described shifting
cultivation. In fact, the hill tribes were described as 'rude'12, but the method of
agriculture, even if associated with such 'rude' tribes, was not described as rude. To the
contrary, the very act of doing agriculture amidst the forests was ameliorating the
rudeness of the tribes and thus, an act of civility. Munro recognised the shifting
cultivators as owners of land, much the way other cultivators owned land.13
Forests figured in yet another sense in the imagination of the Company officials. The
forests symbolised the internal frontier. The colonial rulers had conquered the local
population and the plains. But the hill people were not in the control of the Company or
the local chiefs, at least directly. In the colonial mind, ghats stood as the boundary where
their authority ended. Referring to a tract between Malabar and Coimbatore, Buchanan
noted that the Nairs had no authority over its inhabitants. The area was subject to heredity
chief. Buchanan reported,
9 Munro had worked in Baramahal where he fashioned the Ryotwari system with Read.
10 Letter from Munro to his wife, 2/4/1826, see in Volume 2, Gleigh (1830): pl920-2.
11 Buchanan ( Vol. I, 1870): p414.
12 Buchanan ( Vol. I, 1870): p414
13
Gleigh (Vol I, 1830): p273-288.
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The manner in which these chiefs manage their country, or raise the
revenue, is here totally unknown; as the natives seldom venture up to the
hills, on account of the unhealthiness of their air.14
There were several reasons for this isolation. Forests were perceived as an abode of wild
and dangerous animals. Buchanan reported that even the villages on the fringes of forests
were abandoned due to the menace of elephants. Local people did not venture into the
thick forests out of fear of the wild animals. Even in the fringes, Buchanan reported, it
was dangerous to venture as walking through tall grass, one could step on a tiger.15
Munro had reported that while camping on his tours in Kanara, the attendants would light
fire and keep awake the whole night in the fear of tigers.16 People living in such wild
environment were obviously 'rude' and wild. Perhaps the people in the plains had already
constructed this difference between the hills and plains. The Company officials only
reiterated it. Buchanan observed,
The inhabitants of the plains cannot live on these mountains; nor can the
highlanders live on plains, without the greatest danger to their health.17
The 'difference' had led to an imagined construction of each other. Buchanan noted,
The love of the marvellous, so prevalent in India, has made it commonly
reported, that these poor people go absolutely naked, sleep under trees
without any covering, and possess the power of charming tigers, so as to
prevent these ferocious animals from doing them any injury. My
interpreter, although a very shrewd man, gravely related that the Eriligaru
women, when they go into the woods to collect roots, entrust their
children to the care of a tiger.18
In these accounts, interestingly, the natives are always in the fear of the wild animals. The
colonial officials do not talk of their own fears. The commentary on the fear of the
14 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): pi 12.
15 Buchanan (Vol. I, 1870): p376-7.
16
Gleigh (Vol I, 1830): p277.
17 Buchanan ( Vol. I, 1870): p427.
18 Buchanan ( Vol. I, 1870): p462.
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'natives', by its absence for the colonial officials constituted them as brave and daring.
Buchanan recorded how he ventured on a 'disagreeable and dangerous' journey into the
jungles invested with tigers and snakes, where the native would not dare to venture. He
proudly proclaimed,
...I saw neither elephant, tiger, nor serpent, and escaped without any other
injury than a fall over a rotten tree.19
If the plains people were feminised as cowardly, the hill people in contrast were described
as rude, backward but nevertheless brave. Buchanan narrated the daring acts of Carubaru
chasing elephants with torches,
The animal sometimes turns, waiting till the Curubaru comes close up;
but these poor people, taught by experience, push boldly on, dash their
torches against the elephant's head, who never fails to take immediate
flight. Should their courage fail, and should they attempt to run away, the
elephant would immediately pursue, and put them to death.20
But their bravery could not surmount their environment. They were helpless before
tigers.21
Forests were differentiated from agriculture. But it did not necessarily enter the colonial
imagination as an ugly site to be demolished and destroyed. The depiction of forests as
desolate, irritable, dull and dreary, typically associated with the British rule, was not
universally true. Buchanan described the forests as beautiful particularly when it was in
conjunction with agricultural lands.22
19 Buchanan (Vol. I, 1870): P377.
20 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): p380.
21 Buchanan ( Vol. I, 1870): p380.
22 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): p49-50.
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4.1.2 Forests, an Economic Resource: Conservationist Ideas
If in one sense, forests were the 'other' of agriculture, there was an economic value to
forests too. It was neither possible, nor desirable to decimate forests wantonly. The forests
were valued for their commercial value and utility, the preservation of valuable trees was
a consideration. Buchanan identified teak as the most valuable species and lamented, 'to
the increase of preservation of this, little or no attention has been paid'.23 Despite the
early hopes of finding the treasures of timber in Malabar, it was increasingly realised that
the accessible timber was already felled during Tipu's period.24 Walker was aware that if
forest resources were not prudently conserved, they would get exhausted. Walker
cautioned,
It is of little use to enquire whether this has been occasioned by an
unnecessary waste under Tipoo's government, or has arisen from a more
ancient gradual expenditure, which in time must exhaust the most
productive repository when the means of keeping up the original funds are
neglected.25
The colonial officials were of the opinion that the local people were destroying forests.
Buchanan noted,
... but these people are so ignorant, that, without compulsion, it could not
be expected that any such plans should be carried into effect. At present,
every man who chooses to give the landlord a Fanam may cut down a
tree, and all the valuable trees being cut, while the useless ones are
allowed to remain and come to seed, the consequence is, that in all places
of easy access the valuable kinds have become almost entirely extinct.26
The only solution, in the opinion of some officials, was to forcibly prohibit felling of
young trees. Thus, Walker insisted on rules to prevent 'wanton destruction' of trees by
prohibiting the felling of trees below a certain age and size. He further insisted,
23 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): p77.
24
Bryce Moncreiff to GOB, 14/6/1801, MSS 13602, Walker Papers, NLS.
25 Walker to GOB, 6/6/1800, MSS 13609, Walker Papers, NLS.
26 Buchanan (Vol. II, 1870): p78.
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... wherever we may obtain a supply of timber from Malabar, if we mean
to be provident with respect to futurity, a provision should be made to
plant young trees in the room of those cut down.27
As we saw in Chapter 1, Macknochie, undoubtedly motivated by his private interest,
98 •
raised the alarm on the destruction of forests. In response, the Commissioners had to
order an enquiry. The arguments of conservation must have been a good ground to claim
and be heard. The Court of Directors had endorsed a request for an additional loan on the
grounds that Macknochie had countered the practice of felling of small timber
prematurely.29 John Spencer, the President of the Second Malabar Commission
recommended that,
Jenmkars should also be made to plant young trees for every one cut down
otherwise the present stock will be completely exhausted.30
The Court of Directors were apprehensive,
...the present custom of felling timber of small dimensions is carried to
such an extent as to annihilate the forests in a few years.31
As a result of these concerns within the administration, a proclamation was issued
prohibiting the cutting down of young teak in Malabar.32 Buchanan was suggesting in
1800 what the foresters did after 1870,
...cut down every other kind of timber allowing the Teak to spring up
naturally, which it will every where do; and to enforce the commissioners'
regulation concerning the size of the trees. In the course of fifty or sixty
years, very excellent forests might thus be formed near water carriage,
very much to the advantage of their proprietors and of the nation ...33
27 Walker to GOB, 6/6/1800, MSS 13609, Walker Papers, NLS.
28 Government in Malabar to CD (Revenue), 1/1/1798, f/4/39/965, IOL.
29 CD to GinC (Revenue), 28/8/1800, e/4/1015, IOL.
30 Waddell to Spencer, 29/8/1799, f/4/89/1843, IOL.
31 GinC to CD (Revenue), 21/1/1801, f/4/89/1843, IOL.
32Logan (1891).
33 Buchanan ( Vol. II, 1870): p78.
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In 1805, the Bombay government, through the report prepared by Wrede, made the
'science' of forest preservation clear,
... why do we not at once resolve to husband and manage our forests
methodically, after obvious and long known principles, universally
attended to in all European countries, and at once secure... the best
management of the forests with a view to the preservation of the forests so
as to afford us, permanently the supplies we require.34
The report described the principle of this science,
The principle object of this science, of foresting or administering forests
after principles- is the obtaining, as nearly as possible, a complete
knowledge of the quantity and quality of timber contained in the forests-
so as to determine the quantity that can be annually cut down, and to
know, where to fetch the timber of such particular sort or quality ... b) the
preservation of the forests, new planting of young trees to ensure
permanent supplies and to improve the forests, by forestering the growth
of the most valuable species of timber.35
4.1.3 Ideas and Contestation within the Company
The idea of preservation of valuable timber, like any other idea, was not fixed and given.
Ideas acquire a hegemonic position within certain power relations. In these relations,
ideas can be selectively advanced as representation of some other interest. Through these
processes, an idea acquires a currency, gets into circulation and acquires legitimacy.
For example, Macknochie highlighted the preservation of teak for his own partisan ends.
The Bombay government, by upholding the 'science' of conservation, was arguing for a
Conservator's establishment. Wrede in his report even went about listing the posts,
mostly for Europeans, and even fixing their salaries. In the report, Macknochie was
recommended as the most suited person for the post of Conservator. And more, he was
34
BPP, 26/2/1805, p/343/20, IOL.
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granted double the salary fixed for the post of Conservator. This was justified as a means
-ir
to attract someone of his talent. Our reading of the intentions of the officials is not far
fetched. Company officials in Malabar were told by the Bombay government that the
'principle of the present government is not to seek emolument or create places for
persons'.37 As we have seen, such practices had led to the removal from Bombay of the
Malabar district and later, the abolition of the Conservator's establishment.
Why has the literature completely ignored these discourses on preservation and given us
just the opposite construction? Most of the environmental historians have dealt with the
post-1860 period. In this period, the government was exploiting timber to supply the
incipient railway expansion. Thus, resource exploitation was visible and apparent.
Further, the forest officials in their writings were continuously reiterating the wanton
destruction of forests during the Company rule. This was taken at its face value and
amounted to a self-description and confession of the colonial rule in its proclivities for
forest destruction. As a result, the Company period was assumed to be settled and
unproblematic for any exploration. More plausibly, the forest officials were exaggerating
the destruction of forests during the Company rule, and its consequent environmental
implications, to carve space for themselves within the administration.
We live in and with ideas, and yet, ideas are not always explicitly contested. The period
from 1792 to 1807 was an unsettled one. The Bombay Presidency first got Malabar and
then lost it in 1800. It could claim the forests back in 1805. In this turbulent period, ideas
had to be struggled for overtly and explicitly. In the course of this, the idea of
preservation of valuable timber acquired a hegemonic position. Once ideas become
hegemonic, these crystallise in administrative policy, practices and procedures. The
crystallisation of the ideology was in vesting the forests in the Bombay Presidency and in
creating the Conservatorship. It was through the functioning of the Conservator's







As we saw in Chapter 2, Madras opposed the Conservator's establishment and finally
succeeded in abolishing it in 1823. The Madras Presidency was not opposing the idea of
preservation. It was attempting to displace the Conservatorship in which the idea of
preservation had crystallised. These tussles, however, were not worked out with the
intention of keeping ideas intact. Instead, in the conversion of idea into administrative
mechanisms, the ideas themselves were modified, abridged and refined. In the struggle to
displace the Conservatorship, the idea of preservation was not held sacrosanct. Rather, it
was to displace the Conservatorship with or without the idea of preservation. In the
contestation within the administration, arguments for preservation emerged in a new
form. Bombay became the bearer of the interests of preservation and Madras opposed the
Conservatorship with every means it had at its disposal.
The Bombay government reiterated the relevance of preservation through the
Conservatorship. The Conservator's establishment fixed 28 March, 1810 as the date by
which all immature timber already felled in Malabar forests had to be moved out of
forests. After this, the Conservator pledged, 'small trees in the forests will be allowed to
attain their full growth'.38 The draft of the regulation framed by Bombay for regulating
the Conservatorship boldly declared 'regulation for management and preservation of
forests' in its preamble. It found further regulation necessary on 'account of devastation
committed on forests'.39
The Madras Presidency, whether out of concern or to outflank the Bombay Presidency,
did not detract from the argument of preservation. It was a Madras official who first
raised in 1815 the baneful effect of shifting cultivation.40 In Kanara, the concern of the
administration was to reclaim agricultural lands. However, Read, as Collector of Kanara,
38 See BPP, 9/7/1811, f/4/8156, IOL.
39 GOB to GOM, 27/4/1815, MJC, 23/6/1815, f/4/524/12513, IOL.
40
Pearson, Judge and Magistrate, South Malabar to GOM, 24/6/1815, MJC, 4/8/1815, p/323/18, IOL.
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recommended that ryot should not be allowed to fell teak and poon (a local timber tree)
while clearing the land.41
Harris, the next Collector of Kanara fully accepted the complaint of the Marine Board on
the injury to forests from shifting cultivation. He himself reported that fire from shifting
cultivation spread to other forests and damaged them. He also reported that the revenue
from shifting cultivation was insignificant. However, he defended shifting cultivation on
grounds of equity and good governance.42
Further, Harris endorsed the argument that if preservation of forests was a concern, the
extension of cultivation was equally a concern. He put forward the constraint that Teak
and forests were so interspersed that 'the most beneficial extension of agriculture will
never take place'.43 Towards preservation of forests, Harris proposed that rules should be
made to preserve trees on hills. He first suggested that no part of the hills should be
cultivated. Second, no hill land was to be cleared without previous permission of the
Tehsildar. He had further suggested measures for encouraging planting of teak and
poon.44 Thackeray, in his minute of 1822, did not question the value of preservation but
justified better and more efficient means to strengthen preservation through the
'information and influence' of Collector than of the 'insulated' Conservator.45
The interests in conservation had crystallised differently in Madras and Bombay
Presidency due to the peculiarities of the administrative arrangements. The Bombay
Presidency was charged with the supplies of timber and control over forests but no other
administrative responsibilities on the Malabar Coast. It was, thus, emphasising and
strengthening the ideology of preservation. In contrast, the Madras Presidency, charged
with the responsibility of revenue collection, needed to encourage cultivation and enhance
the revenue. But the Madras Presidency, in opposing the Conservatorship, premised on
41
Read, Collector of Canara to the Board of Revenue, 18/8/1815, MBOR, 28/8/1815, p/291/50, IOL.







preservation of forests, could not detract from the argument of preservation. It had to
work in and around it. However, once the Conservatorship was abolished, it could be
uninhibited in its motivation. Harris, Collector of Kanara in 1823, after the abolition of
the Conservatorship, recommended the removal of duty on the forests of Sonda and
Soopah. He provided the reasons for the Company's interest in preservation,
The only object of government in laying an exclusive claim to teak and
other woods or in the preservation of the forests, was to obtain timber for
maritime...46
Since the forests of Soopah and Sonda were inaccessible to be brought to the coast to be
taken to Bombay, Harris suggested,
... prohibition be removed, this would open a new source of trade and
would also I am inclined to think tend towards the extension of cultivation
by removing any obstacle to this extension, the only case in which teak
would be required... public building...enough forests for these
purposes...47
Harris in another letter to the Board of Revenue rejoiced on the abolition of the
Conservatorship:
It has spread throughout the desolate forest tracts of Soopa— confidence
and safety, for it has enabled the cultivator of land to labour in security by
removing trees and jungle bordering in his cultivation where to my own
knowledge a father, and son and slave were in a day carried off by tigers,
concealed therein.48
The Board did not differ with Harris on clearing of forests. It was concerned about
potential of corruption in the system of farming. The government, however, endorsed the
suggestion and withdrew restrictions on felling in Sonda and Soopah 49
46 Collector Canara to the Board of Revenue, 10/7/1823, MBOR, 21/7/1823, #4/777/21016, IOL.
47 ibid.
48 Collector Canara to the Board of Revenue, 9/5/1823, MBOR, see 19/5/1823, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
49
MRC, 17/10/1823, f/4/777/21016, IOL.
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Thus, the ideology of preservation, after being dominant in early 1800s, subsided after
the abolition of the Conservatorship in 1822. The preservation ideology was not
hegemonic across sites, in an unquestioned form. Like every other ideology, it was in
relation to other interests and ideas, and in this network of ideas and power relations it
was continually fashioned as an ideology. In practice, many conflicting ideologies
inhabited together the domain of the administration. For example, extension of
agriculture, revenue from timber, and preservation of forests for future revenue were not
exclusive. How did one ideology become dominating in relation to the others?
4.2. Contesting Forests and Environment, 1830-1850
The Navy Board, primarily interested in timber supplies and resentful of having lost the
Conservatorship of forests, continued to highlight the felling of immature timber in
Malabar.50 Through this, it mounted pressure to keep the ideology of preservation alive.
The Madras officials did not disagree with the need for preservation of timber in
Malabar. It was apparent to them also that immature timber was being felled and the
prices of quality timber were soaring up. Even before the complaint of the Navy Board,
Shefield, the Collector of Malabar, in a letter to the Board, dated Dec. 25, 1828 had
proposed prohibition of cutting young teak trees under a heavy penalty.51
Clemenston, the Collector in Malabar in 1838, who had raised questions of legality in
prohibiting felling of immature timber, was not opposed to the measure itself. He
repeated, what had been said for the past 40 years, that mature timber near rivers was
already felled and immature trees were being exploited to earn money. Clemenston
suggested the indirect route of imposition of a high duty on immature timber. In this, the
interests of preservation and revenue coincided.52 Madras government derived Rs. 27,000
as revenue on export of timber in Malabar in 1837!53 Clemenston's opposition was to the
50 See Chapter 2.
51 MBOR, 17/4/1834, p/299/35, IOL.
52 See discussion in Chapter 2.
53 Stebbing (1922): p75
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encroachment from the Bombay officials and the threat of re-introduction of the
Conservatorship.
There were perpetual problems in finding quality timber at a reasonable price for
shipbuilding in Bombay. The prices were rising and available timber was often drawn
from young trees. In the 1830s, the Bombay Presidency commissioned its own
investigation in Malabar to assess the timber availability and how to extract it. Further,
the reports of timber shortages and exploitation of immature timber were being passed on
to the Court of Directors. Thus, the Malabar officials had to engage with the question of
timber supplies and felling of immature timber.54
Underwood, the Collector of Malabar in 1840, concerned with the problem of felling of
young timber, tried hard to re-organise the legality to permit at least the imposition on
felling of young timber. Similarly, the Board of Revenue was not opposed to imposition
on felling of young timber. It, in fact, endorsed restrictions on felling of young trees in
Malabar. It only had reservations on the creation of an 'independent authority' and
encroachment from Bombay. To dismiss any possibility of re-introduction of
Conservatorship, Underwood noted that he could not discover any record that any of the
conservators had taken any steps to propitiate the forests, or planted a single tree.
The prospect of timber supplies became bleak enough for Farish, the Governor of
Bombay Presidency in 1839, to strongly suggest that forests near rivers in Malabar should
be leased and resources husbanded and conserved for the next 30 years to ensure future
supplies.55 Underwood, the Collector in Malabar, endorsed the recommendation to
purchase exhausted forests and replant and conserve them.56 The Board of Revenue,
however, was not in favour of purchase.57 This seemed to be making a demand on the
revenue. It warded off the question by saying that further experience was needed.
54 See Chapter two.




The Court of Directors reviewed the forest question in 1840 and endorsed the need for
forest preservation. However, they recommended that the forests should be bought only to
the extent necessary for the requirements of the government. The rest should be left in
private hands. The consideration, clearly, was on the grounds of investment required in
the venture of raising forests.58 The investment, however, had become inevitable. As a
result, Conolly, the Collector of Malabar in 1842, was given a small establishment and
money to lease forests and initiate preservation. Conolly's plantation later became a
subject of much praise and discussion.
The concern for preservation of forests was gaining grounds. Blair, the Collector of
Kanara, in 1838, lamented the need of trained people 'to improve the trees and to plant
young ones when required'.59 Blane, the Collector in Kanara in the late 40s, created a
small forest establishment in Kanara.
With the depletion of accessible teak in the past 50 years, however, timber supplies
continuously became constrained. If one strategy was to explore newer accessible areas
like the Anaimalai hills in Coimbatore and the natives states in Gujarat, the other was to
accommodate the assertion that forests had to be protected to maintain the timber
supplies. Thus, if the imposition of duty on immature timber was one risk, which had to
be taken despite the fear of dissatisfaction, the newer thrusts were for protection directly.
It was in this context that the government of Bombay in 1847 appointed Dr. Gibson as the
Conservator with a separate office to supervise forests.60
4.3. Rise of 'Science' of Environment
Gibson was the superintendent of the Botanical garden and held the concurrent charge of
the Conservator. Madras followed suit in 1858 by appointing Dr. Cleghom as the
57 MBOR, 7/11/1839, p/302/13, IOL.
58 CD to GinC (Marine), 26/2/1840, e/4/761, IOL. And CD to GinC (Marine), 30/11/1842, e/4/772, IOL.
59 Collector of Kartara to the Board of Revenue, 18/8/1838, MBOR, 6/9/1838, TNA.
60
Stebbing (1922): pi 18.
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Conservator. Cleghorn and Gibson were two of the 'experts', who according to Grove,
brought about the decisive shift in Company policy towards forest conservation.
It is undoubtedly true that the surgeons like Balfour, Gibson and Cleghorn adopted and
elaborated the researches produced in Europe on linkages, in the context of India,
between trees, forests and climate. Balfour published a memorandum in 1840 drawing
linkages between forests and climate in the territories under the Madras Presidency. He
observed that the depletion of tree cover had reduced rainfall and moisture content in the
air.61 Following him, Gibson pointed out the same effects of clearance of forests on the
climate.62 He also noted that destruction of forests led to siltation of rivers and creeks.
The subject of depletion of forests in India was taken up in 1851 as a theme by the British
Society for Advancement of Science. A committee on the subject was appointed to make
a report, which emphasised the need for forest conservation.63 Cleghorn contributed a
report on India. Dalzell, the Conservator after Gibson, reiterated the arguments.64
However, that doctors were respected people was no guarantee of the 'expert knowledge'
acquiring a hegemonic position. To the contrary, the 'expert' knowledge was subservient
to the power relations within which it was produced. This knowledge of environment and
ideology of conservation was articulated differently to the different layers of
administration in search of legitimation. Different layers of the administration
understood, assimilated and gave meaning to these ideas in the context of their own
exigencies and functions. The ideas of conservation was continually in formation through
these overlapping and contradictory discourses. I explore these questions with reference









4.3.1 Experts in the Service of Timber Exploitation
Gibson and Cleghorn were 'experts'/ but they were not appointed and paid to develop the
science of the environment. The supply of quality timber was rapidly diminishing. The
Madras and Bombay governments were interested in a more segmented and specific focus
on forests to assess their capabilities and make available timber for immediate and future
needs. The creation of the forest establishment did not have much to do with the
environmental arguments. The Collectors, particularly in Kanara and Malabar, since the
1830s were under pressure to attend to the timber supplies. This was detracting from their
functions of revenue administration.65 Further, the Collectors disliked visiting
inaccessible, backward and 'uncivilised' tracts.66 The task, in their opinion, was better
done by a forest establishment who could visit and engage with such tracts, of course,
under the powers and control of the Collector. As we have noted earlier, in Malabar and
Kanara, forest establishments were created much before the appointments of the
Conservators.
Cleghorn himself recognised that the initiation of forest administration was in
'maintaining a supply of first-class timber,67 and he was committed to the tasks. While
reporting on his first year's work as the Conservator, Cleghorn specifically reported on
the 'wants of Public Departments'. This included the Indian Navy, the Madras and
Bombay railways, the public works and telegraph departments. He regretted the
difficulties and constraints in meeting the heavy demands, particularly of the railways.
Cleghorn was equally alive to the concerns of augmenting revenue from the forests. On
every occasion, where demands were heavy, he recommended charging higher duty on
timber.68
65 Collector Canara to the Board of Revenue , 21/3/1848, MBOR, 16/6/1848, TNA.
66 Blane's First Report (August 31, 1847).
67
Cleghorn (1861): pvii.
68 See for example the first progress report on the Madras forests submitted by Cleghorn to the Madras
government in Cleghorn (1861): pl-23.
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Exploitation of timber to meet the demands was a major concern for the administration.
Cleghorn obediently pledged in relation to teak timber,
This invaluable wood has received the special attention of the department,
and I may say has occupied two-thirds of my own time during the past
year.69
Cleghorn was producing a 'science' useful to the administration. He was surveying the
forests, estimating the supplies and working out the modalities and costs of
transportation. For example, with reference to Wainad teak forests, Cleghorn reported,
From the situation and natural slope of the country the timber must be
carried eastward, and will be extremely valuable for military purposes in
Bangalore. ...it is probable that this timber will come into use also to meet
the increasing demand at Utakamand. It is much to be regretted that no
means of transport exists by which the crooks and other naval timber
found in this tract can be conveyed to the coast, where they would be
extremely valuable.70
In order to strengthen timber supplies, Cleghom organised timber depots. The forest
tracts were unhealthy and thus, labour was a problem. Cleghom negotiated to get jail
convicts to work in the forests as labour.71
He was much concerned in exploiting teak from an inaccessible location in Kanara. The
forest was an unmixed teak and exploitation would have denuded the patch which was
also the source of water streams. Cleghom keenly worked to develop options like
building a road or blasting streams to facilitate water carriage.72 The other aspects of this
'science', which Cleghom was developing, were the techniques of eliminating waste of
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4.3.2 Insertion of Environmental Arguments
Cleghorn advocated conservation of forests but within the economy of power relations in
the administration and society. He accused the local population of bringing destruction of
forests,
... large and valuable forest tracts were exposed to the careless rapacity of
the native population, and especially unscrupulous contractors and traders,
who cut and clear them without reference to ultimate results, and who did
so, moreover, without being in any way under the control or regulation of
authority.73
For Cleghorn, this 'threatened speedily to exhaust the forests, and thereby to deprive the
State of those supplies which were indispensable to the public service'.74 In this political
economy of conservation, 'natives' were to be condemned while the exploitation of
forests by the state was to be celebrated in the interest of 'public service'. And it was this
'principal evil' which had rendered it 'imperative' to organise 'a system of forest
administration'.75 Cleghorn did note the 'vast clearance' of forests by the coffee planters
(exclusively Europeans). But this was justified 'as endeavouring to rescue the soil for
legitimate purposes'. And further, 'it is important to give every facility for the cultivation
of coffee'.76 In contrast, he described shifting cultivation, which was done on hill slopes
similar to coffee plantation, as a 'rude' and 'barbarous' system.77 According to him, the
practice not only affected the climate but also deprived the state of the valuable timber
urgently needed for shipbuilding and railways.
Cleghorn's intention was to 'educate' the administrators. In his opinion, it was 'extremely
desirable that correct information on this subject should be promulgated among the
revenue officers of India'.78 However, Cleghom could do this only by being useful to the
73
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interests of the administration. Having fulfilled the task of timber supplies, Cleghorn
suggested that first-class timber should be marked and only such proportion should be cut
down as would be replaced by other trees. This was to prevent exhaustion of forests.79
Further, coffee plantations were to be encouraged but not on the crest of mountains,
where, it was argued, it would not grow anyway.80
Along with supplying timber, Cleghorn highlighted the pressure on forests. Referring to a
letter from the Secretary of State for supply of timber for the Royal Navy from the forests
of Kanara, Cochin, Travancore and Malabar, Cleghorn said,
If the forests of this presidency are called upon to any extent to meet the
demands of the Home Government, it is evident that the conservancy of
all reserved tracts must be rigorously enforced. There are many
temptations to rob the forests of the young trees; and the result is, that
mature timber (teak especially) is becoming everywhere more scarce.81
Cleghorn, contemplating the prospective demands for the railway expansion,
recommended,
... that immediate steps should be taken to raise large numbers of hard¬
wood trees suitable for sleepers, especially as sleepers of indigenous
woods may be estimated at one-half the cost of those obtained from
England.82
Thus, Cleghorn was using the authority of a superior officer, the Secretary of State's
desire for timber supplies for shipbuilding, to accommodate preservation of forests.
Similarly, he was trying to impress the point by creating the fear of possible obstruction
in the railway expansion.
Cleghorn had described shifting cultivation as 'barbarous'. However, when the Madras
government asked him for his opinion in 1860, he fully endorsed the suggestion of the
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Board of Revenue of a liberal treatment, endorsing only the need to protect strategic
places from where timber could be exploited. He was conscious of the spaces within the
administration in which he was working. Perhaps, realising from the earlier bitter
experience of the Conservatorship, he made it a point to concede the needs of the
cultivators and not to step on the toes of the revenue officers. He said,
... when forest management appears to affect the revenue or cultivation of
the district, I immediately avail myself of the advice and counsel of the
collector; and throughout I have desired to be in the position of his
adviser, and not an executive trenching upon his authority.83
At the same time, where opportunities arose, he would impress the 'expert' knowledge.
He noted, 'In India, there is no class of persons who have made it their business to attend
to forestry as a branch of rural economy'.84 He commented that of the two hundred
applicants for the post of sub-conservator, 'there was not one who could be considered an
intelligent forester'. He made exception of two persons, one trained in the Black forest of
Germany; and another who had worked as a forester in England.85 He found soldiers and
artificers most suitable as 'well disciplined' and to whom 'obedience comes naturally'.86
4.3.3 Court of Directors and Environmental Arguments
The 'expert' knowledge, thus, attempted to accommodate itself by being useful to the
administration. The address of this knowledge, however, was different to the different
hierarchies of the administration. Balfour emphasised that deforestation had led to
reduction of rainfall, dryness in the air, and increase in temperature. This had adversely
affected agriculture. Bringing the spectre of the great Bengal famine where half a million
had perished, he concluded that the result of deforestation could only be famines.87 Later,













affect sea navigation and therefore, trade. Thus, the nascent science was trying to impress
others with the serious effects of deforestation on trade, commerce and agriculture and
therefore, the very stability of the British rule.88
The Court of Directors found the subject 'one of having a strong practical bearing on the
mankind'. But the Court, just five years back, had instructed that only as many forests
were to be leased for protection as was absolutely necessary for meeting government
supply. The rest were to be left in private hands.89 Forest conservation required
expenditure which the Court was not prepared to incur. Pronouncements announcing
impending catastrophe, like the ones brought out by the researchers, were not to be
rebuked or ignored. But nor were these to completely displace all past practices and
considerations. The Court observed, 'the modes in which the presence or absence of tree
influence the climate of a country are by no means so clear as the fact itself. The Court,
thus, respectfully dismissed the plea by directing the Presidencies to furnish 'extensive
and accurate information'.90
One should not read too much into such instances of the Court taking note of
environmental concerns. The Court had only asked for more information. Second, even a
superior layer of the administration cannot be privileged as the exclusive site where
ideologies crystallise and policies emanate from. At the best, it is one of the sites in the
multiple layers of the administration. We need to see the accommodation of
environmental arguments in the subordinate locations.
4.3.4 Madras Presidency and Environmental Ideas
In reviewing the first year of work of Cleghorn, the government of Madras in August
1858 noted that the Forest Department had 'scarcely been able to meet the demands made
87 Balfour (1878).
88 Balfour (1878).
89 CD to GinC (Marine), 26/2/1840, e/4/761, lOL; and CD to GinC (Marine), 30/11/1842, e/4/772, IOL.
90 CD to GinC (Financial-Statistical), 7/7/1847, e/4/792, IOL.
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upon it'. However, it condoned its inability to supply to various departments due to the
Mutiny of 1857 and other factors. Nevertheless, this was to be an exception. The
government noted, 'the operation of the past year do not afford a fair criterion of the
prospective effectiveness of the Forest Department'.91 Evidently, for the government, the
primary purpose of the forestry establishment was to make available supplies to the
various departments. The government specifically pointed out that in the reports the
details of disbursements of the department should be placed alongside receipts. This was
to readily show the profits, and thus, efficiency of the forest establishment.92
Using the imperative of the Secretary of State's request for timber for the King's Navy,
Cleghorn had threateningly suggested that a patch of forests rich in teak would not last for
more than 15 years. According to Cleghorn, this was 'a serious consideration, as it is the
only forest from which long plants suitable for a man-of-war can be produced'. Cleghorn
was suggesting that the patch of forests should be reserved. The government of Madras
detracted that the proposed arrangement was 'not clear'.93
It has been suggested that Blane, the Collector of Kanara in 1847, was elaborating the
linkages between forest clearance and climate with encouragement and help from
Gibson.94 Blane has been highlighted as the one who entirely adopted the arguments of
Gibson. Blane undoubtedly condemned shifting cultivation and used the arguments of
environmental destruction.95 But the Board of Revenue had called upon Blane to report
on the effect of trees on climate. This was in response to the Court's directive to furnish
information on the subject. Blane was only fulfilling his task. In the course of it, he seized







94 Grove (1995): 440 and Stebbing (1922): p222.
95 Blane's First Report (August 31, 1847).
184
Chapter 4
Blane was responding in a larger context of revenue management in Kanara where the
benefits of agriculture were not passing on to the state.96 We have already seen this in
detail in chapter 2. Further, he condemned shifting cultivation, but only its extension by
population migrating to the district. He did not have any objection to the people who were
already doing it.97 Similarly, on the initiative of Blane, the measures the Board took to
prevent shifting cultivation were not guided by environmental considerations but
considerations of supplying timber and generating revenue. Thus, shifting cultivation was
prohibited only near the coast and rivers from where timber could be exploited as
merchandise. It was also prohibited in virgin forests which had a good stock of timber.
This could become of value later.
4.3.5 Cleghorn and Forest Department Staff
If Cleghorn engaged with the primary task of timber supplies and revenue generation
from forests, his subordinate staff understood even less the 'environmental' arguments.
They considered their duty only in extracting and supplying timber and in realising
revenue. The report of sub-Conservators only dealt with statement of expenditure,
receipts and profits98, and highlighted difficulties in getting axemen, and other constraints
in exploiting timber.99 For example, Assistant Conservator Beddome reported,
Owing to the impossibility of procuring many axeman in the past season,
very little timber has been felled; this, however, had been advantageous in
one way; it enabled me to employ the elephants in getting out much of the
old timber lying about the forests.100
96 For details, see Chapter 2









A Sub-Conservator's establishment considered planting of teak to be 'forced upon us'
who was happy exploiting timber.101 Further, one Sub-conservator was found of
sedentary habits dispatching peons to the forests.102
4.3.6 Triumph of Forest Conservation
By 1860, the forest question was perceived to have become significant all over India. This
cannot be ascribed to a single cause. The environmental arguments, shortage of timber for
railway expansion, future needs and revenue considerations worked together, with
different emphasis and thrust, in different layers of the state. The Madras and Bombay
Presidencies had taken appropriate steps103 but forest conservancy in other provinces was
non-existent.104 In 1862, it was decided to create a separate establishment with the
Government of India for the promotion of forest conservancy. The meaning and import of
'forest conservancy' was negotiated within and across different layers of the
administration.
For example, the Government of India ordered local governments and presidencies of
Bombay and Madras to exercise caution in regard to disposal of forest lands. It thus
directed,
... such lands should be reserved until it can be more clearly seen that it is
at present what may be required from them in the interest of general
public. ... Already great difficulties have been encountered in wood for
railway sleepers ... expedient that local governments should be very
careful in regard to the further alienation of the forest lands...105
The government of India was thus concerned about the shortages of timber and future





103 GGinC to SS, 1/11/1862, see in Parliamentary Papers (1871) (LII): p7.
104 ibid: p7.
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expenditure of public money on forest management had to come under the scrutiny of the
Finance Department.106 Forests could be seen purely as a source of revenue. A member
of the Council of the Governor-General demanded in February 1863 that since forest was
a 'revenue', it should not be with the Public Works Department but the Finance
Department.107 Interestingly, 'forest' was with the Public Works Department because
they were the major users of the resource.
And yet, another perspective on forest could at the same time be accommodated. In a
minute dated April 27, 1863, the Governor-General cautioned not to be too concerned
about revenue,
... forests here have manifestly a most important part to play in the
development of our national resources, and it is probable that the revenue
which they yield directly, may be by no means a just measure of the
wealth they contribute to the state.108
The Secretary of State in a reply to the Governor-General of India in Council thus
endorsed the Council's wish to,
... carry on its forest administration on a really sound basis ... to ensure,
for the future, a sufficient and permanent supply of timber from the
various provinces of India.109
This was to be achieved by 'conservancy' but 'at less cost', by limiting the area over
which it was exercised', thus endorsing the proposal of the Governor-General, the
Secretary of State who directed,
... but even in that case, care must be taken to preserve a sufficient
quantity of timber in other parts of the province to attract the rainfall and
protect the soil and climate.110
106 Resolution by the GOI (PWD), 21/10/1862, in Parliamentary Papers (1871) (LII): p 14.
107 Parliamentary Papers (1871) (LII): pi6.
108 ibid: pi7.
109 SS to GGinC, see in Parliamentary Papers (1871) (LII): p89.
110 SS to GGinC, 25/1/1865, in Parliamentary Papers (1871) (LII): p89.
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Thus, together with meeting immediate and future needs and generating revenue,
environmental interests could also be accommodated or inserted.
The indeterminacy in meaning at different layers was exacerbated by tension between the
Forest and Revenue officials; and the Government of India and the presidencies. The
Secretary of State in a despatch dated 24 March 1862 had admonished the Governor-
General in Council for privatising the forests of Burma. Brandis, then the Conservator of
Forests of Burma, had recommended against it. The Secretary reprimanded Government
of India, and described Brandis in the most glorious terms, stating that the
... views of that experienced and zealous officer, whose practical
knowledge of the subject, and incessant labours in this department for
many years, entitle his opinion to great weight.111
If the Secretary of State was upholding the 'expert' labour of Brandis, Strachey, the
Secretary to the Government of India in the Public Works Department, was firmly
asserting his control over Brandis. On Brandis' appointment as advisor to the government
on forests, the Secretary permitted him to visit forest areas, but cut him to size, ordering,
If you find it desirable yourself to visit any particular forest districts you
will of course do so, but you will clearly understand that the object of your
journey is not to furnish a scientific detailed report on the forests, but to
frame practical proposals of a general character for their improved
management.112
Scientific knowledge was to be completely subjugated and dominated by the
administrators.
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I have shown in this chapter that neither posing a binary duality of modern and
traditional, nor showing the colonial state to be conservationist, are adequate
formulations. Representing colonial policy and practice as 'appropriation' or
'conservation' are fragmentary facets and static depiction of a complex interplay of
ideologies and practices. The working of the colonial administration cannot be resolved
into the binary duality of modem and tradition or destruction and conservation. Instead,
what I show here is how use and interest over forests has to be constructed within
multiple power relations.
The idea of preservation was present since the early Company mle. For me, this in itself
is neither good or bad. What is of interest is to explore how these ideas were produced
and disseminated. Through contestation within the state, at times the idea became
dominant. At other times it receded away. During 1800-10, the idea became prominent on
the insistence of the Bombay Presidency, interested in getting control of the Malabar
forests. The idea receded when Bombay got control of Malabar forests. Again, after
Bombay lost the Malabar forests in 1823, it started highlighting the need for conservation.
Bombay was campaigning for reinstitution of the Conservatorship while Madras was
trying to discredit the option.
Similarly, for the period after 1840, I have established that the 'experts' were caught in
multiple power negotiations. The 'science' of forests was learnt, developed and deployed
in the context of the prevalent power relations. The 'science' expressed itself in the
language and terms of the power relations to gain legitimacy. Cleghom reported his
commitment to organising timber supplies. For him, the local use of forest was 'native'
'recklessness', while extraction for the government was 'public service'. Clearance of
forests for coffee plantation was a 'legitimate purpose' while shifting cultivation, the
livelihood of the forest dwellers, was a 'rude' and 'barbarous' system of cultivation. The
'respect' for the 'expert' knowledge was contingent on its usefulness, and 'expert'
knowledge was to be valued and adopted within these bounds.
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The very possibility of the conception of the ideology of forest conservation was in the
context of pressing timber shortages. The ideology sought to acquire a hegemonic
position not by its disinterested articulation of science but by making it subservient to the
power relations. Much the way the ideology of conservation expressed itself in the
language of the dominant, so do the dominant received and read the ideology in a
modified form shaped by their own tussles and exigencies.
The idea of conservation was addressed to and received by different layers of the
administration differently. Broader claims, like climatic effects of deforestation, would
have been more influential at the higher levels of administrations, entrusted with the
overall interest of the state. At the micro-levels, more specific and functional issues
dominated. This included revenue generation, timber supplies and appeasing the
landholders. We can think of it like a pyramid from the lowest rung at the bottom to the
court of Directors/Secretary of State at the apex. What mattered to the Sub-Conservator
was the revenue from forests and logistics of organising axemen, while the Court of
Directors could represent forest conservation in the interest of 'humankind'. It is only
through circulation of such facts, observations and opinions in discourses that an ideology
is accommodated within a given structure. In this accommodation of 'environmentalism',
the forest department emerged as the bearer of environmental interest. The Forest
Departments endlessly re-produced it.
In this chapter, I have traced general questions on the ideology of environment and
interests of the emergent Forest Departments. In the next chapter, I will show how law
was invented, deployed and devised through these contests during the 1860s, drawing on
the micro details in the different sites and locations of the administration. In these micro
sites, we can find the genealogy of legal provisions and ideas in the strategies and
counter-strategies of the contestants. Before moving to this, I need to take stock of the
administrative organisation dealing with the question of forests. A summary here will
serve a guide to the subsequent chapters.
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The forest establishment within the Government of India, initiated in 1862, was attached
to the Public Works Department. In 1870s, it was moved to the Revenue and Agriculture
Department. The forest establishment with the Government of India was primarily to
promote forest conservation in the Presidencies and local governments. In the
Presidencies and local governments, administration of forests was vested in a Conservator
of Forests. The Conservator, for example in the Madras Presidency, reported directly to
the Governor in Council. In other administrative arrangement, he could be attached to a
department. The forest establishment with the Government of India forged linkages with
its counterparts in the local governments and Presidencies. The forest officers developed
a solidarity, often undermining the authority of the local governments. In the subsequent
chapters, I will show that these arrangements were intensely contested and mobile. All
these establishments were referred as 'Forest Department'. Technically, these were not
full-fledged departments. Often, the business of forest administration was attached to a
bigger department like Agriculture or Public Works Department. In the following
Chapters, I will refer to the entire network of forest administration as 'the Forest
Departments'. 'Forest Department' will be mostly used for the forest establishment with
the Government of India. It was this body which was taking initiatives on the behalf of all
other forest establishments in initiative measures for making of legislation. 'Forest





LAW, IDEOLOGY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICES:
EARLY ENCOUNTERS IN LAW MAKING
Introduction
The nascent Forest Departments in their project of creating government reserves
encountered two opposing forces, people living in the vicinity of forests and civil
officers. The forest users, silent and not directly represented in official discourses, were
ever present through their day-to-day practices, making an impossibility of the Forest
Department's ambition. The civil officers opposed the Forest Department through
different modalities at different levels. Legal ideology and provisions of law emerged
out of these strategies and practices.
In the Introductory chapter, I formulated a relationship between law, strategy and
ideology. I posited that the social is about conflict and co-operation but law is more
concerned with conflict. The dispersed sites are locations for the formation of strategies
and counter-strategies. These strategies are formed in certain context of believe, values
and Ideologies (including legal ideas). The prevailing ideologies condition and shape
strategies. At the same time, strategic devices are accommodated by redefining
ideologies. My argument is that legal ideas and provisions of law emerge from these
practices. In this chapter, I will show how the forest officials, civil officers and the local
people, were trying to outflank one another in operations in the field. The legal ideas




In 1865, the Forest Department with the Government of India was still finding its feet
but it knew the effects it wanted the law to create. Despite the efforts of Brandis, the
Act of 1865 could not go beyond the prevailing legal ideology. It thus did not live up to
the expectations of the Forest Department. The Forest Departments went ahead creating
reserves and forged techniques and procedures to counter the effects of the local use of
forests. Often, these practices went far beyond the legal competencies created by the
Act of 1865.
Just three years after the enactment of the Act of 1865, the Forest Department started
pressing for a new legislation. The Forest Department with the Government of India
circulated two memoranda, including draft bills, in 1868 and 1869 to the local
governments. This was to seek their comments and consent before sending the draft bill
to the Governor-General's Council for enactment. The draft bills incorporated the
strategies worked out in the field by the Forest Departments to outflank the local people
and marginalise the role of the civil officers in the management of forests. Not
surprising, the local governments were hostile to the proposals. They severely critiqued
the draft bills and rejected them. The Madras Presidency went even further, presenting
an opposing construction of the nature of property rights in forests. In this chapter, I
recount these early developments in law making.
5.1. Formation of the Forest Act, 1865
The forest Act of 1865 provided for the constitution of government reserves. At the
same time, the Act prohibited the administration from tampering with the existing
rights of the local people. Law is forever always there. District administration in
different presidencies and local governments already had some regulation over the use
and control of forests. The regulations were legitimate in the context of prevailing ideas




The Forest Department pressed for the creation of exclusive reserves. The Governor-
General, at the behest of the forest interest, recognised the imperative: 'it will be
important to record forest boundaries, and to set forest land apart in a very strict and
formal manner'. The question of separation of the domains, however, was primarily a
question of rights and thus, he suggested, 'it seems even possible that the object might
be best attained by an Act of the legislature'.1 The Secretary for State agreed with the
need to establish the boundaries of forests but doubted the need for a legislative
enactment for the purpose. The matter was temporarily put off. But in the field, in the
practices to 'set forest land apart', the Forest Departments found legal competence
wanting.
The Forest Departments had drafted rules to facilitate the creation of reserves. With the
approval of the respective local governments, these rules were sent to the Government
of India for its legislative sanction. In 1863-64, the Chief Commissioner of Burmah
sent up a set of rules. The Central Provinces also had sent in a set of rules. Instead of
legalising a set of these rules, the Forest Department desired a general Act, which
would not only legalise these rules but also give similar powers to all local
governments.2
For the Forest Departments, in the strategies to form reserves, the existing law was a
block. Brandis was just a few months into the new position of Inspector General. But he
had already spent 14 years on the forest question. He had definite ideas about the
effects that he wanted to create through an enactment. It was clear to him that the
creation of state reserves would result in curtailment of the existing rights in forests. In
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... it is intended to demarcate certain tracts as reserved forests which are
to be strictly conserved and where the rules are to be enforced.
Wherever any existing rights will be interfered with by the
establishment of those reserved forests, it is intended to give
compensation, either in land or otherwise, to the parties concerned.3
Irrespective of the legality, Brandis was clear about the requirements of managing
forests. Even if the above were to be accepted, there were more problems. He was
aware that the demarcation would require considerable time and could not be effected
for all forests. He submitted that 'a certain supervision must be exercised over the
great mass of forests in which Government has any rights'.4
In the field, the practices of setting these reserves had already started in the previous
years. But the strategies, abstracted from the field, could be taken only so far. Brandis
himself conceded his helplessness that his role in framing legislation was confined to
submitting memoranda.5 Within the administrative arrangements, the concerned
department (here the Public Works Department) developed proposals for enactment.
Thereafter, the proposals were submitted to the Legislative Department. The Legislative
Department in turn prepared a draft bill and submitted it to the Governor-General's
Council for further proceedings. The Legislative Council had five members. One of
them was a 'Law Member' appointed directly by the Crown. The 'Law Member' had to
be present and had powers to vote to constitute the 'Governor General's Council
Assembled for Making Legislations'. The Law Member also had the charge of the
Legislative Department. Henry Maine, then the Law Member, noted in the statement on
the objects and reasons for the Forest Act of 1865,
3 Memorandum by Brandis, 5/9/1864, submitted to the PWD. Printed as an enclosure in letter to SS,
3/8/1864. See in Despatches to the Secretary of State, 1861-70 combined volume, NAI. Hereafter
Brandis' Memorandum (1864).
4 Brandis' Memorandum (1864).
5 Brandis (1994): pi32.
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But while almost the whole of domainial right over Forest lands has been
vested in Her Majesty for the purposes of the Government of India by the
Act of Parliament transferring the Government of India to the Crown, it
would appear that various petty rights over soil or produce of Forests
have been prescriptively acquired by individuals, villages or wandering
tribes.6
The proclamation of the Queen on the transfer of administration from the East India
Company to the Crown had explicitly pledged to respect all the existing local rights,
including rights acquired through 'prescription'. In the given legality, the proclamation
stood as a binding direction. Not surprisingly, the Act of 1865 provided for the creation
of government reserves, but it also added a proviso the prescriptive rights were not to be
affected or abridged.7 The Forest Departments, thus, were restrained by the local rights.
5.2. Forest Department and the Local People
Irrespective of the Act, the Forest Departments continued with their task of creating
exclusive reserves and in the process, found solutions to curtail the local use of forests.
As Brandis explained the strategy towards a 'systematic management',
... separation of what ultimately to be the Forest domain of the State,
from the large mass hitherto more or less open to the public. As these
State Forests will not be available for sale as wastelands, they were
called reserved forests.8
In the words of Brandis, forests were 'extensive'. But 'reserved forests' could not be
created anywhere. As we have noted earlier, several arguments led to the endorsement
6 Maine, Henry, 'Statement ofObjects and Reasons', 14/9/1864, 'A' Proceedings, Nos. 1-6, October
1864, LD.NAI.
7 Maine, Henry, 'Statement of Objects and Reasons', dated September 14, 1864, in A Proceedings, Nos.
1-6, October 1864, LD, NAI.
8 Memorandum by Brandis, 31/10/1868, in Proceedings Nos. 24-29, December 1868, PWD(R-F).
Hereafter Brandis' Memorandum (1868).
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of the policy for creation of government reserves. This included environmental reasons,
requirements for timber by the state itself and the fact that forests had a long gestation
and therefore, these could not be left in the private hands. But the Forest Departments,
had to earn revenue to justify their establishment. Every report had to have a table
showing the financial layout, revenue and surplus. Despite the arguments that forestry
was a long gestation activity and immediate surpluses could not be expected, there was
nevertheless pressure to perform. The Annual report on the forests for 1870-71 by the
Government of India questioned,
... whether in some parts of the country the vast tracts of jungle which
exist are worth preserving, even if it were possible to do it...9
On an inspection of the forests of Central Provinces, Brandis noticed 'considerable
areas' of reserves but regretted that these were 'in remote localities and at a
considerable distance from the principal centres of consumption' and 'main lines of
communication'.10 The mistake was recognised and the principle established that
reserves should be 'conveniently situated' for the export of their produce.11 Even if
reserves were constituted, protection, which would have curtailed local use, was to be
extended to only selected patches. Thus, intensive management was to be done only on
patches which held 'promise of good production of timber' and 'facilities for the export
and utilisation of their produce'.12
The Forest Departments had limited personnel and financial outlay and thus could not
extend to large areas. Further, despite the vast demands created by railway expansion,
9
Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several Provinces Under the Government
of India, 1870-71, Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 1872:
P27. Hereafter the Annual forest reports are referred as Report on the Administration of the Forest
Department in the Several Provinces Under the Government of India by the year under consideration.
10 Brandis (1876): pi.
11 Brandis (1876): p3.
12 Brandis (1876): p3.
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the market demands for forest products were limited.13 Inaccessible locations further
exacerbated the problem by raising the costs of extraction and of bringing the product
to the market. Thus, the forests that attracted the attention of the Forest Departments
were also the ones closer to habitation and in use by local people. The strategy thus was
to constitute only valuable forest tracts as 'reserved' forests.14
The uncertain nature of the market, a tentative beginning and inability to be certain
about the future requirements made the Forest Department claim a limited interest in
the other forests. The other forests were to be classed as 'unreserved' under the
supervision of the government 'with the view of guarding against improvident working
and devastation'.15
The State brought its might to bear on the people to guard the newly carved-out state
property. The Act of 1865 had already prescribed penalties, including imprisonment,
and vested the powers for enforcement in the Forest Departments. Besides, forest
officials had the power to arrest a person without a warrant. Forest officers were
authorised to confiscate forest property and seize implements and carts. The forest
officers were clamouring for magisterial powers, and in some cases even succeeding in
getting it.16 Brandis prided in announcing that the forest establishment was modelled on
the lines of the Police code.17 The exercise of police and state power had to be visible
in its most minute and subtle manifestation and penetrate the consciousness of the
ruled. The Conservator of Forests of Punjab, Baden-Powell, who later played a vital
role in the making of forest law, noted,
13 See Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several Provinces Under the
Government of India for the period from 1870 to 1880.
14 Memorandum by Brandis, 31/10/1868, in Proceedings Nos. 24-29, December 1868, PWD(R-F).
15 Memorandum by Brandis, 31/10/1868, in Proceedings Nos. 24-29, December 1868, PWD(R-F).
16 See the report on Punjab in Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several
Provinces Under the Government of India for the years 1870-71 and 1871-72.
17
Explanatory Memorandum on draft Forest Bill by Brandis, 3/8/1869, printed in MBOR, March, 1871,
No. 1224. Hereafter Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
198
Chapter 5
The subject of uniform for 'Foresters' and 'Forest-watchers' has been
under consideration. It is evident that it is just as important for the
'Foresters' and 'Watchers' on their beats to have a distinctive official
dress and badge, as for the civil police; for Forest Watchers are a sort of
forest police. I have visited many forests and found only a dirty looking
individual prowling about, whose position and authority no one could be
expected to recognise. I have therefore adopted a neat uniform which
was devised by Major Bachelor, as it is perfectly inexpensive.18
Economy was the key word. Everything had to be done with the least demand on
revenue. Despite the police powers, and intimidation through dress and badges, the
efficacy of this modality was limited. A forest officer said in relation to Simla forests,
the urgency of the evil might excuse such heavy penalties, but I do not
see how they could be enforced in the interior districts, without a large
establishment...It would appear to me, that any penal enactments of the
kind, applied to the interior, would necessarily be inoperative.19
In practices, actors do not follow the neat schematisation in which narratives, like the
one here, have to be structured. The Forest Departments did not begin by using force,
subsequently realise its futility, and as a result, forge other modalities to secure their
ends. For the colonial administration, it was always clear that an entirely repressive
arrangement was expensive and unworkable. Thus, from the beginning other modalities
of vacating local usage were being forged simultaneously.
Even if their voices were never heard in the official discourses, the forest dwellers were
always present through their day-to-day practices. A forest officer, Horsley, pleaded for
a sober understanding of the prevailing political relations. He cautioned that the Bhils (a
tribal group) were in a chronic state of rebellion and a conflict with them would destroy
18 See Chapter on Punjab forests in, Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the
Several Provinces Under the Government of India for the year 1871-72: pl5.
19
Quoted in Cleghorn (1864): p27-28.
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all past achievements. His suggestion was to win over Bhils by giving them permits to
cut wood and supply to the plains.20
Following Horsley's suggestions would have amounted to the state abandoning all
interests of the state in forests. But significant modifications had to be made in the
schema of creation of exclusive reserves. The schema had to make itself fit in the local
contexts. The reserves were to be small in area. But even in these reserves, it was
inevitable to permit local usage. Brandis permitted grazing and grass cutting in the
reserves in the Central Provinces provided the use was not turned into a prescriptive
right. Such pressures were also turned into an opportunity to earn revenue. The users
had to pay a charge for using the forests.21
If reserves could not be completely insulated from local use, the unreserved forests
were any way a relatively free category. Brandis had hoped to regulate the use of
unreserved forests. But he conceded, for example in Central Provinces, that the local
pressure made this impossible. The Forest Department could not prevent the local
people from cultivating and building dwellings on these lands. Finally, improvement of
stock was not even seriously contemplated.22
The reason for keeping the reserves small, and confining intensive management in even
smaller blocks, was the limited resources and personnel.23 The caution was to minimise
the local opposition. In Brandis' scheme,
... it will enable us considerably to increase the area of permanent
reserves without making it difficult for the surrounding population to
provide themselves with the forest produce they require.24
20
Paper presented by Horsley in the Forest Conference in 1875 at Shimla, see Horsley (1876): p25-26.
21 Brandis (1876): p3.
22 Brandis (1876): p2.
23 Brandis and Smythies (1876): p26
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Everything was to be done cautiously, working out political solutions in the field, apart
from keeping an eye on the market and revenue and coping with administrative
pressures. Brandis noted,
The selection of these Forest reserves, or exclusive Government Forests,
is necessarily a matter of time, it must be done gradually, and it would
not be possible at once to fix their final boundaries. Fresh tracts may
from time to time have to be taken up to meet the requirements of the
country, others may be abandoned, and the boundaries of all will for
some time to come require occasional rectification.25
The people living in the vicinity of forests were in the habit of setting fire to the forests.
It was a means for clearing land and ensuring a good coppice of grass for the next
season. Forest fires were greatly resented by the Forest Departments. It was their
conviction that fire damaged and stunted the standing timber. Thus, fire prevention was
an important task for the Forest Departments. The forest officers considered the access
of the people to the reserves as a nuisance in preventing fire. At the same time, the cost
of fire prevention was an equally constraining concern. Towards this, many strategies
were worked out.
Talking of Satpura reserve in Central Provinces, Brandis said, 'cut a line through
9
forests for people to walk, it will serve as fire line'. Passage of the people on the road
would have trampled the grass and created a natural barrier for the fire to spread to the
forests. Others planned to encourage traffic on the road as it would kill the grass and
keep the road clear as a deterrent to the spread of fire.27 But the strategy had a problem.
Brandis himself recognised, 'but then the problems of safety of the forests to a great
24 Brandis (1876): p4.
25 Brandis' Memorandum (1868).
26 Brandis (1876): p8.
27 Brandis and Smythies (1876): p4-18.
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extent depends on the exclusion from it of human beings'.28 But the creation of roads
had additional advantage. A forest officer recommended,
Formation of roads are useful for inspection, of export of forest produce,
of police ... Roads should be straight and curving roads should be
9Q
closed. People can be watched better on straight road.
This strategy was much appreciated. However, this could have succeeded only in plain
country like Audh.30 For the hilly areas, different strategies needed to be conceived.
Even forest fire, which was considered by the forest officers as the most destructive of
forests, was conceded to the local people. Brandis recognised that it had been a long
standing custom to set forests on fire. The question, for him, however, only concerned
imperial reserves, which formed a small part of forests. Brandis elaborated,
... outside our reserves we had no interest in wishing the people not to
burn their grass except in so far as fires outside endanger the reserves;
but that inside our reserves we must strenuously endeavour to keep out
fires ... by every possible means.31
Other strategies were being worked out to free the reserves from local use. As the
Inspector General reported,
In Punjab, through the exertions of Mr. Baden-Powell ... Great progress
has been made ... in the adjustment of rights, by the adoption of the
"give and take" system, by which, in return for making total concessions
to the population of definite rights in certain portions of forests where
they formerly possessed only uncertain privileges, Government reserve
to itself absolute rights in the rest.32
28 Brandis (1876): p8.
29
Paper presented by Captain Wood in the Forest Conference in 1875 at Shimla, see Wood (1876): pl4
30 Brandis pointed this out. See Brandis and Smythies (1876): pl4.
31 Brandis and Smythies (1876): p23.
32
Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several Provinces Under the
Government of India, 1870-71: p21.
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Baden-Powell himself explained the modality,
... we have given up desultory right over the whole of forest, securing in
return the 'absolute' proprietary right in certain compact tracts free of all
grazing and other rights.33
Baden-Powell further noted,
The extinction of obnoxious rights appears only to be possible in
country through... Conceding certain tracts of open forests for
exercise of rights in exchange for a complete reservation of
remainder of the forests...34
Thus, in practice, the Forest Department was firming up on two categories of forests,
reserved and unreserved. The strategy was to relocate claims out of reserved forests and
give a free hand to the local people in the unreserved forests.
In the context of prevailing and widespread local use, penal measures could have only
limited effect. Thus, instead of repression, moderation was to be the rule. This was also
due to the persistent complaint of the civil officers that the Forest Departments were
harsh and repressive. The government also hoped that people would gradually make a
habit of the new order. The 'necessity for moderation' was impressed on all forest
officers.35
The penal clauses were not to be enforced severely. A high number of forest offences
had to be justified and explained. The Report of 1870-71 justified that offences reported
and persons convicted were a very small percentage of the population. And thus, there
33 See the report on Punjab in Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several
Provinces Under the Government of India, 1870-71: p3.
34 See the report on Punjab in Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several
Provinces Under the Government of India, 1870-71: p6.
35
Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several Provinces Under the






was no undue severity.36 The Forest Department was always on guard against
accusations of repression. It legitimated its practices, thus:
... progress has been made without inflicting any considerable hardship
upon the population in the vicinity of the forests. The best proof of this is
the small number of offences committed in these reserves ... people have
now become accustomed to the new order of things.37
The report of 1871-72 summarised the situation that the local people were
'unaccustomed to any restriction of their forest privileges'. Reservation aroused
suspicion of 'infringement of their long-established rights in the forest'. The Forest
Department adopted the strategy of conceding rights for the local people on other
patches and modality,
... if the undoubted rights of Government to the forests be thus gradually
and judiciously established, any sudden enquiry into, or absolute
definition of, the question of forest rights being avoided, rather than
prematurely forced on, it will be quite possible to accustom the minds of
the people to the administration of the forests on fixed rules by
Government officers, and to dispel their preconceived ideas of quiet and
undisturbed right to the brushwood and jungle.38
5.3. Law Reform
The more the Forest Departments went ahead forging strategies and techniques of
dealing with the local population, the more they found incongruity between the
strategies and the existing law and legal ideas. After all, the Act of 1865 had recognised
only demarcated forests as government reserves. It was entirely silent over 'unreserved'
forests. Further, within the demarcated forests, it had prohibited the Forest Departments
36 See Report on the Administration ofthe Forest Department in the Several Provinces Under the
Government ofIndia, 1870-71.
37 Brandis (1876): p6.




from tampering with local rights. As Brandis lamented, under the Act of 1865 and rules
under it, grazing and setting of fire to forests in the reserves could not be excluded.
These were 'existing rights' which could not be extinguished. This made creation of
reserves themselves meaningless.39
This inability to accommodate strategies in the prevalent legal ideas created an
initiative to engage with the legal ideas and attempt to displace them. An early attempt
was to allege that 'existing rights' and 'prescribed rights', mentioned in the Queen's
proclamation, were 'vague' expressions.40 The Forest Department gradually worked out
a detailed legal theory on the nature of the existing rights on forests in India. The
desired effect was to marginalise the theory of 'prescriptive right' and make the forest
use a subject for 'regulation, commutation and extinction'.
The Forest Departments, in practice, had already gone ahead in forging its distinction of
reserved and unreserved forests. This was despite the Act of 1865, which recognised
only one category of forests, and that too subject to local rights. The practices, not in
conformity with the Act of 1865, were put down on paper to constitute the rules under
the Act. Brandis reported,
Under the present Act, separate rules for the Reserved and Unreserved
Forests have been passed for the Central Provinces, British Burmah, and
the Hyderabad Assigned Districts (Berar).41
The Forest Department started pressing for a revision of the Act of 1865. Brandis first
submitted a memorandum on 31st October 1868 followed with a revised memorandum
and draft of a bill in 1869. The proposals were dossiers of tools and techniques already
developed in the field. Brandis emphasised the inadequacy of the Act of 1865. It could
apply to a patch only after it was notified to be a government forest. The government
39 Brandis' Memorandum (1868).
40 Brandis' Memorandum (1868).
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had to declare a patch of forests as it's property through a notification. But Brandis'
concern was that in most of the provinces forests were not notified. The only means of
protecting forests was to create powers to regulate the local rights even before
notification. 42
Some local administrations, like Burma and Central Provinces had framed rules under
the Act of 1865. These rules were approved by the Advocate General, and promulgated
with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council43. The rules had incorporated the
strategic practices of controlling the forests even if these were not in conformity with
the Act of 1865. The problem of the illegality of the Rules was subsequently noted by
the Advocate General.44 Brandis, who was instrumental in getting the rules endorsed,
then, was happy at the emerging legal crisis. Interestingly, one of the comments of the
Advocate general was that the Act of 1865 recognised only one category of forests, as
opposed to 'reserved' and 'unreserved' as was followed by the Forest Departments.45
Brandis' intention was to have a law which could permit restriction on use of forests
even before their notification as contemplated in the Act of 1865. Brandis reiterated the
inadequacy of the Act of 1865,
... the most important omission being the absence of all provisions
regarding the definition, regulation, commutation, and extinction of
customary forest rights. The Act merely provides that the notification,
defining Government forests, shall not abridge or affect any existing
rights of individuals or communities 46
Brandis continued,
41 Brandis' Memorandum (1868).
42 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
43 The rules were made in the following years British Burmah (August 1865), the Central Provinces
(August 1865), Oudh (September 1866), Coorg (September 1865), and British Sikkim in Bengal
(August 1866).
44 See Attorney General's report in Proceedings Nos. 24-29, December 1868, PWD(R-F).
45 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
206
Chapter 5
It seems necessary that some procedure should be fixed for defining and
regulating these rights, otherwise they will render nugatory the operation
of any Forest rules, and impossible the protection of any forest. The
attempt has been made to supply this omission in the draft Bill now
submitted.47
Brandis explained that the provisions of the Bill were intended to apply to only those
forests which were either the property of government, or in which government has
forest rights. Brandis understood different extents of property rights on forests. The first
were the cases where the property right of the government was complete and exclusive.
This was the case in Sindh and Central Provinces. In Central Provinces the operation of
settlements had given this result while in Sindh forests were inherited from the Ameers
(the ruling family of Sindh).48 But in other provinces, Brandis lamented,
... proprietary right of Government is limited by the customary forest
rights of individuals or communities.49
And in yet other situations, the land belonged to private persons but the
government had rights over forests. For example, in Punjab, under the
provisions of the settlement, the proprietary right in the land was given to the
cultivators, while the government claimed the ownership of the trees.
Brandis' first concern was to give powers to the local governments to demarcate the
forests. Once the forests were demarcated and their boundaries defined, the customary
rights on these forests were to be regulated. This included the following restrictions of
exercise of customary rights. One, no fresh rights were to accrue. Two, no rights were
to be recognised unless a formal claim was preferred within three years from the date of
notification of boundary. Three, no right could be exercised in forests closed for its
46 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
47 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
48 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
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management and regeneration. And four, roads and paths passing through demarcated
forests could be closed from time to time.50
With these proposals, Brandis was closer to his aspiration. He expressed his
hope that if accepted by local governments it,
... will constitute demarcated forests a species of privileged property,
whether they be the property of the State, or of communities, or of
public institutions.51
Brandis was conscious about the subversion of prevalent law and ideas. He conceded,
'To a small extent these provisions will interfere with the free exercise of the customary
forest rights without compensation'.52 However, he justified this illegality on the
grounds of benefit to those whose very rights were affected. Further, he considered
these rights insignificant. Brandis assured the government that any interference with the
customary rights of the local people was to be 'only temporary'. He hoped to 'free most
forests of customary forest rights' through compensation like 'grant of forest rights in
other lands' and 'grant of land'.53 Brandis feared flak from his administrative superiors,
for example, the Secretary to the government in the Public Works Department, if he
even had a hint of suggestion of a drain on the exchequer by suggesting cash
compensation. He clarified,
Money compensation will, I trust, be necessary in exceptional cases
only. But in some cases it may be found expedient to remit or to reduce
taxes, or other Government demands54
49 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
50 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
51 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
52 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
53 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
54 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
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He anticipated opposition to the idea from the civil officers. He thus, pledged to make
arrangement for the 'actual requirements of the population in the vicinity of the forests'.
Further, the demarcated forests were to be a 'small proportion only of the total forest
area'.55 Besides this, in Brandis' opinion, if 'protection and improvement of demarcated
forests' was intended, interference with customary rights was 'unavoidable'.56 Brandis
foresaw the possibility that the attempts to conciliate the local claims might not work.
In such cases, according to Brandis, if the Forest Department did not have the powers to
close forests and curtail the use of forests, the 'productiveness' of forests could not be
improved.57 Within the draft rules, such curtailment, like closing of grazing or roads,
was not to be compensated. This would have led to 'endless petty claims' arising every
year and month wasting the time of forest officers. Brandis' justification was that such
improvement would help the right holders themselves in better fodder and forest
products.58 Thus, Brandis attempted to persuade the governments that forests could be
conserved without the 'risk of injustice and oppression'.59
5.3.1 Law: Dossier of Strategies against Civil Officers
If the Forest Departments were struggling with the local people in the field, they had
another power to contend with, the civil officers. The proposal for law reforms were
again a similar dossier for outflanking the civil officers in the field, who were an
impediment in the Forest Departments realising its aspirations. Within the Act, Brandis
constituted and vested the forest officers, who were to be the main functionaries within
the Act, with some important powers. Brandis had modelled the powers on the Forest
officers in the bill on the 'Police Code'. 60
55 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
56 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
57 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
58 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
59 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
60 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
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The draft bill provided the procedure for the working of the law. The local government
was to move on a proposal from the Conservator of Forests for constitution of
demarcated forests. The Conservator was then to 'endeavour to effect an agreement
with the parties interested'. If these endeavours failed, he was to refer the matter to a
special commission appointed for the purpose. On a reference from the Conservator,
the commission was to settle all matters connected with 'regulating, commuting, and
extinguishing forest rights'. The commission also had other functions. It could define
the existing forest rights and settle all boundary disputes. The decision of the
commission in this respect was to be final. The commission could also 'determine the
nature and amount of compensation to be given in the case of any expropriation of
forest lands in which Government has forest rights'.
Brandis was emphatic about the settlement of disputes through a commission. This was
on the grounds that the 'inquiries will necessarily be of a peculiar character'. Only a
specialised commission could acquire the 'knowledge' which was 'indispensable' for a
'satisfactory' settlement. Reference to a commission was to be the 'rule'. Only in
exceptional situations, modalities other than dispute settlement by the commission were
to be followed. In that event, the power of commission was to be exercised by the
ordinary civil courts.
In addition to this, the bill had provisions for the government to control private forests
in exceptional cases. The bill had provisions for the regulation of the transit of timber.
It also provided that all drifted timber was to be government property unless it could be
proved to be otherwise. The bill introduced several refinements in the penal parts. It
required assistance to be given in the detection and extinction of jungle fires by all
persons who exercised forest rights in any forest, or held a lease of timber, pasture, or
other forest produce. The bill provided for confiscation of timber and implements and a
fine not exceeding Rs.500, and in default of payment, simple imprisonment for a term
not exceeding six months. Brandis further provided that up to half the imposed fine
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could go to the 'informer', to be awarded by the Magistrate.61 Thus, Brandis made
strategic moves to reduce the influence of the civil officers in forest administration.
This was through vesting more powers in forest officers and subterfuge, like
appointment of a commission, to erode the role of the civil officers.
5.4. Comments on the Draft Bill by Local Governments
5.4.1 Central Provinces
The bill was circulated to the local governments for comments. The local governments
vehemently opposed the draft bill. The Central Provinces rebuked Brandis, saying that
the bill had in view 'totally different conditions of forest tenure than exists in the
Central Provinces'.62 Central Provinces, of which Brandis had assumed a complete
ownership of forests, asserted that in only one of the categories of forest, right of state
was absolute. In others, it coexisted with private rights. As a result 'various degrees of
complication ensue'. The Central Provinces complained about the usurpation of rights
without even paying any compensation. It noted,
It may be said to place almost unlimited power in the hands of
Government, to deal with all forests (and the definition of forests is a
very wide one) in any manner it may please and to provide only for
/TO
compensation being given in a few extreme cases.
Indicting the law as 'foreign to experience', the Central Provinces observed that 'in
India there is a tradition that the forest is a common property'.64 It teased the Forest
61 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
62 Comments from theGovernment in Central Provinces on the draft forest bill,4/7/1871, in B





Departments by suggesting they should plant trees and conserve resources before they
tried to acquire a 'right to interfere on a large scale with the management of the forests
in which private rights pre-dominate'.65 It found the bill 'clumsy' and 'obscure'.66
Further, in the opinion of the government of Central Provinces, the draft bill was 'alien
to the spirit of our law' and to general policy of government and was certainly not a
'worthy addition to our statute book'67.
5.4.2 Bengal Presidency
The Bengal officials also had serious misgivings about the powers vested in the forest
officers and treatments of rights in the forests. The Commissioner of Cooch Behar, in
response to the bill, commented, 'I deem it my duty to protest, in the strongest term'
that the proposed draft gave powers to 'confiscate' forest land, and its prohibitions
would deprive the owners of all use of the forest and soil. According to the
Commissioner, even if compensation were paid, it would be looked upon by the owners
and population as an act of 'injustice'. He was categorical, 'I would not admit the right
of government to interfere with private property on the grounds of mismanagement' .68
The Commissioner of Chotanagpur also objected to the proposed powers of the forest
officers,
The officers of the Forest Department are masters of the situation even
in the settlement of disputes between themselves and the parties who




68 Commissioner Cooch Behar to Government of Bengal, 19/1/1871, in B Proceedings, Nos. 37-47,
December, 1875, NAI.




The arrangement of settlement of disputes by a commission was also severely objected
to. The Commissioner of Chotanagpur said,
I deprecate new tribunals, all disputes between the officers of the Forest
Department and the people should be settled by the revenue authorities
or the courts of law.70
The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal objected to the powers vested in the forest officers.
He was emphatic that the Collector and not the Conservator was the proper person to
take cognisance of any dispute on forest boundaries or decide on forest rights. He found
the provision 'objectionable' that the 'Conservator of forests in the first instance to
ascertain and determine the nature of existing rights'.71
The Bengal government refuted the construction of rights of the local people over
forests. It noted,
There are many prescriptive rights which cannot be very clearly proved,
and which certainly would not be admitted by a forest officer with little
or no regard for anything but the financial interests of his own
department. Provisions should be made, too, to meet the case of
joomiahs and other migratory cultivators who possess very strong
claims to consideration, from early occupation and clearance of waste
and forest lands, though they might perhaps be unable to prove any legal
right.72
The Bengal government then made a scathing attack on the Forest Department. It
upheld the position of the Collector and urged for the vesting of the powers in the
collectors. The Lieutenant Governor cautioned,
10 ibid.
71 Government of Bengal to GOI, 17/7/1871, on the bill and Memorandum of Brandis, in Revenue and




... it is necessary that extreme care should be used in giving
extraordinary powers to the officers of such a department as forests-
Collector, who is more than a tax collector, being in fact, an officer
educated from his youth in civil administration.73
In contrast, at least the subordinate forest officers were 'men of little or no education'
and had 'generally but a limited acquaintance with landed tenures and customs'.74 The
collector was 'a protector of the people'. He contrasted this with the Forest Department,
'who are too apt to look exclusively to the interest of their own departments'
According to the Lieutenant Governor, the Forest Department not only struggled to
'show a tolerable balance sheet' by 'making a most of their resources', but also by
taking credit for revenues which would have come through Collectors if there was no
~lf%
Forest Department. But the worst result of their desperation and zeal to augment
revenue was,
... when people, whose claim to the soil rests only on the possession of a
few thousand years, before Europeans or Hindoos or any one else came
on the scene, are treated as squatters and trespassers, and when grazing
and similar privileges are suddenly put a stop to or curtailed...77
The tension in the districts was visible. According to Lieutenant Governor,
... a sort of antagonism between the civil and forest departments is
created, which certainly hinders the useful operation of all the
department... the civil officers of Government seem to have some












Other local governments, like the North-West Provinces, made a similar and spirited
objection to the draft bill.79 But the Madras Presidency was hostile in its opposition to
the bill. The Madras Board of Revenue found many substantive problems with the draft
bill, observing:
The provisions of the bill are more arbitrary than any which can now be
found in the Statute book ... It gives executive Governments and Forest
Commissions the power of making an unlimited number of 'laws', all of
which will restrain or destroy rights which are essential to the comfort
and welfare of the people.80
The Madras Board of Revenue exposed the designs of the Forest Department, in having
the substantive questions of people's access determined through courts and a
commission 'placed outside the pale of the law and settled by special courts appointed
by Government, acting of course under the advice of the Conservator'. In their opinion,
the Conservator was given oppressive powers to settle boundaries and claims of the
people.81 In this,
... the contest will be between a powerful Government on the one hand,
and petty cultivators, wood-cutters, honey-gatherers, and hill-tribes on
the other, the Civil Courts will be powerless, for their jurisdiction is
expressly barred, and a department which acquires new importance by
every forest right which it strangles will be the arbitrator.82
Its indictment of the Forest Department was total. It noted,
79 Government of North-West Province to GOI, 10/2/1872, in B Proceedings, Nos. 37-47, December,
1875, NAI.




... its principles, scope and purpose are inconsistent with the existing
facts of forest property and its history... its provisions are too arbitrary,
setting the law of property at open defiance, and leaving the
determination of the forest rights of the people to a department which, in
this Presidency at all events, has always shown itself eager to destroy all
forest rights but those of Government.83
In, thus commenting, Madras was no different from the other local governments. But
Madras went further, eroding the very basis of the proposed law. Madras accused
Brandis of relying on the continental system of forest management, which was a
remnant of 'a long feudal tyranny'. Madras claimed,
The system is based on the assumption that most of the forest property
belongs to the State, and that the rights of the people in forests of which
the State is the proprietor are few and easily defined. No system could
be more opposed either in its history or its provisions, to the
corresponding circumstances in India. It should have been taken as a
warning instead of a model, and yet it is now proposed to make the most
repulsive and arbitrary portions of it law...84
The Madras Board of Revenue went ahead in constructing an entirely contrary
construction of forest rights,
There is a scarcely a forest in the whole of the Presidency of Madras
which is not within the limits of some village ... All of them, without
exception, are subject to tribal or communal rights which have existed
from time immemorial, and which are difficult to define and value as
they are 'necessary' to the rural population... Nor can it be said that these
rights are susceptible of compensation, for in innumerable cases the
right to fuel, manure and pasturage will be as much necessity of life to






Brandis' memorandum had proposed translocation of forest rights. This was in
transferring the rights to other locations to free a patch to constitute it as a reserve. The
Madras Board of Revenue negated this strategy,
Now in this presidency the rights which are to be interfered with exist in
'all' forests... The compensation which the bill contemplates will
OiT
therefore be generally impossible.
Similarly, the Madras Board of Revenue noted,
The peculiarity of Southern India consists in the fact that in all or nearly
all its forests, though the State may claim to be the proprietor, the State
right is reduced to very narrow limits by numerous valuable and
contestable communal rights, which may be regulated, but cannot from
their nature be commuted or extinguished.87
On these grounds the Board felt that it was right in rejecting the bill in its entirety.
What then were the suggestions of Madras for a forest law? The Madras Board of
Revenue proposed to significantly reduce the powers of the Forest Department and
make the forest officers sub-ordinate to the Collectors. The Collectors were to ascertain
in relation to forests 'what use of each of them the people are now making, or had been
making from time immemorial before the Forest Department was created'.88 Madras
government chided Brandis, saying that the Conservator had already made proposal for
'restraining and extinguishing popular rights'. But he will have to redo them.89 And
thereafter, the
... (bill) must be based on the concession that in the forests in which






Government. All instances of the use of forests by the people should be
taken as presumptive evidence of 'property' therein.90
It further proposed the liquidation of the Forest Department. The Conservators were to
act under the orders of the Collector. 'Propositions for the commutation and regulation'
and 'extinguishing' should emanate from Collectors.91
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have described the relationship between law, strategy and ideology in
relation to forests in colonial India in the 1860s. I have illustrated that the legal ideas
and provisions emerged in and through protracted multiple struggles between the local
people, Forest Department and the Revenue Department. Strategies emerged from
practices in the field. The Forest Department worked to outflank the local people in
creating exclusive government reserves. In the field, the strategies for policing the
forests, preventing local people from setting forest fire and techniques of settling and
extinguishing local rights were worked out. Similarly, the Forest Department learnt
from experience the means of minimising the weight of its opponent, the civil officers.
The key functions in creation of forest reserves were given to the Conservator of
Forests. A Commission was proposed to displace the ordinary courts.
The Forest Departments abstracted these strategies and attempted to accommodate
them in the given law and legal ideas. In this process, two things happened. Strategies
contrary to the given legal ideas were accommodated and legal ideology was redefined
to justify the assimilation. Alternately, legal ideology itself became the subject for
contestation in efforts to displace it. The Forest Department was working at both the
fronts. The practices forged by the Forest Department encountered the prevailing notion





'regulate, commute and extinguish' the rights. Further, Madras had posed an entirely
different notion of right over forests. It questioned the very existence of state's property
in forests. In the next chapter, I will explore in detail how the ideas on the ownership of
forests and the nature of local rights on forests developed, in the context of strategies






In the course of chapter five, I noted that the legal idea of prescriptive right became a
constraint for the Forest Department in assimilating strategies formed in the field. It
struggled to displace the idea of prescriptive right. In this chapter, as a part of a larger
story running through this part of the dissertation, I explore how the theory of
prescriptive right was displaced by a new theory of forest right.
Ideas do not arise from idle speculation of thinkers and philosophers, nor are they
necessarily invented in the apex locations of the state, though often they are expressed
from those sites. The impetus to displace an idea by another one is towards achieving
certain ends in specific social contexts. The context for production of ideas is the
concrete problems which people encounter in their situations. The Forest Department
found the prevailing legal idea of 'prescriptive right', incorporated in the Act of 1865
an impediment. Over a period of ten years, a new theory was constructed to displace it.
The theory was built by trial and error and by forging disparate elements from
prevailing theories in India and Europe. The effort was directed towards creating a legal
theory that could justify curtailing and extinguishing local use of forests.
Brandis was already describing the prescriptive rights as 'vague' and 'obscure'. In his
efforts to displace the theory of prescriptive rights, he was joined by Baden-Powell, the
Conservator of Forests of Punjab. Unlike other forest officers, Baden-Powell was not
only a civil officer but also had worked as a judge. He soon became the only expert on
forest law. Baden-Powell argued that before the British rule, the local rulers had owned
the forests in India. Following this precedent, in his view, the state was the exclusive
220
Chapter 6
owner of forests. The prevalent uses of forests were not rights but only 'privileges'
which could be revoked at will. The theory could be a good substitute for the prevalent
legal ideas. But as Baden-Powell himself realised, there were problems in putting it into
practice. It was impossible to significantly curtail the local use of forests. Brandis had
another problem with the theory. If local uses were to be not 'rights' but only
'privileges', these would be subject to only administrative discretion, not law making.
But the Forest Departments wanted a law giving them powers to curtail and extinguish
local use.
Brandis suggested another approach. Taking his cue, Baden-Powell elaborated it,
arguing that local use of forests in India was similar to 'customary right' prevalent in
Europe. Within the law on 'customary rights' in Europe, there were several restrictions
on their exercise. Creating this parallel solved the defects of the earlier theory of
Baden-Powell. In the new theory, the state continued to be the owner of the forests. The
local people had a 'customary right' and thus, local use could be a subject for
legislation. The theory promised what the Forest Department desired the most. Local
rights could be 'defined, regulated and extinguished' by bringing in all the restrictions
known to exist in the European law on customary rights.
While Brandis and Baden-Powell were developing theories to curtail local use, Madras
officials took a generous view of the matter. They argued that the village communities
had developed a right over the forests through long prescription. In their view, the
rights the state had created over forests in the Madras Presidency were without legal
foundation. As a result, much controversy developed within the state over the nature of
forest rights in India. In this chapter, I will explore the formation of different ideas on
the nature of forest rights in India. Before this, however, I want to review the current
knowledge on the subject.
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The only work on the subject of legal ideas and making of the Forest Act of 1878 is that
of Guha. In the introduction, I noted how Guha sees ideas not as contributing to
producing effects, but as existing in themselves. He constructs his categories around
'ideas in themselves'. As a result, he cannot take stock of the multiple relationship of
the ideas with the effects which were intended to be created. Guha groups the opinions
within the colonial administration on the question of local rights, and consequent
policies and approaches, into three fixed and firm categories. One, 'annexationist' was
spear-headed by Baden-Powell who 'held out for nothing less than total state control
over all forests'.1 Second, 'pragmatic' represented by Brandis who supported 'state
management of ecologically sensitive and strategically valuable forests, allowing other
areas to remain under common system of management'. The third, 'populist' position,
was that of the Madras Presidency who 'completely rejected state intervention, holding
that tribal and peasants must exercise sovereign rights over woodland'.
Guha sees a conflict and debate between Brandis and Baden-Powell. According to
Guha, Brandis was a champion of local rights and local institutions and struggled for
the creation of 'village forests', against the might of the 'annexationists'. Baden-Powell
was hostile to this and argued to apply the distinction of 'right' and 'privileges' rigidly
to appropriate all forests to the ownership of the state. Guha's account, however,
exaggerates the differences between Baden-Powell and Brandis, and misunderstands
the basis of Madras Presidencies alternative position.
6.1. Forest as State Property: Government Of India
It was apparent almost immediately after the enactment of the Act of 1865 that the
notion of 'prescriptive right' would need to be displaced. Brandis shifted his gaze to the
'Guha (1990): p67.
2 Guha (1990): p67-8.
3 Guha (1990): p67-8.
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'existing rights', stipulated in the Act. He alleged, 'The words 'existing rights' are
vague, especially in India, and admit of a variety of interpretation.'4 Brandis had so far
referred to the local use as 'rights'. Brandis then referred to these rights as 'customary'
and 'vague'. For Brandis, customary rights were obscure, inferior and merely relics of
the past. Brandis clarified,
Now it must be borne in mind that forest rights are necessarily vague
and undefined. They are the result of long established custom under the
old state of things, when the forests were to a certain extent regarded as
the common property of everybody, and when the people in the vicinity
of a forest were in the habit, under varying restrictions and taxes
imposed by the former rulers, of resorting to it for wood, timber, grass,
and pasture for their cattle, and for a variety of other forest produce.5
The outstanding problem, therefore, was to 'define, regulate and extinguish' the local
rights.6 In thinking of the right over forests, Brandis was later joined by Baden-Powell,
a civil officer.
6.1.1 State's 'Right', People's 'Privilege': Baden-Powell
Baden-Powell, just 25 years of age, who was serving as a Judge of the small cause court
in Lahore, was appointed as the Conservator for Punjab in 1869. Brandis was trying to
get a forest officer for Punjab from another province. But the proposed arrangement
failed. The best alternative then was to get a civil officer familiar with the province.
Baden-Powell was appointed the Conservator of Forests in 1869 and was instructed to
work strictly under the control and supervision of Brandis, the Inspector General of
Forests. The first concern Baden-Powell had was his allowance for the new post.7 In
just a few years, Baden-Powell acquired a prominent visibility as a bearer of 'expert'
4 Brandis' Memorandum (1868).
5 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
6 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
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knowledge on the question of law and rights over forests.8 As a civil officer, he also
had a prominent role in accommodating the interests of the Forest Department within
the administration from 1870 to 1880.
Ideas are not imagined and invented by erudite and gifted individuals. Rather, people in
their struggles within specific contexts produce ideas to achieve specific results.
Brandis and Baden-Powell were not the only ones engaging with the production of
ideas that could extinguish local usage. There were others too in the Forest Department.
Amery, a forest officer, was a self confessed novice on the question of law and rights.
In a paper read at the Second Forest Conference, he found the opinion that private
persons could acquire 'rights by prescription in public land' was contrary to 'English
institutions'.9
Amery attempted to demonstrate the forest rights through a hypothetical illustration. In
this, a person who owned agricultural land along with a moor and forests farmed out
the land to many tenants and permitted them to use the moor and the forests. He
continued to be the owner even if there was a widespread and unhindered use of the
moor. The use was only a 'privilege' given to the tenants by the owner. The owner
could withdraw this privilege at any moment. The property arrangement on forests in
India could be derived from this illustration. The state was the owner of forests and
local usage was only 'privilege' not a right. And thus the solution, 'where rights are
found to exist, confirm them, but where pretended rights are found on investigation to
be mere privileges conceded or usurped, rescind them.'10 Other forest officers
7 These details have been constructed from several notes and communication from the records of the
Revenue (Forests) for years 1868-70, NAI.
8
Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several Provinces Under the Government
ofIndia for the years 1871-72.
9
Paper read by Amery in the Forest Conferent held at Allahabad in 1876, see Amery (1876): p28.
10
Paper read by Amery in the Forest Conferent held at Shimla in 1875, see Amery (1875): p 127.
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supported this emergent theory. Schlich, another forest officer, said, 'Privileges are
conceded because of a sort ofmoral though not legal right'11
Baden-Powell, like Amery, was searching for legal ideas to justify certain practices and
produce certain effects. As if to make it clear that legal ideas do not have a domain of
their own but that legal ideas should be derived from materiality and practices, Baden-
Powell started,
I should begin with the political economy of forestry and ask the
question, "Why should Government cultivate forests? Why not leave it
to private persons, as is done in the case of cereal crops?12
The answer to this question, in Baden-Powell's opinion, was 'well known and
established'.13 But since this course of deriving the law from political economy would
have 'lengthened' his remarks too much, Baden-Powell decided to achieve the same
conclusion by engaging with the nature of the 'existing law' itself. Baden-Powell was
confident that the experience the Forest Department had gained in the previous past ten
years in drafting several proposals and in seeing the working of the law in the field
meant that he knew 'pretty well the real principles of what we want the law to lay
down'.14
The production of his ideas was thoroughly enmeshed in practices. He complained that
the ideas of the Forest Department encountered a hostile legal culture prevalent within
the governments. He was aggrieved with the treatment meted since the beginning, from
to the very first memorandum by Brandis in 1864,
11 Comments by Schlich on Amery's paper, in eds. Baden-Powell and Gamble (1875): pl30.
12 Baden-Powell (1875): p 3.
13 Baden-Powell (1875): p3.
14 Baden-Powell (1875): p22.
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Mr. Brandis's report distinctly contemplates the regulation of obnoxious
rights ... But these things and many others were overlooked or
misunderstood when the draft of the Act was made.15
Indirectly ridiculing Henry Maine, Baden-Powell claimed that,
... it was quite clear that the Act was drafted by a lawyer who had no
adequate conception of the subject or of its requirements, and this is not
to be wondered at.16
To recognise the legal reasoning of Maine and concede 'prescription' was to block
options for displacing it. It was convenient to call it an oversight and mistake. The
mistake could be subsequently 'corrected'.
Baden-Powell declared that most of the uses of the forests were not based on rights at
all. Since in practice people were making unhindered use of the forests, approaching the
question of law from practices was fatal for achieving his desired conclusion. The best
course was to take the question to the domain of 'theory'. Baden-Powell declared,
A very large proportion of them are admitted to be the absolute property
of the State, at any rate in theory. The State had not, it is true, exercised
that full right; the forest was left open to any one who chose to use it,
but the right was there}1 [Emphasis his]
The unsubstantiated precedence for Baden-Powell for this right of the state, in theory,
was,
Every native ruler closed, when he chose, whole areas of forests to
preserve the game, and as in the well known instance of the forests of
the Amirs of Sindh, and in other parts, punished with the utmost cruelty
15 Baden-Powell (1875): p22.
16 Baden-Powell (1875): p22.
17 Baden-Powell (1875): p4.
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the slightest trespass within the forest limits. Whenever this was not the
case, people were in the habit ofdoing what they pleased, no one caring
to stop them.18 [Emphasis his]
The nature of pre-colonial society and rule was being invented to legitimate the
contingent interests of the present. Baden-Powell then derived the other rights from this
theoretical 'absolute property of the State'. The first category was where the State
explicitly granted rights at the time of settlements or through sanads (a grant in writing)
by the native rulers. As Baden-Powell noted,
The Government ... granted ... though in all cases undefined, rights
properly so-called, in these forests, by solemn record at settlement. Here
we hawe forests in which the property of the State is burdened with real
legal rights19 [Emphasis his]
Another kind of private right on forests arose, according to Baden-Powell, due to the
short-sightedness and folly of the early British revenue officers. He noted,
In other cases the Government settlement officers and collectors in early
times granted away the forest land, reserving certain rights in it only to
the State ... the settlement officers, acting with that ignorance of forest
conservancy which characterized those and many subsequent years,
voluntarily let go the forest lands, reserving only the right of the State to
the existing or growing stock on the ground.20
Baden-Powell instanced parts of Ratnagiri district of Bombay, Kangra, Gurdaspore and
Hazra where the lands vested in the private proprietors but the forests in the state.
Following Baden-Powell's general statement of theory, forests 'naturally' fell into three
categories: state forests in which no rights exist; State Forest in which rights exist; and
Private or communal forests, which once were State forests, but which the action of the
18 Baden-Powell (1875): p4.
19 Baden-Powell (1875): p4. For Baden-Powell, these rights were 'undefined'. The grants or settlements
mentioned a general right to graze or extract timber from a forest without specifying the number of
cattle that could graze or the amount of timber which could be extracted.
20 Baden-Powell (1875): p4.
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officers of Government so affected, that now they can only be called private or
communal estates.21
Baden-Powell reassures himself,
That this is the normal legal condition (in one or other class) of all
forests in all India, there cannot be the slightest doubt.22 [Emphasis his]
The exercise of theory building was to declare the prevalent use of forests illegal.
However, the very exercise in theory was to bring certain effects, to change the
practices. The transition from theory to practice had to be made at some stage. Baden-
Powell made the shift by calling the prevalent use, which in his theory were not
'rights', as 'certain other influences (that) had a practical bearing on the state of the
forest'.23 Baden-Powell grudgingly conceded the ' obnoxious rights' which were
already conceded by earlier British officers.24
According to Baden-Powell, the local people were freely using the forests but this was,
... not in pursuance of what could be called a legal, prescriptive, or
granted right ... In all these the right is absolute in theory, but by the
"laisez-aller" action of the state and by its practical every-day policy, it
has never been fully acted on.25
At the level of theory and practice, Baden-Powell had to displace the notion of
'prescriptive' rights, which were pronounced in the Queen's proclamation, re-affirmed
by the Council through the Act of 1865 and shared by the civil officers. To assert that
the prevalent use did not constitute a right acquired through prescription, Baden-Powell
conceded the immemorial use of forests by the local people. However, he argued,
21 Baden-Powell (1875): p5.
22 Baden-Powell (1875): p5.
23 Baden-Powell (1875): p5.
24 Baden-Powell (1875): p5.
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without any distinct grant or license, and without any idea of asserting a
right as against the ruling power, or against other individuals or
communities, everybody got accustomed to graze and cut in the nearest
jungle lands, because nobody cared whether he did nor not.26
[Emphasis his]
Having traced the formation of the local practices, Baden-Powell could then rule out
prescription on technical legal grounds that as opposed to 'a long known principle of
law', for it to be prescriptive right,
... the right should have been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any
person claming title thereto as an easement (servitude), and as of right
without interruption for 20 years.27
Baden-Powell could, thus, sustain his theory,
Hence, while the forests were, and are still, over-run with people cutting
and doing what they like, they are nevertheless, in theory, the absolute
and unrestricted property of the State.28
Baden-Powell needed to bring his theory to practice. But in practice, the use of forests
by the local people was widespread. Baden-Powell conceded to the widespread
prevalent use, 'it is this circumstance that causes the practical difficulty'. But this
difficulty still had to be surmounted: in theory local people had no right, but in practice
they considered themselves using forests from time immemorial. Baden-Powell









He was aware that his theory was entirely unacceptable within the administration. He
posed the question to himself as to what use of forests should be allowed, and debated,
If you reply, I will regard only what are legal rights and knock all the
loose and vague privileges on the head at once- I answer, that for any
practical purpose, it is useless discussing such a proposal, because no
one, either inside or outside of the Legislative Council, would listen to
you; and we must hope to win our way by gaining people to our side,
and be satisfied with the nearest approach of what is right that we can
get.30
The problem again had moved from theory to managing the politics of the situation.
How was Baden-Powell to get 'people to our side' and get 'what is right' for the
creation of forest reserves? Baden-Powell's proposal was to constitute forests into three
categories, Special Reserve, Ordinary Reserve and District Forest. Special Reserves
were to be of a 'very valuable forest destined to produce timber, fuel, & c., for the
market'.31 In Special Reserves no 'privileges' were to be allowed. In exceptional
circumstances, if allowed, these were to be defined and recorded and 'exercised under
supervision, and strictly confined to certain limits'. The Special Reserves were to be
small areas.32
In Ordinary Reserves, 'privileges' were to be allowed but after settlement and recording
and defining their extent and nature.33 In Baden-Powell's proposal, the District Forests
were to be 'made over absolutely for the use of villages and communities'.34
He had, thus, created a theory of ownership over forests and proposed its translation
into practice. However, the theory and practice were entirely unrelated. In theory
building, there came a stage where instead of 'rights', he had to shift to the politics and
30 Baden-Powell (1875): p8.
31 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
32 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
33 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
34 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
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practice of 'gaining people to our side'. In reconciling his theory and practice, he could
offer no better suggestion than leave it to the legislature to 'prescribe the principle on
35which this balance is to be struck1
6.1.2 'Right' and 'Privilege' or Customary Right: Brandis
Baden-Powell had given a more detailed and theoretical basis to what Brandis had
proposed in the earlier drafts. However, in Brandis' opinion, the theory had not solved
any problem. For Brandis, the problem was that if the most prevalent use of forests
were not to be a 'right' but merely 'privilege', it would never be a subject of legislation.
And in the absence of legislation, which bound not only the local people but also the
civil officers, the existing practices would continue. The 'principle' for permitting
'privileges' in forests would leave the matter entirely in the hands of the district and
local administration. And in the context of hostility to the Forest Department,
particularly at the local level, the creation of government reserves would be vitiated.
Brandis was thus interested in making the local use a subject of legislation. He candidly
put it,
If this view of the case could be maintained, forest legislation in India
would be a very easy task, for the forests in which Government have
granted specific rights at settlement are limited in extent and are not
numerous. Act VII of 1865 would in that case be sufficient for the great
mass of Government forests.
But the entire problem was that the Act of 1865 was not adequate. The concern was,
what theory could be propounded to justify 'definition, regulation and extinguishing' of
the existing use? Baden-Powell's theory needed re-working. The imperative was,
keeping the right of the state firm, as Baden-Powell had worked out, how could the
local use of forests be 'defined' so that it would lead to their 'regulation' and
35 Baden-Powell (1875): p8.
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'extinction'? Brandis tried another line. He emphasised parallels between the Indian
situation and Europe that 'time immemorial' use of forests in India 'have the character
of rights of common'.37
Brandis quoted from the common law of Britain and concluded that the same principles
were recognised in French and German law,
"It is the right which one or more persons may have to take or use some
portion of that which another person's soil naturally produces;" and if
we enquire into the origin of these rights, it will be found that in most
cases they may be compared to what is called "the right of common
appendant", by which the owner or occupier of arable land, or, in the
case of commons of estovers and turbary, the owner or occupier of a
house is entitled to the use of the manorial waste for such purposes as
are necessary to the maintenance of his husbandry or premises.38
Brandis re-worked the origin of customary right in India,
... the custom to graze the village cattle and to cut wood for the
requirements of the village have grown up in a manner in every respect
similar to the growth of rights of common or of forest rights in
Europe.39
Having established local usage as customary rights, Brandis could then import all the
restraints customary rights were subjected to in Europe. Brandis was quick to move to
the points of his interest,
Now, as regards the common of pasture, it is I believe agreed that the
right of common appendant is limited to such cattle as the land can
maintain during the winter by its produce, or requires to plough and
36 Brandis (Memorandum) ( 1875): p 13
37 Brandis (1875).
38 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): pl2.
39 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): pl3.
232
Chapter 6
compester (manure) it. The commoner cannot pasture the cattle of a
stranger for hire; he cannot rent his right.40
Brandis similarly quoted authority for the use of timber and firewood and concluded
that such use was limited to 'reasonable quantity for the fuel of the chimneys' and
'repair of his own fences or farm implements'.41 He buttressed this by quoting several
French and European sources. 42
Brandis could then further detail the restraints on local use and bring in the Forest
Department by relying on 'Continental Forest laws' exemplified in 'Code Forestier'.
He summarised the restrictions,
... pasture in any blocks which have not been declared ... safe against
cattle, by the forest administration. The blocks open for the admission of
cattle and the number of cattle which each right-holder may send to
graze are fixed by the forest administration. The principle upon which
these provisions are based is, as regards wood, that right-holders cannot
claim more in one year than the normal permanent annual yield of the
forest, and as regards pasture, that the exercise of the right must not
diminish the productiveness of the forest in wood or timber.43
In Baden-Powell's formulation, the principle for restraining local use was the political
pressure of the local people. The civil administrators were the sole judge of this.
Through the manipulation of 'customary right' Brandis changed this in favour of the
Forest Department. The criterion for permitting customary use was yield and
sustainability of forests, and the judge of this was not the civil administrator but the
expert, the forest officer.
Brandis did not care about any theory, as long as certain desired results were produced,
40 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): pl2.
41 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): pl2.
42 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): pl2.
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It is obviously impossible to come to a final decision at present on the
general question raised by Mr. Baden-Powell. Meanwhile forest
legislation should sanction a mode of procedure by which the exercise
of rights injurious to the forest may with due regard to the requirements
and convenience of the people who now have a beneficial interest in the
use of the forest be regulated, restricted or extinguished...44
Brandis knew he was writing a memorandum which, like previous memoranda (for
example memorandum of 1868 and 1869) would be circulated to the local
governments. In responding to the previous memoranda, the local governments had
much agitated over the negation of 'prescriptive right'. In Brandis' framework, it did
not matter how the customary rights were acquired. The important concern was that the
use had to be regulated. It was thus best to explicitly recognise the prescriptive right
and insist it to be 'customary' and thus, subject to 'regulation, commutation and
extinction'. He thus reconstituted prescriptive rights. He argued, 'there are numerous
forest tracts in which the inhabitants of the vicinity have exercised these rights
peaceably and openly without interruption for more than 20 years'45 But at the same
time, he imposed all the restraints he had derived from Continental law. This included
the use of demarcated forests only for domestic use and not for sale and barter. Even
these were to be used only in patches provided by the Forest Department.46
The memorandum was written for the civil officers in the local administration. It was
just as well if they were deceived by this apparent act of generosity. When Brandis was
not constrained to produce these effects through his texts, he was absolutely forthright.
Amery, as we noted earlier, had dabbled in the nature of law on forests in India. Like
Baden-Powell, he had applied the distinction between 'right' and 'privilege' and re¬
worked it to 'alienable rights' and 'inalienable rights'47 Brandis ruthlessly destroyed
this unnecessary distraction. He ridiculed Amery, saying that the subject was only for
43 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): p 12-13.
44 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): p 14.
45 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): pi3-4.
46 Brandis' Memorandum (1875): p 14.
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those with 'sufficient acquaintance with jurisprudence'.48 He sarcastically described
him as an 'intellectual forester' interested in the 'theoretical study of the origin of right
and property' whereas other ordinary foresters were concerned with what 'practically
exists' and can be used in 'controlling obnoxious practices in forests'.49
Brandis' thrust was to find evidence 'to even so slight a degree'50 of a precedence of
restraint on local use by the previous rulers which could then be consolidated.51
Brandis' reprimand was,
If you choose to call the use a "privilege" in the former case, and a
"right" in the latter, do so without quarrelling about terms; but do not
lose the distinction on which your power of conserving the forest
practically depends.52
Baden-Powell had declared that they had learnt a good deal from experience in the past
ten years.53 He was aware of his own value. The Annual report of the Government of
India on forests for 1870-71 had made a special mention of his legal knowledge of
forest property. Perhaps he had no clue that in continuously stumbling upon practices
and strategies, he was going to invigorate himself further and move on to an illustrious
career which would lead to production of several seminal and authoritative texts. The
Baden-Powell we all know was still in the making,
47
Amery (1875) and Amery (1876).
48 Brandis reviewed the paper of Amery presented at the Second Conference for the Indian Forester. See
Brandis (1876 b).
49 Brandis (1876 b).
50 Brandis (1876 b).
51 Brandis (1876 b).
52 Brandis (1876 b).
53 Baden-Powell (1875): p22.
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6.1.3 Local Use as 'Customary Right': Baden-Powell
Baden-Powell did realise the efficacy of Brandis's strategy of selectively grafting
European law onto the India context. Thereafter, he laboured to become familiar with
European law, particularly the law on forests and waste lands. In any case, he had
already a reputation as an expert on forest law. In late 1870s, he was commissioned by
the Government of India to write a manual on forest law for forest officers. So far,
Baden-Powell was attempting to forge a legal ideology exclusively in relation to India.
Towards this end, his starting points were the concerns of political economy or the
practices of the native rulers. In the Manual,54 Baden-Powell changed tracks. His
starting point now was European law.
While elaborating forest law, Baden-Powell began by justifying how the prevailing
legal system of Europe could hold clues for administering forests in India. This was,
according to Baden-Powell,
... partly because it is always instructive to compare one law with
another; partly to show that the great principles on which forest law
must always proceed, are fundamentally the same, no matter how local
circumstances may require variations and additions in matters of detail.
It will be, I think, a strong ground for confidence in the general wisdom
and reasonableness of our legal provisions,- even those which seem at
first sight to persons unaccustomed to deal with these questions,
arbitrary or too extensive- if I can show that they are supported by a
consensus of skilled opinion in Europe.55 [Emphasis his]
Baden-Powell clarified,
It is true that the countries of Europe exhibit a degree of civilisation so
much higher than that of India that provisions which are acceptable in
the one may be viewed as ill adapted to the other. But this argument is
54 Baden-Powell (1882).
55 Baden-Powell (1882): p79.
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least applicable where those who object to forest legislation in India
most require to use it. The objection to forest law is chiefly that it is an
interference with the rights of the villagers, and here the difference of
civilisation does not tell. It is surprising how much alike in regard to
wants of grazing, firewood, &c., the peasantry of all countries are. The
Swiss, French, and Italian peasantry, after generations of forest
conservancy, are as much opposed to the necessary restrictions on the
exercise of rights, and often make objections to them as unreasonable,
as the peasantry of an Indian province.56
Baden-Powell was revising his opinion to bring in customary right. He began by
puzzling over the problem ofproperty of and right in. He dwells on this distinction,
..while the property itself remains to the owner, and while his ownership
is not in itself reduced or altered, still, some of the rights which go to
make up a perfect or unrestricted ownership, have been as it were
detached and vested in other persons. The detached rights are of the
nature of "ownership" in this sense only "that they are rights over a
specific thing available against the world at large" (He quotes Markby
here)57
Following Roman law, Baden-Powell extracted "servitude", the right to serve. He noted
that in English law there was no general term for servitude but "rights of common"
came close to it. Following this, he further elaborated the distinction between
ownership and servitude. He noted,
...a servitude or right residing in one person over the property of another
person, may exist without any way touching the ownership (though
limiting its enjoyment), it follows that no right-holder has any share in
the property, or is a co-owner of the estate. Nor will the exercise of mere
rights of user or separate servitudes, however extensive, however long
enjoyed, ever give rise to a claim to ownership of the estate.58
56 Baden-Powell (1882): p79 (f.n.).
57 He also relies on Markby, an authority on common law. Baden-Powell (1882): p26.
58 Baden-Powell (1882): P35.
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Here he was anxious to dispel the contention raised by Madras. Before conceding that
the local people had acquired rights to use forests through prescription, he wanted to be
sure that this was not misused by Madras to argue for a co-ownership. It had to be
confined to servitude and 'common rights'. He further buttressed it by quoting German
and French sources to assert that co-ownership did not exist, it was only servitude.59
Baden-Powell then takes a completely different position from that argued in his paper
presented to the forest conference in 1873. He declared that his earlier distinction and
conception of 'right' and 'privilege' 'now must be abandoned'. He stated explicitly,
In a paper read before the Forest Conference in 1873, I endeavoured to
classify forest 'rights' into (1) strict rights and (2) privileges, urging that
the latter are of course always limitable at the will and pleasure of the
Government. I now think, however, that the natural, legal and equitable
limitation which is inherent in all rights as exercised over another's
property, is quite sufficient in all cases... 60
Consistent with this, he reinstated 'prescriptive rights'. In his new position,
...in India, forest rights are nearly always "prescriptive", or have grown
up by long customary exercise.61
Having constituted local use as customary right, he moved to make its implications
clear. According to Baden-Powell, the distinction between ownership and right of user,
... has a very practical consequence, namely, that a right of user not
being a proprietary right, it can only be exercised or exist to an extent
which is compatible with the safe existence of the estate itself For the
right to destroy a thing (abusus) is a part of the proprietary right, and it
is a contradiction in terms to suppose that a person who has not the
ownership should have a right to destroy the thing owned.62
59 Baden-Powell (1882): p37-40.
60 Baden-Powell (1882): pi 12 (f.n.).
61 Baden-Powell (1882): pill.
62 Baden-Powell (1882): p40.
238
Chapter 6
Then came the question of how much the rights could be restrained,
.. the question whether a given forest can or cannot properly bear such
and such rights ... is ultimately a question of fact, which must
necessarily be decided on the basis of the best professional advice which
is available.
Through the 'professional advice', the Forest Department was inserted at the helm of
the affairs. Baden-Powell's ideas on forest law were not fixed but always in formation.
In his later years, Baden-Powell grafted his theory onto the network of other prevailing
ideas. What was a strategic ruse was turned into the best tradition of western law and
administration. To do this, Baden-Powell again contrasted the pre-British with the
British period. Baden-Powell repeated his earlier views,
We have rarely or never any cases, where a right has originated in a
special contract, or where it binds the forest-owner absolutely to specific
terms, or where it derives additional strength from having been granted
for a valuable consideration. In reality our forest rights in India, are not
legal rights at all. Under an Oriental Government no such thing as a
prescriptive right would be practically possible.64
Baden-Powell could now contrast the 'oriental despotism' with liberating 'western law'
and ideas,
Nevertheless, when western law and western ideas were applied to
property and rights in India, there was no other course possible-
certainly none that would have been equitable and befiting a civilized
Government than that which has in fact been followed, namely, to treat
existing ancient practices and users of the forest in the matter of grazing,
wood cutting and so forth, exactly as if they were true 'servitude' under
the modern legal conception of the thing.65
63 Baden-Powell (1882): pi 16.
64 Baden-Powell (1885): p401.
65 Baden-Powell (1885): p401-2.
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There were still loose ends between theory and practice. What were recognised as
'customary' rights were far more extensive than followed within Western law,
Under such conditions it has happened that forest-rights are in India by
no means always rights in rem, or "real-rights". The text-books on the
Continent always define a forest-right as one that belongs to some
estate, and is enjoyable- never apart from that estate but- only by direct
owner or holder of the estate for the time being.66
The only way this dichotomy could be explained was by recognising that the insertion
of customary rights was a strategic device. But the best Baden-Powell could do was
leave it open,
In India, however, we draw no distinction; and the forest right is dealt
with in practice on the same basis whether it is attached to an estate ...
or is a personal right... or attached to a person as being a member of a
village community 67
The ideas propounded by Baden-Powell were still not hegemonic. He acknowledged in
1885 that the relations between the right-holder and forest-owner (in most cases the
State or some community) was an unsettled matter. Disputes frequently came before the
law courts, and Baden-Powell noted,
Consequently, we have as yet neither definite statute law nor the
authority of a series of High Court precedents on the subject.68
He was, thus, insisting that the forest officers should learn the theory of customary
rights so that they could educate the magistrates and the courts. Baden-Powell urged the
forest officers,
66 Baden-Powell (1885): p402.
67 Baden-Powell (1885): p402.
68 Baden-Powell (1885): p400.
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It is absolutely necessary to understand what I may call the true or
complete theory, even though circumstances do not as yet enable us to
apply it frequently... Magistrates and Courts are not perfect, and in any
case, as I have said, they are so little accustomed to deal, in practice,
with questions of forest rights, that it is not surprising, if they should
often make mistakes, or fail to appreciate points, or imagine that a rule
derived from foreign text-books is necessarily inapplicable in India.69
While Baden-Powell forged this theory, Madras continued to assert the construction
that forests in Madras Presidency were owned by village communities.
6.2. Madras Presidency and the Denial of State's Rights
As I have shown, Brandis and Baden-Powell constituted local use as customary right.
By contrast Madras recognised a 'co-ownership' of forests by local people. The Madras
Presidency called every use a right. It not only took the position of co-ownership of
forests and recognised the prescriptive right of use of forests as a right over forest itself,
it also denied any possibility of translocating rights over forests. According to Madras,
every patch of forest was subject to the ownership of the local people. The Government
of India was opposed to this position. It attempted to demonstrate ruptures in Madras's
claims.
The Government of India alleged that Madras was inconsistent in its description of
tenurial relations in Madras. It alleged that Madras had simultaneously described them
as co-ownership, communal rights, and the existence of state's rights but limited by
local use. The Government of India alleged,
This description as a whole appears to indicate a singular confusion of
ideas as to rights of property and rights user. The two, of course, are
69 Baden-Powell (1885): p402.
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perfectly distinct things, and may be co-existent over any land. But the
fact of user is no evidence of a right of property also,- rather the
70
reverse.
For the Government of India's legal department even this was a charitable
interpretation ofMadras's position. According to the reports of the Madras Government
itself, 'extensive reserves' were formed and placed in charge of the Forest Department.
The Government of India noted,
Form statements 3 and 4 of the Madras Conservator's Annual Report for
1875-76 find that the Forest Department had in its charge 84 fuel
reserves containing 134,315 acres, and 68, plantations containing
15,383 acres, besides 76 new "acquisitions" during the year, the area of
some of which amounted to 45,995 acres, while that of the rest had not
been ascertained. In addition to this, there are "Government Forest"
some of which amount to 5,801 square miles, while the greater part are
still unsurveyed and the area is consequently unknown. There are also
71
extensive reserves still in charge of the Revenue officers.
There were other reasons why Madras was so opposed to every proposal from the
Government of India. The ultimate conclusion of Madras always was not so much what
the law should be but who was authorised to make it. Madras demanded that,
... a Forest Bill which aims at the regulation of local usages ought to be
framed, discussed and passed by the Local Legislature.72
And the Madras Board of Revenue had said,
The Board are strongly of opinion that any Forest Act for this
Presidency- and they admit that common rights being wasteful things
70 Note by T.C Hope, 9/10/1877, on the Indian Forest Bill, see in Appendix YY, Proceedings Nos. 'A'
43-142, March 1878, LD, NAI.
71 ibid.
72 MBOR, 5/8/1871, No. 3284.
242
Chapter 6
are proper subject for legislation- should be framed, discussed, and
passed by the local Legislative Council.73
These statements give us vital clues to look at the preceding period and the overall
relations between Madras and the Government of India within which the forest question
was being negotiated.
6.2.1 Madras Versus the Government Of India
In the beginning of the Company rule, the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay
were almost independent with their own 'Presidents' and councils. The Regulation Act,
1773 created a kind of central government consisting of a Governor-General and four
councillors. The Governor of Bengal was also to act as the Governor-General. But its
powers over the Presidencies were only in matters of waging wars, and over diplomatic
and political relations with local rulers. The Charter Act of 1833 centralised the
administration and vested all authority in the Governor-General to 'supervise, direct
and control' over all India.74 This included legislative functions. No Governor in
Council could make or suspend any law or regulation. They could only propose drafts
of law and regulation to the Central Government. A principal reason for these reforms
was the abolition of the trading privileges of the East India Company and the huge
losses the Company had accumulated. To control the revenue, a centralised authority
was needed. In this system, a centralised budget was prepared and all the revenue
accrued to the Imperial exchequer.
The Presidencies much resented the centralised control which was imposed on them
after 1833. The Mutiny of 1857 created a means for the Bombay and Madras
Presidencies to express their simmering resentment. On the termination of the
73 ibid.
74 Misra (1970): pi3-22.
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Company's government in 1858, Indian administration came directly under the British
Crown.
Trevelyan, the Governor of Madras Presidency, wrote a harsh minute in July, 1859
against the erosion of the freedom of the local governments. He alleged that the Central
government had appropriated power contrary to and far in excess of the intention of the
previous reform. He attacked the centralisation,
... the result of the attempt has been to paralyse the local governments,
without providing any effectual support for them ... especially when the
south of India differs from the North as much as France does from
Germany.75
He alleged that the terms used for referring to the local governments, 'subordinate' and
'Minor Presidencies', revealed the condescending approach of the Central government.
He thus demanded the restoration of the 'authority and honour' of the Presidencies.76
The Government of Bombay was equally enraged. The Governor of Bombay lamented
that the tendency of the process of centralization since 1833 was to assimilate every part
of India to the practice of Bengal -
... to judge everything by a Bengal standard - to circumscribe the
powers and weaken the authority of the subordinate governments and to
deaden the energies of all who are employed under them.77
The Income Tax Bill was introduced in the Governor-General's Council in 1860. The
Bill was much criticised by Charles Trevelyan, who asked his representative to place
his views before the council. While the matter was under the consideration of the
Council, Trevelyan published all the confidential correspondence that had transpired on
75 Minute of Charles Trevelyan, 13/7/1859, see in No. 11/12, Home (Public) Consultation, 12/8/1859,
NAI.
76 ibid.
11 Minutes of the Governor of Bombay, Elphinstone, dated, January, 1860, See Proceedings Nos. 9-18,
8/9/1860, Home (Public), NAI.
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the subject between Madras and Government of India. Canning, the Governor-General,
took a serious view of this and demanded from the Secretary of State that Trevelyan
should be recalled from the Governorship for this breach. The Secretary of State did
indeed recall Trevelyan, but only to put him in the Governor-General's Council.78
The Indian Councils Act, 1861 restored the power of legislation to the Government of
Madras and Bombay that they had before 1833. Except for certain subjects79, the local
governments were free to legislate on any subject. However, every legislative measure
of local interest was subject to the assent of the Governor-General in addition to that of
the local Governor.
Madras was zealous in defending the new freedom it had acquired. But the Government
of India was not entirely generous in foregoing its powers. In this relationship, the
Secretary of State had become a powerful person. The Government of India Act placed
all superior appointments of a political nature in the hands of the Secretary of State for
India, a Minister of Cabinet rank, assisted by an under secretary and a Council of 15
members. The Secretary of State had acquired all the powers that were earlier with the
Court of Directors and Board of Control put together. The Secretary had the power to
override the decisions of his Council. Further, his establishment was run from the
accounts of India and he was not responsible to Parliament for their budget. The
secretary of State, thus, was more or less a 'despot', individually responsible for the
administration of India.80 Further, the establishment of an overland cable in 1868, the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the completion of submarine cable in 1870
enhanced the control of the Secretary of State over the administration of India.81
78 Mishra (1970): p25-26.
19 Public debt, public revenues, coinage, past and telegraph affairs, the penal code, religion, armed forces,
patents and copy rights, and relations with foreign governments and Indian states.
80 Misra (1970): p22-24.
81 Misra (1970): p22-24.
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After 1860, the Secretary of State tried to consolidate his position, even dictating
legislation to the Government of India. Lord Curzon, a Governor-General in India
complained,
Govt, at home cannot go on treating the Government of India as though
we were a negligible quantity or a Govt. Dept. ... Of course we are
subordinate and the S. of S. and the Ministry are ultimately supreme.
But there are two ways of doing things - a wise and unwise82
On the prompting of the Presidencies through the Secretary of State, the Government of
India had to formally announce in 1862 the independence of the Madras and Bombay
Presidencies on the forest question. Since a centralised financial system had continued,
the only constraint on Madras and Bombay was that they had to submit annual budgets
to the Government of India for a preparation of a consolidated budget.83
Trevelyan had moved to the Governor-General's council and continued his tirade from
the Centre. In 1863 'forest' was placed under the Public Works Department. He
objected,
It is entirely an executive Department... If it is not employed in actively
directing executive details, it is doing nothing, and this executive
activity is precisely what brings it into conflict with the Local
Governments.84
He further emphasised the independence of the Local administration,
The Local Governments are now quite alive to the importance of
looking after their Forests. I am confident that our object will be more
fully attained by leaving the Local Administrations to follow their own
82 S. and S. referred to the Secretary of State. Lord Curzon quoted in Mishra (1970): p37-8.
83 This was resolved through a resolution, dated 21/10/1862 of the PWD, GOI.
84 Minute by Charles Trevelyan in Proceeding Nos. 11-13, June , 1863, PWD (F).
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plans with only a general and indulgent supervision on the part of the
Central Government, than any amount of interference.85
Madras always saw a design in the moves of the Government of India to subjugate and
dominate it. In official pronouncements of the Secretary of State and even the
Government of India, the independence of Madras and Bombay was declared. But
Madras was apprehensive that the government of India was unwilling to concede the
freedom.
The Government of India appointed Brandis as the Inspector General of forests in 1864.
In the terms and conditions of his appointment, apart from other things, he was allowed
to correspond directly with the Conservators in the local administration and
Presidencies. Madras opposed vehemently the terms of appointment of the Inspector
General. It complained,
It was only on the 26th January last this Government were assured that
by the 'temporary' employment for one year of Dr. Cleghorn and
Brandis as commissioners for forests to Government of India, 'no
interference whatever' with the management of the Forests in the
Madras Presidency is contemplated. In the present Resolution not only
is an officer with the significant title of "Inspector General of Forests
permanently" appointed, but the Government of India state their
intention of deputing him from time to time to examine 'personally' into
the conditions of Forests in the various Provinces. Of all the methods in
which the Imperial Government can exercise its supremacy, the one
which is most subversive of the legitimate authority of a Local
Government, which lowers it most in the estimation of the public and of
its own officers, and is most prejudicial to the public interest, is the
placing over it an officer whose very title implies mistrust, and whose
duty necessarily involve interference, in manner and degree wholly
inconsistent with the position and independence of a Government.86
85 ibid.
86
Proceeding Nos. 22-5, December, 1864, PWD (F), NAI.
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The Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor-General dated 15th August, 1863
where he had expressed the 'desire that the administration of the Forests should be left
'as hitherto entirely' to the Local Governments.' The Supreme Government being
furnished 'with such statements showing the receipt and expenditure, past, present and
prospective, as may enable', the Governor-General in Council 'to see and notice, if
87
necessary, the state of the Forest Revenue of each Presidency.' The Secretary of state
agreed with Madras' apprehensions.88
Similarly, Bombay had made a scheme to raise plantations to supply railways and other
towns. Within this, the Forest Department was to enter in the market directly as a
dealer. The Governor in Council rebuked the proposal.89 Bombay had already taken the
approval of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State admonished the Government
of India that the Presidencies were independent except for submitting a budget for the
preparation of a consolidated budget for the whole of India.90
Bombay prepared a draft forest bill in 1864. Since the Bill could have a bearing on
Imperial finance and also pertained to criminal provisions, they sent it to the
Government of India for comments. The Government of India cleared it on these
grounds but said that since the Bill of 1865 was already introduced, they were not being
'forced' but they could adopt it instead.91
The disinclination of the Presidencies to allow the Government of India to dictate the
law was apparent. The Government of India had designs to make a law for the whole of





Proceeding No. 9, July 11, 1864, PWD (F), NAI.
90
Parliamentary Papers (1871) (HI).
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The Bill originally applied to the whole of India. But when it was last
before the Council ... the Government had no information to show
whether it would be favourably received by the Governments of Madras
and Bombay.92
The Governor found it necessary to assure the Presidencies of their newly found
legislative freedom. It was reported in the Council Proceedings, the assurance that the
bill,
... would not stand in their way to make any other local enactments
which they might think desirable.93
6.2.2 Forests as Property of Local People
Despite the pressure from the Government of India, Madras refused to adopt the Forest
Act of 1865. The Conservator of Madras, Cleghorn, on deputation to the Government
of India, recommended the introduction of the Act. He was also of the opinion that
forest officers should be given magisterial Powers. But the Collectors and the Board of
Revenue were opposed to the introduction of the Act. The Board found the Act
'unnecessary' and thought that it could not 'facilitate conservancy' as,
... no forest land can be placed within the scope of it, which is not
absolutely the property of Government, free from private rights of every
kind, for section 2 specially enacts that its application 'shall not abridge
or affect any existing rights'.94
The Board by this time had developed a distinct hostility to the Forest Department.
They noted,
91 'A 'Proceedings Nos. 32-38, February, 1865, LD, NAI..
92 GOI (1866): p81.
93 GOI (1866): p82.
94 MBOR, 16/4/1868, No. 2777.
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The Forest officers naturally desire to have ample powers, but the Board
should observe that there are other things to be considered besides the
value and preservation of timber.95
A corollary of this was emphasis on local rights to ward off the legislation,
All the jungles and forests of this Presidency are within village
boundaries and the people residing in or near them, have, from time
immemorial, had the right to take leaves for manure, firewood for their
own use, and timber for agricultural purposes, to graze their cattle at
certain periods.96
The Board criticised Brandis by alleging that he was only familiar with Burma and was
imposing his ideas on other parts where there were valuable 'rights' and 'privileges' of
/ /'jv,vrV'' 0*7 . .
the villagers to be respected. The Governor in Council of Madras was categorical in
his explanation to the Secretary of State,
... the introduction of the Forest Act into Madras Presidency is uncalled
for at present, and would be inexpedient ... The tenure of land in
Southern India differs vastly from that of those portions of the continent
where the Act is said to have been introduced with success... where
nearly all the jungles and forests are within village boundaries, and are
subject to the prescriptive rights of the villagers, without causing much
popular discontent and serious risk of oppression.98
Despite Madras's unwillingness, the Government of India kept raising the question of
forest law for the Madras Presidency,99 till the Government of India forwarded the draft
bill and Memorandum of Brandis of 1869. The memorandum upheld 'the regulation
and settlement of forest rights in Government forests'.100 While forwarding the bill and




98 GOM to SS, 22/6/1869, reproduced in Stebbing (1923): pl7.
99
Proceedings No. 30-1, September, 1868, PWD (F), NAI., and Proceeding Nos. 1-4, August, 1867,
PWD (F), NAI.
100 GOI to GOM, 28/11/1870, see in MBOR, 21/3/1871, No. 1224.
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'report with special reference to what they have seen of Forest Conservancy and to the
communal rights of the people'!101 In reviewing the previous draft bill, it had already
declared that in Madras Presidency all forests were common property. The responses of
the Collectors were no surprise.
6.2.3 Madras and the Politics of Difference
Madras was not fighting for the rights of the local people so much as for the autonomy
of the Madras government vis-a-vis the Government of India. I am not suggesting that
the Madras officials did not believe that the tenurial systems of South India varied from
the rest of India. It was not a mere fabrication. In fact, since early Company years,
Madras had come to believe in its own peculiarities and differences from the rest of
India.
Munro, as we noted in an earlier chapter, emphasised in 1800 the peculiarities of
tenures in Canara. He, thus, argued that the Permanent Settlement could not be
introduced. The ryotwari system was instead forged. Similarities and differences are
not innate. These are constituted and maintained through discourses, in the context of
prevalent power relations. We have also explored the politics within which Munro had
forged this ideology of difference. While introducing ryotwari settlement on the
western coast, several difficulties arose which made it appear very much like the
zamindari areas where Permanent settlement was introduced. The land-holders were
certainly not small and self-cultivators. Thus, the ideology of ryotwari was reshuffled to
recognise such land-holders as ryotwar. This alleged difference and introduction of
ryotwari was bitterly opposed within the Company administration.102




Such differences, once constituted, are not fixed and given. Much the same way these
were constituted, these can get de-constituted. The differences themselves have to be
maintained and sustained in discourses. We see this happening through the entire
period. We have already noted that Trevelyan had alleged that the South of India was
as different from the north as France was from Germany.
The Madras government found itself in a bind. It had taken the initiative to create a
Forest Department, primarily an as appendage to the civil officer. The Forest
Department later acquired prominence and endorsement from the Secretary of State.
The Government of India became the bearer of the interest of forest conservancy.
Foresters became or at least pretended to be the bearers of 'scientific knowledge' and
thus, 'experts' beyond the comprehension and control of general administration.
Cleghorn, the Conservator of Madras, joined hands with Brandis, the Inspector
General to demand demarcation of forests in Madras. An Inspector General, despite
Madras' protest, was made to preside over their heads. Madras had realised that it had
created a Frankenstein.
Thus, by 1865, the Forest department appeared as a force independent of Madras with
roots and linkages in many places. Its interest was in collaborating with the
Government of India in undermining the authority of Madras. Madras had already
developed immunity from attacks on the question of forests. It had regained forests
from Bombay in 1822 and been vigilant on their numerous attempted encroachments.
The loss of North Canara to the Bombay Presidency, partly on the grounds that it was
timber rich, was still fresh. Thus, the arguments against a Forest Department and
conservation, to the extent that it threatened the powers of Madras, were alive among
the Madras officials.
As if to prove its point, it condemned the discourses through which it had created
state's property in forests in Kanara in 1850s and 60s through the labours of Blane. In
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1874, it reversed its previous decision to acknowledge the existence of State's property
in forests in Kanara and upheld the rights of the landholders. Madras stubbornly refused
to adopt the Forest Act of 1878 and described it as arbitrary and tyrannical. It further
realised that the best course of asserting its freedom was in enacting legislation itself. In
chapter 8,1 explore further the politics ofMadras in upholding local rights.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that Guha makes his three categories prematurely. Having
made these categories, he gets caught up in their web. In the end, his categories,
annexationist (Baden-Powell) and pragmatist (Brandis), seem entirely imagined,
without any factual foundation. According to Guha, Brandis was the champion of
village forests, against the might of the annexationists. But we have noted that Baden-
Powell had explicitly provided for the category of forests to be 'made over absolutely
for the use of villages and communities'!103
Guha praises Brandis as a man of 'noble' 'sentiments', helpless but zealously
struggling for equity and justice for the local people by asserting 'forest rights in India'
as 'customary rights' 'analogous to the growth of similar rights of user in Europe'.104
Baden-Powell, the 'annexationist', becomes the villain in this history, insisting on the
conception of 'right' and 'privileges' to deny the benefit of 'customary rights' available
in Europe. Guha laments that within the colonial administration the 'annexationists'




1M Guha (1990): p73.
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Based on Baden-Powell's distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges'
the Act was a comprehensive piece of legislation, that by one stroke of
the executive pen attempted to obliterate centuries of customary use by
rural population all over India.106
Nothing of this sort happened. The Forest Act of 1878 was not based on Baden-
Powell's distinction. Baden-Powell himself was relieved that his theory of 'right' and
'privilege' was not taken seriously in making the Act,
... the legislature has done wisely in saying nothing of privileges, which
in fact have no place in law at all, and treating the whole question as
practically one of rights...107
Baden-Powell and Brandis, far from being in tussle, shared a co-operative and mutual
admiration. Brandis acknowledged Baden-Powell as a 'friend' of the department, and
always implied him to be the expert on forest law.108 Baden-Powell dedicated his most
celebrated work, The Land Systems ofBritish India to Brandis, as follows:
as a tribute of personal friendship and of admiration for an official
career which, marked throughout by devotion to the public good has
borne fruit in lasting benefits to the Indian empire.109
The third category of Guha, 'populist' was a caricature of Madras officials by Baden-
Powell. Guha uncritically makes it his own and turns it into an analytical category.
Madras was not fighting for a particular legal construction of use of forests. It was
'proposing a 'mirror image' of the 'annexationist' to make its point over its legislative
independence from the Government of India.
Guha arouses, in relation to his three imagined categories, grand expectations of
theoretical and conceptual advances,
106 Guha (1990): p78.
107 Baden-Powell (1882): pi 12 (f.n.).
108 Brandis and Smythies (1876): p32.
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These three perspectives on state control dovetailed with three distinct
views on the sociology, history, politics and ecology of forest resource
use. They deserve to be reconstructed in full, for the issues they raised
and debated with such intensity a hundred years ago are very much with
us today. [Emphasis mine]
But 'full' reconstruction of 'sociology', 'history' or 'politics' are not done by
indifferent and casual perusal of the material.
To summarise, the Forest Department encountered the idea of prescriptive right as a
stumbling block. Forest officials attempted to discredit the idea and advance alternate
embryonic ideas. These ideas were elaborated towards dislodging the idea of
prescriptive right. Eventually, the idea of customary law applicable in Europe served
the purpose the best and was deployed. In this process, strategic devices were
assimilated and re-defined. For example, what had emerged as a strategy to outflank the
forest dwellers, Baden-Powell was describing as the best tradition of Western law.
Even further, specific provisions of law had only a loose relationship with the
development of these ideas. Baden-Powell was in fact happy that legislatures had not
followed any of the theory he had advanced. The purpose of legal ideas is to make the
practices acceptable and justifiable. In the next chapter, I turn to see how the provisions
of the Forest Act of 1878 were not derived from legal ideas. Rather, the provisions





GENEALOGY OF FOREST PROVISIONS: LAW AS
REGISTER OF PRACTICES
Introduction
In the introductory chapter and chapter 5, I have provided examples of how legal
provisions arise from strategies forged in the field. Strategies are justified and
accommodated within the prevailing legal ideas. In the course of the ascendancy of
these strategies, legal ideas are re-organised to accommodate them. Thus, a genealogy
of a legal provision will show it arising as a base and mundane concern in a specific
context. In this chapter, I provide an example of this by exploring the formation of
some of the key provisions of the Forest Act of 1878.
A Forest Act was finally passed by the Governor-General's Council in 1878. The Act
constituted three categories of forests: reserved forests, protected forests and village
forests. The Act imposed several restrictions on the transit of forest produce. It also
provided comprehensive penal provisions for forest offences. The negotiations over
these provisions were at many levels within the administration. This included tussles
between the Government of India and local governments (particularly the Madras
Presidency); and Forest Department and civil officers.
In his proposal in 1869, Brandis suggested the creation of reserved and unreserved
forests. The proposal was severely criticised by the local governments. Thereafter,
Baden-Powell acquired prominence not only as an 'expert' on forest law but more.
Baden-Powell officiated for Brandis as the Inspector-General during December 1872 to
April 1874. From this position of power, he negotiated to overcome the opposition of
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the local governments to the suggestions of the Forest Department. He prepared a
revised draft bill and supporting explanatory memorandum. He was joined again by
Brandis who took the charge back. Brandis produced another memorandum in 1875.1 In
the memorandum, he further refined Baden-Powell's proposals.
The memorandum was submitted to the Legislative Department and the proceedings for
making of law started. In this Chapter, I will explore the genealogy of the provisions on
reserved forests, protected forests and village forests; procedures for creation of state
property in forests; transit restrictions; and penal provisions. In the first part, I explore
the cumulative working of Baden-Powell and Brandis in making the proposals
submitted to the Legislative Department. The treatment meted out to the proposal by
the Legislative Council needs to be understood in the context of details of power
relations within the administration. I do this in part two. Finally, in Part three, I detail
the treatment of the proposal by the Governor-General's Council and local
governments.
7.1. Formation of the Memorandum
The final proposal submitted by Brandis to the Legislative Council in 1875 categorised
the forests into three: reserved forests, protected forests and village forests. Restrictions
on transit of forest produce were devised to protect the forests from pilferage. Breach of
the law was an offence and penal provisions formed an integral part of the proposed
law. I take up these themes here. In each section, I will explore how Baden-Powell
worked on the proposals formed by Brandis in 1869, and how in turn, Brandis refined
the proposal of Baden-Powell to produce the memorandum in 1875 which he submitted






The creation of reserves was principally a question of respective rights of the state and
local people. As we noted in the last chapter, Baden-Powell categorised the forests
according to ownership as follows,
1st.- Forests, the property of Government, in which the proprietary right
of Government is absolute and unencumbered.
2nd " Forests, the property of Government, in which the proprietary right
is limited or encumbered by the existence of other forest rights.
3rd ' Forests which are the property of village or other communities,
public institutes, religious establishments, or other persons, in which
Government has forest rights.2
He announced that the first was the commonest kind of forest. This was not surprising
for him, 'because, observe, we are talking of rights, not of what Government will out of
kindness allow'[emphasis his]. Baden-Powell made a distinction between rights and
privileges. The prevalent uses were only 'privileges'. He attempted to define 'right' and
'privileges' in the draft bill. 'Forest right' was every conceivable use of forests which
accrued as a 'right'. And 'privileges' were use of forests 'when such is exercised by
permission and at the pleasure of the Local Government and not as of right'.4
2 Draft Forest Bill framed by Baden-Powell in 1874, incorporated in Brandis (1875). Hereafter Baden-
Powell (Draft Bill): pl02.
3 'Statement of Objects and Reasons', Or Explanatory Memorandum, By B. H. Baden-Powell, Officiating
Inspector General of Forests: To Accompany his Proposed Draft for Forest Law', 31/3/1874, see in
Brandis (1875). Hereafter Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 12.
4 Section 4, Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): plOl.
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Having claimed the state's ownership over forests, Baden-Powell could then put
forward his proposal to create reserves,
Any forest of the first two classes is Government property, soil and all;
so that, provided existing rights are respected inside them, and
privileges duly provided for where needed, there can be no objection to
constitute them "reserved" forests.5
The Forest Department could not prevent the local use of forests. The best it could hope
to do was concede whatever was in use and guard against any further extension. To do
this, the informality of the prevailing practices needed to be stopped. This could happen
only through official records and documents. Official documents and records were a
pre-condition to the power of the state. The first element of this process was to
demarcate the forests and record the boundaries. The second was to record all rights
and privileges within this boundary. The third was to attempt to commute or extinguish
as many rights and privileges as possible.
Baden-Powell's primary concern was to physically settle the boundaries of the forests
and demarcate the land. In fact, the Forest Department had a fetish about bringing this
effect in geography, to constitute the space into 'ours' against the others. After
demarcation, the important task was to define and settle all use of forests. Baden-
Powell noted,
In fact, the distinctive feature of the Forest Code, I propose, is, that the
first organisation of the forest area should be effected by a settlement as
in the case of land revenue, and that a "misl," or record of such
settlement should be formed and be used as a settlement record is. The
"forest settlement" consists in determining the boundaries as already
intimated, and then in settling all questions of privileges and rights, and
5 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
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in determining to what class the forest shall belong as regards its use
and treatment.6
On the basis of the settlement report, forests were to be constituted into three
categories, Special Reserve, Ordinary Reserve and District Forest. Baden-Powell
followed his distinction between right and privileges. He said,
In "special reserves" it will be necessary to refuse all privileges; and if,
owing to exceptional circumstances it is necessary to allow such, they
must all be defined, must be exercised under supervision, and strictly
confined to certain limits.7
Baden-Powell had constituted other forests into ordinary reserves and district forests.
Since 'privileges' could not be denied all together, the best was to concede them. He
proposed,
Ordinary Reserve will be an additional area, in which privileges as well
as unavoidable rights will be allowed when settled or permanently
stated, and which is designed to supplement the climatic effect of the
otherwise insufficient area of special reserve. ... District Forest will be
forests made over absolutely for the use of villages and communities.8
He was emphatic that at settlement, forest privileges were to be recorded9. Since
privileges were only a goodwill gesture, the state could consider what was a legitimate
use of the forests. Baden-Powell, thus, felt justified in insisting that privileges were to
be granted for personal or individual use of the grantee, and not for sale and
merchandise.10 'Sale and Merchandise' would obviously have made the local people a
competitor of the Forest Department. Further, the exercise of privilege was to cease if
6 Baden-Powell (1875): p23.
7 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
8 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
9 Baden-Powell (1875): p24.
10 Section 30 in Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl04.
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forests were closed for reproduction, planting or conservancy.11 Through this scheme of
'privilege', the most extensive category of use of forests was to be brought under the
control of the Forest Department.
Baden-Powell was uncomfortable with the nomenclature of forests. He was
apprehensive,
At present forests are called "reserved" and "unreserved" or "open", but
these names are indifferent in themselves, have different meanings in
different provinces... 12
He feared a (mis)signification of 'unreserved' forests,
... because if we say "unreserved," it implies that no kind of protection
is extended; whereas to the "unreserved forest"... protection is
extended...13
Every word in the law needed to be imprinted with this self-consciousness of the Forest
Department to assert itself vis-a-vis others. Thus, Baden-Powell preferred 'special
reserves' and 'ordinary reserves' which signified government property in all forests.14
Baden-Powell had abstracted these from practices in the field. He noted,
The constitution of special and ordinary reserve is in fact, in principle,
exactly what is done now, only that it avoids the objection attaching to
the "unreserve", as it exists in some places.15
Baden-Powell had, thus, taken care of the most extensive use of the forests by fixing
the label 'privileges' to them. He now needed to deal with the 'rights'. In his scheme,
11 Section 30 in Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl04.
12 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
13 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
14 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
15 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
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after the demarcation of the forests, individuals had to make claims of their rights
within three months. Baden-Powell lamented that wherever 'rights' were conceded
through earlier settlements or by native rulers, these were 'undefined'. He explained,
... an undefined privilege to a hamlet of four houses to take wood for
repairs of the houses; this right may be worth Rs.5 a year, but being
undefined, in time the four houses become 400, and the wood for repairs
is no longer the mere poles that thinning would supply without loss, but
the whole produce of the forest is swallowed up, and the right is now
worth Rs.50,000!16
By defining rights, he meant to specify the number of cattle which could graze and the
exact amount of timber which could be extracted. He was erudite,
I have to apologise for dwelling on these common topics, to be found in
treatises on forest political economy; but the subject has been
overlooked hitherto.17
Brandis, in his memorandum had suggested 'regulation, extinction and commutation'
of the rights.18 Baden-Powell argued that the 'rights' should be so firmly defined that
there should be no occasion for 'regulation'. He observed,
... if the right is once accurately defined, we must put up with it, or else,
if it is so bad that conservancy is impossible in the face of it, we must
commute or extinguish it. ... "Regulation," it may be replied, is really a
sort of restriction or half extinction of the right; in that case I say the
provision about extinction applies, and compensation must be given.19
Baden-Powell concluded that if the settlement officers considered extinction or
commutation necessary, they were to prepare a statement of forest rights and submit it
to the local government. Like Brandis' draft, commutation or extinction was to be on
16 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 14.
17 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 14.
18 Brandis (Memorandum) (1869).
19 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 15.
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full and fair compensation. Compensation could be through grant of land; exercise of
forest right on neighbouring patches; payment of cash; or remission or reduction of tax.
Brandis' Proposal
Baden-Powell had worked on the earlier draft of Brandis, weighing and assimilating
objections to make it acceptable to the local governments. Brandis, in turn, worked on
Baden-Powell's draft, amplifying, manipulating and detailing the provisions further.
The proposals were developed through this process of contestation.
Brandis introduced restraints on the use of forests once a patch was demarcated, that is,
even before settlement of the rights. He termed it as 'Legal effects of the demarcation
of a public forest'.20 No fresh rights of user or easement was to accrue. The local
government could not sale or lease a demarcated forest without permission from the
Government of India. Brandis reiterated the suggestion of Baden-Powell that the
privileges granted in forests were to be only for individual and personal use and not for
sale, lease or merchandise. This was now a 'legal effect' of demarcation. Further, the
Forest Department could fix and move the area on which privileges could be
exercised.21
Thus, in practice, the initiative for curtailing the local use of the forests was to be on the
grounds of conservancy and on the initiative of the Forest Department. Brandis then
settled down to minutely list all the prevalent use of the forests and manner in which
these could be curtailed.22
Passage of the people through the forests was another sore point for the forest
administration. Brandis in his earlier proposal had suggested that the local government
20 Brandis (1875): pi 1.
21 Brandis (1875): pll and 14.
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could order closure of roads on the recommendation of the forest officer. Before
closure, alternate and adequate passage had to be provided for.23 The proposal was
severely criticised by the local governments. Closure of passage, without adequate
compensation, was asserted to be a violation of private rights. Baden-Powell,
nevertheless, retained the provision.24 But Brandis, in his Memorandum of 1875
conceded the claims of the local governments and added that wherever paths were
closed, compensation would be provided.
7.1.2 Unreserved Forests
Brandis and Baden-Powell intended to assert the control of the state on forests which
were not demarcated. We saw in the previous section that Baden-Powell had objected
to the nomenclature of 'unreserved' forest. Brandis made another move. He called these
forests 'undemarcated' instead. According to Brandis,
These forests not being demarcated, their boundaries cannot, as a rule,
be defined as precisely as those of the reserves. ... the definition of
undemarcated forests will, in most cases, remain somewhat vague and
undefined. Yet it is essential that Government should not relinquish all
control over the forest growth in lands, which are its property, or in
which it possesses forest rights.26
The concern of Brandis was to keep the option of further extension of reserved forests
open. Thus, 'legislation must at present provide for the continuance of a certain control
over the so-called open, unreserved, or district forests'.27
22 Brandis (1875): pl7-20.
23 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
24 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 15
25 Brandis (1875): pll.
26 Brandis (1875): pl21.
27 Brandis (1875): p21.
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Brandis inserted a number of restrictions on the local use of these unreserved forests.
The local government could declare certain species (mainly commercially valuable
species) as 'reserved', and restrict their cutting and lopping. The government could also
impose restrictions on the use of other trees. Further, the local government could
regulate the disposal of timber and other produce. It could levy dues on the felling,
cutting, removing, or otherwise using of trees or bamboo, or on the collection or export
of gums, fruits, grass, or any forest produce. Further, clearing of land without
permission could be prohibited.28
The most significant power, however, which the local government could vest in the
forest officer was,
Power to close certain portions of the forests, to declare all rules of
demarcated public forests applicable to the blocks thus closed, and
specially to prohibit all ingress of men and cattle except on authorized
roads, the setting of fire to the grass and forest, and interference with the
forest without authority.29
Through an exercise of this provision, an undemarcated forest could be turned into a
demarcated forest, even without the demarcation procedures and settlement of the
rights. The above mentioned restrictions could be imposed through a notification of the
government declaring a forest 'protected'. After the declaration, the local Governments
could frame rules to give effect to any of the above mentioned restraints.30
The different provisions were abstracted from practices already developed in the field.
As Brandis stated,
28 Brandis (1875): p20-22.
29 Brandis (1875): p20.
30 Brandis (1875): p20-22.
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The provisions ... have been taken from existing rules in the different
provinces, they have been found necessary by actual experience...31
Brandis further detailed the abstraction of the law from practices in the field,
... the protection of certain reserved kinds, such as teak, blackwood,
sandalwood, sal, deodar, and others- is intended to legalize the
continuance of the system of royal trees which has existed for ages in
many parts of India long before forest administration was ever thought
of. ... power to close certain blocks, has been inserted with special
reference to the system lately initiated in the unreserved forests of the
Central Provinces, of closing certain blocks for a time in order to guard
against the impending denudation of these lands. Whether the system
will prove practicable and useful is another question; the needful legal
provision, however, should be made.32
Understandably, the above restrictions, without even settlement of rights, would have
been opposed by the local administration. Brandis was conscious of the possible
opposition that he was curtailing rights even before their definition and settlement. He
justified it as practices which were already being followed in the field without
infringing local rights. Further, he declared the provisions 'unobjectionable' 'on
condition that no rights of persons or communities shall be affected'.33 Thus, a
condition was attached in the proposed law that no rights of communities or other
persons was to be affected or abridged by these rules. The rights were not to be
interfered with since there was no procedure for recording and settling the rights, as
was the case for reserved forests. Brandis clarified,
Provisions for recording, regulating, or extinguishing adverse rights in
the undemarcated forests are not required, and would not lead to any
satisfactory result.34
31 Brandis (1875): p21.
32 Brandis (1875): p21.
33 Brandis (1875): p21.
34 Brandis (1875): p21.
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What then was the import of the rules, if the rights were to not to be interfered with? It
was not clarified but the import was that the most extensive use, which still constituted
privileges or customary right, would still be out of the ambit of 'right'. Thus, despite
the proviso to leave the 'rights' alone, significant restraints could be imposed on the use
of forests in the field.
7.1.3 Procedure and Powers of Officers
The powers and procedures for constituting the reserves and managing forests were
highly contested. Three things were important. One, fixing the boundary of a forest,
second, recording the rights and 'privileges' on forests. Third, extinguishing and
commuting of the rights.
Baden-Powell's Proposal
Brandis' draft had proposed that the Conservator of Forests would demarcate the forest
boundary, and if any dispute arose, the Conservator alone could refer it to a '
Commission' for its settlement. The excessive powers to the forest officers and the
constitution of a Commission were strongly objected to by the local governments.
Baden-Powell conceded some of the objections,
All Local Governments nearly objected to this, and I am now convinced
myself that it would not work.35
He instead adopted a system which was already in practice in Punjab. In this, the
objections to the excessive powers to the forest officer could be mitigated without
losing control altogether. He provided,
35 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
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I refer to the appointment of two experienced officers of Government.
The Local Government has its whole staff to select from - one a civil or
Settlement Officer, the other a Forest Officer; and these two shall go out
to the place, and shall effect what for brevity I may call a "forest
settlement."... You cannot have a Civil Officer alone, for he does not
know what the forest requirements are, and the result will be as in
Bombay, where certain forest demarcations were made by Revenue
Officers alone, that now prove utterly useless for any forest purpose
whatever.
The forest officer, in opposition to the civil officer, was the guardian of the interest of
Forest Department. Baden-Powell noted,
The forest officer will indicate what he wants from a forest point of
view, and the civil officer will see how far these requirements can be
met. If the two officers differ (which in the Punjab, where the system
has been in force with excellent results, I have never known to be the
case), a reference to the Conservator of Forests and to the chief revenue
authority will easily settle the difference.37
Baden-Powell also changed the arrangement for settlement of boundary disputes. He
described the procedure in the North-West revenue law for demarcation of wastelands
as excellent.38 The Act made provision for settlement of boundary disputes through
arbitrators. Baden-Powell adopted this. Boundary disputes were to be referred to
arbitrators.39 The contesting parties were to nominate their arbitrators.40 Appeals
against the arbitrators' awards were barred.41
Compared to a court proceeding, arbitration retained the flexibility and control for the
Forest Department. The Forest Department had a strong dislike for the courts and its
procedures. Baden-Powell was certain that the court would not understand the
36 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 13.
37 Baden-Powell (1875): p23.
38 Baden-Powell (1875): p23.
39 Section 16 to Section 31, Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl03-104.
40 Section 16 to Section 31, Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl03-104.
41 Section 16 to Section 31, Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl03-104.
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intricacies of forest management and the bearing of forest right on it.42 He considered
magistrates ' always opposed to forest work in most violent way' ,43
Baden-Powell did not even find it necessary to justify the adoption of arbitration. He
could, as a right, extend a provision forged elsewhere in a different context and power
relations,
I presume there is no need for comment on provisions which are details
already passed by the Legislature.44
These strategies, once abstracted as law from a particular local context, acquired a
degree of universal force. What emerged as a special exceptional case was legitimately
extended in other contexts.
In the scheme of Baden-Powell, after demarcation of forests users had to make claims of
their rights on forests within three months to the settlement officers. If the settlement
officers did not admit these, parties could prefer a claim in a civil court. The provision
of moving the claim to a civil court was admitted because the proposal of a
'Commission' was unacceptable to the local governments. But Baden-Powell did not
trust the courts with the interests of the Forest Department. He added that if the courts
left the forest rights 'undefined', the settlement officer could specify and list them out.45
A person aggrieved with this definition could appeal to the Chief revenue authority.46
42 Section 35 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl04 and Baden-Powell (Memorandum): pi 14-5.
43 Baden-Powell and Gamble (1874): P44.
44 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 14.
45 Section 35 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pl04 and Baden-Powell (Memorandum) (1874): pi 14-5.




Brandis considered that only one settlement officer, a civil officer, to be styled the
demarcating officer, acting in communication with a forest officer, would be more
effective. In this, he was improving upon Baden-Powell. He was of the opinion that
'clear and undivided responsibility is a great advantage, provided due care is taken to
place the contrary opinion of the Forest Department on record' 47
If Baden-Powell had picked up the provision for arbitration from the revenue law in the
North-West Province, Brandis was grafting another set of provisions from the same
law. Brandis borrowed,
The demarcating officer is to assign to the adjoining villages so much of
the waste land as he may consider requisite for their pastural or
agricultural purposes, and shall mark off the remainder and declare it to
be the property of Government. This duty must obviously be entrusted
to an officer familiar with the husbandry and pasturage requirements of
the people who resort to the forest, and for this reason the responsibility
of deciding what boundaries to select, must rest with a civil or
settlement officer specially selected for that purpose.48
Having, on the face of it, conceded to the objections of the civil officers, Brandis
inserted the countervailing powers of forest officers,
But the proposals regarding the boundaries to be selected must be
prepared and laid before him by the forest officer, and both the original
proposals of the forest officer, as well as any objection which he may
raise to the proceedings of the demarcating officer, must be recorded. In
case of a difference of opinion between the forest and demarcating
officer, this provision will give the Local Government an opportunity of
ordering revision of the demarcation, and in the case of bad work it will
make it clear who is responsible for it. This arrangement will ensure
47 Brandis (1875): plO.
48 Brandis (1875): plO.
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prompt action, and at the same time Government will have the full
benefit of the forest officer's professional knowledge and experience.49
In the proceedings after the demarcation, Brandis vested significant powers in the forest
officers. The forest officers were to negotiate with the right-holders for commuting the
rights. He proposed that,
The proposals for the commutation of forest rights by means of an
exchange of land or other compensation must in the first instance be
made by the forest officers acting in concert with the local civil officers.
If the parties interested consent to these proposals, or if any objection
made to them be adjusted by mutual agreement, then the consent or
agreement should be recorded, and the forest law should prescribe the
form of such record and its value as evidence.50
A comprehensive law needed to provide for cases where a commutation with the
agreement of the right-holders did not materialise. Brandis recognised two different
kinds of rights in forests, one, right over land, and two, right over produce. These
needed to be treated differently. If the settlement officer could not settle dispute over
land, an appeal could be preferred to a civil court. If necessary, it could be acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act.51 So far, he was following Baden-Powell's proposal.
But Baden-Powell had recommended the same procedure for extinguishing or
commuting other forests rights, like right to graze and drawn timber. Brandis revised it,
The peculiar feature of this business is that the number of interested
persons is large,- that the arrangements which must be made to satisfy
their requirements are complicated, and that in many cases the decision
will be not only whether certain proposals shall be admitted or rejected,
but that the local officers making the proposal will during the course of
the enquiry be called upon to modify in order to enable the authority
with whom the final decision rests to sanction the arrangement. It is
essential that matters of this kind should be settled on the spot in the
49 Brandis (1875): plO.
50 Brandis (1875): pl6.
51 Brandis (1875): pl6.
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presence of the interested parties and with that perfect knowledge of the
details of the case which cannot be acquired without an examination the
locality.52
On this count, Brandis found the suggested arrangement wanting,
The issues submitted to the decision of the Court and Assessors under
the Land Acquisition Act are of a much more simple nature and can be
determined without necessitating the examination of the locality by the
Court and its Assessors.53
Brandis, thus, retained his earlier proposal for a commission,
Under these circumstances the only plan that I can suggest is that
proposed in the draft Bills of 1868 and 1869, viz., to entrust the decision
of these matters either to a single officer specially selected or to a
commission...54
But the local governments had objected to the suggestion of a Commission. They had
accused that the forest officers would fill up the Commission and that the rights of the
local people would be infringed with impunity. Brandis took care to ward off the
criticism. He provided on the membership of the Commission,
... the selection of the members, mode of procedure and form of
decision being regulated by rules to be framed by Local Government
under the sanction of the Government of India. It should be considered
whether the decision of the officer or commission should be final when
sanctioned by the Local Government, or whether it should be final after
the lapse of two years from the date of publication, unless reversed
during that time by a decree of a Court specially designated to bear
appeals from such decisions.55
52 Brandis (1875): pl6.
53 Brandis (1875): pl6.
54 Brandis (1875): pl6.
55 Brandis (1875): pl6.
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In this also, he retained the interest of Forest Department. The clause that rules had to
be sanctioned by the Government of India implied that the Inspector General's office
would have a say in the composition of the Commission.
7.1.4 Transit Restrictions
In the draft bill submitted in 1869, Brandis had elaborate provisions on transit of forest
produce. Subsequently, he learnt more from correspondence with the Bombay
Presidency. Bombay had prepared draft rules for its forests and submitted it to the
Government of India for its approval. The rules had elaborate provisions on transit. In
the Bombay Presidency, the government forests were interlaced with private forests and
foreign territory. This made the pilferage of government forests easy. Persons could
claim that timber was drawn from private land or foreign territory. The presidency had
devised a system of issuing permits for felling and removing timber growing on private
land. It also controlled movement of all timber whether drawn from private or foreign
territory. The timber had to be accompanied with a pass and could be moved only
through certain specified routes.56
Brandis had proposed restrictions on only timber drawn from government land. It was
an established practice to require timber drawn from public land to pass through tolls
where charges could be collected or pilferage detected. But Brandis' proposal did not
apply to timber drawn from private lands. Brandis was impressed with this new control
and said,
There is no provision, however, in the bill by me that would authorize
the issue of permits for cutting and removing timber grown on private
lands in which government has no forest rights. That would be an
56
Proceedings Nos. 32-34, December, 1870, PWD (F), NAI.
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interference with the management of private forest lands, which was not
contemplated when the bill was framed.57
Brandis, however, considered it to be a 'minor matter' to revise the bill 'interfering'
with the private rights. He assured the Government that if the principle were approved
of, the needful addition might easily be made.58 To manipulate this addition, he touched
on the raw nerves of the Government of India officials. He knew that a proposal of
independent legislation from Bombay would be considered offensive by the
Government of India. He provoked,
... if the principles of these sections are not approved, and Bombay
thinks essential, then it will have to be considered whether the needful
should be done by the Bombay Legislative Council.59
The Government of India discouraged Bombay from making its own law.60 In the next
round of the draft bill, prepared by Baden-Powell, the restriction on transit of timber
drawn from private land was adopted. In addition to the experience of Bombay, Baden-
Powell learnt things from the North-West Provinces and Central Provinces. In these
provinces, the route through which timber could be drawn from public forests was
specified. This was to ensure that the levy for collecting timber was realised.61 Baden-
Powell justified the provisions on transit as 'a limited interference with private right
and liberty'.62
We again see here that strategies are fashioned in dispersed sites in their local context.
The Bombay government imposed the transit restriction as a counter-strategy to the
persons pilfering forests. This was in the specific context of Bombay where public
57 See 'Keep With' 'Not for Record' section in Proceedings Nos. 32-34, December, 1870, PWD (F),
NAI.
58 ibid.
51 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 17.
62 Baden-Powell (1875): pl2.
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forests were interlaced with private forests and foreign territory. Bombay had abstracted
the strategy as a provision in the draft rule. All legal provisions arise somewhere in a
local context, are abstracted and extended to other locations.
Brandis had earlier pleaded and gauged the mood to introduce the new restriction on
transit of forest produce. In the next round, following Baden-Powell's draft, he was
emphatic:
The Local Government must be empowered, within certain districts or
territorial limits, to prescribe the routes by land or by water, by which
timber, bamboos, or other forest produce, whatever their origin, shall be
/r«3
removed or conveyed, as well as to close any such route.
7.1.5 Penal Provisions
Brandis' memo of 1869 had introduced several modifications on the penal parts in the
act of 1865. These were again practices abstracted from the field. Section 58 in the draft
bill required all persons who used forests to assist the Forest Department in detection of
offences and extinguishing forest fires. It was a duty of every person and communities
to prevent the occurrence of fire, extinguish fire; prevent commission of offence; and
bring to justice the offenders. Any cattle straying into government forest could be
seized. Cattle pounds were already there. Sections 59 and 60 legalised the
establishment of cattle-pounds by Forest Officers, and authorised the seizure and
detention of cattle trespassing in any forest. Brandis proposed a penalty for an offender
or any one abetting an offence. It could be a fine up to Rupees 500, and in default of
payment, simple imprisonment up to six months. Half the imposed fine could be
awarded to the informer on whose information the prosecution was secured.64
63 Brandis (1875): p23.
64 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
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Brandis also vested powers in forest-officers to arrest any person without a warrant. He
had proposed seizure and confiscation in addition to the fine. Within the Act of 1865,
there was a bar on initiating prosecution after six months of the commission of the
offence. Brandis modified it to six months from the date the commission of offence was
discovered.65
Baden-Powell's Revisions
Baden-Powell further sharpened the penal provisions. He suggested that the local
governments should be given power through the Act to impose imprisonment and fine
concurrently.66 As Baden-Powell expressed his concern,
For the rest, there is no reason why the penalty for breach of forest and
timber rules should only be met with fine. It has been found in Burma
that while timber thieves will pay a fine, the fear of jail, even for a few
days, is a more powerful deterrent. ... it seems much wiser to leave the
Local Government the option of imposing fine or imprisonment, or
both.67
In the Second Forest Conference, a person had suggested a higher penalty for offence
between sunset and sunrise. He was borrowing it from a German law. The German law
zo
also provided harsher penalties for habitual offenders. Baden-Powell found this
impressive. He proposed a double penalty if the offence was committed between sunset
and sunrise. Similarly, a double penalty was imposed on a person who had committed
the same offence the second time.69
65 Brandis' Memorandum (1869).
66 Section 66 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pi 10.
67 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 18.
68 Baden-Powell (1875): p20.
69 Section 66 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pi 10.
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The only provision in the Act of 1865 that was not defective, according to Baden-
Powell, was the power vested in a forest officer to arrest without a warrant. Baden-
Powell noted,
Section 8 gives the one satisfactory power in the Act, and must be
maintained in a new law; arrest without warrant is absolutely essential.
In all timber cases you cannot, do what you will, keep the issue of
warrant secret; and the moment it is known, every trace of the crime
disappears like magic.70
In the Second Forest Conference, some participants had expressed doubts about vesting
forest officers with the powers to arrest without a warrant. Baden-Powell was not fully
in agreement. He entertained the doubt as it presented 'certain difficulties'. He said,
... the power, as expressed in the formal wording of a Section, looks
formidable, and it seems an extreme measure to allow a subordinate
police or forest official to arrest without warrant...71
Having said this, he brushed it aside,
... this provision has actually stood on the Code for nine years, and its
operation in practice has never been found productive of any
oppression, and it would be perfectly impossible to punish a forest
offence if the police or forest officer seeing a breach of the rules
committed before his face, were unable to take any action till he
obtained a warrant from a Magistrate, perhaps thirty miles distant.72
The participants made several suggestions to strike a balance between the two opposing
concerns. One suggestion was to limit the powers to arrest only if the offender was
caught within the bounds of forests.73 But there were problems with this suggestion.74 It
70 Baden-Powell (1875): pl9.
71 Baden-Powell (1875): pl9.
72 Baden-Powell (1875): pl9.
73 Baden-Powell (1875): pl9.
74 Baden-Powell (1875): pl9.
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was just as common to find people on the road or outside forests with stolen timber.75
Another suggestion was to follow the Railway Act, where an offender was arrested only
if his correct name and address could not be obtained.76 Yet another suggestion was to
restrict the power of arrest to offences of only grave nature.77
Baden-Powell could not be indifferent to the unlimited powers to arrest without a
warrant. The real 'difficulty' was that the local governments, particularly Madras, had
strongly condemned the provision. Baden-Powell could brush them aside by observing,
' The power of arrest without warrant in all cases has stood on the law (Act VII of
1865) for nine years without any complaint of hardship' .78 He gave a similar argument
to Madras on their critique of the Act of 1878. But Baden-Powell was aware that the
Act of 1865 had only given powers to the local administration to make rules. In
practice, the local governments were always opposed to vesting such powers in the
hands of the forest officers. For example, the Proceedings of the Lt. Governor of Punjab
noted,
... the people would prefer the inconvenience of having to attend a
Magistrate's Court several miles distance, to the alternative of being
tried and punished by an official who had a direct interest in their
79
conviction.
Baden-Powell, thus, accommodated the suggestions. Persons could be arrested without
warrant for offences related to demarcation of forests and their protection; violation of
transit restrictions; and setting of fire to forests and wilful mischief. The provision
pretended to apply to only 'grave' offences but effectively applied to any offence. In
other cases, the forest officer could arrest if he could not obtain the correct name and
75 Baden-Powell (1875): pl9.
76 Baden-Powell (1875): pi9-20.
77 Baden-Powell (1875): p20.
78 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 18.
79 Section on Punjab in Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the Several Provinces
Under the Government of India for the year 1870-71.
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address of the offender. Baden-Powell also adopted double penalty for commission of
an offence between sunset and sunrise and commission of the same offence second
In several instances, Magistrates had not given orders for disposal of seized timber as it
was not produced before the court. Baden-Powell made it binding on the Magistrates to
o 1
order disposal even if timber was not produced before them. He imposed a fine up to
Rs. 50 for erasing or removing boundary marks. The fine was primarily to defray the
expenses of restoring the boundary mark.82 Baden-Powell said this was 'copied' from
another act.83 Baden-Powell 'copied' another provision from Consolidated Custom
Act.84 A forest officer or police officer could apply to a magistrate for a search warrant.
A Search warrant was to be issued for recovering stolen timber or other forest produce
or
and realising duty or royalty on timber.
Baden-Powell was most concerned with the clauses on confiscation in the Act of 1865.
Section 5 of the Act had provided for a penalty only in cases where confiscation was
not provided for. Further, where confiscation was provided for, it was mandatory for
the forest-officer to effect it. Confiscation was of two things, 1) tools and implements
used in committing a forest offence, and 2) the produce obtained. To Baden-Powell it
was obvious that only the first was real confiscation.86 He asserted that the word
confiscation was wrongly used. He further argued that the stolen timber was anyway
government's property. It was, in effect, not being confiscated. It was only being
restored to the lawful owner. What was actually being confiscated were the tools and
80 Section 66 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pi 10.
81 Section 70 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pi 10.
82 Section 78 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pill.
83 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 18.
84 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 18.
85 Section 77 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pill.
86 Baden-Powell (1875): pl8.
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implements. But these were, according to Baden-Powell, only 'an axe, or such like' and
thus, of insignificant value.87
Baden-Powell re-organised the part on confiscation and separated confiscation from
restoring the property to lawful owner. He also explicitly provided for confiscation of
'boats, carts and cattle' used for committing an offence.88 He further strengthened the
freedom of forest officers. Brandis had put restraints on misuse of powers of the forest
officer, for example, vexatious confiscation. Baden-Powell removed all such clauses on
the grounds that such restraints were already there in other laws like service rules and
Criminal Procedure Code.89
It would be an error to think that the strategies were always draconian and arbitrary.
The purpose of these revisions, after all, was to come up with a draft which could be
accepted by the local governments. For this, it needed to be in the prevailing best
tradition of law and its ideologies. Brandis had omitted to mention the clause for the
bail of an offender. In fact, the Act of 1865 had no clause for bail.90 The provision for
bail was there in the Criminal Procedure Code under which the offence was to be tried.
But not explicitly mentioning it could have led to the confusion that bail was not
applicable in forest offences. Baden-Powell supplied the omission and inserted a clause
that the offender could be released on bail.
Brandis's Memorandum of1875
Brandis found Baden-Powell's draft to 'meet most requirements' and only had 'a few
remarks to add and modifications to suggests'.91 Brandis would have felt happier with
87 Baden-Powell (1875): pl8.
88 Section 71 of Baden-Powell (Draft Bill): pi 10.
89 Baden-Powell's Memorandum (1874): pi 18-9.
90
see Act 1865.
91 Brandis (1875): p25.
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unlimited powers to arrest without warrant. The justification for this was, ' Act VII of
1865 does not limit the power of arrest without warrant'.92 Brandis was of the opinion
that the power of arrest without warrant should be unlimited as Magistrates can often be
far off from forest areas.93
He recommended the restoration of unlimited power as it was in the Act of 1865. Local
governments could, through rules, decide the districts or circumstances in which the
powers were to be vested in the forest officers.94 Probably, Brandis was reminded of the
criticism the provision would attract. For the proposal to be acceptable, further
safeguards were necessary. He added that 'no officers below a certain rank' should be
vested with the power to arrest without a warrant.95
In addition, he restored the penalties for vexatious or unnecessary arrest from his
previous proposal, which was omitted by Baden-Powell.96 If Baden-Powell had
introduced the provision on search warrant, Brandis expanded the power. Brandis
claimed,
The object of this section would, in most cases, be defeated if it was
necessary to apply to the local magistrate for a search warrant. I would
prefer the provisions of Sections 19 to 21 of the Inland Customs Act of
1875, and authorize Local Governments to grant the power of search to
forest officers above a certain rank, and to provide that the search be
made in the presence of a police officer.97
We again see how strategies incorporated in law are treated as legitimate and thus, fit
for adoption without any justification. Brandis further manipulated the local
communities. In Baden-Powell's draft, it was a duty of the communities to prevent
92 Brandis (1875): p26.
93 Brandis (1875): p26-27.
94 Brandis (1875): p 27.
95 Brandis (1875): p27.
96 Brandis (1875): p27.
97 Brandis (1875): p27.
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forest fire. But mentioning it as a duty was of no help. Brandis proposed that the local
Governments should have the power to close the exercise of all rights and privileges in
a forest to which fire had been set. Brandis was aware 'in the tropical and subtropical
provinces of India where jungle fires are annual institution', the power would not be
exercised.98 He was still satisfied with at least an enabling provision.
In the penalty part, Brandis recommended that power to impose fine or imprisonment
should be in addition to confiscation. Brandis was reflecting on the 'economy' of
punishment,
As the forest rules made under this Act become more perfected, and
more experience is gained regarding their working, it will be possible to
specify more accurately than can at present be done, the penalty to be
assigned to each offence. A beginning in this direction will be to
provide that the penalties prescribed shall, as much as can be, be
proportionate to the damage done by the offence, and shall be increased
when the offence was committed between sunset and sunrise, or in case
of resistance to lawful authority, or when the offender had previously
been convicted for the same offence.99
Brandis made further improvisations in the penal administration of the forest law. He
introduced a clause where the forest officers, instead of preferring a complaint before a
Magistrate, could make a compromise with the offender.100
Brandis had got the idea from the French law. The law in France was introduced in
1859.101 He stated,
... its effect has been most beneficial in saving the time of forest officers
and diminishing bad feeling against the forest administration. During a
tour which I made through the public forests of France in 1866, I
98 Brandis (1875): p27.
99 Brandis (1875): p 27.
100 Brandis (1875): p28.
101 Brandis (1875): p28.
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became acquainted with the great advantages of this system, but
refrained from proposing any similar provision when framing the draft
Forest Bills of 1868 and 1869, because I could not at the time trace any
provisions of similar character in Indian legislation.102
The introduction of a similar provision in the Inland Customs Act provided the
justification for Brandis to introduce the provision.103 Brandis introduced further
provisions on protection of boundaries. He noted several cases of tampering with the
boundaries. This was serious as it undermined the very foundation of the state's
property.104 Brandis intended to make it harsher by making the offence liable to the
same penalties as other forest offences.105
Submission ofDraft
The revised draft by Brandis was submitted to the Legislative Department. As was the
practice, the comments of the local governments were solicited, as the draft bill went
through three revisions with the select committee. The approach of the local
governments, after the revisions by Baden-Powell and Brandis, was not of outright
rejection. They still had comments to make. But overall, they were describing the draft
as 'satisfactory'. Madras was an exception. It continued to maintain that the changes
were insignificant. Thus, all its criticism of the earlier draft applied to the present one
too. We will take up the case of Madras separately in the next chapter. Here, we need to
explore the relations within the administration to understand the shift from hostility to
consent.
102 Brandis (1875): p28.
103 Brandis (1875): p28.
104 Brandis (1875): p28.
105 Brandis (1875): p28.
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7.2. Political Economy of Administrative Relations
I have already noted in an earlier chapter that the accommodation of forest conservancy
meant different things to different people at different levels. Even at one level, it did
not have a single cause but several mutually contradictory interests. Since 1862,
successive Secretaries of State had emphasised the role of forest protection. At the apex
of the administrative hierarchy, the governing power in England, the totality of interest
of the Empire had to be kept in view. Several claims were made for the need for forest
preservation. This included the present and future demands for timber for the
government; the potential to earn revenue from state reserves; and the arguments that
destruction of forests could affect the agricultural production and general climate, and
thus, the stability of the empire. For example, the Secretary of State had strongly
emphasised these on the Madras Government, which was reluctant to form reserves.106
In another instance, again in relation to Southern India, the Secretary of State noted,
When we look to the frequent prevalence, of late years in Southern
India, both of drought and of floods sometimes in the same year, I must
say that the subject is one which appears to me to demand more earnest
consideration...107
But in the routine functioning of the administration, several reports, including the
annual reviews of each of the local governments, were sent to the Secretary of State.
The format of the report had acquired a structure which clearly emphasised the
importance of revenue gains. Shortfall in revenue was always a concern and the
Secretary of State could point this out.108 The claims on forests were mutually
contradictory. Attempts were made to reconcile the claims, for example, between the
106 SS to GOM, 27/1/1870, See in Proceeding No.28, March, 1870, PWD (F), NAI.
107 SS to GOI, 23/5/1878, Despatches from the SS, vol. 1877-1880, RA (F), NAI.
108 There are numerous instances of the SS pointed out disappointing financial performance. See
Parliamentary Papers, 1871 (III, IV and V)
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interest of forest conservation and revenue from forests. But the contradictory claims
aggregated for the powers in London to instruct creation of the state reserves. The
creation of forest reserves, and as a corollary, the support to the bearers of the
'scientific enterprise', the Forest Department, was clear. Very early, in 1862, when the
Forest Department was being created, the Secretary of State had strongly emphasised
the need to create space for the Department.
In the previous chapter, I noted the overriding powers of the Secretary of State over the
Government of India. But the Government of India were not mute followers of orders..
The instability in meaning was in the power relations within the administration. Within
this, the Government of India interpreted orders and implemented policies by its own
logic. As a governing and controlling power, responsibilities fell on them for direct
management. This included the timber shortage for the present and future. Further, the
Government of India could not be oblivious to the assertions that deforestation
contributed to famines. Thus, its inclination for forest preservation was not entirely
imposed. In any case, we cannot separate these influences entirely. The administration,
in executing orders of a superior, cannot maintain two faces for ever. That is, one, what
it actually believes in, and the other, what it actually engages with day and night. In
implementing ideas, it can internalise the idea and makes it its own. Of course, instead
of internalising it, it can also oppose it and see to it that the policy is reversed. But ideas
and actions are in discourses, forming and shaping each other. Forest preservation
became one project of the Government of India in the 1870s.
For the Government of India, by 1870, if not earlier, the Forest Department and creation
of the state's interests in forests became a part of the administrative reality. But in
crystallisation of the interest of forest preservation, the accommodation of Forest
Department was not unconditional. The Government of India, explicitly and implicitly,
supported the Forest Department in its dealings with the local governments and
presidencies. However, the Government of India, run by civil officers, did not recognise
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the Forest Department as bearers of scientific knowledge and 'experts'. Doing this
would have amounted to conceding partial independence to the 'expert' to their
detriment. Thus, the civil officers in the Government of India tried to ensure their
domination over the Forest Department.
Brandis was trying to carve out an independent position for the 'professional' skills of
the forest officers. Hume, the Secretary to the Government of India in Revenue and
Agriculture Department was blunt in demolishing all the ambitions Brandis harboured
for the Forest Department,
The root of all these controversies now continually cropping up lies in a
nutshell. Mr. Brandis is not content, like other members and
subordinates of the Government of India, to merge his identity in the
one governing power,- he wants to stand out an independent authority,
doing things on his own hook and in his own name.109
Brandis' 'own' authority was as an 'advisor' to the Government of India to furnish
technical and expert knowledge. Foucault suggests that we give a prominent position to
the 'expert' and 'expert knowledge' in the relations of power. This should not hurry us
in according a prominent position to the Forest Department. For recognising the power
of the 'expert', we would need to tell when an 'expert' or 'expert knowledge' has been
constituted. Despite ambivalence in Foucault's work, it is certain that expert knowledge
is created in discourses when certain utterances acquire the status of the truth at the
exclusion of others.110 The Forest Department represented itself as a bearer of scientific
knowledge and 'experts'. But for Foucault, experts are not created through self-
representation alone. In the discourses, far from being experts, foresters were only, as
Hume said, 'subordinate' appendages to work within and in conformity with 'one
governing power'. This 'governing power', undoubtedly, was of the civil officers.
109 See Hume's reply to Brandis in an office note dated 15/8 1874 in 'Keep With' 'Not for Record'




Brandis had been cautioned by his superior while taking charge of the office of the
Inspector General not to produce a 'scientific treatise' but 'practical proposals',
proposals which a civil officer could assess and judge.
The civil officers never missed an opportunity to show Brandis and the rest of the
Forest Department their place within the schema of the administration. The first forest
conference, attended by forest officers, had passed several resolutions on the
administration of forests. The resolution was forwarded to the Government of India for
consideration. Hume replied,
During the discussions which are recorded in this report, many ideas
were broached and resolutions passed which the Government of India is
not prepared to adopt or endorse. Nevertheless Governor General in
Council cordially acknowledges the contribution.111
That not a single resolution was even worthy of the consideration of the Government
was a polite way of telling the Forest Department that decision making, even if it
related to forests, was to be done by the civil officers. Forest officers were made to
appear entirely ignorant of the significant aspects of administration, the land tenures. A
commission was being forced on the Madras presidency for demarcation of government
forests. Brandis tried to insert a member familiar with the forest question. Hope
brushed aside the suggestion. He said,
The duty will be one requiring knowledge of law and of the history and
revenue system of the Western coast, and not of mere forestry.112
Brandis frequently complained of exclusion of forest officers in the administrative
decision making.
111 Letter from Hume, Secretary to the GOI, printed in ed. Baden-Powell and Gamble (1874).
112 Office note by Hope, 6/10/1876, in Proceedings 'A', 32-52, RA (F), May 1879, NAI
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Away from the sites of policy, in the field, the civil officers and forest officers were
often at loggerheads, trading charges against each other. We have already noted the
antagonism of the civil officers. The forest officers were no less critical of the civil
officers. Amery, a forest officer, bitterly complained of 'an antagonism based both on
antagonism of interest and difference of stand-point'.113 Civil officers had complete
control over land. Forests had no value and breaking land for agriculture was not only a
means of patronage but also 'became the recognised measure of a district officer's
capability and tact'.114
In contrast, the Forest Department had insisted on the preservation of forests. Amery
lamented that the Collectors believed that forest officers were 'animated by no higher
motive than a satisfactory balance sheet'.115 As a result, the Forest officer sees in the
Collector 'a man willing to sacrifice the lasting well-being of the empire'.116
Baden-Powell was a civil officer but his professional interests, being a Conservator,
coincided with the other officers of the Forest Department. He bitterly complained,
I have known instances of district officers who have warned all their
native officials to be very careful to suppress what they call oppressions
on the part of forest officials.... [a] district officer does not wish to have
any one punished no matter what forest offences he commits; at least,
that is what the tehsildars and native police officers instantly understand
by it. ... The forest officer, instead of receiving assistance from the
district officials, is snubbed on every possible occasion, and finds
himself powerless...117
The distrust of and a sense of harassment by the civil officers was articulated among the









117 Baden-Powell and Gamble (1874): P32.
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I have met with one or two, and one or two only in the Punjab, and have
heard of others, to whom the subject of forests was always sure to be
misunderstood; they were perfectly unreasonable on the subject.
Whether this proceeded from a disbelief in the exhaustibility of forest
products, or in an intense dislike to having anybody in the district
1 I Q
besides themselves, I cannot say, but it is a fact.
Baden-Powell also alleged that district officers
... not knowing anything about the subject, and not very impressed with
the necessity of what the professional man well knew was indispensable
would turn rather a cold and indifferent ear to it, readily take refuse in
excuses about interfering with the people...119
The rivalry and bitterness was intense and manifested in many forums. Anticipating
heated exchanges, Baden-Powell and Schlich, the editors of the inaugural issue of the
Indian Forester noted,
We will impress on ourselves and our contributors the absolute
maintenance of courtesy and good temper in the thick of the hottest
discussion.120
The forest officers thus represented the civil officers as uninformed, short-sighted and
interested in unrestrained self aggrandisement. Meanwhile, the civil officers
represented themselves as bearers of people's interest which a repressive Forest
Department was encroaching upon. The civil officers celebrated themselves by creating
their other, the forest officer as uneducated, inexperienced in managing people and
interested solely in revenue generation.
118 Baden-Powell and Gamble (1874): P44.
119 Baden-Powell and Gamble (1874): P39
120 Baden-Powell and Schlich (1975): pi.
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Administrative rivalry was at the core of these representations. However, all of it was
not being invented. Different interests crystallised in the different administrative organs
of the state. Since the civil officers were charged with the general administration of the
district, it was their duty to maintain at least an non-rebellious, if not contented and
prosperous, population. British rule was not based on control though armed coercion
and repression.121 To compromise, align with and appease different local interests was
at the foundation of the rule. The civil officers, particularly District Officers charged
with land revenue and law and order, were bearers of these interests. The raw jealousy
of the civil officers could not be expressed in the administrative discourses. Thus, the
effects of the Forest Department on the local people were accentuated and exaggerated
and dramatised. The same was true of the representation of the civil officers by the
forest officers.
In this relationship, all the parties had to accommodate the others. As we have noticed,
the draft submitted in 1869 was revised many times, conceding to the opposition of the
civil officers and local governments. Brandis accepted the subordination of the civil
officers. Despite Baden-Powell being younger to him by many years, being a civil
officer, he had more legitimacy with the government. While making any suggestion,
Brandis would, one way or the other, communicate that the proposal had the
endorsement of Baden-Powell. For example, even while making some minor additional
changes in the bill, after it was submitted to the Legislative Department, Brandis added,
' I may mention that I have discussed these remarks with Mr. Baden-Powell' 122
Brandis was carving out space within the administrative and power relations in which
he found himself. His colleagues, the other foresters, could not fully comprehend this
politics and accused Brandis of abandoning the interests of the Forest Department.
Amery regretted that Brandis rebuked those complaining against the civil officers as
121
Yang (1992); and Bhattacharya (1992).
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'officer unfitted for his position who was unable to get along with the district
authorities'.123
If the Forest Department was conceding its sub-ordination to the civil officers, it was
too late for the civil officers to wish that the Forest Department did not exist. In the
light of the existing relations, the creation of reserves and existence of the Forest
Department was a forgone conclusion. Officers in the field could still quarrel, but at the
level of the Presidencies and local governments, Forest Department had to be
accommodated. Even the recalcitrant Madras Presidency had to punctuate its outright
attack by pledging itself to the need for forest conservancy and a role for the Forest
Department. The other local governments were anyway directly under the Government
of India.
Within these limits, that is, as long as liquidation of the Forest Department and denying
state's interests in forests was not being proposed, opposition to the Forest Department
was tolerated and even respected. Through several revisions, Brandis and Baden-Powell
had restored the power of the civil officers which they had curtailed in the earlier
proposals. The local governments could not maintain a tone of outrage and outright
opposition. The thrust thus shifted to a constructive reading of the draft bill, in the
perspective of the local context and experience, to improve it. Another response was to
comment on the words, phrases and organisation of the text. We can thus make sense of
the early antagonism and subsequent shifting of position to refine the law. However, the
contestation did not end. It shifted its site to the micro provisions of law to wrest further
control and power from the Forest Department.
122 Proposed additions to draft Forest bill by Brandis, 6/11/1876, see in Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142,




7.3. The Bill and the Legislative Council
The draft bill was put before the Legislative Council. As was the practice, a select
committee was constituted to finalise the bill. The select committee further solicited the
comments from the local governments on successive drafts prepared by it. Hope, a
member of the Governor-General's Council, in moving the bill before the Council, had
anticipated opposition from other members in the Council. He attempted to pre-empt by
recognising local peculiarities in India. He maintained,
... these peculiarities in different parts of India were not so very
formidable in themselves as was supposed, and it would appear to be
very practicable to have a law embodying general principles applicable
to the whole of India, and to provide for local peculiarities by means of
rules to be framed by Government under it.124
Hope's suspicion was not unfounded. In the next round of proceedings of the Council,
before the bill could be referred to select committee, Dalyell, a member of the Council,
objected to the arrangement. Referring to the diversity of forest tenures, as in the land-
tenures, he was of the opinion that the Local governments should make Acts. He found
the bill before the Council very different from the Act of 1865. In the Act, the local
rights were explicitly protected through a proviso. But the present proposal was to
'define, to regulate, to commute and to extinguish all customary forest rights'.125
Dalyell's recommendation was to question the very authority of the Council. He ruled,
a bill of this nature 'was essentially a measure which should be framed, discussed and
passed by the local legislatures'. He wondered what made the Bombay government
drop its own legislation and be covered by the imperial legislation. He said he had 'no
knowledge of the circumstances which had led that Government to come to this
124 Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor General of India, 24/1/1877,




conclusion'. According to him, this was particularly surprising when Madras had stood
its ground.126 He objected,
Probably the most objectionable feature in the draft was... as regards all
forest-rights and privileges, and the determination of the manner in
which those privileges or rights were to be exercised in the future, were
left to an officer who was, presumably under the Bill, a Forest Officer,
and who, so far as the Bill was concerned, might be altogether wanting
in that judicial experience and training which were essential to the
proper appreciation or adjudication of such questions.127
This sounded very much as if it had come from the Madras Presidency. The comments
had not come from Madras but Mr. Dalyell had. Prior to his position in the Council, he
was a Madras officer, in the Madras Board of Revenue. For the present bill, he
reiterated and attributed the comments of his earlier colleagues in the Board which was
made for the Brandis' draft of 1869,
...altogether too arbitrary, setting the laws of property at defiance, and
leaving the determination of the forest-rights of the people to a
Department which, in that Presidency at all events, had always shown
itself eager to destroy all forest-rights except those of Government.128
No wonder, he was imputing motives to the Government of India in denying local
legislation by the Presidencies. He commented,
... if His Lordship's Government came to the decision that this was the
better plan [local legislation], the local councils of Bombay and Bengal








Hope, anticipating trouble, had already clarified during the proceedings that the use of
the word 'Forest Settlement Officers' in the bill was to distinguish the process from
other Settlement Officers engaged in the settlement of land-revenue. He noted,
It was not intended that the Forest Settlement Officers should be a
Forest Officer; perhaps quite the contrary. The Executive would
probably select for the duty a person not in the Forest Department who
had some particular qualifications.130
Despite this, Dalyell insisted the 'natural conclusion from the draft before them was
that he would be a Forest Officer'. And thus insisted that the point should be clarified
in the bill itself. Further, he objected to the definition of forests. He noted that under its
provisions, 'any waste-land in the country in which a few trees were growing', even if
the land belonged to individuals, could be brought under the control of the
Government.131
Dalyell made many more points. These points also came from the local governments.
The local governments described the bill as worthy of 'hearty approval'132 and
'sufficient to meet the requirements'133 Nevertheless, the local governments further
refined the provisions to fine tune the power relations. A significant concern was with
the procedure for settlement of the claims. Several Bombay Presidency Collectors made
the point that the demarcation procedure was too elaborate for 'use in wild forest-tracts
inhabited only by jungle-tribes'. The 'jungle tribes' in the opinion of the officers, were
hardly likely to answer to the proclamation and thus their rights would be extinguished.
The 'jungle tribes', in the opinion of the Collector of North Canara, were hardly likely
130 ibid.
131 ibid.
132 Central Provinces to GOI, 16/12/1876, see Appendix II in Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878,
LD, NAI.




to answer to the proclamation. He thus feared that their rights would be extinguished.134
The Collector of Nasik observed that the procedure was suitable for 'civilised' part of
India, not the forest tracts. Poor and illiterate forest dwellers could never give a written
notice of their claims. He emphasised the defect by asking, Could we then hold that all
his rights had lapsed?135
Bombay had an additional reason for the objection to the procedure in the bill. In the
Bombay Presidency, according to Horsley, an Assistant Collector entrusted with Forest
Demarcation, forest demarcation was already completed not under any law in force but
merely under government sanction. The new procedure would have bound them to
repeat the process.136 He was thus suggesting that for such jungle tracts, local
governments should be free to design their own procedures.137
Dalyell, also made this point on requiring people to prefer their claim in writing. His
objection was that the settlement officer could ignore a right which was actually not
exercised at the time of settlement. The settlement officer could also ignore a right, if in
the opinion of the officer, it was not essential for the beneficial use of the land or of the
person claiming the right. He described the provision as iniquitous.138 The Collector of
Kanara also objected to the clause of recording only the existing rights in use then. His
argument was that land holdings were small and changing and therefore, occupancy
kept changing. There was injustice in fixing the right to the land in use at the time of
settlement.139
134 Assistant Collector Canara to Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay, 30/11/1876, see in Appendix
RR Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
135 Collector of Nasik to Government of Bombay, 5/12/1876, see in Appendix RR Proceedings Nos,
'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
136 Assistant Collector Forest Demarcation, Khandesh to Government of Bombay, 6/11/1876,, see in
Appendix RR Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
137 ibid.
138 Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor General, 31/1/1877, see in
Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
139 Assistant Collector Canara to Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay, 30/11/1876, see in Appendix
RR Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
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The Conservator of Bengal, Schlich, was proposing fine tuning to protect the interest of
the Forest Department. The Bill had made provisions for settlement of forest rights.
This was by (a) setting aside some other forest-tract for the exercise of the rights or, (b)
by altering the limits of the proposed reserve, or (c) by allowing the right to be
exercised within the reserve. The settlement officer had the option to follow any course.
Schlich suggested that it should be compulsory for the Settlement Officer to try (a) and
(b) only them he could opt for (c), that is, permit the exercise of rights within
140
reserves.
Punjab checked the expansion of the powers of the forest officers. Baden-Powell's draft
had suggested deposition of records of forest settlement in the office of the
Conservator, and not in the Collectors office where all other records of right were
deposited. The Punjab government objected,
The safe custody of such records is a matter requiring much vigilance
and public confidence in them depends largely on the system adopted
for this purpose. It is moreover necessary that they should be easily
accessible both to the Courts of justice and to the public at large, which
would not be the case if they were deposited in the office of the
Conservator of Forests.141
Further, Brandis, following the suggestion of the local governments earlier, had
accepted compensation if passage through forest was closed. Punjab suggested that
villagers did not want money or other compensation, they wanted passage. Their
suggestion was that there was no need for compensation, just provision of appropriate
passage.142
140 From Conservator of Forests, Bengal, to Government of Bengal, 18/11/1876, see in Appendix HH in
Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
141
Report of the Committee constituted by the Punjab Government to consider the Memorandum by
Brandis on proposed forest legislation, the report forwarded to the GOI through letter dated




The provision on forest fire drew much support and appreciation from the local
governments. Section 23 empowered the government to close reserved forests against
rights and privileges if fire was caused wilfully. The Chief Commissioner of the Central
Provinces was of the opinion that the penalty should also be extended to gross
negligence and carelessness.143 Punjab went even further. It noted,
The only chance of extinguishing such conflagrations lies in the prompt
and hearty assistance of the residents of the vicinity in which they
144
occur
They thus considered it necessary to add a provision which would make non-assistance
an offence punishable under the Act including closure of forests against rights and other
users.145 The Collector of Kanara also suggested enlargement of penalty for setting
forests on fire. He recommended,
... like Bombay District Police Act, extra manpower could be deployed
at the expense of communities in the cases of flagrant cases of
mischief.146
In the same vein, the payment of reward to the informer was wholeheartedly
approved.147
Madras Presidency continued to push ahead with its own agenda of freedom from the
Government of India. It alleged that they had seen a similar draft earlier and
143 Central Provinces to GOI, 16/12/1876, see Appendix II in Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878,
LD, NAI.
144
see Appendix PP in Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
145 ibid.
146 Assistant Collector Canara to Chief Secretary, Government of Bombay, 30/11/1876, see in Appendix
RR Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
147 From Commissioner and Superintendent, Mooltan division, to Registrar, Chief Court Punjab,
29/5/1877 see in Appendix VV in Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
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commented on it. They, thus, did not even consider it important to engage with the
• • 148
provisions.
As the members of the Governor-General's Council were busy in other urgent work, an
informal committee consisting of Schlich, Baden-Powell and Hope, with others was
formed. The committee, according to Hope, a member of the select committee, revised
the bill thoroughly. Hope was satisfied that the comments from local government were
favourable and wherever there were objections, these were considered and
incorporated.
In the earlier occasions, the local governments had strongly condemned the draft
proposals on the same or similar provisions. The situation was different now. The
suggestions did not have a common thrust and strong opinion. Different officers had
highlighted different provisions. In such contexts, the opinion seeker acquires a degree
of freedom. He can retain what he likes and yet claim to be participatory and
accommodating. After all, a suggestion would come from just one person.
But the committee members had their constraints. Despite all attempts of the
Government of India to impress upon the Madras government to accept the imperial
law, Madras had continued to be recalcitrant. The Government of India, as I show in the
next chapter, was continuously trying to convince the Secretary of State, under one
pretext or the other, to bear down upon the Madras Presidency. The Secretary of State
had refused to be an ally of the Government of India in this war. At the same time, the
Secretary of State was impressing upon the Madras Presidency the need for forest
legislation and demarcation of forests. The Secretary of State had written to the
Government of India,




you will no doubt think it right, before the Bill is finally passed into law,
to consider and dispose of the objections of the Madras Government149
Thus, the Secretary of State had almost put the satisfaction of the Madras Presidency as
a condition to the ambitions of the Government of India. There were additional
concerns. Even if Madras were not to accept the imperial law, their comments had to be
accommodated and engaged with to the satisfaction of Madras. To introduce a law,
which in the very opinion of a part of the administration, was despotic and obnoxious,
would have been embarrassing for the Government of India. Madras loomed large in
the mind of the Committee. Hope was thus reported in the proceeding reports of the
Council,
The objections of Madras had not been forgotten. The Bill had been so
materially altered to meet them that he had now every hope that the
Madras Government... would find themselves able to accept it.150
In the opinion of Hope, the significant objection Madras and other local governments
on the question of local rights were taken care of. In effect, several of the suggestions of
the local governments and even of Madras Presidency were incorporated in the bill
finally prepared by the select committee. The select Committee furnished a long list of
micro changes it had made in the bill. The Committee stated that the changes included,
...the Forest Settlement Officer should not, except under very special
circumstances, be a Forest-officer.151 ... claims to be preferred orally to
the Forest Settlement Officer and made it obligatory on him to take such
statements down in writing.152 ... Forest Settlement officer to inquire
into the existence of rights, by searching the Government records and
taking evidence, even though the people themselves, through ignorance
or neglect, may not appear to claim them.153... the rejection of rights
149 For SS to the GOI, 5/7/1877 in Proceedings Nos., 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.
150
Hope reported and summarised in the Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the
Governor General of India, 17/10/1877, in Proceedings Nos, 'A'43-142, March, 1878, LD, NAI.





which were not habitually exercised by the claimants ... or which were
not required for the beneficial use of the land or premises or of the
person claiming the same, have been omitted.154 ... no land shall be
constituted as Protected Forest unless the nature and extent of the rights
of Government and other persons in it have been inquired into and
recorded at a survey or settlement or in some other sufficient manner.155
In addition to this several other modifications were made. This included, empowering
local governments to exempt particular classes of timber from transit restrictions. This
was in order not to interfere with the collection of drift wood for fuel for the poorer
classes. Power of compounding by forest officers was restricted.156 Evidently, Madras
had an overwhelming presence. The Select Committee report noted at the end that the
bill was 'now not unsuitable to the circumstances of the Madras Presidency'.157 The bill
was finally put to the motion and passed.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that the legal provisions of 1878 arose from social
practices. Further, that these were the strategies forged in the field to outflank the
opponent. For example, the provisions on the transit restrictions arose from the
practices of the Bombay government in preventing pilferage of forests. The categories
of reserved and unreserved forests came from the strategies of the Forest Department in
creating exclusive reserves. The provision of settlement of forest rights through
exchange was a strategy worked out by the Punjab forest officers.
These strategies were abstracted from the field. In their raw form, these were still
steeped in the peculiarity of the context. Also, these represented the power equation
prevalent in that particular context. In the earlier proposals, the forest officers were





forest officer was proposed. Finally, it was provided that the task of forest settlement
should ordinarily not be entrusted to a forest officer. It was proposed that the forest
settlement officer, having recorded and recognised rights on the forests, could
commute, translocate, buy the rights, or leave them alone. The proposal was refined by
taking away much discretion from the forest settlement officer. He was required by the
law to exhaust all means of settling the right. Only failing this, he could leave alone the
right to be exercised in the reserved forests.
These strategies were in opposition to other strategies. Each of the strategies was to
outflank the opposing ones. The forest officers were trying to marginalise the local
people and civil officers. The civil officers were conceding the creation of the new
Department but trying to retain key functions in their hands. The provisions that
emerged through this process of filtration were a register of the contending forces. It
was worked out to the last detail. The forest records were not to be kept in the
Conservator's office but the Collector's office. The forest dwellers were to assist in
extinguishing forest fires. Failing this, their forest rights could be suspended. The
provisions were crystallisation of the balance of the contending forces. The law that
emerged was already legitimate power. Having completed explorations on the Forest
Act of 1878, I am left with the question as to what happened to the claims of the




LAW, REPRESENTATION AND POWER: MAKING OF
MADRAS FOREST ACT, 1882
Introduction
In this chapter, I will show how law became the means for a struggle within the state,
by exploring the political game played by the Madras Presidency and its culmination in
the making of the Madras Forest Act of 1882. The Madras Presidency had all along
presented a different construction, from that of the Government of India, of the nature
of legal rights on forests. It had claimed that in the Madras Presidency, forests were
communal property and thus, the rights of the local people could not be regulated,
curtailed or extinguished. On these grounds, Madras stubbornly stood its ground and
refused to accept the Act made by the Government of India. Alongside this, the Madras
government provoked the Government of India by implementing its view that the state
had no rights on the forests in the Presidency. In 1874, it reversed the orders of the
Madras government taken in 1860 on the forests of Kanara. It restored the vargadars as
owners of forests and started ceding it to them. While the Government of India was
opposing this move, Madras went ahead and enacted a forest Act for the Madras
Presidency. The Act was no different from the one made by the Government of India!
For the Government of India, the issue no more was the law but the power to make law.
The issue was the affront it had suffered from a recalcitrant Presidency. The
Government of India continued a relentless pursuit till it won a symbolic victory over
Madras and subjugated it.
In this chapter, I examine the power relations through which the Government of India
achieved its ends. In part one, I explore the discourses on the reversal of the ownership
of forests in Kanara by the Madras government in 1874. In part two, I excavate the
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intrigues by the Forest Department and the Government of India to put Madras in its
place. In Part three, I explore the processes through which the Government of India
won a symbolic victory over Madras on the making of a forest Act for the Madras
Presidency.
8.1. Vargadars as Owners: Reversal of Law
In a lengthy minute recorded in 1871, Robinson, one of the members of the Board of
Revenue Madras, reviewed the history of land tenures in Kanara. He emphasised that
Munro had distinctly recognised the property of Vargadars on all lands, including
forests and wastes. According to Robinson, this was the recognised principle of
administration till Blane, in 1850s, misled the government. Robinson meted a harsh
treatment to Blane,
It is obvious to remark that Mr. Blane here invited the Government to
interfere with the established rights of property throughout the district in
direct opposition to the law as then administered, and in summary
supersession of the long fully-recognised usages and privileges of the
landowners of a proprietary district. He further advised, as it appears to
me, an illegal course. ... The course which the Collector recommended
is one which leads directly to wholesale confiscation.1
Robinson doubted Blane's knowledge and experience. Blane's opinion, which he
himself had conceded to be an 'impression', Robinson alleged, was derived from the
East Coast in 'the erroneous fancy of a stranger to these countries and their history'.2
Robinson noted,
1 Minute by W. Robinson, 3/12/1870, MBOR, 21/3/1871, No. 1222. Hereafter Robinson's Minute
(1870).
2 Robinson's Minute (1870).
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Mr. Blane, no doubt unwittingly, misled Government when he gave
these lawless things the dress of historic fact-
Robinson was dismayed that the Board of Revenue had followed Blane's 'unsound'
report. He commented on the relevant proceeding of the Board dated April 16, 1856,
...their object that of pressing the foregone conclusion that somehow or
other this species of agriculture must be repressed, and Mr. Blane's
erroneous "impression" of 1848 and 1849 are accepted and urged as
sound and authoritative.
Robinson restored the 'rule of law'. He argued,
The question here is not the good or evil of Coomery cultivation or the
desirableness of placing it under some regulation— if law for the
purpose of inhibiting private rights could be obtained— but it is the
abstract question of right or wrong in respect to the titles of an ancient
Proprietary. But this point has been lost sight of.4
Robinson, thus, argued that the 'Board's decision based on wrong premises was
untenable5 and concluded,
I am quite satisfied that the recent action of the Board and Government
is open to very serious doubt and question, both in law and in the minds
of those whose rights and usages are affected thereby.6
He was thus giving the rightful place to law and the Rule of Law. The other members of
the Board, however, were not in full concurrence with Robinson. The Madras
Government gave its order in October 1874, after keeping the Board of Revenue's
suggestions under consideration. By then, Robinson had become a member of the
Governor's Council. The Madras Government ordered,
3 Robinson's Minute (1870).
4 Robinson's Minute (1870).
5 Robinson's Minute (1870).
6 Robinson's Minute (1870).
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There seems to be no sufficient ground for declining to accept in its
literal sense the statement of Sir Thomas Munro that "the only land in
Kanara that can in any way come under the description of Sirkar land is
unclaimed waste.7
Following the order of 1860, the government had asked the Collector of Kanara to
scrutinise all title to delineate rights of vargadars and the government. The
Government now considered that the proposal to call and register all titles to land
would be wrong in principle and hard on the people. Also, the insistence on written
documents of title to maintain property of vargadars appeared to them defective.8
Following the orders of the Madras Government, Webster, the Collector of Kanara,
invited claims and conceded forests to the estate-holders. Webster had based his
memorandum for the demarcation of state and private forests on the government's
order of 1874. It read,
... this memorandum is to re-affirm the old principle that prima facie all
land is private property, and that only unclaimed waste, or land the
claims to which were absolutely without foundation, could be declared
the property of Government.9
The Board of Revenue commended Webster.10 But the Madras government went even
further. Government had leased estates to tenants called sirkar gueny. The government
described its rights over the forests in these estates as 'long disused rights'. The
7 Order by the GOM, No. 1361, 23/10/1874. See in Brandis, D, 'Demarcation of the Public Forests in the
Madras Presidency', in Proceedings 'A' 32-52, RAC(F), 1879, NAI. Hereafter Brandis (1879) and
Madras Government Order (1874).
8 Madras Government Order (1874).
9 A. Webster, Collector of Kanara to the Board of Revenue, 21/9/1875 in Brandis (1879). Hereafter
Webster's Letter (1875).
10 MBOR, 11/2/1876, No. 413.
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government ordered to treat them 'precisely as mul Wargadars in the matter of the
forests belonging to their wargs'.11
In 1860, the Board had taken a harsh view of shifting cultivation. Cleghom had
described it as a 'barbarous' system and Government had endorsed the view by
imposing restrictions on shifting cultivation. By 1875, the government had reversed the
rights. Vargadars, as owners of forests, were free to do shifting cultivation. This was a
matter for 'regret' for the Board.12 The Board, however, could only hope that the
vargadars in their own interest would put some check on the practice.13
One can at last solace that Robinson restored the legitimate place of the law. We can
celebrate, that there may be mishaps, but eventually, law's inherent logic and power
comes to play. Finally, law, triumphs. Historically, things keep improving. Robinson
was restoring what the law was by the very dictates of law. But we have seen enough of
law by now to accept this suggestion on its face value. Law has no domain of its own. It
is always trapped in its others.
What was the political economy of this reversal? A pervasive cause for the colonial rule
used to be the 'disaffection' of the local population. In this case, it was not this. In
North Kanara, proprietors had moved the local court and gone in appeal to the High
Court asserting their rights over forests. In South Kanara, proprietors were petitioning
but there was no impending crisis, perhaps not even a serious friction. Webster, the
Collector in 1876 noted that people while 'claiming jungles only ask for permission to
use the jungle as hitherto, i.e. for leaves, trees, firewood, &c., for themselves'. 14
Webster further noted, 'The very moderation in the wording of their petitions shows
11 Order by the GOM, No. 479, 5/4/1876, in Brandis (1879).
12MBOR, 11/2/1876, No. 413.
13 ibid.
14 Webster's Letter (1875).
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that they are claiming no new rights'.15 Instead, it was the Board and the Government,
far away from Kanara, on their own initiative who were inventing a crisis. Robinson
pointed out that the present policy would lead to 'serious complication with a large
body of influential Proprietors'16 The Government of Madras was insisting that
conflicts with the local people were 'certain to occur more frequently, and the danger
must be put to an end'.17
The motive for the changes was elsewhere. It was resentment for the combination of the
Government of India and the Forest Department. The two had come to represent each
other, threatening to undermine the authority of Madras. Madras was defying the
Government of India. It was provoking the Government of India by demolishing what it
stood for— state's right on forests. It was attempting its right to control and confine the
domain of the Forest Department which appeared to be a nuisance to the Madras
government.
Robinson was extremely resentful of the Forest Department. In his minute of 1871, he
accused the Forest Department of 'unauthorized reservations and encroachments on
immemorial private rights'18 Cleghom was described as entirely ignorant of the issues
involved in land tenures and property on forests.19 It was the antagonism towards the
Forest Department and the domination of the Government of India which united the
Board, Government and other officers.
15 Webster's Letter (1875).
16 Robinson's Minute (1870).
17 Madras Government Order (1874).
18 Robinson's Minutes (1870).
19 Robinson's Minutes (1870).
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8.2. Counter-Strategies of the Government of India
Not surprisingly, the Conservator of Forests of Madras complained that government
forests were being given up in Kanara. 20 At this rate, the government will be 'without
an acre of forest in South Kanara, either in the plains or line of Ghats'.21 Following the
Conservator's report, The Forest Department with the Government of India took
prompt note of the developments. Brandis, the Inspector General, created a depressing
scenario before the civil officers in the Government of India, that if the Madras
Presidency did not reverse its decision in relation to forests of South Kanara, the
Government could lose the case from North Kanara pending before the Bombay High
Court. He estimated the extent of damage in the two districts put together at 2,000 to
3,000 square miles of forests. Brandis provoked the officials of the Government of
India, 'Apart from all other disadvantages, loss of prestige will be considerable'.22
Brandis' scheme was to send a commission to Madras Presidency to investigate and
judge the tenure of forests in Kanara. However, since Madras was independent, the
ambition of interfering through a Commission could not be secured without the consent
and support of the Secretary of State. The Government of India complained persistently
to the Secretary of State about the mismanagement of forests in the Madras Presidency.
But it could not find an endorsement from him for a Commission. The Secretary of
State agreed with the Government of India. But a Commission would have created a
crisis of administrative relations.
If Madras was determined in following the ideology and strategy it had worked out, the
Government of India was full of zeal and ambition to vanquish Madras. The officers
were scheming to put Madras government in place. Brandis, every now and then,
20 GOI to GOM, 31/7/1876, in Brandis (1879).
21 ibid.
22 Office note by Brandis, 29/9/1876, in Proceedings 'A', 32-52, RA(F), May 1879, NAI.
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reiterated the urgency for the proposed Commission.23 Brandis insisted on 'impartial'
officers for the Commission, and predicting the outcome he stated,
Much would depend on the selection of the officer, and this selection
Government of India must keep in its own hands.24
Hume, the Secretary in the Revenue and Agriculture department, was building the
mood for a direct intervention in the affairs of Madras to a crescendo. He described the
views of Robinson on the subject of forest rights as 'violent and extreme'.25 Hume
lamented,
His sole idea in regard to Malabar forests seemed to be to yield them up
to the tender mercies of petty hordes of semi-savages.26
To Hume's dismay, Robinson condemned the actions of the Government of India,
which were for proper conservation, as 'roguery and robbery'.27 Hume was describing
the situation to be a hopeless one. He referred to Robinson,
So long as he remains in the Government of Madras, I have no hopes of
any peaceful solution of the question.28
Madras Presidency had followed the strategy of not replying to letters. Hume found it
exasperating,
...even if we write, Madras will not answer, unless it pleases her; and
we may go on sending reminders for two years, or in fact till we are
tired, without eliciting a reply.29
23 Office note by Brandis, 6/7/1877, in Proceedings 'A' 32-52, RA(F), May 1879.
24 ibid.




Arbuthnot, another member of the Governor-General's Council, joined the campaign
against Madras. But it was too late. Arbuthnot was suspect. He had earlier discouraged
the proposal for the Commission on some pretext or the other. His judgement, as the
member in-charge of the forest portfolio, mattered. He was an old hand from Madras.
He had spent all his years in Madras, including as a member of the Madras Council.
Arbuthnot was writing the note marking his removal from the charge of the forest
portfolio! The charge had been passed to another member. Arbuthnot considered it
necessary to justify,
I had no doubt that some such commission would be necessary, from
which, however, it would not do entirely to exclude the Madras revenue
element; but the time was (and I fear still is) very inopportune for
proposing such a commission to the Government of Madras...30
Even if Arbuthnot considered a Commission, unlike Brandis' 'impartial officers', it had
to have representation of the Madras Presidency. Arbuthnot then made excuses,
including lack of details and a tour to Madras Presidency, and concluded,
I therefore abstained from recording any opinion as to the course which
should be taken, and detained the papers with the intention of eventually
recommending that a Commission somewhat of the character that
suggested by Mr. Brandis should be appointed.31
Arbuthnot found it necessary to demonstrate his loyalty by talking against Madras
Presidency. He described Madras' views on the forests of Kanara 'erroneous' and
recommended,
... thorough investigation into the subject by a Commission, mainly
composed of officers independent of the Local Government, has been
held.32
29 ibid.




Perhaps, it was from the same guilt and desire to be a normal member as opposed to
being marked, 'the one from Madras' that he raised the issue of Madras opposing the
India forest bill. In the debates in the Council he noted that the Madras Presidency had
a tradition of respecting 'privileges or prejudices of the people'. Self consciously he
justified,
... he had been bred, he might say, in the same school as that to which he
had been referring- that very great attention and very great respect
should be paid to sentiments and feelings of that description.33
With Thompson taking charge of the forest portfolio, the door was opened for a more
aggressive treatment of Madras. Thompson first created a scenario that things were
beyond redemption. He convinced others,
Things have come to that pass that it seems hopeless by any form of
letter or correspondence to bring Madras Government to realise the
immense injury that is being done to the country under their sanction:
for letters remain systematically unanswered; and in the meantime a
policy is being pursued which gives up proprietary rights in forests
where no such rights had been even claimed...34
Thompson was of the opinion that time had come to follow a course, which Hume had
described as 'a downright rupture with the Government of Madras if we are to do
anything substantial for the forests'.35 If Brandis was struggling for the gains of the
interests and power of the Forest Department, for others, forest was only a weapon to
wage another war. For the Government of India, it was the powers of the Government
vis-a-vis Madras Presidency. Arbuthnot, perhaps, to rehabilitate himself and shrug off
the stigma of being an old Madras hand, noted,
33 Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor General of India, 6/3/1878 in
'A' 42-143, LD, March 1878.




There is one question connected with this matter, and with other
matters, bearing upon the relations of the Government of India, and the
Government of Madras, which appears to me of very great importance. I
refer to the question of the appointment of a successor to Sir W.
Robinson in the Madras Council. The Duke of Buckingham has recently
called into the Council, as a temporary Member, Mr. Carmichael, the
permanent Chief Secretary,- an able man, but I fear very much imbued
with the spirit of antagonism to the Government of India, which for the
last four or five years has practically animated the Madras
Government.
Arbuthnot went further. He desired the appointment of Mr. Puckle as successor to
Robinson,
I don't know whether this is a matter in which the Viceroy could
intervene [if he could] I feel sure that it would strengthen the Madras
Administration, and would render the relations of that Government with
the Government of India more harmonious than they have been for some
time past.37 (Additions in bracket mine)
Hume again revealed the struggle to be one for power between the two governments,
... but we are helpless and hopeless; and the only apparent remedy is a
heroic one, neither more nor less than to take advantage of the existing
great financial difficulties to abolish the Governorship of Madras and
Bombay and subordinate those provinces to the Government of India in
the same way that Bengal is subordinated. Give us the right to interfere
and issue orders, and in three years we can engage to alter altogether the
prospect for forest revenue in Madras.38
The Government of India was all along complaining to the Secretary of State about the
forest administration in Madras. The Secretary of State was not in disagreement with
36 Office note by Arbuthnot, 8/10/1878, in Proceedings 'A' 32-52, RA(F), May 1879.
37 ibid.
38 Office note by Hume, 2/5/1879, in Proceedings Nos. 3-23, HRA(F), October 1879.
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the Government of India. Even without an investigation, which the Government of
India was insisting on, he ordered Madras on Kanara forests,
... deal with all forest questions in accordance with the practice which
was in force in the district up to 1874, and to take care that no further
privileges are allowed the ryots, either in regard to "kumaki" lands or
"kumri" cultivation, than were accorded to them at that date.39
Madras attempted to clarify that it was only redressing wrong committed by the
government earlier.40 Madras argued that it had only reiterated the position taken by the
Madras Government since the early period.41 But the Secretary of State was not
impressed. He noted,
... I continue to regard the orders of your Government in 1874, as quoted
by you, open to the construction of unduly relaxing the just claims of
Government to forest waste 42
8.3. Making of the Madras Forest Act
On a parallel track, Madras and the Government of India were wrestling over the forest
legislation. Having won the first round by stubbornly refusing to follow the Indian
Forest Act, 1878, Madras had created the space to make its own law. Madras drafted a
bill and forwarded it to the Government of India for comments. The gesture was not
voluntary. The draft bill had penal provisions. Within the administrative arrangement,
introduction of penal provisions needed the sanction of the Governor-General's
Council.
39 SS to GOI, 20/2/1879 , in Proceedings 'A' 32-52 RA(F), May 1879, NAI.
40 GOM to SS, 16/5/1879, in Proceedings Nos. 8-23, HRA(F), October 1879.
41 ibid.
42 SS to GinC, Madras, 28/8/1879, in Proceedings Nos. 8-23, HRA(F), October 1879, NAI.
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As the Secretary of State noted, the draft bill was no different from the one made by the
Government of India. Madras had waged war on the Government of India by raising
questions over the ownership of the local people over forests. However, to have
actually made a law to this effect, would have negated the very foundation of law and
rule. For the Government to be a ruler, a necessary condition was to appropriate,
control and supervise. A law which did not do this, would not be law at all. Law is
power, power of the ruler to deploy its strategies on the ruled. It was for this that the
Government of India and the Secretary of State were continually pressing the urgent
necessity of a law. If the ruler gave away significantly to the ruled, there would have
been no state and empire.
Madras pressed the Government of India for an immediate reply towards expediting a
legislation.43 But the Government of India was in no hurry. It was its turn now to defer,
delay and create impediments. On receiving the bill, the Governor-General ordered a
copy to be sent to Baden-Powell for comments. He directed the Secretary,
Send one copy demi-officially to Baden-Powell, and say I shall be
'much' obliged if he will carefully criticise it for me say it appears to me
to be very confused, imperfect and inadequate measure.44
Baden-Powell gladly obliged the Governor-General. Baden-Powell 'carefully
criticise(d)' any and every provision and concluded,
The whole Bill is so confused and contradictory, that it is with great
difficulty I have been able to make anything out of it at all.45
43 Governor ofMadras to Viceroy, telegraph on 6/4/1879 and May 26/5/1879, in Proceedings 8-23,
HRA(F), October 1879, NAI.
44 Order communicated by Hume, 24/4/1879, in Proceedings Nos. 8-23, HRA(F), October 1879, NAI.




The only portion which Baden-Powell approved was the penal part. And this was
because it was significantly drawn from the Indian Forest Act.46
But most significantly, the Government of India pointed out that Madras had
aggressively asserted that all forests in its domain were the property of village
communities.47 It then ridiculed,
It seems strange to the Governor General in Council that on preparing a
Forest Act for the Madras Presidency, where the rights of the rural
community in forest lands have been so long advocated, the position of
the Communal Forests should be almost entirely ignored.. 48
With this draft bill from Madras, the contention over forest tenure in Kanara got
merged with the forest bill. The Government of India, instead of sending a Commission
for investigating the Kanara issue, was now proposing to send Baden-Powell to dictate
a forest law to Madras 49 It was a pragmatic move. Compared to a Commission, this
would have cost a lot less and had greater chances of approval by the Secretary of
State.50
The Government of India pressed again with the Secretary of State by describing the
bill as 'utterly impracticable', 'confused', and 'impracticable'51 The Government of
India regretted,
We cannot believe that such a measure can have been made under the
consideration of the Board of Revenue; and it seems to us that those
who drafted it were ignorant of the practical working of the revenue and
forest administration in the Madras Presidency.52
46 ibid.
47 GOI to GOM, 29/9/1879, 1879 in Proceedings Nos. 8-23, HRA(F), October 1879, NAI.
48 ibid.
49 ibid.
5° Qffjce note by Brandis, 9/6/1879, in Proceedings Nos. 8-23, HRA(F), October 1879, NAI.




There was a new Secretary of State. He concurred with his predecessor in deputing
Baden-Powell but noted,
... I understand that a Bill, which is considered by Forest Officers in
Madras as suitable, has already been sent up to your Government, and
may be shortly expected to become law.53
Madras in this while had revised the draft bill. The Secretary of State was alluding to
the revised draft. Madras Government did not even share the revised draft with the
Government of India. It enacted it and sent it to the Governor-General for his assent.
Baden-Powell got into the Act the second time to nit-pick on every provision and
criticise it. All the Madras Collectors and other revenue and forest officers had made
sense out of the provision while the Select Committee sent the draft to them for
comments. But Baden-Powell opted to be confused. He alleged that the meaning of the
provisions could be guessed by 'straining' oneself or else one was 'left in doubt as to
what is meant'.54 All this would have, according to Baden-Powell, created confusion
for the Madras officials in its implementation.
While the Government of India was exasperating Madras by playing the game of
silence, Madras sent a minute recorded by the Governor responding to the comments of
the Government of India on the earlier draft. On the accusation of absence of provisions
on communal forests in the draft bill, the minute noted,
In reply to this it will suffice to state that this Government are satisfied
that there is no communal proprietorship in forests in this Presidency.55
53 SS to GGinC, 16/12/1880, in Proceedings Nos. 1-37, HRA(F), October 1881, NAI.
54 Memorandum by Baden-powell, 28/4/1881, in Proceedings Nos. 1-37, HRA(F), October 1881, NAI.




Thus, the notion of communal property of the villagers, argued for, defended and
sustained over a decade vanished into thin air without any explanation. The Madras
officials had overlooked to send the minute along with a copy of the Act! The minute
was sent eight months later, after the Governor has ceased to be in office. But the
Government of India was not going to let it go easily. It brought back the issue,
No reply has been given... (only)... a brief allusion... that the
Government of Madras are now satisfied that there is no communal
proprietorship in forests in that Presidency... no reasons in support of
this view are advanced, nor is any attempt made to reconcile it with the
previous statements of the Madras Government on the
subject.56(addition in bracket mine)
Government of India further took Madras to task,
The Government of India has not the means of determining whether the
new position taken up by the Government of Madras in the Forest Act is
in accordance with the facts of the case or not; but such a complete
change of policy on so fundamental a principal clearly indicates that the
whole subject of the rights of the village landholders demands full
investigation, before the proposed classification of forests in the Act can
be accepted by the Government of India as a sound basis for Forest
legislation in the Madras Presidency.57
The legislation by Madras, in the opinion of the Government of India, had made several
legal and technical transgressions. Within the law, a local government could not modify
an enactment of the Government of India. The bill passed by the Madras legislature had
several such violations, including the Indian Evidence Act and Land Acquisition Act.
Further, the Act contained penal provisions. Thus, technically, the local legislature
should have submitted it to the Government of India for sanction before passing it in
the local council.58





It was the turn of the Government of India to do what Madras had done to the India
Forest Act. The Government of India alleged that the Act was the same as the earlier
draft 'in all essential points' and thus 'open generally to the same objections'.59 The
Government of India dismissed the Act,
As a mere piece of legislative workmanship, the Governor General is
advised that the Act is ultra vires of the Madras legislature, faulty in
drafting, badly arranged as regards matter, full of real or apparent
contradictions, and upon the whole calculated rather to raise doubts in
the minds of the officers called upon to administer it than to furnish
them with a clear code of instructions for their guidance.60
The Government of India insisted on sending its representative to Madras to assist and
educate them in making a forest Act. Baden-Powell, after waiting for years to head the
Commission to Madras, had moved to another assignment. Instead, Brandis, the
Inspector General of Forests to the Government of India was to be deputed to 'confer
with the Madras Government on the whole subject of Forest conservancy in that
Presidency'.61
Forest was not the only contested subject between the Madras Presidency and the
Government of India. The two governments clashed over other administrative
questions. The Madras government defied all directives of the Government of India on
the measures for famine relief. In 1874, it bought huge amount of grain to meet the
shortages. In the opinion of the Government of India, this was undesirable. It lowered
the food grain prices. The Government of India was firm that 'the high prices, by






Viceroy Lytton, see Balfour (1899).
318
Chapter 8
The Viceroy Lytton noted,
We were unanimous that this must be stopped at once, and we have
come to the conclusion that our best course is to send Sir Richard
Temple in the character of our Commissioner, and with adequate power,
to Madras.63
In this while a new Governor had taken charge of the Presidency. The Madras
Government appointed a Committee, headed by Brandis, to draft a forest bill. The
Committee took the same position that Brandis had written down in a memorandum on
forest law for Madras. In fact, it significantly copied from there.
The Committee completely aligned itself with the position of the Government of India
on the question of rights of people, 'long agitate in this Presidency'.64 Recognising that
people had used forests for many years, the Committee reproduced the familiar view of
the Government of India that 'the adjoining villages can exercise rights of user only so
long as these lands are not allotted by the Government for cultivation, or required for
other purposes.65 The Committee declared,
... there are no communal forests in this Presidency. The villagers are in
the habit of collecting firewood, thorns for fences, and of pasturing their
cattle on... Such rights of user, however, are vastly different from
proprietary rights, and their existence does not constitute the forests in
which they are exercised communal forests.66
On the design and arrangement of the bill, Brandis was proud,
63 Balfour (1899).
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Wherever possible the wording of the "Indian Forest Act," 1878, or that
of the "Burma Forest Act," 1881, has been adopted.67
The earlier draft by Madras had a chapter on village forests. The Committee deleted the
entire chapter. Brandis gave the rationale for the provision in the Indian Forest Act and
Burma Forest Act,
The chapters in these two Acts are of a prospective character. They have
been framed in order to enable Government eventually to arrange for
protection and management of forest and waste lands, which shall yield
a permanent supply of wood and fodder to villages, without any expense
to the State.68
Brandis found Madras deficient in doing even the main task of creating state forests. A
provision on village forests, even a prospective one, as in the Indian Forest Act, would
have been a distraction. Brandis ruled,
Not only will it be necessary to indicate the correct policy which should
be followed, but this policy must have been successfully followed for a
considerable number of years, before a task so difficult and delicate as
that of forming and managing village-forests can be undertaken.69
Brandis must have feared the 'misuse' of the provision. Madras could have reverted to
its earlier position by assigning state forests to villages. Further, it was symbolic.
Madras all along had clamoured for village and communal forests. Annihilating the
category was symbolic of the complete domination of the government of India.
Madras Government was entirely subjugated. Even the members of the Council were
eager to satisfy Brandis. It was stated during discussions in the Council,





... since the select committee had issued their report, the Members, in
their anxiety to meet the wishes, so far as might be, of the Forest
authorities, had informally met Mr. Brandis, the Inspector General of
Forests with the Government of India, and discussed with him the main
alterations in the Bill as settled by the Committee.70
The Government of India now readily endorsed the draft bill, and expressed satisfaction
on it being based on the Acts of the Government of India. It commented,
It is certainly desirable that the Madras Forest Act should be framed on
the general lines of the Indian Forest Act, 1878, and of the Burma Forest
Act, 1881...71
There were several technical problems. Madras could not pass a bill whose provisions
violated any law made by the Government of India. The Government of India was
patronising. It told Madras to enact the law. And the Government of India would
sanction it through a special Act. Thus, the Madras Forest Act was passed by the
Madras Government and sanction by the Governor-General's Council through the
Validation Act.72
Conclusion
The Madras Presidency, since 1860, had opposed all initiatives of the Government of
India towards forest conservation. It asserted that all forests in the Madras Presidency
were in the ownership of village communities. Thus, according to the Madras
Presidency, the law proposed by the Government of India, which was based on
regulating, curtailing and extinguishing local rights, was entirely opposed to the
existing arrangement. Despite the pressure brought to bear on it, the Madras Presidency
did not accept the Forest Act of 1878. Instead, it implemented its version of forest law
70 Abstract of the Proceddings of the Council of Governor, Madras, 26/8/1882, in Proceedings Nos. 9-31,
HRA(F), NAI.




and gave away the forests in Kanara, which the state had carved for itself, to the
vargadars. Madras Presidency had taken a recalcitrant position to assert its autonomy.
The law making itself was a site for struggle affecting the law that was made. The
Madras Presidency maintained its theory for twenty years without any factual support.
This is another support for the argument that official discourses could be autonomous. I
have also shown that if law has to do with grand ideas, it is as well enmeshed in petty
and mundane interests. We have support for this in that the officials of the Government
of India were conniving backstage to dominate the Madras Presidency.
Legal discourses do not act in isolation. Discourses have to share the terrain with
counter discourses to come to a conclusion. The Government of India and Madras
Presidency had ultimately to resolve their contrary construction of the nature of rights
in Madras. This was done by going beyond what they were saying. The reliance was
again on official discourses; for example documents produced by the forest officers or
by the Madras Presidency itself. A survey was proposed which was by its constitution
going to support the view of the Government of India. Thus, there was nothing that was
not already a part of a discourse. But the two discourses had to keep expanding their
boundaries, sharing the material and information to settle the question. In this sense,





This dissertation was a study on the making of law, legal ideas and provisions on forests
in colonial India during the period 1792 and 1882. I hoped to draw insights from the
study in three concurrent fields, forest law in colonial India, law and the colonial state,
and modern law in general. Most accounts of law in India have tended to treat law
merely as an instrument of state power or ruling classes. In reviewing the literature on
law in India, social theory, post-colonial theory, and environmental history, I developed
ideas, arguments, suggestions and a hypothesis for the study. The aim of the study was to
refine the ideas, strengthen and substantiate the arguments, modify the suggestions and
check the hypothesis. In this concluding chapter, I discuss the key ideas from the
introductory chapter again in the light ofmy findings.
In section one, I confirm that the official discourses had a degree of autonomy in
producing legal knowledge but I re-emphasise that official discourses should be located
in their social and material context. In section two, I conclude that the pronouncements
from official discourses could not be imposed on social practices. Thus, there was
always a gap, ambiguity and co-existence of contrary ideas. I find these productive of
law. In section three, I discuss how legal provisions and ideas are generated in the
dispersed sites, and from there, abstracted, refined and assimilated in the existing body
of law. Section four asserts that the duality of traditional and modern law is misleading
and untenable. Section five is less of a summary than a speculation. I take up the theme




1. Legal Knowledge and Official Discourse
Knowledge is produced in discourses, and I suggested that the colonial state had a
monopoly on the production of legal ideas. It pronounced ideas which suited it the best,
even if there was no clear support for them. The study confirms this. In 1800-1, the
Court of Directors set aside the elaborate findings of Walker on the question of
ownership rights over Malabar forests. It instead pronounced the theory that Tipu Sultan
had a royalty right over forests. Further, the Court of Directors argued that by virtue of
being the new ruler, the Company had acquired the 'sovereign' right over public forests.
In Kanara, in the 1840s Blane dismissed Munro's theory of ownership which had been in
use for the previous 40 years. It was declared to be a 'mistake' and a new construction of
property right over forests and wastes was presented. The Madras government adopted
this view in 1860. Just a decade later, the same government declared Blane's view
erroneous, and restored the earlier arrangement. It also successfully maintained for
twenty years, that the forests in the Madras Presidency were the communal property of
the villagers. When called upon to substantiate its claims, it withdrew them. Similarly, in
1873 Baden-Powell was emphatic that there never was any prescriptive or customary
right in India. Yet just a few years later, he was upholding that the local people have
always had customary and prescriptive rights in India.
The official discourses were not only independent of what they represented, they were
also arbitrary, but not the entire story of the social. They are only a part in constituting
the social. Reviewing the literature from social theory, I had objected to the privileging
of textual production. Privileging the textual or the official discourses gives us erroneous
impressions. We could infer that the Court of Directors established sovereign rights over
Malabar forest. As Guha falls in the trap and argues, relying only on a section of the text,
that Baden-Powell imposed his theory that the local people had no rights but only
privileges on forests. Or, we would conclude that in the Madras Presidency, local people
were actually co-owners of forests.We know that none of this happened.
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The official discourses should be located in their historical, social and material contexts.
We should explore the conditions in which certain ideas were produced. Further, we
should examine how these ideas were received, disseminated and taken to practices.
2. Official Discourse to Social Practice
The colonial state maintained a monopoly on the production of legal knowledge. It
forged theories and ideas most suited to its needs. But the theories could not be imposed
to significantly alter the practices. Thus, the social practices, irrespective of their
representation, could continue without major restructuring. What then was the use of
developing a theory if it could not change practices? Development of a theory was no
guarantee of its success in practice. But it created the potential for circulation of the
theory and the subsequent transformation of the social practices. I have suggested that
these gaps are productive of law.
I illustrated this in chapter two. The pronouncements of the Company's 'sovereign'
rights over public forests made in the official discourses were taken to the Malabar
forests. A bridge was made between the discourses and practices through the provision
of a pension for the 'alleged' proprietors. The local people constructed the pension as a
continuation of their kutty kanam rights, while the Bombay government and the Court of
Directors claimed that the Conservatorship had established the 'sovereign' right over
'public' forests. The conflicting interpretations tended to extend their domains. Through
these processes, social practices subverted the extension of official discourses. The
Company could not establish its rights over forests. At the same time, official discourses
extended over practices to establish the categories of public and private for
understanding the property rights.
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I feel inclined to speculate from this about the nature of law in general. In this study, I
have covered a very specific time, place and subject. With caution and qualification, I
could ask if the monopoly of the state over production of legal knowledge and its
relationship to social practice is a general condition of law.
Several sites for production of legal knowledge are situated within the state. In fact, the
entirety of the state is synonymous with the production of law and legal knowledge. In
other instances, an opinion can acquire the status of knowledge or truth only by passing
the 'examination' and the endorsement of the state, most notably through the Courts.
The procedures for who can scrutinise and 'authorise' legal knowledge have been laid
out. Transgressions, for example, appropriating the role of examiner, by giving an
opinion on a matter pending before a court; or examining the examiner by commenting
on a judgement can attract 'contempt of the court' and other punitive clauses. Similarly,
disagreement with the authorised legal knowledge as 'truth', manifested through
defiance, is liable for punishment. I am not interested here in asking why the state must
have this monopoly over law. In contemporary societies, state and law are synonymous.
The very fact that the state rules, gives it control on the production of this truth. To
problematise law at this level is to ask as to why should the state exist.
What does the state do with this monopoly? Law has a fascination for principles and
theories. Specific cases and problems are brought by litigants or complainants before
courts and governments. For these persons, the outcome of the case is important. After
all, that is what they had come for. For the institutions of law, not the outcome in
specific cases, but the principle and theory of law is important. These institutions are
supposed to be disinterested in specific results. Their proclaimed concern is upholding
the legal principles and precepts. For a court, it is the 'ratio' of a case that is important.
But the monopoly over production of legal knowledge is no guarantee of its success. The
state can fabricate ingenious legal ideas but it cannot put them into immediate use. Thus,
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a perennial gap between the official discourses producing legal ideas, and social
practices is created. The official discourses attempt to bridge the gap. I think, in general,
these contradictions, ambiguities and co-existent of different ideas are productive and
generative of law.
3. Law, Strategy and Ideology
The legal provisions are enacted by the state and legal ideas circulate on the initiative of
an apex site within the state. These facts in themselves are important. But it would be
inadequate if we were from this to say that the state was the author of provisions and
ideas. I advanced the argument that both, the legal provisions and ideas, emerged from
practices. These are abstracted from these sites, refined, assimilated and re-circulated. I
will re-establish the different connections that work here.
3.1 Strategy and Ideology
Strategies are formed in certain context of ideas, belief and ideologies, including legal
ideas. I have shown in the preceding chapters how legal ideas conditioned and shaped
the strategies. The administration in Kanara had no means of realising revenue within the
ideas on property set by Munro. The Forest Departments could not create exclusive
reserves during the 1860s within the legal ideas which respected the prescriptive rights
of the local people. Within the prevalent ideologies, forest officials could not be given
powers of a Magistrate. Thus, ideologies constrained and facilitated the creation of
strategies.
In this process, ideologies were also revised to facilitate accommodation of strategic
devices. My suggestion is that the changes in ideologies are produced in the dispersed
locations. For example, in Kanara, the Board of Revenue and Company officials,
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constrained by Munro's legal ideas, described the vargadars as fraudulent. They asserted
that the records were produced by colluding with the local accountants and thus,
unworthy. The forest officers were inhibited by the legal ideology of prescription. They
were jostling with it. Brandis described local rights as 'vague' and 'undefined'. Amery
argued that there could be no right of prescription on public property. Similarly, he was
trying to create a new basis for understanding property. Thus, strategy and ideology are
related to one another.
3.2 Abstraction of Ideologies
How do official discourses assimilate ideas? My general argument is that the top layer of
the administration does not invent ideas. I will state different concepts related to the
working of official discourses.
I argued in the introduction that the production of ideas is not idle and speculative.
People in specific context engage with concrete situations to produce certain results. In
this sense, knowledge is always interested. Macknochie insisted on 'royalty' and
sovereign rights of the company on public forests to draw benefits from the Company.
Walker privileged and advanced the theory of jenmkar's birthright in the soil. This was a
means to favour the jenmkars to mobilise their support to neutralise the influence of the
rajas in Malabar.
Baden-Powell advocated the use of the local theory from India. He argued that in India,
local rulers were the exclusive owners of forests. Through deployment of this idea, he
could claim that the use of forests by the local people was only a 'privilege' and not a
right. Thus, the state was free to extinguish this use. This was to serve in the interest of
the Forest Departments in creating exclusive reserves. It was for the same interest that he
entirely abandoned this theory and embraced the idea that the use of forests in India by
the local people was always based on prescriptive rights. Similarly, the Madras
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Presidency was holding on to the idea of the forests being communal property to wrest
legislative powers from the Government of India.
So far, I have established two concepts. One, that ideas are generated to derive certain
desired results, and two, that ideas are produced in dispersed sites. I will elaborate the
working of these processes further. Ideas are not displaced entirely and at once by
another well developed, pre-fabricated idea. Over time, several small things contribute to
it. It is commonplace that the law changes with changing social and material conditions.
The question, however, is the relationship between the two. We should not see the
changes in social and material conditions from a distant 'objective' perspective, and
from this, try to see the changes which constituted the law. Instead, we should explore
how changes are registered in discourses. Law does not have logic of its own. Rather, the
discourses invest it with logic. With the incongruity between the social and material
condition and law, the settled law is made to seem incoherent, incongruent and illogical.
The gaps and ruptures within the law are pointed out, discussed and analysed. The stage
is then set for a systematic attempt to re-organise it to make it 'logical', 'consistent' and
desirable'. The actors in the preceding chapters, particularly, Walker, Blane, Baden-
Powell and Brandis were mastering these techniques.
One modality of bringing this about is to deny outright and disclaim the existing law.
This can include a demonstration that the law was based on wrong facts, it was wrongly
derived or the issues were not adequately understood. Another modality is to search
deeper into the 'foundations' and 'origin' to find a basis to demolish the existing law.
The questioning of the existing law creates the space for accommodation of alternatives
to the legal ideas.
Alongside the demolition of the existing legal idea, an alternate idea is forged. Blane did
not replace an entire theory in one block by a new one. Different ideas were taken and
discarded in different ways. Blane argued that since kumeki land was for supporting
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agriculture, there could be no independent right on it for the vargadars. Thus, of the
network of ideas, one was demolished by promoting this theory based on use. Similarly,
Kanara was compared with the neighbouring areas to discredit the existing law. Another
argument was to assert that varg was not a statement of ownership but only an account.
Again, he raised the distinction of rent and tax to argue that the vargadars did not have a
right on the shifting cultivation land.
During the 1860s and 1870s, the idea of prescriptive right was not replaced by another
pre-developed coherent idea. Over a period of time, the idea was eroded and the new
theory of forest rights developed. Baden-Powell asserted that for claiming prescriptive
rights, a person should have exercised undisputed use for twenty years with the intention
of creating the right. He argued that the forest users never intended to create a right for
themselves. Baden-Powell, thus, alleged that the local use of forests was not a
prescriptive right. Similarly, he made the distinction between right in 'theory' and
practices to claim that even if the local people since the time immemorial used the
forests, these were the exclusive property of the state. When this did not work, the theory
of customary right was borrowed from the European law. Similarly, in Kanara, in 1850s,
we saw that Fisher sometimes claimed that social practices were superior than abstract
legal theory. In other situations, 'law' as theory and idea was privileged over social
practices. Thus in the official discourses, from the womb of a given idea, new ideas
emerge.
My argument is not that people like Baden-Powell, who were considered as legal
experts, were mere collators of ideas developed in the dispersed sites. I do not doubt
anyone's inventiveness. But this imaginativeness itself is in picking up ideas from
practices, grafting then, refining then, and justifying them in the existing tradition of
ideas and literature. I will summarise here how, for example Baden-Powell, did this.
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Baden-Powell relied on his experience as the Conservator of Forests of Punjab, meeting
with forest officials and taking stock of reports from the different provinces. Baden-
Powell first assimilated his theory under the well-accepted idea that India should be
ruled according its own laws. Brandis gave the disjointed idea that forest use in India
was like customary use in Europe. Baden-Powell justified and systematised this idea. He
argued that the European law had the advantage of rigorous scholarship. It would thus
always be beneficial to compare and benefit from such a body of knowledge. He also
justified the 'normality' of the law and mitigated its harshness by arguing that even the
European peasants complained against these laws. The concept of customary law, which
was introduced as the best means of imposing restrictions, was turned into a different
ideological light. Baden-Powell later projected it as an example of the liberality and the
humane tradition of Western law. The task of revising and taking stock is never
complete. Baden-Powell then urged the forest officers that the Magistrates would be
unaware of these theories and they should be educated.
3.3 Abstraction of Provision
I argued in the introductory chapter that legal provisions arise from practices. To take a
few examples, the Bombay Presidency came up with restrictions on transit of forest
products. Bombay Presidency was interspersed by the territory of the local rulers. As a
result, it was becoming difficult to protect pilfering of timber and realisation of revenue.
Imposition of transit restrictions was a strategy to outflank the person pilfering the
forests. Brandis and Baden-Powell picked up the provision from there and assimilated it
in the Forest Act of 1878. The elaborate provisions on commutation of forest offences
came from the constraint that the Magistrate's courts were far away from the
inaccessible forest areas. Taking a case before a Magistrate could lead to the forest
officers being away from their forest jurisdiction for days. The strategy of commuting
offences came from this constraint. The elaborate provisions for the settlement of forest
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rights came from intense measures by the forest officers and civil officers to outflank
one another.
I also stated that after extraction, these strategies were refined. In the course of taking
comments from the officers all over India, the proposed provisions, initially drawn from
a particular location, were purged of their peculiarity by bringing in other experiences.
There were minute details, for example, that records on forests would be kept in the
Collector's office and not the Conservator's office. In this process of filtration, law was
refined and became a register of social power. I want to state this more generally. We
know that the state makes the law. But where do the legal provisions come from? The
social is organised around law. Around the given law, in the latitudes of its
interpretation, even violation, actors form their strategies and counter-strategies, to
outflank one another. These become generative of the new legal provisions.
4. 'Modernity' and 'Tradition'
The binary duality which 'modern' law has created with 'traditional' gives a sense that
we can specify a date and period from which we can see the inauguration of modern law.
Prior to this, in the timelessness of 'tradition', there was no law as we would understand
it. But 'modern' law did not install itself. Instead, it was forged together by picking up
diverse elements from the local law. The colonial contact was not an encounter of two
diverse spheres. Diverse elements from local society and what the British brought with
them were selectively unfolded and strategically deployed to achieve certain results. The
movement of law was towards producing specific results rather than the sanctity of
western-modern ideas vis-a-vis local ideas. As this process went along, the positive
attributes were paraded as a part of Western-Modem law, and a bleak past invented as
tradition to demonstrate the triumph of modernity.
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In counter-posing itself to 'traditional' law, 'modern' law has lost its self-reflexivity and
criticality. It has been asserted that the law in pre-colonial society was flexible and
adaptable. In contrast, the colonial (modern) legal system was structured, written, given
and thus, inflexible. The distinction is very much based on a dichotomy of
traditional:modern and Pre-colonial:colonial. Thus, the traditional society could readily
accommodate the rise of social forces, while, in the modern one, the rising social forces
registered more distinctly, and were accommodated with many contradictions and
tension.
The colonial administration completely overturned the forest law and its meaning several
times. To categorise law in the duality of traditional:modern is misleading. Law has to be
within two limits. If it is highly flexible and malleable, it forfeits its relevance and social
life would be chaos. On the other hand, if law is rigid and inflexible, it again loses its
relevance to interpret and bring order in social contradictions. No society can be
completely unchanging and static. Instead of judging the flexibility of a legal system, it
is more interesting to see how law manages to change and yet legitimate its relevance as
given, fixed and definite.
But is it not true that these representation themselves are important? Do we not all the
time make such summary statements and judgements? As Chakrabarty argues that
'Europe' and 'India' (Modem and Traditional) very much remain as figures of
imagination and geographical referent even if the analyst have dissolved the notion of
modem and tradition. He says that a phenomenon does not disappear simply because
some have attained critical awareness of it. But we can be reflexive about it. We
recognise that the colonial official could congratulate themselves for having introduced
'rule of law' by constructing India's past. An assertion that there was no 'rule of law' in
colonial India is from the vantage point that coloniality is behind us and India is a
democratic republic with a modem Constitution. And it is from the vantage point that
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India is supposed to have 'rule of law' that one laments at the contemporary 'Crisis of
the Indian Legal System'.
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GLOSSARY
Ameers Rulers of Sindh.
Azmaish Trial.
Bijavari Estimate of crop from the amount of seed sown.
Brahmin A social class, associated with priesthood and scriptures.
Chali-gainis Temporary tenancy. Also written as 'gueny'.
Chauth Fine.
Gaini-varg A rented estate.
Ghats Hill ranges.
Jamabandi Statement of the amount of revenue assessed upon a estate or
a village.
Jenmkar Land owning class in Malabar. Related words, janmis,
janman, and jenm.
Kawl Contract document.
Kulnasht Agricultural land deserted by cultivators.
Kumeki Land in Kanara used for drawing fuelwood and manure.
Kumri Shifting cultivation.
Kurnums Accountant.
Kutty Kanam Fee for felling a tree.
Magnis A division of a district.
Moppilas The Muslim population ofMalabar.
Mul-gainis Permanent tenants.
Muli Original.
Mulpatta Original lease document.
Mulvarg Original estate.
Mulvargadars Original owners of land.
Naib Assistant.
Nair A social group ofMalabar.
Nuzzarana Gift.
Pagoda Temple, also a local currency in Malabar in 1800.
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Patta Lease document.
Piyamashee Measurement or measured.
Poligar A social group in the Southern India.
Rajas Local rulers.
Rekah Literally a line, referred to total assessment on land.
Rekahnasht Immemorial wasteland.
Ryot Cultivator.
Ryotwari A system of land settlement where revenue charge was
directly on the cultivator.
Sanad A written document of right.
Sarkar Government.
Shanboghs Accountants.
Sheristedar A revenue officer.
Shist Assessment.
Taluka A division of a district, also spelled Talooka.
Talukdar One who heads a Taluka
Tehsildar A an official entrusted with revenue administration.
Varg Estate.


















Bombay Presidency gets the charge ofMalabar; Joint
Commissioners appointed for the administration of Malabar.
Fall of Tipu Sultan at Seringapatnam. Kanara ceded to the
Madras Presidency. Munro takes the charge of the
Collectorship of Kanara.
Court of Directors declare Company's rights over the Malabar
forests. Munro writes two minutes on Kanara which become
the basis for the administration.
Read becomes the Collector of Kanara.
Forests ofMalabar and Kanara transferred to the Bombay
Presidency. Watson appointed Conservator of Forests for
Malabar and Kanara. Watson establishes office in Malabar.
Conservatorship established in Malabar and Kanara.
Bombay Presidency submits a draft regulation on Malabar
forest.
Harris becomes the Collector of Kanara.
Munro becomes the Governor of the Madras Presidency.
Babington takes charge of the Collectorship of Kanara.
Abolition of Conservatorship in Malabar.
Riots break out in Kanara.
The Court of Director's disclaim rights of the Company on
Malabar forests.
Blane writes his first report to the Board of revenue. Gibson
appointed the Conservator of Forests for the Bombay
Presidency.
Blane's second report to the Board of Revenue.















Mutiny, wax of Independence.
Transfer of the administration of India to the Crown. Fisher
submits report to the Board of Revenue. Cleghorn appointed
the Conservator of Forests for the Madras Presidency.
Madras Government rules that the forests in Kanara were the
property of the state
Creation of forest establishment within the Government of
India.
Brandis appointed the Inspector General of Forests with the
Government of India.
Enactment of the Forest Act of 1865.
First draft forest bill and memorandum.
Second draft forest bill and memorandum.
Robinson's minute emphasising the rights of the landholders
in forests in Kanara.
Madras Government gave orders to give back forests to the
landholders of Kanara.
Third draft forest bill and memorandum.
Enactment of the Indian Forest Act, 1878.




A NOTE ON THE STATE AND ADMINISTRATION
IN COLONIAL INDIA, 1790-1880
The East India Company (EIC) started as a trading Company. Its structure was
oriented towards trade than administration of a territory and population. When it
acquired the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1760s, it considered itself an
inheritor rather than an innovator. The existing structures were stretched to
accommodate the local arrangements for governance. With experience, the
administrative arrangements of the Company changed in subsequent years. The first
major change came with the Regulation Act of 1773.'
1. ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS
1.1. REGULATION ACT OF 1773
The Regulation Act of 1773, (enacted by the British Parliament), provided for a
Supreme Government of India with a Governor-General and four Councillors. The
Governor-General's Council had the primary responsibility for governing the
revenues, territories and administration of the Bengal Presidency. The Governor-
General and Councillors were appointed for terms of five years. They could be
removed only by the King on the recommendation of the Court of Directors of the
EIC. The Regulation Act of 1773 also authorised the Governor-General's Council to
make and issue rules, ordinances and regulations for the good order and civil
government of the Company in Calcutta. The Act expected the enactments to be just
and reasonable, and not repugnant to the laws of England.
1 This notes is based on Misra (1959), Misra (1970) and Stokes (1959). See these sources for details.
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The Governor-General's Council was also given controlling authority over the
Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. The Presidencies were prohibited from waging
wars without the consent of the Governor-General and Council. Parliament gave
itself a degree of control over the functioning of the East India Company. The
Governor-General's Council was to keep the Court of Directors regularly informed
through despatches and the directors were to submit to a Secretary of State for advice
on matters related to civil, administrative and military affairs in India.
1.2. PITT'S ACT OF 1784
The administration was further modified through Pitt's Act of 1784. It provided for a
hierarchy of political executives, beginning from the London Government through
the Supreme Government in India to provincial or local governments. The Home
Government in London consisted of a Parliamentary body of six 'Commissioners for
the Affairs of India' known as the Board of Control. A Secretary of State was the
President of the Board of Control. The Board of Control was the instrument for
control, direction and supervision over civil, revenue and military administration in
India.
To strengthen the hands of the Governor-General, Pitt's Act reduced the number of
Councillors to three. An amendment in 1786 invested the Governor-General with the
powers to override the decision of his Council under certain conditions. The
appointments of Governor-General for the Supreme Government of India and
Governors for Madras and Bombay Presidencies were made by the Court of
Directors with the advice and approval of the Board of Control.
In the subsequent decades, several territories were acquired. Madras and Bombay
Presidencies expanded. New local governments, for example, North-West Provinces,
were created. The conquest and acquisition of territories raised serious financial and
administrative problems. The recurring deficit in the Indian finances and the heavy
public debt incurred to meet the acquisition of territories directed the necessity of
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drastic reduction in the cost of administration. There were additional problems. The
monopoly of the East India Company was abolished in 1833 under intense pressure
from private traders. It was clear that the opening of Indian markets would lead to an
influx ofBritish subjects, requiring reform in law to regulate and control them.
1.3. CHARTER ACT OF 1833
The Charter Act of 1833 brought about these changes. It vested the administration of
the whole of British India in the Governor-General in Council. The Council was
authorised to supervise, direct and control the entire civil, revenue and military
government of the whole British territories in India. The Council consisted of the
Commander-in-Chief and four ordinary members. Three of the Ordinary members
were to be appointed by the Company from among its servants of more than ten
years' experience. The fourth member was called a Law member, appointed with the
approbation of the Crown.
The Governor-General in Council had unlimited powers to make laws. The Act of
1833 provided that the Council could make laws for all persons, whether British or
local, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice. The only limitation was that
the Council could not repeal or overrule law made by the British Parliament. The
expansion of the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council was at the
expense of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies. The legislative power of these
Presidencies were taken away. They could only propose drafts of laws and
regulations for consideration by the Governor-General in Council. The centralisation
of power extended to the finacial arrangement also. All the revenue was appropriated
by the Supreme Government. The Presidencies and local governments had to submit
annual budgets for the approval of the Supreme Government. The Supreme
Government disbursed finances to the subordinate governments according to the





Following the Mutiny of 1857-8, the administration of India was brought directly
under the Crown. The powers of the Crown were exercised by a Secretary of State, a
minister of Cabinet rank. The Secretary of State with a Council of 15 members
formed the Council of India. The Secretary of State in Council took over the
combined powers of the Court of Directors and the Board ofControl.
The executive powers of the Governor-General in Council were strengthened. The
Governor-General was authorised to appoint 6-12 additional members, half of them
non-officials, including European and Indian, 'to be members of the Council for the
purpose of making Laws and Regulations only'. They were not entitled to sit or vote
in ordinary meetings. The legislative powers which the governments of Madras and
Bombay enjoyed prior to 1833 were restored to them. The Governor-General in
Council was empowered to devolve legislative powers to other local governments
like Bengal, North-West Provinces or any other province placed under a Lieutenant
Governor. These local councils (including Madras and Bombay) were not to legislate
on subjects like public debt, public revenues, coinage, post and telegraph, the penal
code, religion and usage of Indian subjects, armed forces, patents and copy rights,
and relations with foreign governments and Indian states.
1.5 OFFICERS AND INTERNAL ARRANGEMENT
The administration of the Supreme Government and Presidencies and local
Governments was done through several departments. In the early years of Company
rule, there were departments like military, public and Revenue. As the activities of
the administration expanded, the departments diversified. The new departments
included education, agriculture, forests, railways and irrigation. A Secretary headed
each department. In the portfolio system after 1833, different departments were
assigned to members of the Council for supervision and control. The departments
suggested measures and proposals for law making. These were then taken up by the
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Law Department for consultation and drafting of law to be put up to the Governor-
General in Council.
In the early Company period, the Directors of the East India Company appointed
writers for the Company. Appointments to the Company were a matter of patronage
dispensation. Increasingly, the patronage came under some control. In 1853,
provision for open competition for appointment to a covenant position in the
Company was made. With this, the powers of the Directors to nominate candidates
ceased altogether. The service evolved to be called the Indian Civil Service. For
provinces, it came to be called Provincial and Subordinate Civil Service. Earlier,
only Europeans were employed, but from 1830s, Indians came to be employed in
subordinate positions. The Company recognised that it was more efficient and
economical to educate and employ Indians in subordinate positions than to get them
from England. As the members of Indians in employment increased, their chances
for acquiring senior positions became a contested issue.
2. REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
The principal source of revenue for the ruling power in India was agriculture. Thus,
the settlement and collection of land revenue was important. This involved the
decision of who, among the rival candidates, was to be accepted as entitled to
settlement, and on what terms was this settlement to be made. The relations on land
varied from region to region. Often, there were several layers of interest, starting
from the cultivator of land to the ruling powers. Further, these arrangements were
perpetually being reorganised. The peasant cultivators as tenants and rent payers
constituted the base of the hierarchy of landed interests. They were generally the
descendants of former dispossessed proprietors or they had been located by
proprietors of their estates. On top of the hierarchy of landed interest in Bengal stood
a class of persons known as zamindars. These persons were the descendants or
representatives of ancient chiefs and nobles, military chiefs, and a considerable
number of middlemen called assignees. In between the cultivating tenants and the
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superior landholders, there existed a class of subordinates. Their relationships above
with zamindars and with peasants below were complex and changing.
British rule, as it acquired territory, had to come to a decision on land tenure. What
was the 'truth' of land tenures in India was a matter of much contention within the
Company administration. The first province that came under the control of the
Company was Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General in
1793, despite opposition within the administration, ordered that land settlement
should be made in perpetuity with the zamindars. The British land policy was to
create property in land through legislation and build a hierarchy of courts to enforce
property rights. The system was called 'Permanent Settlement' because the revenue
due from the zamindar was fixed forever. The system was introduced due to the
difficulties experienced in the prior years. Earlier, the revenue collection was farmed
out annually. This had led to decline of agriculture. By fixing revenue in perpetuity
and creating property rights, it was hoped that the zamindars would improve
agriculture. Further, the corruption of the Company officials was a problem. Fixing
the revenue in perpetuity took away the discretionary powers of the Company
officials and thus, reduced the opportunity for extortion.
The other territories that came under the Company control were in south India. The
Permanent Land Settlement system was taken to parts of south India called the
Northern Circars. There were pressures to introduce the Permanent Settlement as
more territories came under British control in south India. However, officials of the
Madras Presidency, mainly Thomas Munro, insisted that land tenure in south India
was different from that in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and thus, the Permanent
Settlement was not suitable. He argued that it was ryots (peasant cultivators) with
whom land was settled in the pre-British period. In this arrangement, the state
became the owner of land and the ryot the perpetual lessee. The proposed system
came to be called ryotwari settlement. In this arrangement, the state took the land
revenue directly from the ryots. After a decade of debate within the Company
administration and authorities in London, it was decided in the 1810s to introduce
ryotwari settlement in southern India. There were factors that supported this. The
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wars had escalated the cost of administration. It was recognised that under
Permanent Land Settlement, the Company had forgone the discretion of increasing
revenue. A crucial aspect of the land settlement was creating courts that could then
enforce the property rights.
3. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The need for institutions for administration of justice had arisen with the very first
factory settlements in India. The factories had King's Courts. The jurisdiction of the
Court extended over the English subjects residing in the factories. Later, Mayor's
Courts were established in the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.
These courts had civil and criminal jurisdiction over all persons residing within these
towns. An appeal from these courts lay with the Governor in Council and from him
to the King in Council (Privy Council).
The Regulation Act of 1773 abolished the Mayor's Court of Calcutta and established
the Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William. The Supreme Court of Judicature
had a Chief Justice and three judges. Its jurisdiction extended to all persons in
Calcutta and all British subjects in the province of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. In
administering personal law for the local people residing in Calcutta, the court
followed Hindu and Mohammedan laws depending on the religion of the person.
Similarly, in Madras and Bombay, the Mayor's courts were abolished in 1797 and
Courts of Records were established.
With the control of the province of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the Company also
acquired the responsibility of administering justice to persons. In the pre-British
period, the local rulers and the state functionaries administered justice. The
Company followed this system. The Collector of the district was responsible for
revenue collection as well as judicial functions. In 1793, Lord Cornwallis introduced
an entirely different system. He was interested in purging the corruption and
extortion by the Company officials. The Permanent Land Settlement had taken away
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some of the discretion of the Company officials. Divesting the executive of judicial
functions was a further measure to clip the powers of the Company officials. Courts
were created in the districts with jurisdiction over all criminal and civil matters. All
local people came equally under its jurisdiction. Even government, when a party
with its subjects in matters of property, was bound by the decree of these courts of
justice. Cornwallis thus laid the foundation of an independent judiciary. This was
also to secure the sanctity of private property conferred upon the landlords under the
terms of the Permanent Land Settlement.
The Cornwallis Code provided for a three-tier structure. Zilla (district) and City
courts were at the bottom, the Provincial Courts of Appeal in the middle, and the
Sadr Diwani (civil) and Nizamat Adalat (criminal) on the top. These apex courts had
a member of the Governor-General in Council as the Chief Judge and two covenant
judges. The courts enforced laws derived from very different sources. The
regulations of the government were one source of law. In suits and complaints
regarding succession, inheritance, marriage, caste and all religious usage and
institutions, Hindu or Mohammedan laws were followed. In other cases, the sense of
justice, equity and good conscience was followed. In the early years, the courts
employed pandits (learned in Hindu texts) and maulvis (learned in Islamic texts) to
provide expert opinions from their religion on matters before the court. The judges,
however, resented their dependence on these persons. Lord Cornwallis
commissioned William Jones to prepare digests on local law from scriptural sources.
With time, precedence developed and the administration of justice acquired a body
of knowledge and continuity. The courts increasing came to borrow many features of
the English courts. This included use of stamp papers, presence of pleaders and
lawyers, and adversarial modes of adjudication. The judiciary in Madras and
Bombay Presidencies developed on similar lines.
The Courts followed local laws and customs which were unwritten and undefined.
There were enormous variations and thus, uncertainties in judicial determinations.
Further, law paid deference to antiquity of religion and caste, the basis of local
custom. The necessity of a general code of law was recognised. As noticed earlier,
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the Charter of 1833 created the position of Law Member in the Council of the
Governor-General. In addition, a Law Commission was created to work on
codification of law. The work of the Commission resulted in the enactment of
several pieces of legislation including the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, Limitation
Act, 1859 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. These codes did away with
regional and local variations.
After the transfer of the administration to the Crown, the Indian High Courts Act,
1861, abolished the Supreme Judiciary, Sadr Diwani and Nizamat Adalat. In its
place, High Courts were created in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. In the post-
Mutiny period, the codification of law and legal enactment became brisk. In





INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY, LONDON
Board's [Control] Collection, f/4 series
Despatches from the Court of Directors to Governor in Council, Bombay, e/4 series
Despatches received by the Court of Directors from Governor in Council Bombay,
e/4 series
Records on the Administration of the Bombay Presidency
Bombay Public Proceedings
Bombay Revenue Proceedings
Records on the Administration of the Madras Presidency
Madras Revenue Proceedings
Madras Judicial Proceedings
Proceedings of the Madras Board ofRevenue
STATE ARCHIVES MAHARASHTRA, BOMBAY
Despatches from Governor in Council to the Court of Directors
STATE ARCHIVES TAMIL NADU, MADRAS
Proceedings of the Madras Board ofRevenue
Malabar Diaries
NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI
The administration of forests was attached to several departments between 1862 to
1882. For this period, the proceedings of the following departments were relevant.
Public Works Department (Forests)
Revenue and Agriculture (Forest)
348
Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce (Forest)
Home, Revenue and Agriculture (Forest)
The other proceedings include,
Proceedings of the Legislative Department
Home Consultations
Correspondence between the Government of India and Secretary of
State (Forests)




Anderson, F., The Jamabandi of Canara for Fasli, 1244 and 1245, Selection from
the Records of the Collector of South Canara, Collectorate Press, Mangalore,
1890.
Banerjee, I. B., ((ed.)), Fort William and India House Correspondence and Other
Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, Vol. XI- 1789-92, India Records
Series, Published by National Archive of India, Government of India, New
Delhi, 1974.
Brandis, D., Memorandum on the Forest Legislation Proposed for British India
Other than the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, Government Central
Branch Press, Simla, 1875.
Brandis, D., Suggestions Regarding Forest Administration in Central Provinces,
Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 1876.
Brandis, D., Suggestions Regarding Forest Administration in Madras Presidency,
Madras Government Press, Madras, 1883.
Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XV-Part II, Kanara, Bombay,
Government Central Press, 1883.
Government of India, Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-
General ofIndia, Assembledfor the purpose ofMaking Laws and Regulations,
1865, with Index, Vol.IV, Published by the Authority of the Governor-General,
Calcutta, O.T. Cutter, Military Orphan Press, 1866.
349
Government of India, Narrative ofthe Course ofLegislation During the Official year
1864-65, O.T, Cutter, Military Orphan Press, Calcutta, 1865.
Government of India, Report on the Administration of the Forest Department in the
Several Provinces Under the Government of India. 1870-71, Calcutta, Office
of the Superintendent of Government Printing. (Annual reports from 1870-71
to 1876-7).
Malabar Commission, Reports of a Joint Commission from Bengal and Bombay,
Appointed to Inspect into the State and Conditions of the Province ofMalabar
in the Years 1792 and 1793, Printed at Courier Press, (undated), in three
Volumes.
Maltby, F. N., Settlement of the Land Revenue of South Canara Dirstrict for 1263,
Selection from the Records ofCollector, Collectorate Press, Managalore, 1911.
Maltby, F. N., Settlement of the Land Revenue of South Canara Dirstrict for 1259,
Selection from the Records of Collector, Collectorate Press, Managalore, 1907.
Maltby, F. N., Settlement of the Land Revenue of South Canara Dirstrict for 1261,
Selection from the Records ofCollector, Collectorate Press, Managalore, 1909.
Stokes, John, Revision of Assessment and the Disturbances Know as Hooks in
Canara, dated 1833, Selection from the Records of the Collector of South
Canara, Collectorate Pess, Mangalore, 1855.
Sturrock, John, Madras District Manuals, South Canara, Volume 1, Madras, 1894.
Sullivan, Report on the Province ofMalabar and Canara dated January 29, 1841,
Collectorate Press, Calicut, 1916.
Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), 1871 (III, IV and V).
Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), 1812 (VII).
3. Secondary Sources
Amery, C. F., 'On Relation Between District and Forest Officer', The Indian
Forester, 1(3), January, 1876.
Arnold, D., Police Power and Colonial Rule, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1986.
Arnold, David and Guha, Ramchandra, (ed.) Nature, Culture, Imperialism, Oxford
University Press, 1995.
350
Baden-Powell, B. H. and Schlich, W. 'Our Prologue', Indian Forester, 1(1), July
1975.
Baden-Powell, B. H., 'The Nature and Limitation of The Servitude and Ownership
Right in Forest Estate', The Indian Forester, Vol. XI, No. 9, September, 1885.
Baden-Powell, B.H., 'On the Defects of the Existing Forest Law(Act XIII of 1865)
and Proposals for a New Forest Act', (ed.) Baden-Powell, B.H. and Gamble,
J.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Forest Conference, 1873-74, Calcutta,
1875.
Baden-Powell, B.H., A Manual ofJurisprudence for Forest Officers, Calcutta, 1882.
Baden-Powell, B.H., The Land-Systems of British India, Vol 1, reprinted, Crown
Publications, New Delhi, 1988.
Balfour, Betty, (ed.), The History of Lord Lytton's India Administration, 1876 to
1880, Longman, Green and Co., New York, 1899.
Balfour, Edward, 'Influence Exercised by Trees on the Climate and Productiveness
of the Peninsula India', Indian Forester, Vol. IV, No. 2, October, 1878.
Bandopadhyay, Jayant and Shiva, Vandana, 'Chipko', Seminar, No. 330, February
1987.
Bandopadhyay, Jayant and Shiva, Vandana, 'Communication', Seminar, No. 336,
August, 1987.
Barnes, Barry, Interests and the Growth ofKnowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1977.
Bauman, Z|., Intimations ofPostmodernity, Routledge, London, 1992.
Baxi, U., 'The State's Emissary: The Place of Law in Subaltern Studies', (ed.)
Chatterjee P and Pandey, G Subaltern Studies VII, Oxford University Press,
New Delhi, 1993.
Baxi, U., Towards a Sociology of Indian Law, Stavahan Publications, New Delhi,
1986.
Bayly, C. A., Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 7750-1830,
Longman, London, 1989.
Beaglehole, T. H., Thomas Munro and Development of Administrative Policy in
Madras, 1792-1818, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966.
Bhabha, H., Location ofCulture, Routledge, London, 1994.
351
Bhattacharya, Niladri, 'Colonial State and Agrarian Society' (ed.) Stein, B. The
Making of Agrarian Policy in British India, 1770-1900, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, 1992.
Bhattacharya, Niladri, Pastoralists in Colonial World, (ed.) Arnold, D. and Guha, R,
Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays in Environmental History ofSouth Asia,
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1995.
Brandis, D. and Smythies, A. (eds.) Report of the Proceedings of the Forest
Conference Held At Simla, October 1875, Office of the Superintendent of
Government Printing, Calcutta, 1876.
Brandis, D., 'Report of the Proceedings on the Forest Conference of 1875' Review,
in The Indian Forester, 2(2), October, 1876. Brandis (1876 b)
Brandis, D., Forestry in India: Origins and Early Developments, First Published in
1897, reprinted with Foreword by Samar Singh, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun,
1994.
Buchanan, Francis, A Journey From Madras Through The Countries OfMysore,
Canara and Malabar, Volume II, reprinted, Original Higginbothan And Co.
(1811), Madras, 1870.
Burchell, Graham and Gordon, Collin, (ed.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality, Harvester, London, 1991.
Cain, Maureen and Hunt, Alan, ((ed.)), Marx and Engels on Law, Academic Press,
London, 1979.
Callinicos, Alex, Is There a FutureforMarxism, Macmillan, London, 1982.
Centre for Science and Environment, The State of India's Environment 1982: A
Citizen's Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1982,
Centre for Science and Environment, The State of India's Environment 1985: A
Citizen's Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1985.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 'History as Critique and Critique(s) ofHistory', Economic and
Political Weekly, September 14, 1991.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 'Open Space/Public Place: Garbage, Modernity and India',
South Asia, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1991.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for
'Indian Past', Representations 37(Winter: 1992).
352
Charlesworth, Neil, British Rule and the Indian Economy 1800-1914, Macmillan,
London, 1982.
Cleghorn, Hugh Francis, The Forests and Gardens of South India, W. H. Allen,
London, 1861.
Cleghorn, H., Report Upon the Forests of Punjab and the Western Himalaya,
Thomson Civil Engineering College, Roorkee, 1864.
Cleghorn, H., Royle, F., Baird-Smith, R., and Strachey, R., 'Report of the Committee
Apointed by the British Association to consider the Probable effects in an
Economical and Physical Point of view of the Destruction of Tropical Forests',
Report of the Proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science, 1852.
Cotterrell, Roger, Sociology ofLaw: An Introduction, Butterworth, London, 1984.
Dale, Stephen F., The Mappilas ofMalabar 1498-1922: Islamic Society on South
Asian Frontier, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980.
Dalzell, N. A., Observations on the Influence ofForests and the General Principles
ofManagement as Applicable to Bombay, Byculla, Bombay, 1863.
Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, translated by G Spivak, Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1976.
Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, translated with an introduction by Alan
Bass, Routledge, London, 1978.
Dews, Peter, Logics ofDisintegration: Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of
Critical Theory, Verso, London, 1987.
Dhavan, R. ((ed.)), Law and Society in Modern India: Marc Gallanter, Oxford
University Press, New Delhi, 1989.
Douzinas, C., Warrington, R., with McVeigh, S., Postmodern Jurisprudence: The
Law of Text in the Texts ofLaw, Routledge, London, 1991.
Duff, Grant M. E. (with Whilley Stokes), Sir Henry Maine: A BriefMemoir ofHis
Life John Murray, London, 1892.
Eagleton, Terry, Ideology, Longman, London, 1994.
Eagleton, Terry, Significance ofTheory, Basil Blackwell, 1990.
East India Company, Selection ofPapers from the Records at the East India House
Relating to Revenue, Police and Civil and Criminal Justice Under the
Company's Government in India, (In four Volume), Volume 1, 1820.
353
Edelman, Bernard, Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory ofLaw,
translated by Elizabeth Kingdom, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.
Ellis, John M., Against Deconstruction, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989.
Ewald, F., 'Norms, Discipline and the Law', Representations, 30, 1990.
Falconer, H., Selection from the Records of the Bengal Government, No. IX: Report
on the Teak Forests of Tenasserim Provinces with Other Papers on Teak
Forests ofIndia, Military Orphan Press, Calcutta, 1852.
Fitzpatrick, P., Mythology ofModern Law, Routledge, London, 1992.
Fitzpatrick, Peter and Hunt, Alan, Critical Legal Studies, Blackwell, London, 1987.
Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison Vintage Books,
New York, 1979.
Foucault, Michel, Knowledge/Power, Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, edited by Gordon, Colin, Harvester Press, 1980.
Frykenberg, R., Guntur District 1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and
Central Authority in South India, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965.
Gadgil, M. and Guha, R., This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India,
Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992.
Galanter, M., The Aborted Restoration of Indigenous Law in India, Comparative
Studies in Society and History (XVI), 1972.
Gleigh, G. R., The Life ofMajor-General Sir Thomas Munro Two Volumes, Henry
Coldburn, London, 1830.
Grove, Richard, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and
the Origins of Environmetalism, 1600-1860, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1995.
Guha, Ramchandra, 'An early environmental debate: The making of the Act of 1878
forest act', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27(1), 1990.
Guha, Ramchandra, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance
in Himalaya, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989.
Guha, Ranajit, A Rule ofProperty for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea ofPermanent
Settlement, Mouton and Co., Paris, 1963.
354
Guha, Ranajit, Elementary Aspects ofPeasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Oxford
University Press, Delhi, 1983.
Gupta, Asin, Das, Malabar in Asian Trade, 1740-1800, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1967.
Habermas, J., The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, MIT
Press, Massachusettes, 1987 (First published 1985).
Hay, D., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-century, Allen Lane,
London, 1975.
Haynes, D., 'From Avoidance to Confrontation? A Contestatory History of
Merchant-State Relations in Surat, 1600-1924', (ed.) Haynes, D. and Prakash,
G., Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South
Asia, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991.
Horsley, 'Khandesh Satpura Forests and Their Bheel Inhabitants' in eds. Brandis, D.
and Smythies, A., Report of the Proceedings of the Forest Conference Held At
Simla, October 1875, Office of the Superintendant of Government Printing,
Calcutta, 1876.
Hunt, Alan and Wickham, G., Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as
Governance, Pluto Press, London Boulder, 1994.
Hunt, Alan, Explorations in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive Theory of
Law, Routledge, London 1993.
Inden, R., Imagining India, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.
Jessop, Bob, State Theory, Polity, Cambridge, 1990.
Kelly, Michel, (ed.) Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate,
MIT Press, London, 1994.
King, Rogers, The State in Modern Society: New Directions in Political Sociology,
Chatham House, New Jersey, 1990.
Kosambi, D. D., An Introduction to the Study ofIndian History, Popular Prakashan,
Bombay, 1956.
Lacan, Jacques, Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alen Sheridan, London, Routledge,
1989.
Lele, Jayant, 'Orientalism and the Social Sciences', (ed.) Breckenridge, Carol A. and
Veer, Peter Van Der, Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1993.
355
Lingat, R., The Classical Law of India, Translated by Derrett, J D M, University of
California Press, London, 1973.
Logan, William, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Other Papers of
Importance Relating to British Affairs in Malabar, Second Edition, Printed by
Superintendent ofGovernment Press, Madras, 1891.
Logan, William, Malabar, Volume 1, (original print 1887), reprinted by
Superintendent ofGovernment Press, Madras, 1951.
Majid, J., Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's The History of British India and
Orientalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.
Mani, Lata, 'The Production of an Official Discourse on Sati in Early Ninteenth-
Century Bengal', (ed.) Barker, Francis, Hulme, Peter, Iverson, Margaret and
Loxley, Diana, Europe and its Others: Proceedings ofthe Essex Conference on
the Sociology ofLiterature, July 1984, University of Essex, Colchester, 1985.
Marshall, P. J., Bengal, The British Bridgehead: Eastern Indian, 1740-1828,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Metcalf, T. R., Ideologies ofthe Raj, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
Metcalf, T. R., Land, Landlords and the British Raj, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1969.
Minson, Jeffrey, Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the
Eccentricity ofEthics, Macmillan, London, 1985.
Mishra, B. B., The Central Administration of the East India Company 1773-1834,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1959.
Misra, B.B., The Administrative History of India, 1834-1947: General
Administration, Oxford University Press, 1970.
Munro, Thomas, 'Timber Monopoly in Madras and Canara', (ed.) Arbuthnot,
Alexander, Major General Sir Thomas Munro: Selection from His Minutes and
Other Official Writings, (Reprint), Government ofMadras, Madras, 1886.
Nightingale, Pamela, Trade and Empire in Western India: 1784-1806, Cambridge
University Press, London, 1970.
Norris, Christopher, The Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory After
Deconstruction, Methuen, 1985.
Pashukanis, E. B., translated by Einhorn, Barbara and edited and introduced by
Arthur, Chris, Law andMarxism: A General Theory, Ink Links, London, 1978.
356
Porter, D., 'Orientalism and its Problems', (ed.) Barker, F, Hulme, P., Iversen, M.
and Laxley, D., The Politics of Theory, Proceedings of the Essex Sociology of
Literature Conference, University of Essex: Clochester, 1983.
Pouchepadass, J., 'Land, Power and Market: The Rise of the Land Market in
Gangetic India', (ed.) Robb, P., Rural India: Land, Power and Society Under
British Rule, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992.
Pouchepadass, J., British Attitudes Towards Shifting Cultivation in Colonial India: A
Case Study of South Canara District, 1800-1920, (ed.) Arnold, D. and Guha,
R., Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays in Environmental History of South
Asia, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1995.
Rangarajan, Mahesh, Fencing the Forest: Conservation and Ecological Change in
India's Central Provinces, 1860-1914, Oxford University Press, New Delhi,
1996.
Ray, Ratnalekha, Changes in Bengal Agrarian Society, New Delhi, 1977.
Ross, Charles, (ed.) Correspondence ofCharles, First Marquis Cornwallis, London,
John Murray, 1859.
Rudolph, L. and Rudolph S. H., The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development
in India, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1969.
Said, E., Orientalism, Vintage, New York, 1979.
Sampford, C. J. G., The Disorder of Law: A Critique of Legal Theory, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
Shore, John, Minutes of The Governor-General Sir John Shore on the General and
Supplementary Reports ofthe Joint Commissioners of the Province ofMalabar
in the Years, 1792 and 1793, Lawrence Asylum Press, Madras, 1879.
Stebbing, E.P., Forests ofIndia, Vol I, John Lane, London, 1922.
Stebbing, E.P., The Forests ofIndia, Vol. 2, Jone Lane, London, 1923.
Stein, Burton, Thomas Munro: The Origins of the Colonial State and His Vision of
an Empire, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1989.
Stephen, J., Fitzjames, 'Legislation Under Lord Mayo', (ed.) Elder, Smith A Life of
the Earl of Mayo: Fourth Viceroy of India, Volume II (Second edition),
London, 1876.
Stokes, Eric, English Utilitarians and India, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1959.
357
Sundar, Nandini and Jeffery, R., A New Moral Economy for India's Forest, Sage,
New Delhi (In Press).
Tallis, Raymond, Not Saussure: A Critique ofPost-Saussurean Literary Theory, 2nd
edition, Macmillan, 1995.
The Fifth Report From the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India
Company, in Parliamentary Papers, 1812(VII);
Therborn, Goran, What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules?, Verso, London,
1989.
Thompson, E. P., Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, Allen Lane,
London, 1975.
Tigar, Michael E. and Levy, Madeleine R., Law and the Rise ofCapitalism, Monthly
Review Press, London, 1977.
Washbrook, D A, 'Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India', Modern Asian
Studies, 15(3), 1981.
Weber, Max, edited by Rheinstein, Max and translated by Shils, Edward and
Rheinstein, Max, Max Weber on Law and Economy in Society, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.
William, R., Marxism and Literature, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977.
Wood (Captain), 'Roads and Fire Conservancy' in eds. Brandis, D. and Smythies,
A., Report ofthe Proceedings of the Forest Conference Held At Simla, October
1875, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 1876.
Yang, A. The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District,
1793-1920, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989.
358
